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A NOTE AHEAD 
 
This book is a map. It maps the landscapes of the country of digital images, or, as it was lately 
renamed, the realms of Computational Visualistics.  
 
Like any picture, a map – and hence this book – is a context builder: it allows the readers to ex-
plore different paths in an abstract region, to connect many landmarks on several ways, and to 
establish their own distinctions of figures and backgrounds according to their proper interests.  
 
However, a text is bound to its linear progression of propositions woven into the digital fabric 
of argumentation that only mimics the true spatial quality of images. As an extended path, read-
ing this text snakes through the map in the effort to systematically cover all of its regions: the 
map only appears in the reader’s mind. Not all of the details present may be integrated on first 
view. After all: a real map presents all its details simultaneously, but only those details are ac-
tually “read” that are relevant for the reader’s present intentions. The map reveals its contents 
not on a single glance. That is to say: this text is explicitly written in order to be read more than 
one time. 
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Concerning the sources of the ideas described: it is a valuable academic tradition to mention all 
means used, well observed by the bibliography at the end of this book. There is however a prob-
lem in the strict application of this principle depending on the enormously extended medial ac-
cess to the thoughts of others. It has actually become impossible to explicitly quote or even re-
member everything that has contributed ideas to an ambitious academic work: apart from the 
classical form of scientific papers, books, talks, discussions, dialogues, and (long ago) lectures, 
which usually can be traced back easily, there have been documentaries in television, features 
in radio, articles in newspapers, fictional films and novels, comics and advertisements transmit-
ting views effective in this book; from visits to exhibitions to web-browsing, many other kinds of 
mediated communication have provided arguments to the present text without the author being 
able to remember them in detail.  
 
Although I am not able to trace back all the “underground” elements not originated by the au-
thor, and to list their sources: without them, this work would not have been possible. 
 
 
 
Magdeburg, October 2003 
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1 Images in Computer Science: Clarifications Required 
1.1 The Age of the Images  
Images take a rather prominent place in contemporary life in the western societies. 
Together with language, they have been connected to human culture from the very 
beginning. Recently – that is, after several millennia of written word’s dominance – 
their part is increasing again remarkably. Can’t we even characterize the 20th century as 
the century of pictures? Photography and film have reached a heyday barely anticipated 
when they were invented at the end of the 19th century. Together with TV and video, 
they have become generally accessible and easily consumable pictorial media, which 
partially can even be produced by everybody without many problems. FAX and Xerox 
copies allow us for about 40 years now to get in the most simple way copies of graphics, 
and to transfer them almost immediately to the most distant places. Comics and tabloids 
with many photographs have used the new technologies of picture production to renew 
and multiply a tradition that reaches from the Neolithic paintings through the Bayeux 
tapistery to WILLIAM HOGARTH, RODOLPHE TÖPFFER, WILHELM BUSCH, and further on. 
The effects of the digital revolution during the last three decades on producing, 
distributing, and “consuming” pictures are yet hardly conceivable in their totality. This 
is true not only for the entertainment industry, which has developed into a significant 
factor of economy already (concerning its commercial weight alone). In the area of 
education, the importance of supporting learning with modern pictorial media is 
basically unquestioned, as well. Even in scientific discourse, graphical representations 
have become unavoidable – in didactical contexts as in diagnostic ones: otherwise the 
growing complexity of research themes cannot be presented in an adequate manner that 
is simultaneously accessible fast enough. In general, skilled work without using pictures 
by means of computers is receding quickly: we barely can imagine our society without 
the graphic programmes for designers, the ultrasonic diagnostic units for physicians or 
the digital simulation models for engineers.  
The fact of a waxing “pictorialization” of our environment, be it private or at work, 
has been judged quite antithetically [POSTMAN 1985]: on the one hand, images are as-
cribed the potential to let us gain a fast and trustworthy orientation about complex mat-
ters. Digital pictures in particular open us new ways for accessing reality, and help to 
make traditional (i.e., mostly verbal) approaches more easily accessible. On the other 
hand, critical minds deplore the erosion of rational structures of discourse and thought 
associated with the flood of images: the medium of written language alone, they state, 
supports and advances a conceptual discussion of reality and knowledge. Indeed, the an-
tagonists of this strange discrepancy consider rather different phenomena by the expres-
sion “image”: the first value special aspects of modern technology while the second 
judge structural implications of modern entertainment industry.  
Steps toward a general science of images, which we may call “general visualistics” in 
analogy to general linguistics, have been taken recently. So far, a unique scientific basis 
for circumscribing and describing the heterogeneous phenomenon “image” in an inter-
personally verifiable manner has still been missing while distinct aspects falling in the 
domain of visualistics have predominantly been dealt with in several other disciplines – 
partially even the same aspects in incompatible manners. History of arts and aesthetics, 
philosophy and semiotics are traditionally involved. Psychology and science of commu-
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nication, anthropology and science of media have joint more recently. Last (though not 
least), important contributions to certain aspects of a new science of images have come 
from computer science. 
1.2 Toward Information Society 
Picture’s triumph in the 20th century is embedded in a general tendency of alteration in 
western society: numerous analysts tell us that we change rapidly into an “information 
society” where most of the labour is gathering or processing information instead of 
material goods. Pictorial information here plays a prominent part. Consider, for 
example, the enormous amount of earth-related information gathered by satellites day 
after day, and the important, sometimes even explosive political and economical effects, 
an appropriate processing and presentation of that information may provoke. Who does 
not remember the impact of reports on the “ozone hole” gained in particular by the 
visualizations: seemingly, mere columns of figures could not have informed us in a 
sufficiently sensible manner about the expansion and temporal development of damage 
in the Antarctic region. 
As most of the information-related work characterizing information society is per-
formed by means of technical tools, the expression ‘media society’ is used, as well. The 
appearance of new keywords like ‘multimedia’, ‘internet’, ‘information technology’ 
(now even commonly shortened to ‘IT’) bears witness of the continuous social changes 
that are transforming every single aspect of society – public or private; economic, cul-
tural or scientific. On the way toward information society, the forms of communication 
in particular are altered as their characters depend on the media used. The concept »in-
formation« is often determined as: “a mediated message with pertinent meaning for 
sender and receiver” (cf., e.g., [PROSS 1972]). Correspondingly, the expression ‘me-
dium’ is used in general to indicate a means for transferring and distributing information 
– the “middle area” between sender and receiver in a common spatial metaphor of 
communication; an “in between” that is simultaneously connecting and separating the 
communicative partners. Its structure determines the form of messages possible to pass. 
A well-known classification system of media theory distinguishes three types of media: 
whereas media of class I (also called primary media) do not involve any technical de-
vices that open the possibility of temporally or spatially separating the communicative 
partners, class II media (secondary media), like books or letters, involve devices on the 
producers side, and class III media (tertiary media) on both sides of the communication 
channel, like TV or telephone. With the shift toward information society, class III media 
are becoming the dominant means of exchanging information.  
While speaking of information implies communication, i.e., some interaction between 
several partners, ‘data’ and ‘knowledge’ – two expressions sometimes used almost syn-
onymous with ‘information’ – lack such implications: data is (potential) information 
considered from a merely technical point of view, e.g., the data of ozone concentration 
in the stratosphere gathered by satellites. The expression ‘knowledge’ comes into the 
game when information is involved in the (conscious) decisions of somebody to act in a 
particular way (or the explanation thereof), e.g., the knowledge about the ozone hole in-
fluencing a citizen’s political decision. Thus, in another sense of mediation, information 
and its form has to be conceived of as mediating between data and knowledge.  
On the long turn, the construction of fictional visual presentations up to “virtual reali-
ties” as they are commonly known may have even deeper social consequences. Holly-
wood film productions provide a number of quite prominent examples for the potential 
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of such electronic picture production and manipulation. The economic potential of visu-
ally intriguing computer games cannot be overestimated while their other effects on so-
ciety are still to be investigated further. With photography and cinema, the technological 
ascent of pictures gains its modern dynamic, but only in its younger digital form, ma-
nipulating graphical information has become possible almost without any limitation. In 
the entertainment industry, such “makeovers” can be quite desirable; in political and 
economical contexts, however, catastrophic consequences are imminent.1  
It is, of course, computers that have contributed most to accelerate our transformation 
to information society in the last couple of years, and that have empowered us to ma-
nipulate pictures almost beyond imagination.  
1.3 Images and Computers: The Digital Picture 
In fact, the combination of images and computers did originally cost the former a 
property conceived of as characterictic for pictures by the scientists of many disciplines 
involved: pictures had to become digital in order to join that liaison. Essentially this 
means that the resolution of pictures has a definite (and often quite small) value. In 
contrast, the common view holds that pictures have to be (at least in principle) 
analogous, i.e., without any limitation of resolution. This debate is still a theoretical 
issue we shall discuss in greater detail below, but for pratical reasons, the restriction is 
quite irrelevant as the resolution can be chosen far below the threshold of our visual 
resolution. Far more relevant is, however, the question of authenticity for images being 
digitally processed, and also the question of their communicative and expressive forces. 
The rapid alterations into an information society, which sometimes are even equaled 
to such major leaps in human development as the Neolithic revolution or the Industrial 
revolution, have provided pictures with a particular feature they have rarely shown so 
far: interactivity, i.e., the potential to be modified instantaneously by the beholder. 
Those alterations may be concerned mainly with parameters of the screen, but also with 
attributes of the scene depicted (including the beholder’s relative viewing position). In 
the latter case, we reach the fascinating field of 3D virtual environments, more popu-
larly known as virtual reality. It is in fact an open question, whether these systems are to 
be conceived of as pictures or rather as an architecture or sculpture. 
In the following, we shall use the artificial expression “computational visualistics” for 
addressing the whole range of investigating scientifically pictures “in” the computer. 
The expression was first used in 1996 for an academic educational programme, mirror-
ing the relation to computational linguistics – the field of investigation concerned with 
(natural) languages “in” computers. In a way, this book is essentially about the question 
whether computational visualistics can be constructed as a homogenous field of re-
search (in contrast to a mere agglomeration of several picture-related areas of computer 
science). In order to positively answer that question a unique subject has to be specified 
together with a particular methodology. For short: The subject of computational visual-
istics may best be described as the data type »image« and its implementations. Its meth-
odology is essentially derived from computer science with an interdisciplinary compo-
nent from the general science of pictures. We shall come back to those questions in 
much greater detail below. 
                                                     
1 The observation that the public information in recent wars has predominantly been made of digitized 
pictures may be mentioned here only as a secondary thought. 
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The theme ‘pictures and computers’ indeed forms an extremely manifold domain, 
which is often quite hard to follow up in its complexity and variety. But it also offers in-
sight with unforeseen potential and risk for future development. Computer scientists 
must react upon this challenge in a manner adequate to the most developed social stan-
dards of our time. That is, not only do they have to keep up to date with objective 
knowledge and skill, but also with respect to the understanding of their social functions 
and tasks. 
1.4 Requirements for a Modern Computer Scientist 
C.P. SNOW’s diagnosis that modern (Western) society is split into “two cultures” still 
holds after 40 years [SNOW 1959]. In his Rede Lecture, SNOW used that expression for 
critically referring to the communicational breakdown between art and the humanities 
on the one side, and science and engineering on the other side. Since recent develop-
ments in teaching have to be seen in that light, a closer look at the underlying difference 
may help to better understand the conception of “new” engineers. 
In the nutshell, engineering is the endeavor of constructing systematically material ar-
tifacts – engines – that are defined by some given purpose: if they serve that purpose 
they “work”, if they don’t work they are “broken”. This type of activity can be under-
stood as one of the most prominent consequences of a shift in the late medieval period, 
prepared by BACON, explicitly stated by GALILEI, and made an ideology by DESCARTES 
[ROS 1990, Vol. 2]: a shift that broke loose the enormous acceleration of the technical 
development of the following four centuries. This was to start focusing more or less ex-
clusively on how nature can be used for our goals as the only guiding principle for ra-
tionality of arguments. The ancient philosophers had sought to understand nature in its 
own right, without projecting our own views. However, this became problematic, since 
an access to the nature of things could not be rationally defended. Understanding nature 
seemed possible only as a means of dominating nature. Engineering comes, so to speak, 
as a late consequence of the biblical “subdue the earth” (Gen. 1.28). 
The humanities, on the other hand, are usually conceived as an investigation follow-
ing the old Delphian motto “gnothi se auton”, “know thyself”: the unremitting endeavor 
of self-interpretation, where human beings try to understand their very own nature. The 
roots of dealing in a systematic manner with the questions of self-knowledge, which 
also include the ethical component “How do we want to live?”, stems from the ancient 
Greek philosophers about two and a half millennia back. Human beings, as the central 
object of investigation, are conceived of as ultimately setting their goals and purposes 
on their own: unlike a machine, a person not following one’s goals is not “broken”, but 
follows his/her own goals. The actions of that person must be rated with respect to the 
objectives uttered by herself/himself. This also includes the actions of research. The re-
flexive nature of such a hermeneutic investigation must lead to standards of rationality 
and methods of argumentation that are rather different from the empirical sciences or 
engineering [BROOKS 1996]. 
Even with this simplified sketch, it is clear that the underlying methodologies of the 
two “cultures” are quite conflicting: constructing machines that follow some pre-set 
goals vs. interpreting phenomena related to the self-determined aims of humans. The 
success of the scientific-technical culture with its strictly purpose-driven arguments cer-
tainly speaks for itself. However, the underlying programme of “subdue the earth” is not 
uncontroversial: who sets the goals pursued? Who decides about the purposes that rule 
development and application of technologies? The critique of a purely technocratic per-
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spective can be heard louder and louder since, at least, the late 1960s. An integration of 
the two methodologies becomes increasingly necessary if the problems – often evoked 
by the very use of engineering – are to be solved. In the words of the German philoso-
pher HABERMAS, this is the question of whether our societies are able to find a satisfy-
ing relation between our enormously grown technical powers, and democracy as the in-
stitutional forum for discussing how we want to live [HABERMAS 1996].  
A general solution of how to integrate the culture of “subdue the earth” with that of 
“know thyself” cannot be approached here. However, “building bridges” from both 
sides is a task worth trying. In future, a successful engineer “must, in addition to being 
competent in engineering, be a skilled listener for concerns of customers or clients, be 
rigorous in managing commitments and achieving customer or client satisfaction, and 
be organized for ongoing learning.” [DENNING 1992]. A shift can be observed away 
from conceiving of engineering as merely “art for art’s sake” towards a communicative 
expertise of assisting other people in solving their particular problems. 
1.5 Determining the Goal 
In the face of the eminent role of pictures generated, processed, stored, manipulated or 
transferred by computers in the progress of social regrouping toward information 
society, it must be considered as crucial for every computer scientist involved to 
understand the underlying abstract data structure and the reasons for its properties. The 
question, thus, ultimately is: What are images (and their uses) for computer science, and 
what is computer science for images (and their uses). The profound understanding of the 
own position on all levels of the intellectual environment is important for planning 
successfully any further development: this includes the development of specific 
technical solutions with computerized uses of images, and, on a more general level, the 
direction of research leading to completely new technologies. 
Furthermore, the ability to clearly lay open the basis of one’s own professional deci-
sions is important for the proper external presentation in particular to those that are af-
fected by those decisions.2 This includes in particular the scientists in the other disci-
plines of general visualistics using the results of computer visualists. The relation be-
tween the decisions in computer science and the arguments structuring the fields of ap-
plication are obviously highly relevant; but they remain often quite unclear. What is 
needed is a description and justification for the particular methods and subjects of com-
putational visualistics. 
The following argumentations are guided by the idea that only results of general visu-
alistics gained in an interdisciplinary manner provide us with an adequate framework 
for generating and employing pictures in human-computer interfaces. Which properties 
and relations are absolutely needed? What ranges of freedom can or must be granted? 
Which additional parameters may or may not play a role depending on the particular 
task at hand? The elaboration of those structures has to be conceived of as a sub-domain 
of general visualistics, i.e., in close relation to its other sub-domains. 
There are of course many texts dealing with pictures in computer science from a gen-
eral perspective. They fall in two classes: one type assumes that the concept »image« is 
already completely clear – usually employing a rather naïve and narrow understanding, 
and emphasizing technical aspects of generating or manipulating digitized images. 
                                                     
2 The expression “collateral damage” may come from a different field; but it evokes quite an adequate im-
age in the context of unreasonably introduced technical artifacts, too. 
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Members of the other class investigate from a more sociological or media-theoretical 
perspective the influence computers have on image uses and image users; they are often 
not interested too much in technical details.  
The main goal of the present text is to integrate the two perspectives and to provide a 
sketch of a general investigation of the concept »image« from the particular point of 
view of computational visualistics. 
To that purpose, chapter 2 starts with a general overview about computational visual-
istics – and thus, on the approach of computer science to images – by sketching the root 
disciplines computer science and general visualistics, their subjects, and their method-
ologies. This leads to the introduction of our main theme, the data type »image«, and a 
first set of coarse sub-divisions.  
Chapter 3 summarizes some of the theoretical approaches to images (and pictures) in 
other disciplines, i.e., what any computational visualist has to know from other areas in 
general visualistics. The relations between images and (a) what is depicted, (b) what we 
can communicate in contrast by means of language, and (c) what image users do in gen-
eral when communicating are recapitulated on the basis of a definition of pictures as 
used in visualistics. 
On this basis, chapter 4 elaborates the relations and attributes of the generic data 
structure with the type »image« on a general level. Following the semiotic distinction 
between syntax, semantics and pragmatics of signs, the relations between several parts 
of the generic data structure are investigated. This includes in particular: types for geo-
metric Gestalts determining the pictorial syntax; the relation between geometry and sor-
tal objects (spatio-temporal, material, countable entities in the usual sense) as the basis 
for semantic analyses; and beholder models as the means to deal with pragmatic aspects. 
Chapter 5 introduces a collection of four case studies that demonstrate various dimen-
sions of the data type »image« as introduced in the preceding chapter. 
Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the whole investigation and presents some perspectives 
concerning the future development of computational visualistics.  
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2 Computational Visualistics: Seen From Its Roots 
Computational visualistics gains its name from two “parent disciplines”: 
“computational” refers to the rather young discipline of computer science, which 
nevertheless is well-established for about 30 years at our universities. “Visualistics”, on 
the other hand, brings into mind a unified science of pictures – general visualistics – that 
has not institutionally existed before recently. A close look on these sciences, their 
subjects and their methodologies seems prudent in order to gain a better understanding 
of the scientific basis of computational visualistics, and may additionally provide us 
with a more precise plan for our investigation.  
2.1 Computer Science: Subject and Methodology 
Let us focus our attention onto methodology first: computer science, the endeavor of 
studying scientifically computers and information processing, has two different roots 
determining its methodology. In some aspects, computer science is a typical structural 
science like mathematics and logic: their subjects are purely abstract entities and their 
relations – entities far off of our living practice, at best linked to everyday life by means 
of an interpretation relation. With respect to some other aspects, computer scientists are 
like electrical engineers interested in engineering problems, an interest resulting in 
concrete artifacts that have already changed our lifes dramatically during the past few 
decades and continue to do so with growing acceleration. The fluctuation of the focus of 
attention between structural science and engineering is characteristic for all 
investigations in computer science, and thus, is valid for the dealing with pictorial data, 
as well. On the one hand, particular abstract data types for pictorial representations are 
investigated and designed from a purely structural point of view. For example, 
efficiency properties are examined, or minimal sub-structures for particular tasks 
determined. On the other hand, concrete algorithms (based on those data structures) for, 
e.g., picture processing are “software-engineered” and used in diagnosis – with 
considerable influence on our social structure. 
Correspondingly, computer science’s subject is a pair, as well. Although it is not 
wrong to view computer science as the discipline dealing scientifically with computers 
and data processing – as we often do colloquially – a better understanding evolves if we 
consider »data structure« and »implementation« as the basic concepts and main subjects 
of the field, two concepts that can more easily be related to central concepts in the phi-
losophical theory of argumentation. That relation is particularly helpful to understand 
the connection between computer science and its application domains.  
The processing of data is certainly a crucial theme for computer scientists, but it de-
pends completely on the fact that data is always structured and grouped into types. Each 
such type implies a set of possibilities to “do something” with that kind of data: num-
bers can be added or multiplied (etc.); polygons in a geometric model can be moved or 
turned, mirrored or strained (etc.), but not vice versa. Usually, several data types and 
their interactions are relevant. As it is only important here that we can perform some 
operations with one sort of data so that certain relations hold between their results while 
ignoring the concrete manner of how those operations are actually realized, computer 
scientists consider abstract data structures – abstract entities that grasp exactly the es-
sential properties. Algebraic formulae or logical expressions are often used to that pur-
pose: the former for describing which operations transform the instances of which data 
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type into what other type’s instances; and the latter determining which properties remain 
unchanged – invariant – after a certain sequence of operations [EHRIG & MAHR 1985]. 
The methodology of computer science as a structural science is, then, partially covered 
by this first question: How can we find for a given class of problems an adequate data 
structure so that a procedural solution – an algorithm – can be given by means of com-
bining the operations of that data structure? 
A close relationship between abstract data structures and the understanding of a field 
of concepts can be seen when taking into account the philosophical theory of rational 
argumentation – an association that is also particularly well suited for studying the rela-
tions between computer science and other disciplines. We shall therefore elaborate this 
unusual approach to the subjects and methodologies of computer science a bit further.  
If we refer by the expression ‘the concept »X«’ – e.g., by ‘the concept »image«’ – to 
everything that is structurally common to all explanations of ‘X’ (in the example: the 
expression ‘image’) and its synonyms [WITTGENSTEIN 1953] – that is, everything that 
“remains the same independent of how or in what language I formulate or show it” – 
then naturally, we never examine one concept alone: it is always a system of concepts 
that are mutually related and cannot be defined independently from each other, like 
»king«, »queen«, »knight, and »medieval society» (or alternatively »chess«) or, of 
course, »image« and »perception«. They belong to the same field of concepts. From the 
perspective of structural science, we can therefore view data sorts as a formalized ver-
sion of certain concepts, and the corresponding data structure as the appropriate field of 
concepts. While concepts and their fields in everyday life often lack precision or may 
even be inconsistently organized, abstract data types must (usually) satisfy formal rules 
of consistency and completeness. 
Relations between several fields of concepts are of particular interest for the theory of 
argumentation. The internal relations of one field may indeed be used to explain correct 
or wrong applications of the concepts of that field (or the expressions for these con-
cepts) – presupposing however that all the parties involved in the argumentation agree 
that the field considered is appropriate at all. But in order to firstly motivate this presup-
position for a critically-minded interlocutor: in order to explain why the internal rules 
are adequate conceptual rules in the frame of a rational argumentation, field-external re-
lations have to be thrown into the game, in particular relations to fields of concepts all 
the parties of the argumentation agree upon already [ROS 1999]. We may try to recon-
struct for our opponent the conceptual structures of the field in question as a systematic 
combination of the concepts already shared.  
Take an example from mathematics: new types of numbers are introduced exactly 
with such a reconstructing schema. Imagine we only know about integer numbers and 
are to be introduced to rational numbers. Perhaps, somebody (let us say, a globe trotter 
interested in mathematics) told us about this – for us new – kind of numbers he heard of 
in Arabia, and we, on first view, experience the described entities and their properties as 
rather strange. Or we spontaneously invented the specification (the description of the in-
ternal rules) like in a combinatorial game without being aware of doing more than a 
“Glasperlenspiel”. In any case: the only thing we know for the time being is the abstract 
and symbolic specification of that concept. Whether such entities really exist, i.e., 
whether we deal here with a useful and correctly constructed concept, that is still com-
pletely unclear.  
How could our dialog partner (the mathematical globe trotter) convince us that these 
mathematical entities, which for us seem so strange, are possible and useful (“real ob-
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jects”, so to speak)? He could try to show us how to introduce this concept from the 
fields of concepts we already have (namely integer numbers). That is, he can show us 
the schema for implementing rational numbers by means of integer numbers (as equiva-
lence sets of pairs of integers, to be precise, i.e., as fractional numbers). That schema 
must specify how the primitives and the operations of the rational numbers are con-
structed using the primitives and operations of the integers. This could be done by 
means of a constructive operation that is neither part of the field of integers nor of the 
rational numbers. Our teaching dialog partner may postulate, for example, that every in-
stance of a rational number can be represented by pairs of instances of integer numbers: 
we are very well able to recognize such pairs, following our preconditions. If we accept 
this introduction schema for the rationals, we are additionally able to justify (ground) the 
internal rules of the new field as given in its specification by means of the attributes of 
integers: that the equivalence class x/x (for all integers x that are not 0) is the neutral ele-
ment of rational multiplication can now be derived from the rules of the integers and the 
fractional combination schema (etc.). 
Analogously in computer science, an abstract data structure can be implemented by 
means of other data structures: the implementation provides us with “real” instances of 
data types that had only been symbolically defined by means of the abstract descriptions 
of the data types included. Furthermore, a computer scientist may motivate that an ab-
stract data structure (and a particular algorithm defined within) does indeed “make 
sense” (i.e., does what we want it to do): he may do so – in a scientific paper or talk, for 
example – by pointing out the construction schema of the data structure by means of 
those data structures supposedly accepted by her audience in advance, i.e., by giving a 
corresponding implementation.  
Thus, »implementation« is a central concept of computer science derived from the 
notion of data processing. But it is also closely linked to computers, the second subject 
of computer science in the colloquial understanding: for the engineering perspective, 
computers are in fact implementation engines. If, for example, a group of engineers has 
reached an agreement that a certain artifact of electrical engineering indeed realizes the 
data structure of the integer numbers – i.e., the artifact “acts” like that (at least if no 
technical error occurs) – then, of course, the engineers can perform particular calcula-
tions with integer numbers by means of the artifact. But they may also use several cop-
ies of the artifact for constructing another technical artifact – an artifact they are moti-
vated to view as a realization of another data structure, e.g., the rational numbers, if its 
construction mirrors the abstract implementation schema of that data structure on the 
basis of the integer numbers. Therefore, realizations of an abstract implementation 
schema are often called “technical implementation” (or “implementation in the technical 
sense”). The engineers may use the new artifact for doing calculations with rational 
numbers. But they may also convince other persons (who agree already on the interpre-
tation of the “integer artifacts”) of that understanding of their “rational number ma-
chine” by explaining the abstract implementation schema.  
Computers are a particular sort of engineering artifacts that – by general understand-
ing – provide through a chain of realizations of more elementary structures (e.g., assem-
bler and register machines, binary numbers and logical gates, electron flows and mag-
netic bubbles, to name but a few) a technical implementation of a broad spectrum of 
useful data structures chosen in a way that one can use them to implement more or less 
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easily any other data structures.3 And the search for a correct technical implementation 
of algorithms has to be counted as the second main task of computer science. 
As already mentioned in Section 1.4, communicative and social competence is the 
keystone for every computer scientist to her or his professional success; without the 
abilities (1) to consider the non-technical preconditions and implications of a technical 
problem at hand, and (2) to communicate the quality of a proposed solution to those af-
fected by the consequences, the best structural and technical knowledge is not enough to 
make a good computer scientist. Taking »data structure« and »implementation« as the 
central subjects of computer science rather than »data processing« and »computer« 
helps us to better understand how the methodological core of the discipline may interact 
with those “soft skills”: the connection to the theory of rational argumentation explains 
in a clear way how an implementation relates to a certain understanding of pictures (for 
example) used in a particular field of application. The answer to the question ‘What 
kind of “translation skill” is to be used in order to understand the problem to be solved?’ 
is: “Listen carefully to grasp the fields of concepts structuring the argumentations in 
their domain.” And the answer to the question ‘How should the resulting computer sys-
tems be explained as the expected solution (“translated back”) to the users from that 
field (who are not specialists of computer science)?’ has the form: “Explain your im-
plementation as a rational argumentation: Introduce the structure of your implementa-
tion as a combination of concepts already agreed upon, and show that that structure nec-
essarily fits the specified criteria.”  
It is a crucial intention of computer science in general to provide by its results others 
with tools to deal with their problems – for the example of image-related software: the 
physician, the industrial designer, the material scientist, the historian of arts, the physi-
cist or the creator of cinematic special effects among others. Therefore most questions 
and argumentations of those areas of application reappear in the “micro cosmos” of 
computer science. With respect to computational visualistics – i.e., the science of im-
ages in computer science – this is particularly true for the diverse concepts developed in 
the general science of images.  
                                                     
3 This is, of course, a variant of the famous CHURCH/TURING thesis [KLEENE 1967, 232] 
2.2 Visualistics and the Many Sciences of Pictures / Images 
When characterizing visualistics in the introduction of this chapter as “a new unified 
science of pictures” , we of course have no intention of denying that there have been – 
indeed for a long time already – numerous sciences of pictures occupied with the 
description and analysis of pictures and picture uses from various points of views and 
with diverse methodologies. Although quite common nowadays, the expression in 
singular “science of images” dates actually back only to the 1990’s prepared by several 
calls articulating the need for such a new approach – with variant expressions: “imagic 
turn” [FELLMANN 1991, 26], “pictorial turn” [MITCHELL 1992, 89], “iconic turn” 
[BOEHM 1994, 13] among the more well-known. 
The scientific subject of general visualistics is given by any form of images and pic-
tures: esthetic images of art and functional pictures of advertisement, graphics in 
mathematics and visualizations in medicine, Indian sand pictures and computer-
generated 3D-environments, trompe l’œil paintings and airport pictograms, children’s 
scribbles and masterly Paleolithic cave paintings, failed photos and excellent video-
recordings. The characterization used to bind together these quite different phenomena 
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in the new approach of general visualistics is their classification as perceptoid signs 
[SACHS-HOMBACH 2001, 18ff]: each of them is – or is at least intended as – a tool for 
communication (»signs«) that has to apply our abilities of visual perception in a specific 
manner (»perceptoid«) in order to function properly. More precisely, in using – i.e., 
adequately using – pictures we do not only perceive visually the sign in its physical ap-
pearance (which would be the same with reading written texts): we have also to invoke 
– at least to some degree – our abilities to visually perceive spatial objects and configu-
rations that are closely related with what the picture is employed to symbolize. We shall 
come back in Chapter 3 to a more precise discussion of this definition of images and the 
consequences it bears. 
SACHS-HOMBACH [2005] bases a collection of essays on general visualistics and its 
relation to the partial sciences of pictures and images on the following grouping of the 
participating disciplines (Fig. 1):4  
• those concerned with the theoretical foundations (including (in alphabetic order) es-
sentially cognitive science, communication science, mathematics, neuro sciences, 
philosophy, psychology, science of art, and semiotics);  
• those orientated historically (archeology, ethnology, history, and museology);  
• those in the context of social sciences (cultural science/visual culture, education sci-
ence, media science, political science, sociology); 
• those considering or enabling applications (advertisement, cartography, computer 
science, typography); 
• and those producing various forms of pictures (art, design, film and TV, photogra-
phy, digital media).5 
As for the methodology of general visualistics, the interdisciplinary background 
opens a broad range of methods to be used while investigating perceptoid symbols. The 
philosophical roots contribute theoretical analyses. Science and history of art add more 
                                                     
4 Taken from the „information for the contributors”, personal communication; cf. [SACHS-HOMBACH 
2002]; cf also [SACHS-HOMBACH & REHKÄMPER 1999]. 
5 The list is by no means intended as being complete. 
General Basics 
Special Basics 
Aspect of communi- 
cation and signs 
Aspect of  
media 
Aspect of  
perception 
Basics of sociological applications 
e.g., in politics, culture, education 
 
 
 
 
Art history &  
art science 
 
Basics of technical applications 
e.g., in computer science, design, film 
 
      Figure 1: SACHS-HOMBACH’s Organization of the “Scientific Parts” of Image Science 
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descriptive-hermeneutic approaches. Design and also computational visualistics com-
plement with a constructive component. 
While the efforts toward an integral science of images at Magdeburg evolved around 
the double center of philosophical picture theory and computational visualistics, com-
plementary approaches have followed that take mainly history of arts and science of art 
as a starting point and combine them with considerations from cultural anthropology 
(cf., e.g., [BELTING 2001]). As we are mainly interested in the relation to computational 
visualistics, the Magdeburg approach is more directly useful, and thus, bases the sketch 
of image science in Chapter 3. 
2.3 Computational Visualistics and the Data Type »Image« 
In computer science, too, considering images and pictures has originally evolved along 
several more or less independent questions, which lead to proper sub-disciplines: com-
puter graphics is certainly the most “visible” among them. Only just recently, the effort 
has been increased to finally form a unique and partially autonomous branch of com-
puter science dedicated to images and pictures in general, and named ‘computational 
visualistics’ in analogy to computational linguistics. 
For a science of images within computer science, quite obviously the abstract data 
type »image« (or perhaps several such types) stands in the center of interest together 
with the corresponding data structure (s) and the potential relations of implementation. 
Keeping the distinctions of section 2.1 in mind, a reasonable methodological ad hoc or-
ganization of the field could be derived by distinguishing the examinations of computa-
tional visualistics along the following three paths: we may be interested (a) in a purely 
field-internal consideration that concentrates exclusively on the abstract data structure 
around the type »image«, the basic operations that determine the structure, and the algo-
rithms that can be defined with those operations; or (b) in the relations of implementa-
tion that may lead from more elementary data structures to the structure with the type 
»image«, and that would allow us to technically implement the image-algorithms of par-
ticular value for us; or (c) in the relations of implementation that open up even more 
complex data structures on top of the one including the type »image«, e.g. in VR sys-
tems. The considerations in chapter 4 follow essentially the first path. 
Each of the “traditional” image-related sub-disciplines of computer science considers 
those three methodological aspects to various degrees. The distinction establishing the 
disciplines follows a simpler semantic pattern resulting from the types of operations and 
algorithms around the data type »image«, which relate an instance of »image« with 
something that either is or is not of the same type. From this criterion the following 
three main fields result (cf. Fig. 2) – we only give a short overview at this point: 
• Algorithms from »image« to »image«  
In the field called image processing, the focus of attention is formed by the opera-
tions that take (at least) one picture (and potentially several other parameters that are 
not images) and relate it to another picture. With these operations, we can define al-
gorithms for improving the quality of images (e.g., contrast reinforcement), and pro-
cedures for extracting certain parts of an image (e.g., edge finding) or for stamping 
out pictorial patterns following a particular Gestalt criterion (e.g., blue screen tech-
nique). Compression algorithms for the efficient storing or transmitting of pictorial 
data also belong into this field. 
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• Algorithms from »image« to “not-image”  
Two disciplines share the operations transforming images into non-pictorial data 
types. The field of pattern recognition is actually not restricted to pictures, but it has 
performed important precursory work for computational visualistics since the early 
1950’s in those areas that essentially classify information in given images: the identi-
fication of simple geometric Gestalts (e.g., “circular region”), the classification of 
letters (recognition of handwriting), the “seeing” of spatial objects in the images or 
even the association of stylistic attributes of the representation. That is, the images 
are to be associated with a non-pictorial data type forming a description. The 
neighboring field of computer vision is the part of AI (Artificial Intelligence) in 
which computer scientists try to teach – loosely speaking – computers the ability of 
visual perception. Therefore, a problem rather belongs to computer vision to the de-
gree to which its goal is “semantic”, i.e., the result approximates the human seeing of 
objects in a picture. 
• Algorithms from “not-image” to »image«  
The investigation of possibilities gained by the operations that result in instances of 
the data type »image« but take as starting point instances of non-pictorial data types 
is performed in particular in computer graphics and information visualization. The 
former deals with images in the closer sense, i.e., those pictures showing spatial con-
figurations of objects (in the colloquial meaning of ‘object’) in a more or less natu-
ralistic representation like, e.g., in a computer game. The starting point of the pic-
ture-generating algorithms in computer graphics is usually a data type that allows us 
to describe the geometry in three dimensions and the lighting of the scene to be de-
picted together with the important optical properties of the surfaces considered. In-
formation visualizers are interested in presenting pictorially any other data type, in 
particular those that consist of non-visual components in a “space” of states: in order 
to do so, a convention of visual presentation has firstly to be determined – e.g., a 
code of colors or certain icons. The well-known fractal images (e.g., of the MANDEL-
BRODT set) form a borderline case of information visualization since an abstract 
mathematical property has been visualized.  
The algorithms behind the arrows in Figure 2 may indeed consist of complicated 
combinations of all three possibilities mentioned above: For example, we may consider 
a procedure in computer graphics that is put in sequence after an algorithm of computer 
vision in order to solve a complex problem in image processing. Within this framework, 
   Figure 2: Sketch on the Operations with the Data Type »Image« 
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investigations have a focus on structural aspects or on engineering problems – mirroring 
the traditional differentiation between a more mathematically oriented theoretical in-
formatics, and the engineering-oriented practical and applied computer science.  
The interdisciplinary structure of computational visualistics influences its methodol-
ogy, as well. The main focus is on the constructive side. But the clear understanding of 
the underlying data structures requires at least a profound overview of the methods of 
the other disciplines of visualistics. Indeed, the work of computational visualists may be 
considered as of the following three essential components: compiling partial specifica-
tions of a data structure the implementation of which is needed by a client. Augmenting 
the – probably incomplete – specification in a coherent manner. And finally, implement-
ing the specification either in the abstract or the technical sense, or mostly both, so that 
the client can apply the data structure initially specified in an automatized manner. The 
second and third tasks, being field-internal and field-external considerations respec-
tively, are what has traditionally been thought of as the central work of computer scien-
tists that does in fact not change much for different fields of computer science. The first 
task holds the true domain-specific aspects. For computational visualistics, the argu-
mentations of image theory provide the necessary clarifications. 
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3 Preliminary Clarifications from Visualistics 
Pictures seem to be a very easy and simultaneously a very complicated subject of 
investigation: on the one hand, nobody has serious problems in everyday life to 
distinguish pictures from other things, and to use them exactly as pictures. On the other 
hand, it remains notoriously unclear even in scientific contexts, where (or better: how) 
that border is to be drawn, or with what internal characterizations the manifold of 
context-dependent uses could be systematically explained in a satisfying manner. In the 
following, a condensed overview on crucial aspects of image theories in visualistics is 
given as an introduction to every computer scientist interested professionally in pictures. 
Correspondingly, there are few references to computers and data structures in this 
chapter.  
We first (3.1) have a superficial look on a collection of borderline cases that may ren-
der us more sensitive for the reach of the class “picture”, for its less typical subcatego-
ries, and for the erroneous properties we easily attribute to the concept »image« from 
our colloquial but too narrow understanding. Section 3.2 introduces and elaborates the 
conception of images as “perceptoid signs”  that is central for modern visualistics 
[SACHS-HOMBACH 2002, 53ff], hence also for the rest of this book. In this framework, 
investigations on the relations of images to the objects depicted (3.3), to the communi-
cative functions of verbal language (3.4), and to the picture users (3.5) are presented.  
 
Figure 3: Where does the picture end?  
Art Imitating Life Imitating Art Imitating Life. JOHN PUGH, deceptive mural, with framing brick walls 
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3.1 Pictures on the Border: Overlooking a Wide Kingdom  
Asked to name spontaneously a picture just coming to mind most people mention 
personal photos (holiday snapshots, passport portraits), pictures of art or advertisment 
(genre-paintings, billposters) and illustrations in books or papers (weather charts, 
scientific graphs). At the core of the concept are, we might conclude, flat smooth 
material objects a marked surface of which shows permanently the significant 
distribution of pigments. But beside those “normal” pictures (cf. Fig. 3, and again Fig. 
2), there are less central cases: what about TV pictures, projected images from a slide, 
stained glases, mirror images? What about the optical image on the retina? In the 
following, a “gallery of the curious” of unusual or even questionable pictures may 
broaden our view.  
Perhaps with the exception of the last case (and this exclusion indeed holds only on 
first view – think of an ophthalmologist), all the examples given above are things to be 
seen – they belong to optical phenomena that have to be visually perceived by (or at 
least perceptible for) somebody, and thus connect the physical dimension with the men-
tal one. Although the expressions ‘image’ and ‘picture’ are also used for phenomena 
that are accessible by other modalities of sense (or even for verbal metaphors), which at 
least partially qualify for the definition of »image« as perceptoid sign given below as 
well (Sec. 3.2), we exclude in the following all cases that are not predominantly visual.  
Usually, we understand a frame as being a necessary (external) part of a picture: a 
border marking which part of the total surface of a “picture vehicle” is to be considered 
“being in the picture”. As in the examples of Fig. 4, this border may consist only of a 
discontinuity in pigmentation in a standard shape (predominantly a rectangle in Euro-
pean tradition), but there may also be an explicit frame – additional lines or special 
physical devices to emphasize this border of the pictorial space. The frame indeed 
marks one figure-ground distinction associated with pictures. A second one applies in 
the picture’s space: the distinction between the image’s foreground objects (e.g., a per-
(a) L. V. HOFMANN, Fischende in Felsenbucht, ca. 1910 (b) Photograph of the author 
Figure 4: Examples of a Picture of Art (a) and of a Private Photograph (b) 
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son in Fig. 4b) and the background in front of which they are depicted/perceived (bits of 
meadow and grove in Fig. 4b). This is usually a much more fluid distinction, similar to 
ordinary visual perception: we can see a crouching human figure in front of a landscape 
in Figure 4a, but we may also separate the rock in the middle from the surrounding 
scene in our perception. 
There are exceptions to both types of figure vs. ground for pictures: in pictures with a 
tessellation,6 like the well-known works of M. C. ESCHER (Fig. 5), an observer’s attribu-
tion of figure and ground in the image space changes more or less involuntarily, de-
pending on where they focus their attention on momentarily. Pictures without a frame 
are quite common in the form of highly naturalistic representations intended to deceive 
the beholder’s eye (cf. Fig. 3), traditionally named in French: trompe l’œil – ‘deception 
of the eye’. Seemingly (at least on first view), these pictures lose their “pictoriality”: 
there appears to be a real statue on the left side of the alcove, and a real girl sitting and 
reading at a table on its right side in Figure 3. Of course, here in the book, printed in 
small format and in gray values only, what is given is indeed the image of a picture – 
which is also true for most of the other example pictures shown here (even often with 
several further intermediate steps of representation). Like ordinary quotation of words 
and phrases, “pictorial quotation”  obeys special rules as to which aspects of the picture 
quoted remain unchanged (e.g., proportions, intensity), and what others may be left 
apart (e.g., color, size; [STEINBRENNER 1999]).  
Like pictorial quotation, pictures of art often emphasize certain aspects of being a pic-
ture or using a picture. For example, pointillist pictures are often interpreted as guiding 
our focus of attention to the theory of coloring (and the schematic treatment thereof in 
earlier academic painting, among other factors); cubistic works of art draw our attention 
to the fact that spatial objects always integrate a multitude of perspectives not just one 
(cf. Fig. 6); nonfigurative art demonstrates in various ways that pictures are not only 
used to represent spatial scenes (with traditionally associated cultural significance). 
                                                     
6 Tesselation: the geometric plain is fully covered with non-overlapping segments in an iterative manner. 
  
Figure 5: Pictorial Tessellation  
M.C. ESCHER: Eight Faces, 1922
   Figure 6: Cubistic Specimen 
J. GRIS, Portrait of PICASSO, 1912
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One such non-representational use appears in body paintings, in so-called primitive 
tribes as much as in “civilized” cosmetic face painting or (more or less temporary) tat-
toos (Fig. 7): these border cases of pictures clearly serve primarily as a means for self-
portrayal of their bearer, i.e., their tendency to react in certain manners to particular 
conditions, or at least to be seen as such. Avatars in 3D-interactive virtual meeting 
places7 and their changeable “skins” have indeed an analogous function. Although the 
self-expression by means of body paintings (or avatars) does not have to be always sin-
cere, the distinction “true or false” is here as inadequate as it is for masks (which we 
also take as a border line case of »picture«). In all those cases, the picture “screen” is 
not flat, and the patterns of pigmentation used are often highly abstract or schematic, 
emphasizing bodily features or indicating certain gestures or mimic.  
Combined with a more traditional kind of reference, a high degree of abstraction is 
also to be found in maps: geographic features and/or passages (or obstacles) for travel-
ing are represented in a variety of highly stylized and culture-specific forms. In many 
early cases of map usage, the property of the map was ritually linked to the control of 
the corresponding territory (Fig. 8) – a habit still vivid in the maps and registers of land 
registry offices in our more urbanized societies. A similar picture, but with even more 
(and a different type of) abstraction involved, is given by illustrative sketches as in Fig-
ure 2: that “geography” is indeed completely unreal, the geography of a field of con-
cepts, so to speak. We might also say that such a picture presents the passages one’s ar-
gumentation may follow. In a way, to have that image is to control that knowledge, as 
well. 
Does the pattern of a Scotch kilt qualify as a picture? As we have seen so many de-
viations from the naïve determination of the concept »picture« so far – flat or not, with 
or without frame, with or without a unique figure-ground-distinction, with or without 
referential links to real entities – there seems to be little sense in excluding such color 
patterns from being considered pictures. Even more so, if they are conceived of in their 
traditional function of indicating a family membership, which brings them functionally 
very close to the body painting examples mentioned above. In general, decorative ele-
ments and ornaments are often derived from a representational original (cf. Fig. 9). 
Some elements of a representational picture are isolated, graphically simplified, and 
then used repeatedly, e.g., as an ornamental border of another picture. Although their 
                                                     
7 cf. for example http://www.atmospherians.com/at_avatars/avatars/listings.html 
  
Figure 7: Drawing of Maori Facial 
Tattoo for Chieftains 
Figure 8: Australian Aborigine Tschurringa: A Map as Mytho-
logical Proof of Territorial Property 
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origin may not be recognizable later, such decorative elements may throw a kind of dim 
meaning halo on other picture elements, enhancing a certain interpretation or coloring 
of the general impression.  
This, by the way, is also a crucial ingredient of traditional Chinese poetry: the ideo-
grams forming Chinese writing not only encode words; they are composed of graphical 
 
Figure 9: Example for Developing Decorative Elements from Representational Pictures 
R.B. SCHURICHT, Naturstudie, 1905
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elements derived by simplification from graphics with quite a direct representational as-
sociation (cf. Fig. 10). For the connoisseur these connotations are still visible and form a 
halo of weak additional meanings modifying the literal meaning of a poem – an effect 
held in high esteem (and barely comprehensible for somebody used to writing based 
merely on phonetic letters). In Chinese calligraphy, the roles are exchanged: it is the lit-
eral meaning of the written words that adds an unusual component to the understanding 
of a primarily graphical-expressive painting (Fig. 11). 
In all the examples presented so far, the beholder can repeatedly have looks at the pic-
ture over and over again. Indeed, most of those pictures only work as intended if the be-
holders really have several looks at them at different times. The pictures are of a persis-
tent nature. Though in many tribes of Australian and American indigenous people, a 
frequent means of cultural expression are sand drawings. Such pictures are “drawn” by 
strewing colored sand in patterns on a relatively flat part of the floor, or by pushing 
lines and dots with a stick or the fingers in flat monochrome sand or mud (Fig. 12). 
They are usually produced in the course of a religious ceremony, which also requires 
the picture being destroyed at the end. As for the pictures produced in a life TV broad-
cast (without recording), these images are seemingly not persistent, too, and cannot be 
accessed after the event.  
But then, when the same ritual is performed again, the members of the culture insist 
that the same sacral picture is brought into appearance. It is the material picture vehicle 
 
 
Figure 10: Some Chinese Characters 
a) archaic and modern version of character “bundle of 
fibers, thread”; b) combination of the thread with the 
movement of a shuttle (archaic and modern version) 
meaning “order, sequence”; c) the thread combined 
with phonetic component (“paper”); d) archaic picto-
gram for “roof”; e) combination “women under roof” = 
“peace”; f) “fire under roof” = “accident, mishap”; g) 
“pig under roof” = “family”; h) three character word 
“light bulb” (left to right) with respective elements (be-
low):  “rain – flash”;  “steam from a pot – rice”; “fire – 
rising – base”;  
Figure 11: Cloudy Mountain After Rain, 
CHITFU YU, 1997 
 
lowest black character = mountain; in up-
per right corner (gray) character for rain 
(cf. Fig. 10h) 
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that needs not be persistent, while the picture per se still continues to exist – so to speak 
– and may come forth materially again in a different context. We here touch the ques-
tion of the identity of pictures that has been discussed quite controversially among pic-
ture theorists. It may suffice at this place to say that a picture is best being conceived of 
as an abstract entity. In some cases this entity is considered as being bound immediately 
to its material vehicle, and thus disappears together with the latter (e.g., we would think 
of “Las Meniñas” as irretrievably lost if the famous screen is destroyed, leaving behind 
mere copies). In other cases the same picture may be materialized (successively or si-
multaneously) more than once.  
Sand pictures drawn with a stick or finger are not smooth – in particular the shadows 
thrown by their three dimensional structure are indeed necessary for perceiving them. 
Similarly, in some artistic styles, “texture” includes a three-dimensional distribution of 
pigments that contributes shadows as an essential ingredient to the pictures. Corre-
spondingly, relieves and engravings (the plates, not the prints!) depend on being per-
ceived visually under certain illumination conditions, although they also may be per-
ceived haptically. As the former is the major path of access to them, we shall consider 
them as another peripheral case under the concept »picture«. Following that path even 
further, we wonder whether sculptures should be included under the concept – as the 
German expression ‘Bildhauerei’ (literally: ‘image hewing’) for sculpture’s art clearly 
suggests. For our purposes it is certainly advisable to include them at least as marginal 
cases of pictures, since we do not want to block the possibility of studying cases of vir-
tual reality, i.e., highly interactive computer graphics, as much under the perspective of 
the two-dimensional projection as under the viewpoint of three-dimensional modeling – 
the former binding the investigation more to the center cases of pictures (in particular to 
trompe l’œil) while the latter connects it to sculpturing and architecture. An avatar (Fig. 
13) appears at each moment as a picture, but in order to be able to generate those instan-
taneous pictures, it has to be modeled like a sculpture first. 
Let us finish our small “gallery of the pictorial curious” with considering a really spe-
cial find: Do we have to classify the marks made by chimpanzees in some experiments 
as images? The most famous of such events is described by [GARDNER & GARDNER 
1980]: The captive chimpanzee called ‘Moja’ was trained to communicate with Ameri-
can Sign Language signs. On an occasion, the animal made some traces with chalk on 
paper (Fig. 14). A research assistant who had observed this behavior, signed immedi-
ately afterwards to Moja ‘what that?’ provoking the gestured reply interpreted by the as-
 
Figure 12: Photography of an Australian Sand Draw-
ing 
Figure 13: Simultaneously Sculpture and Mask 
Screenshot from an Insect-like Avatar 
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sistant as ‘bird’. Indeed, the ques-
tion rather must be for whom is the 
paper with Moja’s marks a picture. 
For the animal? For the assistant? 
For both? For us (from the dis-
tance)?  
It is not a particular property of 
a picture candidate that decides the 
issue of its being a picture or not, 
but a complicated relation involv-
ing the object, the users and their context of action, and also their level of reflection on 
what they are doing there. In order to theoretically grasp the multiple harmonics of this 
orchestra, LOPES [1996] identifies two different (philosophical) tracks of discussion: in-
fluenced by linguistics and semiotics, pictures are viewed by some researchers, as a par-
ticular kind of sign, forming semiotic systems like a language.8 Rooted in psychological 
theories of perception, pictures are conceived by others as a special phenomenon of 
(visual) perception, LOPES suggests.9 Unfortunately, the “semioticists” often bind their 
investigations too closely to another particular type of signs – verbal language – and 
thereby ignore the special relevance of perception for pictorial signs, while the “percep-
tualists” have a drift to not bother with the communicative context every picture is used 
in; their weaker representatives sometimes even confuse perception in general with per-
ception of pictures and put pictures in a categorical opposition to language and commu-
nication.  
3.2 A Synthetic Proposal: Images as ”Perceptoid“ Signs 
Backgrounded by LOPES’s analysis of the historical situation of theory formation, the 
main methodological characteristics of the general science of images (visualistics) 
presently in statu nascendi can be summarized as a proposal to systematically combine 
the two lines of tradition by conceiving pictures as perceptoid signs.10 Traditionally, a 
concept can be determined by giving a superimposed concept, and then adding the 
specific difference to the other subclasses. Applied to “perceptoid signs”, we distinguish 
generic characterizations that pictures have in common with all signs from the specific 
difference »perceptoid«, which allows us to distinguish pictorial signs from other kinds 
of signs, e.g., verbal signs. There are a couple of important consequences of that 
conception, which guide us in the following in order to gain an understanding of what 
precisely is meant by “perceptoid signs”. 
3.2.1 »Sign« as Genus Proximum for Pictures 
First: choosing »sign« as the superimposed concept clearly connects this position to the 
semiotic roots of picture theories. As a result, everything conceded about signs (in 
                                                     
8 NELSON GOODMAN is usually conceived to be at present the most prominent “father representative” of 
the semiotic track; cf. [GOODMAN 1976]. 
9 ERNST GOMBRICH counts currently as the most influential and relevant “picture theorist” who follows 
mostly the perceptual track; cf. [GOMBRICH 1960]. 
10 It is mainly KLAUS SACHS-HOMBACH who has worked out this synthesis; cf [SACHS-HOMBACH 2001], 
[SACHS-HOMBACH 2002]. He uses the German expression ‘wahrnehmungsnahes Zeichen’ – which is 
approximately ‘sign close to perception’. 
 
Figure 14: Moja’s „Bird Picture”  
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general) must be applicable to pictures, as well. In particular, they are embedded in a 
specific context of action – the sign act – that involves two participants: one role may be 
called the “sender”, the other is the “receiver”.11 In a sign act, the sender gives something 
to understand to the receiver by means of the sign, that is, she acts in this specific way 
in order to direct the attention of the receiver to something. This “something” must – by 
logical grounds (cf. [ROS 1990, Vol. III, 125ff] and [ROS 2005, 556f.]) – be primarily an 
attitude of the sender: an expression of his/her/its readiness to be involved in certain 
reactions (cf., e.g., a bodily expression equivalent to “I am angry”). This primary 
attitude may or may not allow us to differentiate the understanding into the sender’s 
intentionality toward a state of affair (potentially fictitious: a warning cry: “Tiger!!!”; or 
an assertion “In 1631 Magdeburg was completely destroyed”) or toward an object 
(possibly not present: “the author of the Philosophical Investigations”).12 As a 
consequence, we never investigate single signs but always systems according to the 
multitude of “things” that the receiver is to be made aware of by means of the sign acts. 
Pictures are conceived of as a separate sign system – it may be decomposable in distinct 
subsystems: naturalistic representations, technical graphs, icons, etc.  
Second: since “being a sign” is determined by the use in a particular type of activity it 
is obviously not a combination of attributes of a physical object that allows us to catego-
rize something as a sign. We indeed produce sometimes artifacts with the sole purpose 
to be used as signs (e.g., name tags for the participants of a conference, street signs). 
But more or less any physical object may under certain circumstances be interpreted as 
a sign, as well. It is always the sign act and all its current (or potential, i.e., anticipated) 
participants that have to be considered if we understand something as a sign.  
Third, if using physical objects as pictures is a communicative act, the various semi-
otic aspects are applicable, like the distinction between what is referred to, what is rep-
resented, and what is intended with the sign act (or, alternatively in BÜHLER’s terms: 
‘representation’, ‘expression’, and ‘appeal’ of a sign; cf. Fig, 15, and [BÜHLER 1933, 
28]).  
In this context, SACHS-HOMBACH follows the tradition by suggesting to distinguish 
picture vehicle, picture content, and picture referent [SACHS-HOMBACH 2003]: with the 
expression ‘picture vehicle’ we restrict our attention to those aspects of a picture that it 
has as a mere physical object, like a cathode ray screen, with the usual properties of 
physical objects including the visual ones of shape and color. As such, it may be em-
ployed in a sign act, but it also may be used in many other types of activities not related 
with communication. If we speak of “the referent of a picture” we mean the (factual or 
fictitious) scenes, events, objects, etc. that the picture is taken to represent. Finally, by 
considering the “picture content” we focus on those properties of the picture vehicle that 
are relevant for understanding its significance in the sign act.  
                                                     
11 Alternatively, one sign user may simultaneously take both roles; e.g., somebody wandering through an 
art gallery contemplating the pictures (“showing them to herself”), or somebody performing soliloquy 
(“speaking to himself”). 
12 Note that the first form is quite common among animals; the second form is restricted to higher verte-
brates, the third form is private to human beings (or language users in the close sense of language). cf. 
[CLARKE FC, Sect. 5]. It is also important to note that, concerning the more complicated forms, it is still 
the sender’s attitude toward a state of affairs/object that is denoted or referred to in a complex sign act: 
what is denoted or referred to and what is represented are usually not identical in a sign act (cf. [ROS 
1989/90, Vol. III, 129ff]). 
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Fourth: denoting objects or events is not the only communicative purpose pictures are 
used for. By showing a picture to someone we might want to express our feelings or ask 
that person to do something (cf. ‘expression’ and ‘appeal’ in the organon model, Fig. 
15). It is coherent with this understanding that the development of communications for 
infants is described as a sequence of repetitions and variations: based on innate emo-
tional expressive acts, e.g., smiles, exchanged with (not just send to!) the reference per-
son, variations are developed on both sides, and established or ignored by the mutual 
feedback reactions, so that more and more complicated patterns are formed that can be 
used to communicate more than just expressing attitudes [DORNES 1993, 152ff]. 
Communication, then, may be seen as a kind of dance. Each of the diverse types of 
moves in a language game determines a corresponding interpretation schema for the 
concrete utterances, which cannot be associated with the mere sign vehicle used but is 
determined by the position in the overall choreography. For verbal language the 
sequence of pragmatically possible and plausible communicative moves in various 
language games is described by the theory of speech acts [AUSTIN 1962, SEARLE 1969]. 
Some authors have extended this approach to “picture acts” (including mixed 
communication, as well; [ANDRÉ 2000, Sect. 2.3.1]).  
Fifth: using pictures requires mastering a variety of semiotic rules: pragmatic rules 
that describe the typical functions and use conditions of pictures within the context of 
the other types of activities the communicating partners are (or may be) involved in; 
semantic rules that express the relation between the picture vehicle and its broader 
meaning as far as this relation can be construed without explicitly dealing with pragmat-
ics; and – as the most abstracted level of investigation – syntactic rules that try to iden-
tify and formalize the range of attributes the picture vehicles must have in order to be 
usable as a particular sign of a system. The primary effect of the digitization of pictures 
necessary to deal with them in computers as mentioned above, is a syntactic effect, and 
we shall have to deal with that in more detail in the following chapter. But the two other 
levels have crucial influence on the way images are dealt with in computer science, too. 
Therefore the next sections of this chapter summarize some general observations on the 
particular relation (resemblance) between pictures and their prime referents (spatial ob-
jects), and on the relation between pictorial sign acts and the other acts of the picture 
 
Figure 15: Standard Situation of Sign (S) Use (the Organon Model [BÜHLER 1933, 28]) 
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users in that context, in particular propositional communicative acts. We shall see in 
Chapter 4 that primarily semantic and syntactic features have been investigated in com-
putational visualistics for most of its (pre)history; taking explicitly a pragmatic perspec-
tive is essentially a rather new development in the field. 
Let us now consider the properties that distinguish pictorial signs from other 
subcategories of »sign«. 
3.2.2 »Perceptoid« as Differentia Specifica for Pictorial Signs 
What distinguishes pictures from signs like words and sentences is the special role 
perceptual competences play for constituting the picture’s content, i.e., for interpreting 
the sign.  
Sixth: resemblance theory provides one means of construing the characteristic role of 
perceptual mechanisms [REHKÄMPER 2002]. According to that approach, a sign is a pic-
ture if the perception of essential properties – that constitute the pictorial content – is 
identical to the perception of the corresponding properties of some other object under a 
certain perspective. Thus, we may use an object S as a pictorial sign for something else 
motivated by the observation that S looks similar to that other thing; however, similarity 
is a secondary condition for being a picture working only within the semiotic context of 
use. GOODMAN’s critique of resemblance as necessary condition of being a picture is 
indeed directed only against taking resemblance as a condition constituting the semiotic 
context of picture use instead of restricting the general scenario of sign acts in a particu-
lar manner [FILES 1996]. 
Seventh: talking about likeness between perceptions instead of resemblance between 
objects brings the psychological characteristics of (visual) perception into account, and 
with them the principles of object constitution underlying them. For example, psycho-
physical restrictions of receptivity, laws of Gestalt formation, conditions of color invari-
ance, and factors of interpretative schemata for 3D-perception must be considered if we 
want to understand what objects appear as similar for somebody, and in what respect. 
As object perception may be distinct for different social groups (different by culture or 
by age), so may be the motivation to use and understand an object as a pictorial sign.  
There is no general restriction to the visual sense: perceptoid signs may be conceived 
accordingly in any modality. This accounts for the use of the expression ‘picture’ for 
non-visual perceptoid signs. Whether we can use such “pictures” to focus our attention 
to things in a way similar of using (visual) pictures depends in these cases on whether 
there are methods of object constitution associated with the sense modalities involved: 
while it is relatively easy for us to employ “sound images”, we usually would need 
some training in order to use “odor images” for more than evoking very generally a 
situational context. 
Eighth: the shift to psychology also opens an interpretation of pictures with fictitious 
objects or contradictory scenes by means of resemblance theory. The objects of percep-
tion are “intentional objects” [HUSSERL 1980], i.e., objects as something in the mind, 
something one’s attention is directed to, something “in one’s intention”; not something 
existing independently of any such intention and anybody having the intention. What 
we perceive in the case of an optical illusion, for example, cannot be – by definition of 
‘optical illusion’ – an “objective object.” Correspondingly, there need not be a likeness 
to any real object or scene for a corresponding picture, only one to intentional objects or 
imagined scenes. 
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Ninth: resemblance as a criterion to characterize pictorial signs presupposes that cer-
tain properties are excluded that do not contribute to the content of the sign and are ir-
relevant to its interpretation. Regarding something as a picture makes it obviously ir-
relevant how heavy that object is or what its back looks like. In the case of linguistic 
expressions, we consider some respects as irrelevant, too, but different ones, e.g., the 
color of the font. Resemblance comes as a vague criterion; but the fact that it is deter-
mined only in certain respects allows us also to accommodate it to quite different picto-
rial phenomena. In some cases – mainly naturalistic pictures like photographs – it seems 
that we immediately and involuntarily regard most respects as relevant that are also 
relevant in perceiving objects visually. In others, like line drawings, we leave aside 
many of those respects: the picture is taken to resemble some object only relative to the 
remaining respects. In the extreme case, a diagram, for example, does not show us any-
thing about how any physical object looks like.  
Tenth: it is possible to establish different respects of similarity as dominant because 
the picture vehicle does not in itself determine which properties are relevant for the de-
piction. We may develop13 different pictorial schemata with respect to some particular 
communicative functions the pictures are supposed to perform. It is then true to say that 
all pictures resemble their objects in one way or the other, but this relies completely on 
the pictorial schema determining in each case the relevant respects. Even more: actually 
perceiving resemblance depends then completely on the use of the sign vehicle as a sign 
ruled by a particular pictorial schema. Resemblance can only be established as embed-
ded in the sign act (cf. Fig. 16). 
Eleventh: in consequence, the distinction between pictures and their content is less 
clearly marked than is the case for language. The visual impression of a trompe l’œil is 
– as a crucial feature of this type of image – more or less identical to the impression of 
the real object depicted in that picture. This closeness to the content gives us the impres-
sion of an access that is intuitive: we have to learn with an effort to master words, but to 
understand pictures seems to be a congenital facility for humans. Compared to verbal 
language perceptoid signs are less conventional, though the range of conventionality 
covered may still be rather broad.  
                                                     
13 – within one set of principles of object constitution, see sixth item. 
 
Figure 16: Perceptoid – the Special Connection to Perception for Pictures  
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Twelfth: This also helps to understand the strange double fact: that we can on the one 
hand communicate with pictures in a way much more precise and more immediate than 
we are able to do with verbal language; but that we on the other hand usually need more 
contextual information to disambiguate what is actually meant by a picture from a lot of 
possible interpretations. In the words of SACHS-HOMBACH [SACHS-HOMBACH & 
SCHIRRA 1999, 35], their high degree of semantic abundance comes along with a sig-
nificant lack in semantic precision.  Therefore, pictures need to be used in a context of 
action that determines in the concrete event their meaning, e.g., most explicitly by em-
ploying a caption.  
3.2.3 A Note on “Natural Images”, “Indices”, and “Icons” 
We have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter the images in mirrors. The 
phenomenon as such is obviously independent from any context of sign use. So the 
question arises whether – or in what respect – we can classify mirror images as 
perceptoid signs. Or put inversely: is the definition of pictures as “perceptoid signs” too 
narrow to include mirror images – and hence probably too narrow in general? How do 
we have to interprete “natural signs”, as mirror images are sometimes called together 
with object shadows (cf. Fig. 17), the red spots of measles, and the foot prints on a 
sandy beach? In fact, in a society of blind nobody would have the idea of associating the 
discourse about, e.g., the surface of a quite lake with the discussion on perceptoid signs: 
considered as a mere object without anybody (even potentially) perceiving it in the right 
modality of sense (i.e., visually), there is no reason to link a mirror with pictures, at all. 
C. S. PEIRCE has introduced the semiotic distinction between “index”, “icon”, and 
“symbol” that comes in handy for this discussion [PEIRCE 1931ff, 2.274]. An index is an 
entity that may be used as a sign for something – the referent – due to its direct physical 
relation to that referent. Thus, we may use smoke as an indexical sign for fire – we keep 
 
Figure 17: A Shadow in Hiroshima — August 6, 1945, 8:15 a.m. 
Burn pattern on the steps of the Sumitomo bank building – the only indication a human life has left 
in the moment the human race demonstrated its power of ultimate self destruction 
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our focus of attention on that (assumed) fire by means of “showing to ourselves” the 
smoke we perceive alone. Analogously, a photograph may be conceived of as an index. 
Due to the causal relations – mediated by the light energy and the chemical reactions of 
the photosensitive emulsion – between a spatial scene and a photo thereof, a person can 
use the photo in a sign act to move the attention of somebody else to that spatial scene 
(or rather his/her attitude toward that scene).  
Indexical signs cannot be used to refer to fictitious scenes – taking something as an 
indexical sign implies the reality of the referent. Nevertheless it is possible to lie with a 
photo [HGBRD 2000]: if the sender is aware of the photo not to be an index (e.g., being 
a photomontage) but leaves the recipient in believing it to be used as an indexical sign 
this sign act fulfills all criteria of a lie. That a photo can be used as an indexical sign and 
as a non-indexical sign for referring to the very same scene leads us to PEIRCE’s second 
class: icons are objects that may be used as a sign for something motivated by the fact 
that they bear resemblance with the intended referent. In the case of a photo, such a vis-
ual resemblance is usually assumed even in the case of massive alterations of the origi-
nal index: then, a fictitious scene is assumed to look like that, and the photo may be 
used in a sign act to denote that fictitious scene. Films with naturalistically rendered 
computer graphics that place believably behaving dinosaurs together with real actors in 
the background of an exotic forest, which may or may not be a real landscape, give a 
perfect example of such an iconic sign of a visual fiction.  
PEIRCE’s third class, symbols, are characterized by no such immediate relation be-
tween sign vehicle and sign object or sign content: it is the semiotic activity of the sign 
users in general that is responsible for that connection. Hence, symbols are called 
arbitrary. For indexical signs and iconic signs it is possible to understand them without 
learning – by spontaneously activating knowledge about causal relations or resemblance 
within the contextual semiotic activity: “this guy tries to tell me something (anything!) 
with that thing, which looks similar to / is causally linked to …”. No such spontaneous 
semiosis may take place for symbols without a prior introduction. The meaning of 
words, “human life” for example, must be taught; the significance of a date, e.g., “Au-
gust 6, 1945”, must be explicitly communicated (as part of an already established com-
plex cultural frame) before they can be used as symbols. 
In the light of these distinctions, we can interpret mirror images as icons and as iconic 
indexical signs: the situation for the interpretation as an icon is given when we get a 
fright because taking erroneously our own mirror image – in the periphery of our field 
of sight, or when it’s a bit dark – for another person appearing there unexpectedly 
(PEIRCE’s “genuine icon” [PEIRCE 1931ff, 3.362]). If we realize a moment later what has 
happened, the mirror image changes its character immediately and becomes for us an 
iconic indexical sign: we focus our own attention to our own visual appearance by 
means of something looking similar and being causally linked directly to that appear-
ance. 
Quite obviously, iconic signs and perceptoid signs are closely related, to say the least. 
Note, however, that the explanations of “perceptoid” make an explicit reference to the 
psychological background of resemblance as something derived in perception according 
to the principles of object constitution. Speaking of icons does not necessary imply such 
a complication: if it is possible or favorable to define similarity between objects per se, 
iconic signs become possible that need not “feel” (“look” etc.) similar to the referent 
scene, as long as the perception-independent relation of similarity holds as well (and is 
used as a motivation for preferring that particular vehicle in that sign act). It is however 
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quite dubious that such a concept of resemblance apart from psychology should not be 
considered as merely derived and usable only within very limited conditions.  
In any case, the use of iconic and indexical signs depends on the sign users’ aware-
ness of similarity or causal relation, which can be stabilized inter-individually only by 
means of symbolic communication. Without anchoring the language-mediated context 
of Figure 17, its iconic use remains ambiguous (“Is this meant as a human form or 
not?”), its indexical reference unclear (“where is this?” “who/what made that shadow-
like spot?”). In order to provide a better understanding of how iconic (and indexical) 
sign uses depend on symbolically mediated frames of interpretations, the next section 
gives a coarse sketch of the complex inner structures of resemblance relations.  
3.3 Image and Object 
According to BÜHLER’s organon model (cf. again Fig. 15, p. 24), representation is one 
of the three fundamental aspects of signs, characterizing in our case the relation between 
image and object (or state of affair) represented.14 Although the obvious relation 
between image and object depicted is resemblance – seemingly a relation not too 
complicated to understand –, there has been considerable debate about its actual nature 
(and the consequences thereof for the concept »image«). 
Almost everybody knows that the difference between a picture of Paris and a name or a 
description of it consists in the fact that the picture is more similar to the city. This of 
course is nonsense. 
[GOODMAN & ELGIN 1988, VIII.1] 
The complication of similarity is most evident for pictures of fictitious objects. As a 
fast way out of this problem, the similarity between all the pictures of the same fictitious 
entities has been brought forward, though that is obviously not a real solution – at the 
least: one picture has to be the first. There are (for example in dictionaries) also pictures 
that are not meant to represent individual objects, but to demonstrate classes or con-
cepts. Think also of the pictures on the doors of restrooms – they most certainly are nei-
ther (at least not in a straightforward way) similar to a class nor a concept. The resem-
blance to a typical member of the class depicted (or falling under the concept) has been 
considered to explain this case, but this, of course, extends any simple theory of resem-
blance in quite complicated manners.  
So, what is resemblance? First of all, this (class of) relation(s) is not bound to pictures 
as one of the arguments; similarity may be stated for any two objects (states of affairs, 
etc.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 Since “states of affairs” may be considered as a certain kind of object, too, only the expression “ob-
jects” is used in this section; states of affairs are explicitly dealt with in Section 3.4. 
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3.3.1 The Naïve Approach to Resemblance 
We have a cat on the mat, and we have a picture of it. There is a part of the picture that 
corresponds to the cat; it is composed of parts that correspond in turn to parts of the cat: 
to the paws, the tail, the whiskers, ... This part of the picture is mostly black, except for one 
white bit that corresponds to a bit of the cat's throat; therefore the picture represents the 
cat as being black except for a white patch on the throat. The part of the picture that cor-
responds to the cat touches on another part of the picture that corresponds to the mat; 
therefore the picture represents the cat as being on the mat. 
[LEWIS 1986, 166]  
The quote above examplifies (particularly with the final sentence) a common non-
semiotic conception of pictures assuming a representation relation that is (i) 
independent of any use in a sign act, and (ii) immediately derived from a similarity 
relation. It demonstrates the naïve understanding of similarity as an objective relation 
between objects existing – without perspective – out there. In the naïve approach, the 
world consists of a set of individual objects – cats, mats, trees, chairs, teapots or bones – 
an observation quite in accord with everyday experience. These objects have specific 
distributions of attributes, which are used, assumedly, to classify or identify the objects 
by means of comparing them with an inner standard. Resemblance is conceived of, in 
this view, as a derived relation, a weak form of identity that may be stated to some 
degree if not all but only a certain amount of the attributes of two objects match. There-
fore, likeness is one of the potential sources of deception (as in the case of the mirror 
image taken eventually for another person).   
With a more sophisticated understanding, it is evident that objects are conceivable 
only as something given to an individual [UEXKÜLL 1909]. That individual must then 
show a certain behavior, or act in a specific way, as the anecdote about ZEUXIS [PLINIUS 
1977, 65], a famous artist in ancient Greece, indicates: in the presence of a picture of 
fruit – perhaps ZEUXIS had exhibited them for sale by hanging the pictures in a tree – 
 
Figure 18: Ascription of an Elementary Deception: the Observer Assumes a Relation of the Ob-
served Behavior to Another Situation 
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birds behaved in a most peculiar manner. They mistook, it is told, this picture with what 
is depicted: they tried to eat the fruits “deceived by the similarity of the painting”. But 
what is actually the criterion for such a statement? What clue do we have for speaking 
legitimately of “the bird’s deception”? Well, the answer may be approximately like this: 
the birds flew hither and tried to peck up the feigned fruit – they behaved as if such fruit 
was really present. This behavior, or more precisely: their behavior that we recognize as 
not adequate to the situation while simultaneously imagining a situation in which it 
would be adequate for them is the condition that allows us to ascribe a deception to the 
animals (Fig. 18).  
It is advisable to explain the concept “object”  not as the concept of an isolated entity, 
but as a component of the concepts for certain dispositions to behave or act [PLESSNER 
1928]: an act-theoretic analysis of the concept of resemblance in the general framework 
of object constitution is therefore unavoidable. 
3.3.2 The Act-Theoretic Basis of the Concept »Resemblance«  
Studying systematically the relations between animal behavior and situational 
conditions is the subject of the biological subdiscipline of ethology. Ethologists can 
profit by experiments with situations mistaken by animals: they can, for example, use 
dummies with varying attributes in order to study relevant dependencies between 
corresponding aspects in an animal’s environment and the actual behavior.  
Mimicry, i.e., “imitating” something (in appearance and behavior) that their enemies 
ignore or avoid, is a “strategy” of numerous species to “protect” the corresponding indi-
viduals. Certain butterflies provide prominent case studies: if, e.g., an individual of the 
species Smerinthus ocellata feels being attacked it 
lifts its unspectacular brownish (camouflage) upper 
pair of wings and, thus, presents framed in a brilliant 
red its striking hind wings with their distinct black 
and light blue eye pattern (Fig. 19). The similarity of 
the lepidopteron’s appearance with the head of a fox 
(or perhaps an eagle-owl) is hardly doubtable at least 
for the human beholder, and it is assumed that the 
main enemies of the insect (birds, rats, etc.) are suffi-
ciently often impressed, too.  
Conceptually, behavior based on simple stimulus-response schemata allows us al-
ready to ascribe deceptions to a corresponding creature, though deceptions of a very re-
duced kind. Such instinctive behavior, called a “reflex” , includes the ability to distin-
guish the present situation of stimuli: those with a corresponding stimulus, and the oth-
ers. The associated behavior is (usually) observed only in the former. The classification 
ability of reflexes is summarized by the formula “stimuli of the same kind lead to re-
sponses of the same kind15“. The behavior of predators when facing successful mimicry 
is based on this merely schematic ability of classification. It is therefore wrong to as-
sume that creatures thus endowed are able to deal with objects as individuals in the 
sense of our concept of material spatio-temporal objects – or even to be able to perceive 
two such objects as being similar. In the field of concepts of »reflex creatures«, there is 
no way of “projecting back” to the reflex arc whether the reaction performed was not 
                                                     
15 – presuming the same inner conditions hold, i.e., apart form states of fatigue, illness, etc. 
 
Figure 19: Smerinthus ocellata – a 
Case of Mimicry   
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appropriate, i.e., whether the stimulus was not really “of the same kind” (cf. also 
[PLESSNER 1928, Sect. 6.2]). 
The behavior of ZEUXIS’ birds is, however, not at all explainable by means of simple 
reflexes alone. There are at least two interacting reflex-like elements, since the birds do 
not just try to peck up the painted fruits; they have to come close, first: into pecking dis-
tance to the apparent fruit. It is part of the repertoire of such creatures to react on food 
already from a distance (much) greater than the one necessary for the “food ingestion” 
reflex proper to successfully “fire”.  
In this context, G. H. MEAD proposed to distinguish “distance experiences” from 
“contact stimuli”. While reflexes in the proper meaning depend on contact senses (and 
lead to “contact reactions” accordingly), distance senses are understood as the sensory 
part of a reflex-like functional entity that is additionally related in a systematic way (i.e., 
by its concept) to other reflexes. Only in the later case, MEAD explains, it is legitimate 
to speak of ‘perception’ [MEAD 1932]. As observers of creatures with distance senses, 
our attention is focused on activities that are (i) activated by stimuli of the distance 
senses, but that we (ii) understand as having the purpose of establishing (or avoiding) 
certain contact reactions (of the associated reflexes): we consider those movements in a 
broader temporal context than would be possible with the concept of reflexes alone. In 
the example of ZEUXIS’ birds, the pecking (contact) reflex can be assumed as systemati-
cally associated to an “approach food” (distance) reflex – although the same stimulating 
object for us, there are involved two quite different and unrelated stimuli on the level of 
mere reflexes. 
However, the punch line of the systematic relation is not only the approaching (or 
avoiding) reaction from the distance. That could be explained as a simple reflex (form-
ing “a reflex chain” ). For MEAD, the activation of the distance sense also provokes an 
anticipation of the contact reflex linked. Or more precisely: we must conceive the con-
tact reflex as being potentiated before its stimulus is in fact present, so that the reflex 
can be activated quicker and more easily (weaker stimulus) – sometimes even without 
the actual stimulus (displacement activity).  
Furthermore, with each distance stimulus, many potential contact reactions can be an-
ticipated: “toward the water… – in order to drink, – in order to bath, – in order to cool 
down, – in order to prey,” etc. Usually, a motivational structuring coordinates the di-
verse contact reflexes associated: e.g., the potential contact behaviors may inhibit each 
other, so that only one actually gets the better when the contact situation is reached. 
MEAD calls “resistance” the influence that the potentiated but finally not selected op-
tions have on the contact reaction actually performed. This resistance is in his under-
standing the origin of the primary object constitution [MEAD 1968, 413].  
3.3.3 Perception, Deception, and Primary Object Constitution  
The systematic conceptual correlation of distance stimulus and contact stimuli prepares 
a first concept of an object that can be ascribed by an observer to such a creature. We 
can say then that for such a creature there exists – in contrast to mere stimuli – 
something like an object. That is, we can interpret the creature’s behavior as being 
directed toward that object – though ‘object’ must be understood here in a rather 
rudimentary manner: this is but a precursor of our concept of objects as appearing in 
everyday language. The concept of such “pre-objects” (as they shall be called here for 
short) depends on the compound of anticipations “to one theme”; since a connection of 
several options of behavior is considered that remains invariant (“objective”) compared 
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to the changing stimuli that appear from different distances or perspectives (cf. also 
[PLESSNER 1928, Sect. 6.3]) .  
The field of concepts coarsely sketched so far – let us call it the field of »pre-object 
creatures« – has been introduced by means of the field of simple »reflex creatures«. In-
stead of sensors, which react on stimuli in a certain bandwidth, we speak in this context 
of detectors for specific pre-objects: a detector integrates the corresponding distance 
sensors with the associated contact sensors. Similar to the mutual dependency of the 
concepts »sensor« and »stimulus« in the field of »reflex creatures«, the concepts »detec-
tor« and »pre-object« cannot be determined independently of each other: it is always a 
detector for a pre-object, or a pre-object relative to a detector. We may therefore say 
that C perceives O if a creature C’s detector for pre-object O is activated.  
Because the concept of perception is introduced in this primary object constitution as 
the fusion of reflexes, the corresponding reactions are part of »perception«, as well. A 
pre-object perceivable in this sense is something on which the creature can react in dif-
ferent ways – this is the basis of properties associated to the pre-object. Nevertheless, 
the pre-object is still “schematic”: detectors always detect membership of a set, so to 
speak, not individualized objects with a single coherent spatio-temporal development. In 
certain cases, we may find a “detector for an individual”, e.g., for parent binding; but 
then, this is merely a detector for a set that has just one member by chance, not by prin-
ciple. 
Pre-object creatures can be conceived of as having intentional states: the pre-objects 
to which these states are directed are intentional objects – objects for the creatures with 
corresponding active detectors. These intentional objects may even be “fictitious” : if, 
e.g., a food-detector becomes activated by distance stimulus – the creature perceives 
food from far – but there is not any stimulus for activating the corresponding contact re-
flexes for food when approached. Thus, the case of ZEUXIS’ birds is explained quite 
well, although this determination of “fictitious” remains completely on the observer’s 
side: The pre-objects are fictitious intentional objects for us – there is something look-
ing similar to something else from the distance. For them, reality and deception are in-
deed indistinguishable. Certainly, the birds left the picture of ZEUXIS quite soon: after 
being “disillusioned” as the food-detector was deactivated when the “food ingestion” re-
flex could not be performed successfully. Perhaps, a more adequate detector has even 
been activated instead. But the birds – conceived of as pre-object creatures – have no 
means of construing a relation between the two detectors, or the corresponding pre-
objects respectively. By deactivating the food-detector, the intentional pre-object “food” 
just disappears from their world. 
In consequence: if ‘recognizing resemblance’ is based on the ability to distinguish be-
tween ‘being equal’ and ‘being seemingly but not really equal’, then clearly, the birds 
cannot have seen the picture of ZEUXIS as resembling grapes. Because for them, it is not 
a question of ‘being similar to grapes’ but strictly of ‘being equal to grapes’ (i.e., rather 
just ‘being grapes’). It might be prudent to distinguish in the discussion of images be-
tween two concepts of resemblance: concept »resemblanceα« applies in all cases similar 
to those birds: a schematic classification is rated by some observer as erroneous. Con-
cept »resemblanceβ« is used if the creature we observe performing a classification does 
– or is at least in principle able to – understand that that classification is erroneous. Ob-
viously, »resemblanceα« cannot be conceived of as a relation derived as a weaker form 
of identity. It is logically more elementary and forms the basis for originally establish-
ing the field of concepts of identity. In that latter field, »resemblanceβ« takes the con-
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ceptual place of »resemblanceα« 
(now in opposition to »identity«), 
thus opening the possibility of 
perceptoid signs. Though at its 
core is still the older primary re-
semblance only modified by the 
new possibility of individual ob-
jects. 
For the complete object consti-
tution necessary to understand 
how resemblanceβ is conceived, 
another transition to an even more 
complicated field of concepts of 
behavior must be considered: we 
have to look at creatures that can 
establish relations between pre-objects in arbitrary contexts, and thus originally invent 
identity in the proper sense (Fig. 20). The anticipations of pre-object creatures essen-
tially integrate contexts directly linked by means of distance stimuli. That is, those con-
texts are organized along the course of coherent activity – they are, in an extended 
sense, all present in the course of the ongoing action. Hence such anticipations are not 
sufficient to establish identity between completely disparate situations. A re-present-
ation of any contexts apart from those mediated by continuous action can only be medi-
ated by means of signs (cf. also [PLESSNER 1928, Sect. 6.4]).  
3.4 Image and Language 
The anchoring of indexical and iconic signs in language plays a major role for the 
second step of object constitution. Over and above the dependency of the concept 
»identity« from language use and the corresponding effects on our understanding of the 
relations between image and object, assertions like uttering the sentence “The 
photograph is blurred” are also imperative if we try to explain to what purpose a picture 
has been used. In particular, the interaction of the semiotic partial functions constituting 
language are quite well examined, and indeed help us to understand the corresponding 
interactions for picture uses. We continue by investigating the relation between images 
and assertions.  
3.4.1 Assertions, Identity, and Contexts  
Most language-analytic philosophers (e.g., [TUGENDHAT 1982]) have reconstructed 
assertions as a specific composition of certain partial sign acts. By uttering “the 
photograph” in the example above, the speaker performs a nomination, with “is blurred” 
a predication. Both partial acts are “unsaturated” [FREGE 1892]: it is not possible to use 
such a partial act by itself in order to perform a complete act of communication. 
Nomination and predication are determined by their function. Although they are pre-
sent in every single assertion they are not necessarily bound in a fixed manner to certain 
types of words or phrases. A nomination is the sign act used to direct someone’s atten-
tion to the object of which something new (informative) is to be communicated; this ob-
ject must be familiar to both (all) participating interlocutors – it must be part of their 
Figure 20: »resemblanceα«, »resemblanceβ« and »identity«
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common “discourse universe” .16 If the actual situation of communication and the mate-
rial objects “within” are meant, deictic expressions together with pointing gestures an-
swer the purpose of nomination particularly well. But the function of nomination is not 
limited to those objects: we may of course utter expressions like ‘the last unicorn’, ‘the 
Platonic Form of beauty’ or ‘Otto von Guericke’, as part of an assertion, too, in order to 
point out an object of a corresponding discourse universe. They work as long as the dis-
course partners are able to distinguish the object meant from the other discourse objects 
in question. In contrast to the nomination, predication has no immediate representational 
aspect: it is the sign act used by the sender to inform or propose to the others that a cer-
tain custom of distinction – a concept – is relevant and applicable to the objects named. 
In the example above, ‘being blurred’ carries the predication. In every assertion, one 
predication (that may indicate a complex combination of concepts) and one or more 
nominations concur systematically. 
Assertions are context-relative: if the corresponding discourse universe is unknown, 
an assertive sentence remains essentially incomprehensible. The nomination can only be 
performed effectively if it is clear which set of objects is at stake at all.17 Objects are 
never given in isolation. We always speak of objects as something appearing as a figure 
in front of a background: they are part of a context. The expression ‘context’ is used in 
the following for indicating a finite structured set of intentional individualized entities, 
i.e., objects (as something known by somebody) with relations between them. More 
precisely, the relation between propositions and contexts is one of figure-ground to me-
dium. A proposition offers a unique figure-ground distinction with the predication as 
figure on the ground of the objects known already and identified by the nominations. A 
medium offers the potential of figure-ground dichotomies, i.e., for many possible dis-
tinctions. Objects, while forming the background for predications, are thus seen as fig-
ure against other objects, as well. 
Based on this introduction, many different types of contexts may be considered: for 
example,  discourse universes are contexts shared by several creatures that communicate 
with each other. The situational context corresponds to what a single creature perceives 
as (individual) objects from its present environment. Other contexts are analogous to the 
situational one, but entail the “objective” environment of other times and places or even 
of fictitious and hypothetical situations.  
Nomination can primarily be anchored in the overlapping parts of the interlocutors’ 
situational contexts. The physical environment of the sign act (and all simultaneous be-
haviors of the interlocutors) provides then, it seems, the discourse universe of the ob-
jects being commonly perceived.18 In contrast to that, the objects in the contexts evoked 
by previous assertions – or co-texts as they are called – do not have to be physically ac-
cessible. An earlier characterization (the concept used in predication) can be applied as 
part of a consecutive nomination in the form of a definite description: ‘The blurred 
photo was taken by Hermione.’  
                                                     
16 Proper names (‘Harry Potter’), deictic particles (‘this’, ‘she’, ‘you know who’), definite descriptions 
(‘the picture of the fat lady’), and deictic descriptions (‘this blurred photo’) are the forms of nominations 
traditionally considered. 
17 Though the power of words for spontaneous context-evocation should never be underestimated, see be-
low.  
18 Note that the different individual perspectives (as of pre-objects) must have been integrated conceptu-
ally in order to allow us of speaking from anything “being commonly perceived”. 
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Objects (as we usually understand the expression) are members of many contexts. 
What we call the identity of objects is basically the question of connecting an object in 
different contexts. Take for example a court of law trying to establish the identity of, for 
example, the dagger now presented (1st context), the pointed object that was used to stab 
the victim one year ago on the other side of the city (2nd context), and the knife bought 
by the accused in the neighbor city 13 months ago (3rd context). Note that it is impossi-
ble to actually perceive simultaneously all the contexts in order to directly establish 
truth about identity. An important distinction of contexts – in FREGE’s terminology (cf. 
below): of the “ways of being given” of objects – is the one between referential con-
texts and intra-lexical contexts. Objects are said to be referentially given if they are 
elements of the current situational context. In this case, the legitimacy of an assertion 
can be tested directly at the object by, coarsely speaking, including it in corresponding 
sensory-motor behaviors. The sensory-motor anchoring in the referential context is ob-
viously the foundation of any empirical research. If, however, an object has only been 
introduced verbally in the discourse universe, there remains nothing but to apply con-
ceptual rules and draw conclusions from the predication about the objects that are not 
explicitly mentioned, and to check whether the assertion is logically compatible with the 
context [SCHIRRA 1995].  
Assertions allow us apparently to make any context whatever a discourse universe, to 
share or harmonize it with the others, that is. Harmonizing perceptions between 
interlocutors by means of the sign acts has the obvious purpose of combining the 
diverse perspectives of an environment. Creatures thus endowed can perceive not only 
with their own senses, but also with the other’s senses; they can manipulate not only 
with their own hands but with the other’s hands, as well. Still, this would be a very 
restricted employment for assertions compared to what we usually do with them: 
humans mostly talk about objects that none of the interlocutors can actually perceive in 
the situation – or that may even be not perceivable at all.  
That is, assertions allow us to relate an arbitrary context with the current situational 
one. The use of proper names given in a christening situation long ago depends on that 
ability. As was noted above, speaking of a deception – viewed as an explicit lack of 
identity – also means to relate two different contexts of behavior with each other; so 
does considering resemblanceβ (in particular with something being absent). Thus, being 
able to use resemblance as a crucial component of a certain type of signs (iconic/per-
ceptoid signs)  depends on a faculty that appears to be essentially mediated by asser-
tions, disclosing a strong conceptual dependency between assertions and perceptoid 
signs.  
In summary, assertions are context-relative on the one hand; but on the other hand, 
they are context-independent, since we can, at least in principle, perform an assertion 
relative to some context in any situational context whatever. The two characterizations 
of assertions depend on each other because it is only possible to speak independently of 
the actual situational context if another context can be explicitly referred to.  
3.4.2 Communication Among Pre-Object Creatures 
In a Gedankenexperiment, TUGENDHAT [1982, Sec. 12] mentions a simpler class of 
communication games that are not independent of the situation of utterance: the “quasi-
predicates”. A spontaneously sounded warning cry – ‘FIRE!!’ – may serve as an appro-
ximation of that type; but also an infant’s utterance (‘bow-wow!’) in the one-word 
phase (ca. 20th month, [LOCK 1993]) is closely connected with quasi-predicates. Their 
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Figure 21: Ascribing a Quasi-Predication 
rules of application must be 
strictly related to the correspon-
ding context of utterance: a 
particular quasi-predicate is utter-
ed only if certain conditions are 
being perceived (Fig. 21). The 
partner in communication also re-
acts on such an utterance (as a 
quasi-predicate) only directly, e.g., 
by taking flight or by calming the 
excited child. That is: judging the 
correct use of a quasi-predicate (or 
explaining the correct use19) is to 
be conceived of as being bound 
strictly to the situation of use. 
There is, so to speak, a fixed association between the (correct) use of a quasi-predicate 
and certain sensory-motoric routines (for testing or as a reaction). 
Therefore, quasi-predicates articulate habits of distinguishing similar to a predication. 
The difference becomes prominent if we compare the situations of utterance of the 
warning cry ‘Fire!’ and of an assertion like ‘The house is burning’: the rules of use of 
the predication can be discussed in absence of a concrete example; situation of usage 
and situation of explanation can be separated. Correspondingly, the spontaneous reac-
tion can be dispensed with in the case of a predication. That is impossible per defini-
tionem when using the expression ‘fire’ (or also the sentence ‘the house is burning’) as a 
quasi-predicate. Quasi-predicates belong to the class of signals, a basic form of commu-
nication widespread among animals, and also part of the biological endowing of the an-
thropines (e.g., primary affective utterances; cf. [EIBL-EIBLESFELD 1984, Sect. 4.3]).  
Of course the understanding of a child’s utterance ‘bow-wow!’ as the child telling us 
about a perceived individualized object suggests itself. But it is the field of concept of 
pre-object creatures that already allows us to construct a concept of communication 
based on quasi-predicates.20 Let us assume for the moment that the repertoire of behav-
ior of the child is (still) quite simple, so that we cannot yet speak of him/her perceiving 
objects in our usual pretentious sense; but we may speak without problems about detec-
tors and the perception of pre-objects. We can “explain” to that child that he/she used 
‘bow-wow!’ in the wrong manner or we may “confirm” the regular use; but only as long 
as that pre-object is perceived – i.e., is part of the situational pre-context.21 Furthermore, 
we can provoke “accepting” reactions if we use ‘bow-wow!’ in the appropriate way: if 
the child perceives the corresponding pre-object; or the child begins to search for it. If 
there appears no corresponding perception the child reacts quite disconcerted. It would 
be rather odd if we react in a similar way on the nomination ‘our neighbor’s dog’ in 
case it is not simultaneously part of our situational context. Thus, assuming the child is 
                                                     
19 Note that such an explanation (in a wide sense) becomes necessary if the habits of distinguishing are no 
longer fixed genetically but by means of training, habituation, learning, etc. 
20 Evidently, the simpler creatures particular to the field of concepts of »reflexes« cannot be ascribed of 
having any sort of communication in a proper sense: there are only reactions on stimuli that we under-
stand as being causally linked to other creatures. 
21 The ‘pre’ is necessary here since contexts have only been introduced on “full grown” objects.  
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a pre-object creature leads into interpreting its characterizing utterances as quasi-
predicates. 
Quasi-predicates are saturated: their communicative function cannot be set equal to 
neither the function of nominations nor that of predications. At best, the whole assertion 
may serve as an equivalent. But quasi-predicates depend on the situational context while 
assertions have become – despite their context-relativity – independent of the context of 
their utterance. 
3.4.3 Context Builders and Referential Anchoring 
In comparison to the elementary quasi-predicate, creatures gain with the complex sign 
act ‘assertion’ and its clearly separated partial acts ‘nomination’ and ‘predication’ the 
following essential advantage: it allows them originally to communicate about objects 
that are not present – not perceivable for them – in their actual environment. Using 
assertions is the only way at all to make “reachable” other contexts of action.  
Indeed, we continuously use more or less consciously many verbal indications of con-
texts / discourse universes. Applying tempus is a typical example, since assertions about 
past or future affairs do precisely not refer to the present situational context as their 
proper discourse universe; the latter must be derived from the former. The grammatical 
modifications of the verb are quite an implicit indicator. Explicit specifications of loca-
tion and time may also serve to reconstruct the context used as the discourse universe to 
be considered further on. 
In order to adequately fathom this crucial aspect of assertions we assume another 
necessary partial sign act beside nomination and predication. GILLES FAUCONNIER, who 
is particularly interested in the linguistic potentials and consequences of such a proposal 
from a cognitive science perspective, uses the expression ‘mental spaces’ for contexts; 
correspondingly he speaks of ‘space builders’ – the verbal constructs that open up ex-
plicitly or implicitly contexts as the relevant discourse universes [FAUCONNIER 1985, 
17]. In the following, the expression ‘context builder’ is used analogously for character-
izing the partial sign act that in the frame of an assertion allows the interlocutors to re-
construct the underlying context.  
A special form of context building is the sequence of previous assertions, the co-text: 
the (intentional) objects introduced or modified there may easily be referred to again by 
means of definite descriptions that employ the distinction mentioned before. Thus, each 
continuous propositional text can also be conceived of as the complex context builder 
for subsequent assertions: “In Tolstoy’s ›War and Peace‹, Platon is shot dead by a 
French soldier” (context builder in italics) 
The distinction between the referential and the intra-lexical “way of being given” of 
objects has already been mentioned: only in the first cases, assertions about objects can 
be empirically checked – or as we shall say: can the assertion be referentially anchored. 
Context builders pointing out locations give us at hand a method of how to transform 
the context meant by an utterance into the situative context in which the referential an-
choring could actually be performed. Spatio-temporal coordinates play an important 
role [TUGENDHAT 1982, Sect. 26II]. Referentially anchoring an assertion then involves 
two steps: first, one has to know / recognize how the sensory-motor test routines linked 
to the nominations descriptive part (i.e., the one using distinctions formerly mentioned) 
are “prepared” – positioned, orientated, etc. (by transforming the context pointed out by 
the context builder into the situational context); second, one has to know how to actu-
ally perform the sensory-motor test routines for the newly communicated habit of dis-
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tinction associated with the predication (e.g., that I have to look in order to recognize 
whether something – take the photo mentioned in the example above – is really 
“blurred”). Therewith, the “local” habits of distinguishing already associated with the 
elementary, i.e., strictly context-bound sign acts (quasi-predicates) may be employed. 
However, they are modified by extra conditions that are necessary for the individuation 
of objects, i.e., the integration of their absent aspects. Such conditions are essentially 
stabilized socially. 
Assertions may be conceived of as derived from quasi-predicates (gray arrows in Fig. 
22) since they fulfill a very similar overall function – to harmonize situations of behav-
ior. The additional differentiation into the three clearly distinguishable partial acts “con-
text building”, “nomination”, and “predication”  is the precondition for redeeming 
communication from the strict binding to the actual situation. So far, all contexts but the 
actual situation of communication can apparently be constituted only by means of being 
verbally evoked. That is, we are in the interesting situation of considering, on the one 
hand, creatures that are able to communicate in an elementary manner but are in a way 
completely restricted to the “here and now”.22 On the other hand, we think of creatures 
with a more complicated behavior; they master a kind of communication that is inde-
pendent of the actual situation. However, this art of a relative independence from situa-
tion depends circularly on their ability to communicate in such a complicated manner. 
The tool for overcoming that horizon is given only in communication. We hardly know 
yet how to understand this sharp transition (cf. [ROS 2005]). 
The problem we have reached here is indeed the question of the origin of (the field of 
concepts of) geometrical space (and measured time) per se: the medium needed for con-
taining objects in the full-blown sense. A strange abstraction is necessary here for pre-
object creatures: to learn to differentiate the places in space (and time) from the events 
and (pre-)objects “there”. Perceptoid signs may play a crucial role for this step, though 
this is not the place to continue investigating this thread of thoughts. 
                                                     
22 This includes more precisely all the locations in space and time that are directly connected with the pre-
sent activity, i.e., not just a single (ideal) point of time or space. 
 
   Figure 22: »Contexts«, »Context Builders«, »Nomination«, »Predication«, and »Quasi-Predicates«  
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The human fact par excellence is perhaps not so much the creation of the tool but the 
domestication of time and space, i.e., the creation of a human time and a human space. 
[LEROI-GOURHAN 1984, 387] 
3.4.4 Secondary Object Constitution: Sortal Concepts & Geometry 
While pre-objects are always referentially anchored, but cannot be accessed from 
another context, objects in the sense we usually associate with the expression ‘object’ 
are the constituting parts of many contexts. They are essentially viewed as instances of 
sortal concepts: perceptible, countable entities that are persistent over time even if they 
are not perceived, and that may even change their appearance dramatically during their 
lifetime (e.g., catapillar to butterfly). These are apparently also the kind of objects 
depicted in the most central cases of the concept »image« – from the animals of 
prehistorical cave paintings to ZEUXIS’ apples and grapes, from the author’s passport 
photograph to JUAN GRIS’ cubistic portrait of PICASSO (Fig. 6). In his Elements of 
Arithmetics [FREGE 1884, §54], FREGE distinguished this kind of concepts that “separate 
clearly and do not allow arbitrary divisions.” A chair, by means of being a chair, clearly 
can be separated as an individual from any other chair; and the parts of that chair are not 
also chairs again. Objects falling under concepts like »water« or »red« do not have these 
attributes: two red objects are not distinguishable by means of their being red alone. 
And every part of a red surface is also red. Furthermore, sortal concepts allow us for 
pursuing an individual object in its singular temporal development across the contexts. 
How can we be sure that something we saw this morning, e.g., a very bright star near 
the rising sun (let’s call it ‘the morning star’), and something we see right now in the 
evening, e.g., another bright star near the west horizon (correspondingly called ‘the 
evening star’), are the same object? Or: what is actually the communicative function of 
an assertion stating the identity of the morning star and the evening star? It is in fact the 
 
Figure 23: How Can the Morning Star Be Identical to the Evening Star?  
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attribute of »planet« to be a sortal concept that renders an identification phrase like ‘the 
morning star is the same as the evening star’ to a meaningful utterance although the 
perceptual contexts of the two nominations are incompatible: the assertion has to be 
understood as ‘they are both the same planet’ (cf. Fig.s 23 & 24). That the referent of 
‘the morning star’, which can merely be perceived in the morning, and the referent of 
‘the evening star’, which correspondingly can be perceived only in the evening, are in 
fact identical, this proposition cannot be verified but by means of the criterion of spatio-
temporal individuation given with the concept »planet«. In contrast to the planet Venus, 
i.e., the whole spatio-temporal extension of that object from its birth to its present 
existence (and beyond), which is only abstractly given and forms in FREGE’s terms the 
common “Bedeutung” (reference) of the nominators ‘the evening star’ and ‘the morning 
star’, the immediate sensations of the Venus at either the early morning or the late 
evening, are the “Gegebenheitsweisen” – ways in which the Venus is presented to us, 
and also the only concrete way for it to be given [FREGE 1892]. Obviously, these ‘ways 
of being given’ are closely related to pre-objects, their associated sensory-motor 
routines, and the referential anchoring basing any empirical observation.  
Similarly, the referent of ‘this house’ while uttered from one particular point of view, 
and of ‘this house’ while uttered from a very different point of view may be the same 
house. In this case, the two nominators, which are in fact linguistically the same with 
the exception of their perceptual contexts, refer to two different manners of presentation 
of the same individual house meant – or, from the prespective of pre-object creatures, to 
two unrelated pre-objects.  
In analytic philosophy, sortal concepts are conceived of as a systematic co-ordination 
between (a) configurational ‘Gestalt’ entities (of a ‘geometrical field of concepts’), and 
(b) objects involved in part-whole relations that allow us to assign functions to those ob-
jects (of a ‘functional field’) (cf. Fig. 25; [VIEU 1991]). The field of objects with the 
functional part-whole relations, abstract as it is, does not describe or restrict in any 
manner the geometrical relations between an object and its parts. It only allows us to 
state that there are such parts, and that without this or that part, the whole object would 
be something different. The schema of sortal objects leads to entities that have not only 
parts, but also a geometrical shape and a location; and additionally, all the parts also 
have shapes and locations – the whole object is a configuration of the shapes of its parts. 
 
Figure 24: Identifying the Appearances of a Sortal Object (Planet) in Several Contexts 
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Note that the pre-objects or views at different 
“time slices” form another kind of parts of the 
whole sortal object. 
The combination of the two fields of concepts 
has an interesting effect on the ability to identify 
corresponding instances: similar to two red ob-
jects, which are not distinguishable by their being 
red alone, the functional parts of a car, for exam-
ple, do not distinguish one car clearly from an-
other one of the same type, since they both have 
the same functional structure, and are therefore 
functionally indistinguishable. Only the different 
geometrical components of two instances of 
»car«, their different histories, allow us to distin-
guish both. It is, on the other hand, not the mere 
geometric Gestalt that makes something a car, but 
the functional restrictions between its parts. Fur-
thermore, it is not possible to distinguish purely 
by geometrical features an object from its mate-
rial, e.g., a ring and the gold making it up: in 
many contexts, these two different objects, which 
stand in a particular functional relation, have the same Gestalt properties and are in-
volved in the very same geometric relations. 
We remember: a pre-object is usually perceived by means of just one of the sensors 
of the reflex arcs combined in the corresponding detector. In analogy, a sortal object is 
perceived by means of just one detector: of all the pre-objects covered by the concept 
the one pre-object that is possible in the actual situation. We cannot perceive an instance 
of a sortal object in its whole spatio-temporal extension but only what is given in the 
one, present situational context. But whereas the concept »pre-object« does not include 
an option of accessing the constituting reflexes as opposed to the whole pre-object, it is 
a central feature of sortal concepts that the corresponding “manners of being given” can 
be made explicit: the current perception (as of a pre-object) in opposition to the individ-
ual with its complete history.23 The ability to separate the different views is indeed 
equivalent with the ability to access other contexts (i.e., holding the non-current views 
of a sortal object). The integration of a multitude of contextual views also subsumes the 
co-relation of the distinct perspectives of the different interlocutors in one situation.24  
The field of concepts of geometric Gestalts is of particular interest for us. The in-
stances in this field correspond approximately to visual pre-objects. They are immedi-
ately observable. But they do not have the persistent identity of sortal objects and disap-
pear if the beholder stops keeping them in his/her focus of attention. In contrast to mere 
pre-objects, they form however an incompatibility area of locations – a Euclidean co-
ordinate system of potential, that is, not actually realized, situational contexts: space per 
se. Because that is after all what empty space is to be conceived of: as an infinite poten-
                                                     
23 – in opposition also to the abstract functional part-whole constituents, of course. 
24 For MEAD, the anticipation of the perspective of another one forms the crucial step for pre-object crea-
tures to reach “significant gestures”, i.e., context-independent communication by using signs with a 
common meaning, cf. Section 3.5.3.  
 
Figure 25: Sketch on Sortal Object 
Constitution  
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tial of situational contexts together with a structure that allows us to reach one situation 
from another one.25  
True individuality and true generality depend on the ability to consider the negative as 
such, the lack of something, the absence, the void. Homogenous intuition of space and 
time, hollow space and hollow time with empty places “needing” to be filled with constant 
elements are thus necessarily coextensive with true objective perception of things and true 
ideative abstraction. 
[PLESSNER 1928, Sect. 6.5] 
As a consequence, if told the assertion that an object is at place ABC we do not – as 
usually with assertions – interpret the nomination (which object) and check whether the 
distinction mentioned by the predication holds or not (is at ABC), but go looking at ABC 
and then check whether the object is there (verification inversion). 
3.4.5 Pictures as Context Builders: Resemblance Once More 
In the previous sections, we have elaborated the semiotic partial functions of assertions 
to an extent that might be considered a bit exagerated in a discussion on pictures. 
Though, at least on first view, pictures seem also employable quite well for performing 
predications, and nominations, too. The standard function of a photograph in a passport, 
for example, can be understood as a predication: “This person looks like this”. The 
photograph then activates a rather complex visual habit of distinction, which is 
linguistically integrated within the assertion’s predicative part by means of the second 
use of the deictic particle ‘this’. The nomination “this person” is implicitly clear in the 
situational context. On the other hand, it does not appear unusual if somebody presents 
the picture of a large red suspension bridge with two remarkably designed piles, and 
additionally tells us “ ’s been build in 1936.” Here, the pictorial sign act takes over the 
role of a nomination. As is the case for purely verbal nominations, the passive discourse 
partner must consider that object as one already mutually known. In both cases, the 
pictorial sign act seems to receive one partial act of an assertion, the other partial acts of 
which remain unsaturated and unclear without the picture. The pictorial sign acts are not 
associated to any of the partial acts of the assertion per se or in any obvious way. The 
need for saturation of the verbal acts co-occuring with the presenting of the image 
originally induces the manner in which the picture is employed. 
Nevertheless: in the light of the considerations about contexts and context-builders 
above, there is another possibility. Is it not quite tempting to understand pictures as ficti-
tious referential contexts ? And in consequence: to interpret the communicative act per-
formed by presenting the picture as a sign act of type “context building”? The presenta-
tion of the picture certainly enables the interlocutors to employ a discourse universe for 
their assertions different from the actual situational one. After all, the objects depicted 
are usually not also part of the latter. But we can use assertions with nominators for ob-
jects “perceived in the image” (and a complementary predication) without any prob-
lems. They are intentional objects, individuals that may, but need not, exist in any real 
situational context. Thus, pictures play on the one hand a role similar to a co-text, i.e., a 
sequence of assertions, by which an ensemble of objects has been introduced into the 
discourse universe so that some of their attributes and relations are explicitly fixed 
while others are implicitly inferred. All these attributes/relations may be employed for 
                                                     
25 A more extended elaboration of this field in terms of computer science is given in Sect. 4.3.2 
44 VARIATIONS AND APPLICATION CONDITIONS OF THE DATA TYPE »IMAGE«
 
 
the identification of the objects by a nomination in further assertions (compare Fig’s 22 
and 26). But on the other hand, and in contrast to the context building of a novel, the 
fictitious context opened up by a picture is referential: the objects are not again intro-
duced by means of assertions (intra-lexically); they can be perceived visually in the im-
age – in the case of the typical pictures mentioned earlier perceived almost as corre-
sponding objects are perceived visually.  
Therefore, the referential anchoring of the nomination (and hence: of a corresponding 
assertion) can be performed at least partially without intermediate steps: the according 
(i.e., basically visual) sensory-motor schemata apply to the image just as they do to a 
corresponding situational context. Context building by means of pictures may be char-
acterized as a partial amalgamation of a context that is not present with the current situ-
ational context. This amalgamation of contexts may reach more or less continuously 
from a relative separation by “ALBERTI’s window” to the complete immersion of virtual 
reality. Quite in analogy to the “usual” conditions of perception in the situational con-
text, pictures are not integrated in a fixed association with certain assertions; they rather 
form an offer for interpretation, they open a potential for many reactions or interpreta-
tions in the form of assertions [FELLMANN 2000, 27 ff]. These options are not 
completely arbitrary, restricted by means of the mechanisms of object constitution as 
they are.  
Pictures are not employed primarily neither for nomitations nor for predications: 
those functions arise as secondary uses from the pictures’ basic function as context 
builders. Let us have another look at the examples of pictures being used seemingly for 
nomination or predication mentioned above: the photograph in the passport, and the 
picture of the Golden Gate Bridge. Here, the picture’s application as context builder is 
not only quite plausible. It is also compatible with the observation that the picture does 
not show the predicative or nominative function per se but receives them originally in 
its relations to the complete sign act and the other parts given explicitly. For the picture 
of the Golden Gate Bridge seemingly used as a nomination, this is fairly obvious: the 
picture opens up a referential context with a certain intentional object as a (potential) 
figur in front of a (potential) ground. Under the assumption that the interlocutor also 
recognizes the individual object visually, the year of construction is then verbally 
introduced as an additional concept holding of this object. Indeed, it is not the whole 
picture being used for nomination – the sky, the ocean, some vegetation or some ships 
though visible, too, are not meant in the example case. But they could be picked out 
occasionally as the relevant figures given by that picture, as well. 
 
      Figure 26: Pictures as Context Builders: Meaningful Only in Relation to Potential Assertions 
THE FOUNDATION OF COMPUTATIONAL VISUALISTICS 45
 
 
The presentation of the photograph in the context of showing the passport also works 
by making available another context: it complements the situational context, in which 
the (alleged) owner of the passport is present, with a second context, in which the real 
owner of the passport is semioticly present (at least visually) – that is, available for the 
corresponding sensory-motor test routines. The resemblance investigated is not one be-
tween (square) picture and (non-square) person but one between the appearances of the 
person at two different temporal contexts: earlier26 and now. The assertion performed by 
means of the complete sign act “presenting the passport” comes out as a statement of 
identity between two “ways of being given” of the person, just like in FREGE’s example 
of Morning Star and Evening Star. The picture’s apparent function as a predication is 
therefore only derived from the more basic use as a context builder: the predication “to 
look like that or similarly” (a case of resemblanceβ taken as the symptom of identity) is 
something introduced originally by means of a “carrier object” in the picture (i.e., in 
that other context).  
In conclusion, a first type of resemblance we called ‘resemblanceα’ can be defined in 
the field of concepts of pre-object creatures where any concept of identity necessary for 
sortal objects is still missing. Remember that this type of resemblance was not recog-
nized by the pre-object creatures themselves but only by someone thinking about them. 
The field of concepts that entails a concept of identity can only be conceived of as a 
field in which the differentiated interactions of the partial acts of assertions are estab-
lished, as well. As a consequence of the ability to deal with more than one context si-
multaneously associated with that differentiation of semiotic behavior, resemblance ap-
pears in this field as »resemblanceβ«– a similarity that can be recognized by those crea-
tures themselves: they can be said to be able to distinguish between real and apparent. 
The thesis has been proposed that a perceptoid sign act is a referential context builder 
– one of those partial acts constituting assertions – in a more or less restricted range of 
sense modalities: based on the merely schematic classifications associated with pre-
object detectors in those modalities (i.e., resemblanceα), we may introduce with the sign 
vehicle of a perceptoid sign something that for a pre-object creature could falsely acti-
vate detectors at least to some degree: the creature perceives an object – erroneously, 
but without being able to know that. More complex creatures however are able to cope 
with assertions, hence are able to understand sortal concepts and the relations between 
several situational contexts associated with them. They are thus used to distinguish be-
tween a sortal object and its context-dependent visual Gestalt, which may change while 
the identity of the object does not – or two of which may “resembleβ” each other for two 
quite different objects. They can employ the presented picture vehicle as the context 
builder part of an assertion, i.e., use it as a perceptoid sign.  
Using perceptoid signs is, thus, unseverablely interwoven with the assertive sign sys-
tem. But, in contrast to most other context builders, perceptoid signs allow the interlocu-
tors for checking empirically the claimed statement at least partially by immediately an-
choring the assertions referentially – that is by using corresponding detectors. The ex-
pression ‘representation’ as understood here is associated with the function of context 
building in general to bring the absent to presence, but may be used most clearly with 
the context amalgamation performed by means of perceptoid signs: the objects enclosed 
in the contexts communicated by means of a perceptoid sign can be reacted on verbally 
                                                     
26 – more precisely, the time of registering the identity in order to construe the passports function: in a 
way a kind of formal christening situation. 
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and also (at least partially) in the more elementary and spontaneous bodily manner re-
served for objects really present (i.e. as part of the situational context). 
Note that as a consequence of this understanding it is impossible to conceive any im-
age use for creatures that do not have the equivalent of assertive language. Without the 
separation of the functions of nomination and predication, awareness of a multitude of 
contexts cannot be established, conceiving sortal objects is out of the range, and the rep-
resentation of any non-actual context remains impossible. Nor is there much plausibility 
for assuming a field of concepts of creatures that have only assertive language but can-
not use perceptoid signs (not necessarily pictures, as there is no general necessity for a 
sense corresponding to the complex of human visual senses for creatures falling under 
that fields of concepts). The very idea of referentially anchoring assertions already in-
cludes the option for perceptoid signs. 
3.5  Image and Image User 
The previous review on analyzing similarity and the consequences for the semantics of 
perceptoid signs rests essentially on an act-theoretic basis: resemblance is not something 
independent from those recognizing or stating it; its concept corresponds in particular to 
the complexities of their potential behaviors. The relation between images and their us-
ers has therefore already formed a permanent background. In this section we rephrase 
and extend the results with an explicit focus on this relation and the pragmatics of picto-
rial sign acts. This also leads us to abstract, structural, and reflective pictures. 
It has often been observed that pictorial signs seem to have a strange and ambivalent 
range of effects: on the one hand, their reception is eased by the mechanisms of object 
perception. On the other hand, this entices the beholder to uncritically interpret proper-
ties of the picture as properties of the object depicted. For gaining a better understand-
ing of how perceptoid signs are used – and may be misused – it is of particular impor-
tance to reformulate their characteristics by bringing into the game different modes of 
reflection image users may take toward an object, sign or picture. 
3.5.1 Reflection Modes of Dealing with Pictures 
Let us first consider the symbolic mode of reflection, which is the usual mode we are in 
when using symbolic signs: somebody in that mode knows that the picture of a pipe is 
not a pipe, that he/she is 
employing something as 
a representative for 
something else, which 
more often than not is 
not present in the actual 
situation at all. As has 
been noted earlier, being 
in this mode also means 
to understand that a sign 
act takes place, which in-
cludes at least two par-
ticipating roles and a 
sign that is part of a 
whole system of signs. 
The sign is a tool in or-
Figure 27: Ascribing the Symbolic Mode  
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der to coordinate the focus of interest of the participating interlocutors allowing them to 
act coherently together in a way that can even be negotiated and adjusted eventually. 
Independent of that task, there is just another object, the mere sign vehicle (cf. Fig. 27). 
Note in particular that it does not matter on this level of view whether the sign is a spe-
cial kind of sign.  
In contrast to the symbolic mode, the deceptive mode of reflection is given if we react 
on an object in a way as if a completely different object is indeed present. We may, for 
example, mistake the naturalistic portrait of a woman for that person – wondering per-
haps about the strange stiffness she seemingly exhibits. This is of course not a case of 
communication at all – for somebody in deceptive mode toward a picture vehicle, there 
is no picture indeed. As should be clear, this mode is what pre-object creatures can 
reach at best. The deceptive mode is independent from the symbolic mode. However, 
ascribing the deceptive mode to someone (A) presupposes that the one who ascribes it 
(C) is him/herself in symbolic mode with respect to that picture vehicle (V): C must un-
derstand V as a sign for O in some communicative setting in order to see that A’s reac-
tions fit to the presence of O but not of V (cf. Fig. 28). Note that the deceptive mode is 
exactly the stance we usually take with respect to ordinary perception: although we are 
quite aware in principle not only of the existence of sensory illusions, but also know 
about the complicated and not at all fault-free mechanisms underlying object constitu-
tion, we usually just trust our perception – we are in the world we perceive, a world 
consisting of sortal objects (among other more fluid things). 
As we have seen in the previous section, the symbolic mode provides us with a virtual 
presence of objects and situations – in particular when dealing with assertions. Signs al-
low us to evoke other situative contexts, as is still preserved in the very root of the ex-
pression ‘representation’: “being brought back to be present”. We can act correspond-
ingly, e.g., feel a bit creepy when hearing the word ‘snake’. But simultaneously, we 
must be able in symbolic mode to suppress most sensory-motor routines that otherwise 
would have fired “reflex-like”. Or it would be quite hard indeed to finish reading a 
gothic novel. For example, the utterance of ‘The Cologne city hall is burning!’ gives us 
usually little panic compared with a signal call ‘Fire!’ (or similarly with the film of a 
fire in our room perceived in deceptive mode) – if only the Cologne council hall does 
not happen to be our actual situational context, of course. The context-evoking force in-
herent to the symbolic mode enables us to “put a distance” to the situational context and 
any spontaneous behavior inherently linked to it on the level of reflexes and pre-objects.  
There are very interesting 
mixed forms that appear particu-
larly clear in the case of so-
called virtual reality, but in a 
general sense cover all percep-
toid signs: within virtual reality, 
a person acts at least partially as 
if a certain picture is indeed the 
object depicted, i.e., as if being 
in deceptive mode, though with-
out losing the awareness of the 
semiotic foundation of the pic-
ture. This person acts, so to 
speak, consciously as if con-Figure 28: Ascribing the Deceptive Mode  
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fronted with real objects. In contrast to the deceptive mode, this immersive mode of re-
flection, as we would like to call the basis of this acting ‘as if’, presupposes the sym-
bolic mode: we know the illusion, know that there is not really (let’s say) a table, some 
chairs and a piano in the room we are in. But we actively engage with that illusion: for a 
creature in immersive mode, it is essential that the primary misclassification of the de-
ceptive mode – a detector that is in fact wrong for the present situation, so to speak – is 
(and remains) activated, while the corresponding reactions can be suspended more or 
less like in the symbolic mode (Fig. 29). Resemblanceβ (as we have introduced the con-
cept) is always involved in a pictorial sign act: it is only possible to conceive some 
things as “resemblingβ” each other when being in symbolic mode while comparing the 
potential misclassifications for those two objects: that is, we have to be in the immersive 
mode in order to notice resemblanceβ.  
In order to ascribe the immersive mode, a correspondingly complex behavior must be 
observed: essentially (though this is not a complete characterization), the bodily reac-
tions are mostly consistent with an interpretation of being in deceptive mode, while the 
utterances indicate the symbolic distancing. 
The immersive mode governs the “ordinary” use of pictures, and doing so involves 
already a high amount of reflective competence. In theoretical discourse on pictures, an 
additional level of reflection is usually employed, which we shall call the reflective 
mode.  Ascribing the immersive mode to somebody (A), as sketched in Figure 29, is 
possible only when being in reflective mode (C). As the functioning of pictures is to be 
investigated and explained in this mode, a focus on certain partial aspects is imminent: 
there are many examples of using pictures for directing our attention to one or the other 
aspect of picture uses in this book. Those example pictures are mostly employed outside 
there “normal” context of use, with special use conditions, similar to verbal examples 
given in a textbook on linguistics: it is crucial not to mix those special conditions valid 
for the reflective mode with the normal use conditions. We shall come back to the re-
flective mode in section 3.5.4. 
 
Figure 29: Ascribing the Immersive Mode
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3.5.2 The Game of Picture Making 
The previous paragraph focused mostly 
on the reception side of the communi-
cative act, though for computational 
visualists the production side is rather 
prominent, too. Is a picture during the 
time of its production viewed always as 
a sign? Who is communicating then with 
whom anyway?  
In fact, producing a picture means first 
of all producing a picture vehicle to be 
later used as a picture. There are of course cases where some object found may appear 
just ideal to serve the purpose, like a graining pattern of a piece of wood or even the 
clear surface of a lake. Though, recognizing/choosing the object as a potential percep-
toid sign may be considered being equivalent to the explicit production of the sign vehi-
cle in the other cases. Beside the behavior toward the picture vehicle, the picture makers 
must also be able to act with respect to what is symbolized – they must be able to show 
spontaneous reactions on the presence of that (sort of) thing – rudimentary or inade-
quate, as those reactions might be. Furthermore, they need to evoke a context of com-
munication in general – they have to be able to anticipate the semiotic presentation of 
the picture vehicle by taking two different perspectives at once, as the sender and as the 
receiver of a message. That is, a picture maker has to shift perspectives a lot during the 
process of picture production, even if the purpose of the picture is decidedly to deceive 
a future beholder and not to communicate at all: taking the picture vehicle as a mere ob-
ject with properties that can be changed in some way; evoking deceptive mode towards 
something else (i.e., evoking the spontaneous reactions together with the linked percep-
tion of something not present); evoking a communicative situation; and taking the pic-
ture vehicle as a sign used to “conjure” a fictitious context encapsulating the spontane-
ous deceptive mode for sender and receiver.  
In the cases of naturalistic pictures, the visual appearances of sortal objects are usu-
ally to be primarily communicated. There are, of course, a number of different determi-
nations of the meaning of the expressions ‘realism’ and ‘naturalism’ and their corre-
sponding contraries depending on the context of discussion (e.g., in literature or episte-
mology). For our purpose the following conception has been helpful. Putting it simply, 
‘realism’, as we understand the expression here, is the property of a representation of 
giving the impression of a configuration of spatial (mostly sortal) objects that is or could 
be found in the world. That is, fictitious objects are included whereas impossible objects 
are not (cf. Sect. 4.3.2.2). ‘Naturalism’ in our sense refers to the degree of a pictorial 
representation to which it evokes a visual impression as close as possible to that of the 
scene depicted. While realism is a binary category, naturalism only defines one pole of a 
continuous scale. The contrary to a realistic representation is one that either depicts non-
spatial entities (e.g., air temperature, or the percentage of catholic households) or shows 
spatial entities as something “outside” the everyday space of three Euclidian dimensions 
(like pictograms of spatial objects in the abstract state space of an infogram). At the op-
posite pole to naturalism, a representation may still be realistic. But it does not use the 
“natural” visual impression of the spatial arrangement. Woodcuts, copper plate engrav-
ings or drawings with a pencil, even a black-and-white photograph give quite good ex-
amples of pictures that while being non-naturalistic are still realistic. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Reprise: Where does the picture end?  
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Total naturalism is a border case for realistic pictures that might make it difficult for 
observers to “see” the picture and not merely its content. Take for example again Figure 
3: a quite extreme case for a live size trompe l’œil mural (ca. 3.3 x 8.6 m2), the borders 
of which are barely noticeable at least in the pictorial reproduction given here and taken 
from the ideal viewpoint (cf. Fig. 30).27 But at least its producer must view even a 
trompe l’œil in the immersive mode, i.e., as a sign in a communicative setting. 
Normally, realistic pictures are composed of naturalistic and non-naturalistic ele-
ments. In a watercolor painting, the forms of the objects in a scene may lack naturalism 
while the colors are quite close to the visual impression of the “real” scene. A copper 
plate engraving may be highly adequate with respect to the depicted objects’ forms, 
though we would rate it quite uncommon for those objects to show us nothing but un-
colored crosshatched surfaces. Of course, it is the technique that restricts the modes of 
visual perception available for naturalism in these classical examples, and the producers 
of functional pictures often did not have much choice of technique in the past. As not 
only good “photo-realistic” computer graphic systems become increasingly available 
but also “non-photorealism” matures to a standard option in graphics systems that is 
quite diversified in form [STROTHOTTE & SCHLECHTWEG 2002], designers of computer-
generated pictures can already select quite freely between many techniques of represen-
tation with different aspects of naturalism. 
“Truth”  comes in mind as a good criterion of quality for both realism and naturalism 
of presentational pictures: truth of depiction of a real situation or truth of visual appear-
ance. Take color photography: its indexical character seemingly guaranties both types of 
truth automatically, many believe. It has of course a precise sense to speak of an asser-
tion as “being true” (or false, as may be the case): depending on the outcome of the sen-
sory-motor test routines associated with the predication applied to the objects picked out 
by the nominations from the corresponding contexts, we may or may not agree with the 
assertion (or rather: the one stating it). Or, if it is not possible to referentially anchor the 
assertion, we check whether the new concept brought to mind by the predication leads 
to inconsistencies with what we know of that context so far. As it is the interaction of 
the two main components of an assertion – predication and nomination – that is origi-
nally responsible for ascribing truth, and in particular, for ascribing truth only with re-
spect to the given context, we rather have doubts about conceiving truth as something 
directly applicable to perceptoid signs. 
After all, only the assertions we are capable to generate from a given context can be 
associated with truth-values, not the context itself. Nor does the context builder qualify 
for truth-values. Pictorial sign acts are, then, not true or false. What can be used as a cri-
terion of quality is at best the distribution of truth values assigned to the assertions gen-
eratable from the context built by the picture: compare it with the distribution of truth 
values assigned to the assertion producible with respect to some original situation. That 
criterion of quality is of little practical value due to the cardinality of the two sets of po-
tential assertions, and of little theoretical value in the light of the context builder’s de-
fining function. 
Though, closely related with truth is the question of authenticity. What is, for exam-
ple, often meant when we say colloquially a film “is true” is that we rate the film as an 
authentic sign act. Remember that any sign act primarily shifts the interlocutor’s focus 
                                                     
27 A clear case of pure deceptive mode is hawed on the web page presenting JOHN PUGH, the artist of that 
mural, and his art: a patron of the café with that mural reportedly complained with the manager that the 
girl did not react on his trying so hard to flirt with her. (cf. www.illusion-art.com/incidents.html) 
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of attention toward the sender and 
his/her attitude, and only secondar-
ily (if at all) toward what the 
sender’s attitude may be directed 
at, an object, state of affair, etc. 
Authenticity is a general quality of 
sign acts indicating whether the 
sign act’s primary focus, the indi-
cated attitude, fits to the sender’s 
actual attitude: not whether the 
sign act was true, but whether it 
was correctly performed, i.e., 
whether the sender was genuine, 
sincere with that sign act, and did not only pretend to be in that attitude. Remember in 
this context the tattoos and avatars mentioned in Section 3.1.  
While truth is only applicable to assertions as a whole, authenticity can be ascribed to 
any partial sign act as well. One aspect only of this general concept »authenticity« is 
covered by the technical term ‘authenticity’: is the apparent sender of the message, e.g., 
a picture, its real sender/producer?  
But what about the pictures occurring on the screen in a life transmission from a re-
mote camera: is not »truth« the better concept there? And who is the sender, anyway?  
3.5.3 Who Is Communicating with Whom? 
In the preceding sections, perceptoid signs have been closely linked to verbal 
communication in the form of assertions. But we also find many pictures that are 
presented apparently free of any immediate relation to verbal language. Sure, the 
functional pictures we are mainly interested in appear seldom independent of co-
occurring words. The use of sketches in maintenance instructions would be quite 
unclear without the explaining texts – just as the text remains incomprehensible if the 
discourse context the producer had in mind is not mediated by means of the sketches.  
Furthermore, the presentation of pictures in a private photo album, too, has only sense 
if they evoke commentaries or explanations about the things, persons, and situations 
communicated by means of the pictures. Even if one browses the own photo album just 
alone, assertions form in one’s mind that one could use at least as potential utterances 
for another party (B) – episodic stories or christening acts for persons who B does not 
know and about who one could further on talk occasionally to B.28 The corresponding 
assertions need not be uttered aloud: it is sufficient to direct them in a kind of (inner) 
soliloquy to oneself while looking at the picture – or more precisely, while presenting 
the picture to oneself (in the role of an other person). 
The pictures produced by means of the life transmission from a remote camera can 
also be interpreted as cases of perceptoid signs: it is indeed the beholder who directs 
his/her own focus of interest toward the situational context of the camera and the things 
there (or rather; who indicates to him/herself that his/her attitude is now to look at those 
things by means of the deceptive mode encapsulated in the symbolic attitude). Then, of 
                                                     
28 This seems also to be the reason for browsing the family album of someone else alone without 
commentary being quite boring: the pictures in the album offer the possibility of stories, which are, 
however, not told. The contexts evoked remain unproductive, the partial sign acts unsaturated. 
Figure 30: The Pictorial Answer to Figure 3  
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course, saying that those pictures are eventually “true” or “not true” has a derived 
meaning not too far away from that for assertions: when the self-directed partial act of 
context building (with respect to a non-fictitious context) is rated as being not authentic 
– e.g., because I as the sender know about a technical error of the camera or the trans-
mission – then, of course, the assertions formed by me as the receiver on the basis of 
that context builder are not reliable with respect to that original context; but if the self-
directed sign act of context building is rated as authentic, the assertions evoked for that 
context must have the same truth values as for the original context. Arguing for mirror 
images and other “natural pictures” as signs follows the same line of explanation. 
Overcoming the restrictions of communication to the common situative context has 
been the dimension along which the three classical types of media mentioned already in 
Chapter 1 have been distinguished. With media of classes II and III,   technical devices 
are involved so that a sender can communicate with a receiver at a totally different place 
and/or time. Usually, producing pictures is one such device (with the potential exception 
of ritually produced sand drawings mentioned earlier): the situation of production is 
completely different from the situation of reception. It is, then, of particular importance 
that the image producer keeps in mind the potential interlocutors and their possible 
situations of reception – and vice versa. If, as we have said, the beholder has to face the 
picture simultaneously in two roles, one of these roles is certainly the one of the prob-
able (though possibly just imagined) image producer trying to communicate with us. 
This anticipation of the communicative partners corresponds to G. H. MEAD's analy-
sis of a crucial aspect of conscious communication distinguishing it from more elemen-
tary forms of communication like signals: in the sending individual, the same reaction is 
systematically triggered as is in the receiving individuals [MEAD 1968, 68ff]. This con-
cept of the role »sender« entails that any instance of »sender« has to adopt the role of 
the »receiver» in the sign act (and, in fact, vice versa). In order to be language – i.e., 
communication in an advanced sense – what is communicated has to be understood 
equally by all the interlocutors of the exchange. More precisely: the sender must in 
principle be influenced by his/her sign act in the same way as the others. For verbal lan-
guage, such a conception is essential since speakers never mention explicitly everything 
actually communicated: the phenomena of ellipses and anaphora, presuppositions and 
Figure 31: About MCCLOUD’s Mask Theory of Faces 
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conversational implicature are just the tips of the 
iceberg. They can hardly be conceived without a 
speaker who is able to anticipate systematically 
the part of her/his listeners.  
In another form, this is true for pictures, as 
well. We may, for example, interpret the lack of 
visual features in line drawings as a form of picto-
rial ellipsis. Even for trompe l’œils – to be seen as 
such, and not reacted upon in mere deceptive 
mode – the close similarity, which evokes “cor-
rectly” the “wrong” detectors spontaneously and 
without a special phase of training in advance, 
leads only to understand that a deception takes 
place and may have been intended, but not to un-
derstand why this particular deception was placed 
there and then. That question concerns the com-
municative purposes of the picture use, and hence 
the two roles participating, together with the mu-
tual anticipations of each other.  
Even on the level of quasi-predicates, the per-
ception of faces is important for communicative 
processes among anthropines. Faces are primarily 
pre-objects (or, on the complex level, sortal ob-
jects), but if we follow MEAD’s analysis of com-
munication they must be more than just that. Pic-
torial presentations of faces invite, so to speak, 
the beholder to identify the role of sender with them, in particular if eye contact seems 
possible. In his considerations on comics, SCOTT MCCLOUD [1993, 36] argues that the 
offer for partial identification is indeed the reason for reducing naturalism and increas-
ing the amount of abstraction (Fig. 31). It is much easier to identify with a figure with-
out highly individualized facial features, easier to put on that mask, and to “walk” with 
it through the pictorial space (of comics, in that context). 
3.5.4 Indirect Resemblances & Rhetoric Derivations 
The final sections of the overview on the basics of image science are dedicated to more 
complicated manners of using pictures. Not all pictures represent sortal objects in a 
momentaneous spatial configuration. Beside those representational images, which may 
be more or less abstract, SACHS-HOMBACH [2002, 145ff] puts two other classes: structu-
ral pictures like diagrams, and reflective pictures. The latter appear often in art. They 
are called ‘reflective’ as they are used to communicate pictorially about the conditions 
of picture uses and picture productions, or for short: about picture communication and 
its constituents itself. Especially modern art has contributed many different aspects to 
that pictorial meta-discourse.  
Structural pictures are (usually) not intended as a reflection on the uses and condi-
tions of pictorial sign acts. They are part of the class of non-realistic pictures, i.e., they 
do not depict a spatial arrangement of sortal objects (with potentially a few non-sortal 
accessories), and it is usually not straightforward to understand how resemblance is in-
volved in their interpretation.  
 
Figure 32: A Caricature  
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Note that already realistic pictures 
in a non-naturalistic style, i.e., ab-
stracted representations, call for a 
modification of the strict resem-
blance criterion. The sketchy line 
drawing of caricature may still spon-
taneously evoke a strong deceptive 
mode on the basis of a rather re-
duced set of prominent visual fea-
tures (cf. Fig. 32). Other abstracted 
presentations need much more intel-
lectual effort to activate the corre-
sponding detectors necessary for 
recognizing what is depicted (Fig. 
33). When we take resemblance as a 
general criterion to characterize pic-
torial signs, we presuppose that properties are ignored that do not contribute to the con-
tent of the sign and are irrelevant to its interpretation.  
The fact, that resemblance is determined only in certain respects allows us to accom-
modate it to quite different pictorial phenomena. In some cases – mainly naturalistic 
pictures like photographs – we immediately and involuntarily regard most respects as 
relevant that are also relevant in perceiving objects visually. In others, like line draw-
ings, we leave aside many of those respects: the picture is taken to resemble some object 
only relative to the remaining respects. As an extreme case, a diagram, for example, 
does not show us anything about how physical objects look like. It is possible to estab-
lish different respects as dominant because the picture vehicle does not in itself deter-
mine which properties are relevant for the depiction. Sometimes, relevant respects are 
even missing (Fig. 33). We may develop different pictorial schemata with respect to 
some particular communicative functions the pictures are supposed to perform. In this 
sense it is then plausible to say, SACHS-HOMBACH argues, that all presentational pictures 
resemble their objects in one way or the other: what resemblance exactly is to be used 
relays completely on the pictorial schema determining in each case which are the rele-
vant respects.  
Accordingly, understanding pictures involves two components: the image users have 
to decide what properties of all are intended as relevant for a perceptoid sign before they 
can integrate any spontaneous deceptive reactions in the immersive mode, and thus de-
termine which objects it is that resembles that sign in those respects. The more the pic-
ture producer restricts the set of relevant respects, the more the picture users must know 
about the semiotic rules of that particular pictorial subsystem in order to be able to in-
terpret a corresponding “abstract” picture adequately. Spontaneous deceptive reactions 
alone may become too weak. However, the greater the number of essential properties a 
picture has in common with another object (by means of resemblanceα), the more easily 
a picture user recognizes that object in the picture in spontaneous deceptive mode. 
Looking at the picture then becomes more and more like looking at the object depicted 
itself, and the picture’s style more and more naturalistic.  
Abstracting in general can be understood as the process by which an extract of all the 
information available for some theme or scenario is refined so as to reflect the impor-
tance of certain aspects for the communicative situation at hand [STROTHOTTE ET AL. 
Figure 33: A Rather Famous Picture with Obscured 
Resemblance Due to Color Reduction 
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1998]. It is especially linked with the rhetoric figures of metonymy and synecdoche. 
‘Metonymy’, from Greek ‘metonymia’ = renaming, refers to the rhetorical use of a word 
or expression for something that is closely connected in a spatial, causal or logical way 
to the literal meaning. ‘Synecdoche’, from the Greek words ‘syn’ = ‘together’, and ‘ek-
doche’ = ‘taking over’, ‘conceptualization’, is often viewed as a central case of meto-
nymy. Its more familiar Latin equivalent, pars pro toto, indicates that the expression for 
a part of the whole is used to name the whole. Typical examples in everyday life are 
evoked by: ‘The White House has officially denied any involvement in the murder’, 
‘I’m the ham sandwich, the quiche is my friend’, ‘Wall Street is in a panic,’ and ‘Sep-
tember 11 has severely changed the Western social climate’.  
GILLES FAUCONNIER – mentioned already earlier as giving the motivation for the 
name ‘context builder’ by his studies on mental spaces and linguistic space builders – 
has indeed explained metonymies as a special kind of linking two mental spaces (his 
version of contexts). As an example, Figure 34 sketches two mental spaces relevant in 
the following situation: Suppose, a film is made about the life of Alfred Hitchcock, 
whose role is played by Orson Wells, while Hitchcock himself appears in a minor role 
as “the man at the bus stop”. The context of the stars of Hollywood (H) is opposed to 
the context established by the film (F). The objects in the contexts are linked by the 
“drama connector” Fd (who acts as who), and by the “image connector” Fi (who is pic-
torially represented by who). Those relations are used to construct metonymic expres-
sions, i.e., by employing an expression correct for one context to refer to the corre-
sponding object in the other one: “In the third scene, Hitchcock was seen following 
Hitchcock” or “You mean, the man at the bus stop is played by Wells?” 
The linguistic phenomenon of metonymy applies essentially to nominations, and with 
respect to this function, the transfer of the concept to pictorial sign acts must be viewed: 
a context builder that is used to introduce a context with objects standing in metonymic 
relation to some other objects actually meant to be contained in the context. In fact, the 
perceptoid sign acts always depend on a metonymic relation – taking the momentary 
appearance of a sortal for the temporally extended whole. On this basis, further meto-
nymic abstractions can be easily integrated into the conception of pictorial signs.  
An important concept in the context of abstraction is »exemplification«: we can use a 
concrete object metonymically as an example case for any concept that holds of that ob-
ject in order to speak (symbolic mode) about this concept, e.g., a certain horse in order 
to discuss horses in general, a certain keyboard in order to debate keyboards in the es-
 
Figure 34: An Example from [FAUCONNIER 1985, 36] – Metonymic Connectors between Mental 
Spaces (Contexts) as the Basis for Metonymy
56 VARIATIONS AND APPLICATION CONDITIONS OF THE DATA TYPE »IMAGE«
 
 
sence. The object then is used as an arbitrary sign29 
for the concept. Correspondingly, we may employ a 
picture as a context for introducing an object not as a 
particular individual but as an exemplification for 
some concept, in particular concerning the visual Ge-
stalt constituents of sortal objects. This is often cov-
ered by distinguishing ‘a picture of an X’ from ‘an X-
picture’ [SCHOLZ 1991, 26ff].  
Concentration of features – as in the case of carica-
ture – is one means of abstraction that can even be 
linked back down to the reflexes integrated in the de-
tectors for the corresponding pre-objects. The phe-
nomenon of “supernormal stimulus” is well known 
among ethologist: for example, male sticklebacks behave in a specific way when in re-
production mood if another male stickleback is present (“defense of district” behavior). 
Due to the merely schematic classification possible with reflexes, the sticklebacks react 
already on dummies with only a coarse similarity (from our point of view, of course): 
elliptic shapes of about the right size trigger the fighting behavior if only the red belly 
spot typical for male sticklebacks in reproduction mood is present. The reaction on pre-
senting the “abstracted” dummies is often even more distinct and stronger – they are su-
pernormal stimuli for the sticklebacks (Fig. 35). We may take it as an educated guess at 
least that caricature is based on that mechanism, as well. The suggestive indicators also 
weaken in these cases the tendency mentioned above to identify with the figure. 
Another source for abstraction can be reconstructed on the level of detectors. Let us 
assume that certain indicators may be among the distance stimuli integrated into the de-
tector for one kind of pre-object that are not directly “emanating” from that (sortal) ob-
ject: the fresh foot prints in wet sand or mud can be used as quite valuable distance 
stimuli for the animals having produced them, as well. For a pre-object creature with a 
“foot print reflex”, the firing of that sensor activates the corresponding detector, i.e., it 
perceives the pre-object associated, and reacts accordingly – quite reasonable under 
many circumstances (e.g., foot 
prints of an enemy).  
When continuing the argument 
on the level of sortal objects, the 
footprints can be viewed as one of 
the many forms of visual appear-
ance of that object – one of its 
manners of being given visually. 
Consequently, it can establish a 
resemblanceβ relationship and be 
used as part of a perceptoid sign. 
Figure 36 shows an example of 
foot prints of several species in a 
jukurrpa picture, where the foot 
prints of mythical ancestors in 
human and animal shape, or even 
                                                     
29 The object is not linked by causality nor by similarity to the concept, hence it is not an index nor an 
icon, and must be symbolic in consequence.  
Figure 35: Supernormal Stimulus: 
The shape of the three-spined stick-
leback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) 
and several dummies  
Figure 36: Traces and Paths – Section of the Australian 
Aborigine Picture Karrku jukurrpa  
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the U-shaped depression left by a sit-
ting human (with the elliptic bump 
from the traveling basket beside) are 
quite prominent. Note that by means of 
the traces, sortal objects are in a way 
shown in an integral manner: the ap-
pearances at many moments are bound 
together. The pictures of Australian 
aborigine art are assumedly simplified 
or obstructed versions of the secret rit-
ual sand pictures employed when the 
myths are enacted. Most interestingly, 
the traces are used to structure the 
myth’s narration ([WATSON 1999] and 
[RUMSEY 2001]) – another indication 
to the strong conceptual connection with assertions by means of context building.  
Maps can be conceived of as directly associated to trace pictures, but form also a link 
to structural pictures. Maps can but do not have to preserve the full set of geometric re-
lations, i.e., being “true” with respect to directions and distances. Distances may be not 
a relevant respect of resemblance (Fig. 37), or topology becomes the only interesting 
feature to be communicated (Fig. 38). Maps for the users of public transportation sys-
tems share this characteristics with state diagrams for Finite State Machines – a formal-
ism often employed to describe simple programs, the behavior of non-player characters 
in computer games, or any system of actions to be performed in various temporal orders 
depending on some contextual conditions (Fig. 39). All these examples also abandon 
usually depth in the representation as a relevant aspect, though there are structural pic-
tures employing the three dimensions of pictorial space in a non-literal way, as well 
(Fig. 40). 
The relation between representational pictures with traces and diagrams has been 
mentioned already at the beginning of this chapter. The clue to that link is given by an-
other rhetorical figure, namely metaphor, which may indeed help us to understand the 
phenomenon of structural pictures in general. ‘Metaphor”, from the Greek expression 
‘metapherein’ = ‘to transfer’ indicates the non-literal use of a word or expression based 
on an elliptic comparison: if Julia is for 
him like the sun in some respect, Romeo 
may say ‘she shines so bright’, or that the 
world is so dark without her. As a rhetori-
cal means, metaphor seems to appear es-
sentially in high literature, in poems, etc., 
but not as frequently in everyday language 
use: though think about “time is money”, 
“life is a journey”, and “movement is a 
path.” In fact, metaphors transfer not sin-
gle expressions but significant parts of a 
whole field of concepts into the other 
field, and thus allow us to generate more 
than a singe metaphor: a complete and co-
herent system of metaphorical expres-
  
Figure 38: A (Mainly) Topological Map  
Figure 37: A Simple Hand-Drawn Map 
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sions. Time, for example, may be 
conceived as “flowing” like a 
stream of water, sometimes fast, 
sometimes slowly, sometimes 
troubled, sometimes calm; events 
drift toward us, meet or even hit us 
or pass by, etc. 
While metonymy interacts with 
nomination, metaphors are con-
nected with predication. Meta-
phoric transfers are often used to 
originally structure a new domain 
of experiences by means of a con-
ceptual structure that is well-
known and seems to be similar in 
some respect with what is yet 
known about the new field (cf. 
[LAKOFF & JOHNSON 1980] for a general discussion of metaphor).30  
The application to context builders is indirect again, but explains the foundation of 
structural pictures. It is the structure of the geometrical Gestalts that becomes the source 
of metaphoric transfer for a field of concepts not directly linked: time “is” space; con-
cepts (or other abstract entities) “are” boxes, relations become paths (arcs or arrows). 
Set inclusion becomes geometric inclusion (note the linguistic metaphor here), multiple 
memberships occur as intersections; quantities “are” heights, etc. By means of that 
transfer, the elements of the goal domains firstly become something visible at all. Re-
semblance, then, plays a role for structural pictures, as well. But in their case, it is an 
abstract kind of resemblance, the same kind involved in metaphor in general: a partial 
isomorphism between fields of concepts. In contrast to sortal objects and their appear-
ance in presentational pictures, there is usually no resemblanceα at the foundation since 
the abstract entities do not qualify for pre-objects per definitionem. The fact that words 
are usually integrated in structural pictures is another indicator for such pictures being 
based by metaphors: the connection to the target domain must be established in some 
way: “Julia is the sun” or 
“this circle is an option”.  
In Figure 41, several me-
taphors (and metonymies) 
are integrated with stan-
dardized pictograms and 
words connecting the gra-
phical source domain of the 
overall metaphor with the 
target domain, the structure 
of a university degree pro-
gramme. “Building” a de-
gree by starting from the 
base and step by step finish-
                                                     
30 Due to this use of the concept »similarity« in explanations of »metaphor«, the latter have sometimes 
been called “verbal images,” “pictorial expressions”. 
Figure 40: Metaphorical Transfer of Three-dimensional Space 
(visualizing a complex relation in election theory) 
 
Figure 39: State Transition Diagram of a Finite State Ma-
chine – Actions in a Computer Game 
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ing the roof – a lot of work; “passing” an institution on a certain path; an institution 
structured by building blocks (like columns). This conceptual structures can be used as a 
“narrative map” , either by an explicit sender, or by the beholder, presenting the graphic 
to himself/herself and explaining in an inner monologue about that degree programme 
by traveling “through” the picture. 
3.5.5 Reflective Communication & Pictures of Art 
A visitor to a museum looking at a pictorial exhibit (of the representational kind) can be 
conceived of as presenting the exhibit to him/herself: s/he “tells him/herself internally” 
(so to speak) what s/he could tell somebody else about the scene depicted. This also 
forms the very basis for any stylistic considerations and aesthetic judgments (a path 
which we shall not pursuit here). In those cases, the quality of the constitution relation 
plays a particularly important role, i.e., the relation between sortal objects one thinks to 
see, and the visual Gestalts that the picture shows and that constitute the sortals. Many 
pictures of art are reflective pictures: as has already been mentioned in Section 3.5.1, 
they must be associated with a special mode of reflection, as the communicative act 
they are used for deals with the pictorial sign act itself, and hence with the immersive 
mode and its complicated inner structure. This may reach from exemplifying the ability 
of the picture maker to produce highly deceptive pictures (as plays a major role for 
many nature morte of the 16th century) to the pictorial critique of the focus on natu-
ralism. The central theme of the American art style ‘photorealism’ of the 1960s and 
‘70s, for example, is an indirect critique of the visual access to reality in the modern 
industrial societies: an access that is almost totally mediated by technical reproductions, 
and thus open to all kinds of hidden manipulations [HELD 1975]. The images of artists 
like CLOSE, BELL, and MORLEY do not try to show reality in a photo-like realism; their 
 
Figure 41: “The Three Columns of  Computational Visualistics” 
Pictorial Presentation of the Structure of a Degree Programme    
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subject is the mediated access 
to what is believed to be 
reality by media that are 
assumed to present subjects 
naturalistically.  
The emphasis in cubistic 
pictures on the integration of 
many perspectives necessary 
for pictorial presentations of 
sortals has been mentioned al-
ready in Section 3.1 (cf. Fig. 
6): such an integration forms, 
as we have seen, the basis of 
object constitution. The topic 
of cubistic pictures over and 
above the still realistic spatial 
arrangement of sortal objects 
is therefore, in a way, the dif-
ference in temporal quality between momentary visual Gestalt and persistent sortal ob-
ject. Even further along this path, PIET MONDRIAN’s famous paintings at the border of 
figurative and non-figurative pictures have evoked commentaries like: “The rapt quality 
of the image seems to embody a longing to deny time” [SYLVESTER 1997] (Fig. 42). 
Other branches of visual arts concentrate on the materiality of the picture vehicle, in 
particular the screen and the pigment. 
Although reflective pictures of the kinds used and invented in modern art are seldom 
relevant in computational visualistics, at least the particular use conditions of example 
images employed in texts on pictures may be considered important. We may quote pic-
tures in order to exemplify a certain algorithm of image processing or computer graph-
ics. Again, an aspect of picture production (hence use) is communicated by means of the 
presentation of such a picture; what is to be seen (as those pictures are usually of the 
representational kind) is more or less contingent. The frequency of teapots in pictures 
presented in computer graphics books does by no means communicate a particular ad-
diction to the beverage (Fig. 43), nor does the insistence on skeletal feet in publications 
from the Magdeburg computational visualistics group indicate a very strange fetishism. 
How the object chosen is depicted, how the visual Gestalt relates to the sortal object, 
and in particular: how that relation again is linked with some aspects of the algorithm 
exemplified, that is what the sender of such a message normally intends – and what the 
receivers expect to be told in those communicative circumstances. Those pictures are 
therefore clear cases of reflective pictures, as well. 
3.6 Conclusions for Computational Visualistics 
The overview on image science given here was centered around the following idea: to 
isolate the essential properties of the concept »picture« by means of a logical 
reconstruction (“an implementation” see Sect. 2.1) of the corresponding field of 
concepts. Such an investigation deals with questions like “how can we motivate that 
such a form of sign acts with the special involvement of (visual) perception could have 
developed?” – “What are the general properties of sign use and perception that are 
necessary for such a conceptual combination?” – “To what purpose and under what 
 
Figure 42: Ocean and Pier 
 P. MONDRIAN 1915
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preconditions did creatures evolve 
that can use such a type of signs?” 
Thus, we deal with the concepts 
»perception« or »sign use« or 
»picture« in the essence, so to speak, 
not with a particular form any such 
concept may take in a certain cultural 
environment; with the “conditions of 
their possibility” in KANT’s words. 
Some characterizations, then, hold 
for pictures because of those general 
structures of perceptoid signs while 
others are just contingent conse-
quences of one particular and idio-
syncratic instance (of many equiva-
lently possible such instances) of a 
perception apparatus with sufficient complexity, or of the specific language and sign 
systems established for those picture users. The latter properties may change with cul-
tural development, and may even be used to investigate cultural differences and devel-
opments (being the classical fields of history of arts, and cultural anthropology, of 
course). Modifications in the former attributes however do result in a different concept 
altogether, something that is not characterizing pictures anymore but something else. 
The difference between the two types of properties is clearly expressed when corre-
sponding forms of explanations are juxtaposed: “Since visual perception follows this or 
that rule (for us middle-aged Europeans at the beginning of the third millennium)” – 
think of perspective, for example – “that and such is true for pictures (for us)” vs. “Since 
perception (in general) can only be rationally conceived if this and that relation holds” – 
e.g., between sender, receiver, sign vehicle, and sign content – “perceptoid signs are 
only possible if that and such is granted.” Computational visualists are expected to 
know something about the first kind of explanations, but ultimately they must know 
everything about the second kind by heart if they want to earn their name. 
From a general act-theoretic perspective, two lines of argumentation have been fol-
lowed, associated with levels of understanding with growing complexities: for (i) per-
ception and (ii) sign use. Combinations have been sketched on different levels, but only 
the most complex pair – perception of individual things and assertive language – allows 
us to reach the conceptual structure of perceptoid signs. The goal in the next chapter is 
to take the essential structures resulting for pictures as a guidance toward the specifica-
tion of the “complete data type »image«” that underlies and structures every effort in 
computational visualistics, if one such thing can rationally be considered; or alterna-
tively to motivate the set of distinct data structures necessary, and to clarify the relations 
they stand in.  
The gigantic task of unfolding the new discipline on the basis of general characteriza-
tions of visual perceptoid signs can indeed act as a research programme only in the pre-
sent context. As has been mentioned in Chapter 2, computational visualistics, as a co-
herent field of computer science, is a relatively new idea, a consequence of general 
visualistics – as a unified image science – not being established earlier. Up to now, deal-
ing with pictures in computer science has been separated in several sub-disciplines with 
more or less loose methodological connections (mainly by means of computer science 
Figure 43: An Exemplification of the Algorithm ‘envi-
ronment mapping’ Using the Notorious “Utah Teapot”
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but not by the common subject “picture”). Only aspects of the “complete data type” (or 
the structured set of several types) have been considered. 
Let us conclude the condensed review of theory in image science by summarizing the 
most essential points for the computational visualist.  
 
• An explication of pictorial communication must consider the double nature of per-
ceptoid signs: their general symbolic aspect and their particular perceptual aspect. 
The way pictures are interpreted is mainly influenced by the way these two aspects 
interfere: pictures stand in the diverging force fields between communication and 
immersion. 
• When dealing with pictures, one has to answer in general the question “who is 
communicating with whom”; that relation between sender, sign, and receiver is fur-
thermore complicated by the very nature of conscious communication – to internally 
anticipate the interlocutors. Generic models of senders and receivers anticipated by 
the actual communication participants regularly interfere in the sign process.  
• Pictures are signs with representational function. However the naïve conception of 
a simple relation “similarity” per se between picture and objects or states of affairs 
as the basis for that function does not satisfy. Internalization of the resemblance re-
lation leads to the integration of the complicated principles of primary and secon-
dary object constitution into the act of signification. 
• Pictures are neither true nor false; they are used in sign acts that are authentic, i.e., 
legitimate, or not. This is a relation not merely between a picture and what it is used 
to stand for (objects, states of affairs), but a relation that additionally (and more 
importantly) includes the participants of the sign act (sender and receiver). 
• Pictures are basically used as context builders: their presentation is an unsaturated 
form of communication that refers to complementing sign acts. The complements 
are not part of the picture, and can therefore not be predicted by the picture vehicle 
alone. 
• Pictures are not primarily used for referring to objects, exemplifying abstract enti-
ties, or communicating states of affairs: they are employed to open up a medial dis-
course universe with objects as partaking in states of affairs. Reference to objects is 
performed by means of nominations (that depend on contexts introduced priorily). 
States of affairs are communicated by assertions.  
• Objects (referred to by means of a nomination) may be used in a metonymy as ex-
emplification for an abstract aspect. The metonymy can be extended to a corre-
sponding picture leading to abstract pictures. Fields of concepts, which structure 
state of affairs, can be mapped on each other by metaphorical transfer. The meta-
phor can also base the use of pictures leading to structural pictures. Finally, quoted 
pictures and pictures of art are employed in a very special mode of usage different 
from the usual un-reflected mode.  
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4 The Generic Data Type »Image«: General Aspects 
By analogy, we propose that pictures be thought of as instances of [several] Abstract 
Data Types on which certain operations are defined, while other operations are not de-
fined. For example, for many maps the operation measure distance is not defined. If a 
viewer measures a distance on the map and computes the distance between the points in 
reality on the basis of the scale, a wrong answer will undoubtedly result. 
[STROTHOTTE 1998, 404] 
We have to deal with the data type »image« and the data structures including that type 
or being related to it. As was explained in section 2.2, an abstract data type is the formal 
equivalent of a concept in the context of data processing. Many of the details sketched 
in the previous chapter appear here as properties and relations within a data structure 
containing a version of the type »image«.  
There is by no means any necessity of assuming exactly one unique date type »im-
age« for every task in computational visualistics, or just one corresponding data struc-
ture. Although covered by single expressions with very similar ranges of uses in many 
cultures, the phenomenon of pictures and the contexts of use they partake are quite di-
verse, as was indicated in the first section of Chapter 3. In the last section of the same 
chapter, the differentiation between three quite general types of pictures used by SACHS-
HOMBACH [2002, Sect. 7] has been mentioned, which could be taken as a hope that we 
may also be at least able to concentrate on only three main data structures with different 
but still similar versions of their central data type. 
It is characteristical for the theory of data structures to use “inheritance relations” 
along lines of abstractions: very general data structures with only a few very basic rules 
restricting the properties of the types contained and the operations that relate them with 
each other can be used as a common structure underlying several different data struc-
tures with more complicated specifications. Most computer scientists are familiar with 
the application of such “generic data types” in object-oriented programming languages. 
For example, a generic data type »number« is often defined with an unspecific relation 
“addition” only – there are few general rules restricting how the result of an addition ac-
tually relates with the items added: the operation has to be closed, symmetric, transitive. 
This framework is differently filled for specific types of numbers. 
Correspondingly, distinct levels of “genericity” for several generic data types »im-
age« and the corresponding data structures may be assumed. The most abstract one (i.e., 
“THE” generic data type »image«) has but a few attributes, relations, and operations 
with a small number of restricting rules. But these most elementary structures are inher-
ited to sub-types, as for example »representational pictures« or »reflective pictures«, 
with further specifications or modifications. 
4.1 The Organizational Principle of the Discussion 
This chaper is structured by aspects derived from the semiotic background of the 
generic data type in question. The course of discussion follows the conceptual triple of 
pragmatics, semantics, and syntax, which is closely related to the superimposed concept 
»sign« in general. They bring into the focus of interest domains of questions with more 
or less restricted horizons. It is an educated guess that the effects of the specific 
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difference ‘perceptoid’ of pictorial signs can be demonstrated particularly well by 
means of these domains. 
As the most complete one of the three, a pragmatic investigation deals with the com-
plex formed by a communication act and the other related acts (of communication or of 
any other sort), i.e., the embedding of the sign act in the “living practice” of the sign us-
ers. Which other act or behavior can or must precede a certain sign act? Which others 
may or have to follow? That, for example, the utterance of an assertion can be answered 
either immediately by an accepting or refusing (doubting) act of communication of the 
interlocutor, or by first performing a referential anchoring with corresponding sensory-
motor test routines, this is the structure of that particular “language game”, and hence a 
theme of pragmatics.  
More restrictive in its perspective, semantics focuses on the relations between sign 
vehicle and what is represented by means of it – as far as those relations are relevant for 
the sign use and can be investigated essentially without looking at the pragmatics of the 
sign act. Expressive or appellative aspects of sign uses are not taken into account. Usu-
ally, such relations are subsumed under the expression “meaning”. The links between a 
definite description (“this blurred photo”) and the object referred to, between a certain 
part of the distribution of color on a screen and the face depicted, or between a particu-
lar arm movement and a child’s emotional state are typical examples for the “objects” 
semantics is interested in. From a strictly semanticist point of view, indexical signs offer 
causality, and iconic signs similarity as candidates for a non-pragmatic meaning rela-
tion. Following the linguistic turn, it is now widely accepted that the concept of a 
strictly semantic investigation of meaning is ill-formed (with the exception of formal 
and artificial languages), and that semantics forms a special part of pragmatics focusing 
on the representational aspects of sign acts. 
The syntactic domain of questions has the most restricted horizon as it deals, strictly 
speaking, only with the relations between the sign vehicles of a sign system. Since sign 
vehicles are essentially some physical objects used in a particular manner, syntactic in-
vestigations examine in consequence just the relations between and properties of physi-
cal objects. Representational, expressive or appellative aspects are ignored. The main 
focus of interest lies in determining the range of deviation of physical properties not 
changing the identity of a sign, and the rules of composition forming vehicles for com-
plex signs from vehicles for simple signs. Obviously, the criteria used to distinguish one 
sign from the other can only be derived from the sign system as a whole, i.e., from a 
pragmatic point of view.  
Although the „natural“ order is, thus, to start with pragmatics, and then progress to 
the particular aspects of semantics and syntax, we shall go the other direction – a proce-
dure quite familiar to computer scientists, as programming languages are usually ex-
plained by starting with the syntax, adding the semantics of the constructs, and some-
times complementing the explanation by style guides as a very weak form of pragmat-
ics.  
In our context, the section on pragmatics (4.4) serves the purpose of bringing the par-
ticipants of the pictorial sign act, their interest in those images, the purpose of their in-
teractions with the computer, and the general communicative setting into prominent fo-
cus. Before doing so, section 4.2 investigates the options to reproduce pictures by means 
of a computer: (a) How can this particularly complicated but nevertheless closely re-
stricted physical artifact provide the range of properties that renders it useful as a picture 
vehicle? (b) How does that effect the data type »image« that ultimately determines the 
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subject of computational visualistics? These syntactic considerations are followed by 
focusing on the representational aspects of pictorial communication: under the label 
“semantics” we investigate in section 4.3 a particular set of relations between the data 
type »image« and other data types covering the image’s content. 
4.2 Syntactic Aspects 
Combining elementary sign vehicles into complex ones is often viewed as the central 
issue of syntactic investigations. In this tradition, STROTHOTTE & STROTHOTTE [1997, 
Sect. 3.1] have presented some thoughts about a combinatorial syntax for computational 
pictures. They have introduced analogies that may be drawn between linguistic and 
pictorial levels of sign elements we shall also use in this section. In particular, we have 
to distinguish between the non-autonomous elements combined into a picture (4.2.2.1), 
and the combination of autonomous pictures into pictorial (or other) signs of a higher 
order (sect. 4.2.2.2).  
In the present discussion about the concept of pictures, the property of having a dense 
range of sign elements is considered prominent among the syntactic aspects: verbal 
signs are characterized in contrast by their discreet succession of elements. GOODMAN 
has introduced in this context the concept »density« – intuitively related to the structure 
of rational numbers – by means of a strange bipartite negation concerning (i) the 
uniqueness of the relation between sign vehicle and sign, and (ii) the existence of an ef-
fective procedure to prove the former relation. However, the two negations also hold for 
the concept »continuity«. As the distinction between the two concepts throws some light 
on the other two themes of pictorial syntax in computational visualistics, it is discussed 
first. 31  
4.2.1 Pictorial Resolution and the Identity of Images 
For GOODMAN [1976, 133] it is essentially the attribute of syntactic density that is 
characteristic for pictorial sign systems, and hence plays an important role for the 
corresponding data structures. A sign system is called syntactically dense, if the 
dimension of values for at least one of the syntactically relevant properties of the sign 
vehicles corresponds to the rational numbers: between any two values there are always 
more values. Sign vehicles with different values in that property are taken as different 
signs in that sign system. That is, two of the infinitely many signs of such a system can 
be “infinitely similar”  to each other. If no such dimension of properties is given, that is, 
if all syntactically relevant attributes take values that can be separated from each other 
distinctly, the sign system is called syntactically discreet. 
Syntactic characteristics of pictures are obviously defined by the visual properties of a 
marked surface of the picture vehicle. There are at least two different relevant dimen-
sions that are apparently dense: (i) the positions of a point of color or a border between 
colors, and (ii) the perceived color (in a broad meaning). In the following, the range of 
positions and its connection to the concept »resolution« is investigated (for color cf. 
sect. 4.2.3).  
                                                     
31 Let us, for the time being, restrict ourselves to flat, smooth, rectangular pictures. The other forms can 
usually be dealt with in analogy or by a simple projection to the basic form. 
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If syntactic density is accepted as an important criterion for pictorial sign systems, the 
author has not given pictures in the first row of Table 1 at all. The second row, however, 
is used in fact for exemplifying five pictures.32 
The signs in the upper row belong to the discreet sign system of the international traf-
fic signs. The first three sign vehicles depicted in the lower line can indeed be also used 
as vehicles for the first sign in the upper row. However, those three sign vehicles carry 
three quite distinct signs when viewed as pictures – the sign system actually intended in 
the second row. The syntactically discreet system of traffic signs is embedded in the 
syntactically dense system of pictures: each traffic sign forms the island of an equiva-
lence class, so to speak, surrounded by pictures that are not used as traffic signs. Simi-
larly, the sign vehicles of letters – “a”, “b”, “c”, etc. – can be conceived of as pictures 
(as in a font editor) and also as signs in a syntactically distinct sign system (as in a word 
processor) depending on the pragmatic context. 
The syntactically characteristic property of density is of high significance for the pos-
sibility of encoding, presenting, storing, and transferring pictures in/with a computer. Is 
it decidable whether two pictures are syntactically equal? Can we, with other words, de-
termine whether the transmission of a picture through the Internet, for example, has 
been correct, or whether a stored image still corresponds to the original? 
GOODMAN deduces from density as the relevant syntactic property of pictorial sign 
systems that sign vehicles cannot be associated uniquely to one sign alone. In conse-
quence, an effective proof of correctness for any image transmission becomes impossi-
ble on the base of syntax. He writes, referring to signs (“characters”) of a sign system 
that are determined by the lengths of sign vehicles (“marks”) [1976, 132]: 
Corresponding to the different rational numbers, there will, then, always be two (or 
more precisely: infinitely many) characters such that measuring cannot determine that 
the mark does not belong to them independent of how precise the length of a mark can 
be measured.       
Here GOODMAN implicates a division of problems in classes of decidability well-
known to any computer scientist. In the concrete example, a semi-decidable problem is 
considered. We have to decide whether a length is not equal to another length.33 The 
positive case (“not equal”) can be determined with a finite number of steps: by compar-
ing with successively higher resolutions. That does not work for the negative case of the 
                                                     
32 The reference to the sender is of course quite essential here, as a finite set of example sign vehicles 
alone does not properly identify a sign system – we would at least have to add “that’s all”. The property 
of syntactic density or discreetness can be ascribed only to the intended sign system as a whole. 
33 The same holds true if not lengths but the positions of spots of color are considered. 
Table 1: Five picture vehicles of two quite different sign systems 
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question (not “not equal”, i.e., “equal” – here is indeed the reason for the complicated 
formulation with double negation GOODMAN uses).  
4.2.1.1 Density, Continuity, and Decidability 
From a formal perspective, density can be stated if there is a property of the sign 
vehicles (like position) that is structured as to allow us to speak about a “between”-
relation of its values. This “between”-relation must again fulfill certain conditions. That 
is, syntactic density is a property of another property (“between”) of attributes 
(“position”) of objects. Rational numbers are the archetype for density. Real numbers 
are dense as well, but they have also another property of the same general structure: 
they are continuous. A type of numbers is continuous if the limes of any infinite 
sequence of numbers also belongs to that type. This is not true for the rational numbers, 
as for example the sequence of numbers approximating the relation of a circle’s 
diameter and its circumference has as its limit not a rational number. The real numbers 
can indeed be conceived of as introduced by means of closing the rational numbers 
under the limes operation. 
Being material objects, picture vehicles have surfaces we usually consider as being 
continuous, i.e., associated with the real numbers. Marks on that surface, spots of pig-
ment, for example, may be the results of movements (of a brush, a droplet of ink, a jet 
of electrons). In physics, we have to consider a continuous range of locations in order to 
describe the interception of the movement with the surface adequately, i.e., without 
paradoxes of ZENO’s type haunting our conception.  
The distinction between density and continuity for the range of positions of pictorial 
surfaces is particularly important because the two types of numbers are associated with 
different kinds of infinity. The rational numbers can be enumerated while the real num-
bers cannot [CANTOR 1874]. As is well-known, many problems concerning the question 
whether an instance with a specific combination of attributes does exist can be decided 
if the members of the set considered can be enumerated: any member can, then, be 
reached for checking after a limited number of steps. Correspondingly, testing the iden-
tity of any two numbers (e.g., in decimal notation) is a decidable problem only for the 
rational numbers. For real numbers, the test is only semi-decidable: we can find out in a 
finite number of steps whether two numbers (of usually infinitely many figures) are not 
the same, but in general not whether they are indeed the same.  
The observation that picture vehicles must be viewed as a field of concept with a con-
tinuous, hence over-enumerablely infinite range of locations due to the conditions of 
their production does by no means imply the type of infinity for the locations relevant 
for the concept »image«. Although the vehicles may be linked with locations by real 
numbers, it is still possible to assume that rational numbers are sufficient for the range 
of positions relevant for pictures: densely ordered equivalence classes in the continuous 
sea of possible picture vehicles.  
4.2.1.2 Syntactic Types of Pictures in Computers 
Based on the classes of decidability, three classes of pictures can be distinguished on 
syntactic grounds in computer science. 
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A) Simple pixel pictures – the data type »bitmap« 
The most simple and well-known type for making pictures available for a digital 
computer are bitmaps – matrices of pixels as they are called (‘picture elements’). This 
data type allows us to define a pixel-value for any 
pair of coordinates taken from two finite sets of 
successive indices (i.e., natural numbers). The 
pixel values encode a visual property, like color 
or intensity (Fig. 44). Bitmaps have therefore a 
finite and fixed locale resolution that depends on 
the size a pixel is given: bitmap pictures are 
ratcheted. The presentation of pictures on a 
computer screen usually employs this data type 
(essentially in just one matrix size).  
The number of different bitmaps of a given in-
dex size is finite, while the number of different 
index sizes is infinite but enumerable. Although 
bitmaps are a rather limited candidate for the data 
type »image«, they have at least the advantage 
that there is no problem to decide identity or dif-
ference between two instances effectively.  
B) Pixel pictures with variable resolution 
Other candidates have been developed that do not use a fixed resolution – originally in 
order to save memory space (and to minimize transmission times). Starting with a 
simple bitmap, the granularity can be reduced to just one pixel for a connected region 
with the same pixel values. If the description of the region is not too complicated, this 
results in a dramatic reduction of memory space or transmission time. Dividing a matrix 
recursively in halves (or quarters) provides a good algorithm to find out promising 
regions without a complicated specification: the description of the regions takes the 
form of a binary (or quarterny) tree. Figure 44 gives us a quite extreme example: this 20 
* 20 matrix with its 400 pixels can be reduced to: one value for the left half, one value 
for the lower half of the right half, one value for the left half of the upper-right quarter, 
etc. If each remaining bitmap is quartered instead of halved so that we do not have to 
bother about alternating the direction of the parting), the resulting data-type is called a 
»quadtree« (cf., e.g., [FOLEY ET AL. 1996, 843 ff]). 
Of course, the original idea of locally reducing the granularity of a given bitmap for 
the internal representation of that image can be inverted: the recursive definition of 
»quadtree« and similar data types allows us to increase the resolution of a simple bitmap 
at relevant locations if necessary – up to the ultimate degree of resolution for any sub 
region (Fig. 45). 
Let us call all instances of »quadtree« with the same frame size a “quadtree family”. 
Each element of a family has obviously a finite maximal resolution; but there are always 
members with a higher resolution. This property of »quadtree« should remind us of the 
rational numbers. The data type indeed determines a syntactically dense domain: be-
tween any two different quadtree instances of the same family there are always other in-
stances (e.g., with higher maximal granularity), indeed infinitely many others, that is. 
Nevertheless the finite maximal resolution of each instance opens the possibility to 
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check identity and difference of two 
quadtrees effectively. Since there is no 
resolution fixedly associated with the 
data type »quadtree« (and its relatives), 
all members of a quadtree family can eas-
ily be compared effectively with each 
other. With quadtrees, we are able to de-
cide whether two instances are indeed 
versions of the same bitmap at different 
compression rates, so to speak. 
In contrast to simple bitmaps, the data 
type »quadtree« can be used to grasp in-
finitely many different pictures of a given 
frame size. The relation between the ab-
stract incarnation of pictures by means of 
»quadtree« and bodily pictures corre-
sponds to the relation between rational 
numbers and rational lengths: in the abstract structures of the descriptive systems 
(»quadtree« or »rational number«), two instances can be clearly distinguished despite 
the density; for rational numbers embodied by physical lengths and for bodily pictures 
alike, the decision problem is only semi-decidable.  
In order to view quadtree pictures it is still necessary to transform them to simple 
bitmaps corresponding to the uniform and finite resolution of the video screen (or 
printer). The variable resolution can only be made available by means of an explicit 
zooming operation, which projects a local refinement of granularity onto the bitmap 
level. We shall come back to the zooming operation soon. 
C) Generative computer pictures 
Real numbers can be adequately represented by digital computers only in an intensional 
manner, i.e., by means of rules for sequences of other (rational or natural) numbers. 
There is, so to speak, no purely syntactic version of computerized real numbers. This of 
course reduces the chances for continuous computer pictures dramatically, leaving open, 
however, the option of a generative procedure that generates always on request a new 
“surface picture” with a refined resolution. Imagine a quadtree with infinitely many 
branching levels but without leaves.34 It is, then, reasonable to speak of a “real” image 
with infinite resolution underlying any “observable” incarnation. Such generative data 
types are indeed of the same infinity type as the real numbers: they form a syntactically 
continuous domain of computer pictures. Some of the programs for generating the 
popular fractal pictures (Fig. 46) belong here. In principle (i.e., from a structural point 
of view, ignoring the familiar technical restrictions), the users can zoom into such a 
picture at any place without limits – on the screen, they always get a provisory version 
of the actual continuous picture. The generation rules are pretty simple for fractal 
images. Pictures more useful for everyday life would need numerous much more 
complex rules (which also have to include semantic and pragmatic factors). 
Those are already all the relevant syntactic classes of representing pictures in a com-
puter. If we want to ascribe to pictures the syntactic attribute of being continuous, we 
have to count with severe restrictions since not all the pictures are representable with a 
                                                     
34  In fact, the definition of »quadtree« includes that the number of branching levels is limited. 
 
Figure 45: Quadtree Structure with Nine Levels of 
Detail for the Picture of a Rose 
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computer. Furthermore, we do 
not even know whether or not a 
refined resolution suffices to tell 
us about a difference since the 
differences between two pictures 
may be infinitesimally small.  
We could confine our concept 
»image« to syntactic density. 
Then, the data type »quadtree« 
suffices us to deal computation-
ally with all possible pictures 
(presuming that enough resources 
are available). We can also de-
velop algorithms that decide, for 
example, whether a transmission 
has altered a picture. 
Are there other reasons to consider a dense range of locations for the data type »im-
age«? Or is it nevertheless necessary to aim for a “continuous syntax”? Indeed, not what 
pictures per se are syntactically is the question, but what do we want to do with them, 
what kind of “room for action” do we want to use, and how do we want to communicate 
about that. For a satisfying conclusion between the arguments supporting pictorial con-
tinuity, and others speaking for a restriction to density, the relation between pictures and 
perceived (and depicted) reality is to be considered. Indeed, as was marked above, a cer-
tain behavior associated with pictures and with visual perception in general – i.e., an as-
pect of pragmatics – is of particular importance for the question of syntactic classes: the 
zooming operation, which is a generalized version of any beholder’s option of moving 
his/her visual sensors closer to or away from the scene observed.  
Considering a zooming operation has the particular advantage in computational com-
plexity that it is at each moment necessary to deal only with a finite number of locations 
– as there is analogously a limited number of sensory cells only. The locations “in be-
tween” can be “generated” if necessary by means of the zooming operation – performed 
either by concretely approaching the scene, by using an optical device (tele-
scope/microscope), or by performing an algorithm controlling the computer screen. The 
unusual inversion of verification of ascribing positions (cf. Sect. 3.4.4) is also closely 
related to the ability of moving and orientating the optical sensors. With other words: 
the field of concept for visual perception, which is connected so closely with pictures by 
their definition, depends on the concept »motion«, which can only be described in a 
continuous domain.  
The general dependency of syntax from pragmatics thus gains a particular meaning 
when considering pictures: density or continuity as a syntactic attribute of the underly-
ing faculty of visual perception can only be determined as depending from a certain type 
of behavior – the ability to move the visual sensors in space.  
4.2.2 Remarks on Compositionality 
The infinity class of the parameter “resolution”  is only one aspect of pictorial syntax. It 
corresponds roughly to the level of linguistics dealing merely with the range of letters; 
the notorious pixel usually comes into the beholder’s (or creator’s) focus of attention 
only when the presentation quality of a picture is low. There are other parts of which a 
 
Figure 46: Simple Fractal Picture („Mandelbrodt set“) 
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picture is viewed as composed of and which could be rearranged to form another image 
– thus forming the basis of a morphology of pictures, so to speak. Furthermore, several 
images can be arranged into pictorial signs of higher order, mimicking the arrangement 
of words into sentences and texts. 
4.2.2.1 Composition of One Picture: Pictorial “Morphology” 
The linguistic branch of morphology investigates essentially how words are build from 
“morphemes” – minimal meaning-contributing particles, like the postfix ‘-ed’ in 
English, the prefix ‘pré-’ in French, or the stem ‘-wend-’ in German. Mostly, such 
morphological elements are identified and arranged into classes by means of a rule of 
interchange: some words beginning with ‘pré-’ can be transformed into other words of 
French by just changing the prefix to ‘re-’, ‘con-’, ‘de-’ etc. The morphemes may best 
be viewed as the vehicles of unsaturated partial signs acts without a pragmatic function 
of their own (unlike predication or nomination) that modify in a more or less specific 
way the meaning of the whole. 
Are analogous “pixemes” relevant for the generic data type »image« or any of its 
more specific derivatives? It is important to note here that semantic arguments may be 
used to find such pixemes, but that their description must avoid any semantic “contami-
nation”. The characterization of pictures as perceptoid signs of the visual sense modali-
ties already suggests that visual Gestalt entities may serve exactly that purpose: closed 
areas, grouped by neighborhood and similarity (e.g., of coloration); connected lines; 
some visual pattern inducing directional “energy” (diagonals, arrow shapes).35 On a 
more formalized level, we may consider geometric entities – lines, curves, dots, areas, 
etc. as the basic morphological components of pictures. Indeed, such entities are also the 
standard elements offered by painter programs (like Corel Draw).  
Let us concentrate for the moment on lines or strokes. A stroke may be defined prag-
matically by the painter’s movement or semantically as the contour line of an object. 
Beside the potential graphical meaning of a line or the stylistic indications associated 
with its particular make (not to mention any other expressive or appellative function of 
dynamism associated to it on the level of pragmatics), there are several dimensions in 
which a line – just being taken as a line – can vary: most prominently in the course or 
path it takes. But there are other ranges: is it a continuous line, or dashed, or dotted? 
Does it consist of strokes of one kind or another? How thick is it? Does its thickness 
change over its course or not? Is there an internal fine structure to the strokes? Assum-
ing a corresponding data type »pictorial line« separate from »image« is, thus, certainly a 
wise idea. 
An extensive treatment of such a data type and its possible implementations has been 
performed in the context of non-photorealistic rendering (NPR) , a sub field of computer 
graphics. While Figure 47 exemplifies several types of digital “hairy brush strokes” that 
have been generated – quite expensively in computational resources – by simulating a 
brush with several individual bristles applied with changing pressure, Figure 48 shows 
examples of lines resulting the application of a “style function” to the “skeletal path” of 
the stroke. Both constituents of the latter case are defined by means of parametric 
curves: the style describes how a given path (as the core of the line) is to be perturbed in 
order to result in a corresponding pixeme. Style and path can be viewed as independent 
ranges determined in each particular picture by semantic and / or pragmatic aspects. 
                                                     
35 [SACHS-HOMBACH 2002, II.4.3] offers an overview on important “classical” texts for that theme. 
72 VARIATIONS AND APPLICATION CONDITIONS OF THE DATA TYPE »IMAGE«
 
 
The rules of composition of strokes or other pixemes into a picture can be investi-
gated by means of the tools of formal languages. Every computer scientist knows by 
heart the structures called formal grammars – or CHOMSKY grammars – since those are 
the major instrument for defining and classifying linear structures like programming 
languages. Formal grammars based on replacement rules that lead to two-dimensional 
“pictorial” structures have been investigated essentially under the name of L-systems.36 
The expressions generated by an L-system can be interpreted as orders to place sub-
structures, and to move or turn in-between. A fairly simple example is defined by the 
following replacement rule: 
P   Æ  P [ – P ] P [ + P ] P 
Interpret “P” as “place a pixeme and move a bit forward”, “+” by “turn right”, “–“ by 
“turn left”, and the square brackets as stack operations that allow us to return to that 
point after the bracketed sub expression has been dealt with. The plant-like structures in 
Figure 49 have been generated by this rule. Obviously the pixemes themselves are not 
really relevant for L-systems and their relatives, since these grammars basically deal 
with arrangements and groupings of abstract entities that may or may not be interpreted 
in a pictorial sense. 
For a more extensive approach to pictorial morphology, a data type for pixemes can 
best be derived from a calculus for geometry. That any pixeme must be a geometric en-
tity seems almost too trivial to be mentioned. That inversely any entity in flat geometry 
– apart from non-extended points – may also be a candidate for a pixeme is at least a 
good guess. Taking the common Euclidean formalization of geometry leads however to 
the “unpleasant” consequence that the most basic pixemes must be non-extended points 
– a concept highly abstracted from experience, that is. Non-standard approaches to ge-
ometry like mereogeometries37 here offer an interesting way out. The traditional calculus 
                                                     
36 The “L” stands for “Lindenmayer”, as the botanist ARISTID LINDENMAYER started to use a correspond-
ing formal language for describing plants; cf. [PRUSINKIEWICZ & LINDENMAYER 1990]. 
37 cf. [WHITEHEAD 1929], [LEONARD & GOODMAN 1940] [CLARKE 1981], [AURNAGUE & VIEU 1993], 
[ASHER & VIEU 1995], [SMITH 1996], and [BORGO & MASOLO 2001]. 
  
Figure 47: Enlarged Fine 
Structure of Computer-
Generated Stroke Types  
Figure 48: Examples with Style-Parameterized Stroke Functions  
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of geometry develops around the fundamental concept of a zero-dimensional point. In 
contrast, mereogeometries are based on extended regions as the most elementary enti-
ties, which may or may not have (distinguishable) proper parts. The regions are often 
called “individuals”. Individuals do not have immediate attributes of form or position: 
only the relations to other individuals, in particular parts, determine form and (relative) 
location. 
An individual may quite well be thought of as a visual Gestalt – thus following the 
principle of perception psychology of the Gestalt school: one has to consider the per-
ceived whole first and introduce the concepts for perceptual atoms as instruments of the 
explanations of the former, not the other way round. We do not see sets of zero-
dimensional points but regional Gestalts. The abstract notion of a spatial entity without 
extension is secondarily constructed in order to explain some aspects of experienced 
space, but leads on the other side to severe difficulties as the discussion on infinite reso-
lution has shown. The thesis is therefore that the constructs of an individual calculus for 
the two-dimensional mereogeometry are excellent candidates for a general and exhaus-
tive discussion of pixemes.  
The syllable “mereo” indicates that part-whole relations form a central aspect of 
mereogeometries: more precisely, the fundamental data type “individual” in mereo-
geometries is primarily characterized by the reflexive and transitive relation of being 
part of between two of its instances.38 In the words of B. SMITH [1996, 290]: “We adopt 
as mereological primitive the relation of parthood or constituency. We say x is a part of 
y, and write ‘P(x, y)’, when x is any sort of part of y, including an improper part (so 
P(x, y) will be consistent with x’s being identical to y).” With this relation, more com-
plex relations and entities can be formally defined, especially those with topological in-
terpretations, like boundaries and interiors. Two individuals are, for example, defined to 
“overlap”, if there exists a third individual being simultaneously part of both of them. In 
particular, the concept of a minimal region usually called a “point” (“Pt”) – we may 
well use “pixel” instead – can be introduced: Pt (x) = def ∀ y (P(y, x) ⇒ y = x). That is: a 
                                                     
38 Some mereotopologies and mereogeometries are based on other relations; for example, AURNAGUE and 
VIEU [1993, 403] use the symmetric, reflexive binary relation C (for “being connected with”), from 
which (among others) the relation used in the text, P (part of/inclusion), is derived: P (x, y) ≡def ∀ z (C(z, 
x) ⇒ C(z, y)) 
 
Figure 49: Two Example Pictures Generated by (Bracketed) L-Systems, and the Graphical Interpreta-
tion for the Rule for the Left Example 
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point in this sense is a region that has no proper parts (or rather, a region where no 
proper parts are considered).39 40 
When the concept »point« is introduced in the data structure as mentioned above, 
there is no need in any concrete instance for using infinitely many point instances: only 
the “relevant” points must be instantiated. This also means that there is always a finite 
resolution. N. ASHER & L. VIEU [1995] propose a formal mechanism called “micro-
scopization” covering a kind of zooming operation by means of a modal extension to 
their calculus. What is a “point” on one level may be a compound of regions with sev-
eral points on a microscopized level. While Euclidean geometry first introduces the con-
tinuous range of infinitely many coordinates determining potential points some of which 
are then chosen to be relevant (still an infinite number in any practical relevant in-
stance), mereogeometry starts with a (usually finite) number of relevant individuals (re-
gions) we can think of being given in perception. That is, we may indeed assume that 
the principles governing visual perception determine the regions that are syntactically 
relevant, hence leading only to the essential “points”.  
Mereogeometries are a formal way to deal with geometry in a manner more closely 
related to visual perception than traditional point geometry. If we accept the view that 
the central data type of a two-dimensional mereogeometry determines what is a pixeme 
– namely any connected sub system of individuals, then there is indeed no finite number 
of possible pixemes – a clear difference to verbal sign systems with their strictly limited 
number of morphemes. However, any pixeme can be described and dealt with in a 
unique and generatable manner in the calculus in a finite number of steps: pixemes can 
be combined to form pixemes of a higher order – until every visually separable Gestalt 
of a picture is covered. 
4.2.2.2 Compositions With Pictures: Pictorial “Text Grammars” 
Considering compositions of (or with) pictures to form signs of higher order brings us 
first back to the compositions of pixemes as by L-systems: did we not in fact arrange 
pictures of strokes by means of a formula derived by an L-system? Indeed, the 
arrangement could be, as in that case, one performed in the picture plane as well as one 
in our usual three-dimensional environment, or even in the separate dimension of time. 
While such formal systems may be also quite useful for describing part-whole relations 
in the sense intended here, the two forms of compositions – within one picture, and with 
several pictures – must not be confounded: pixemes are never used for autonomous 
signs, while the composition with pictures depends on the status of the component 
pictures of being quite well useable as independent signs. The linguistic counterpart to 
the latter is indeed text grammars dealing with the composition of texts from sentences, 
which can be seen as being already the sign vehicle for a complete sign act, a status not 
ascribable to single words or phrases. An abstraction of pure syntactic classes analogous 
                                                     
39 There are other ways to introduce a similar notion of a point in other mereotopologies/mereogeometries, 
some of them leading even to the non-extended Euclidean version. The nub here is that points are logi-
cally secondary entities. 
40 So far, only the definition for a mereotopology has been sketched: by adding, for example, relations of 
relative distance between points (point A is closer to point B than to C), and of relative direction be-
tween points (point A is between points B and C), the data structure can be extended to a geometry basi-
cally of the same expressive power as Euclidean geometry. As an advantage over and above not chosing 
a highly abstracted starting point but a more perception-like entity, topological and metric aspect can 
then be dealt with in relative separation. 
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to »verb«, »noun«, »adjective« is not available, and may, in the light of the 
considerations of Chapter 3, never be in general. 
Only for very restricted domains of use, an association between grammatical catego-
ries and pictorial compositions might be possible: TH. STROTHOTTE [1989, Sect. 3.1], 
for example, offers a syntactic schema in the context of maintenance instructions. Based 
on a formalized verbal description, an arrangement or sequence of pictures is to be gen-
erated. To that purpose, the noun phrases in question are schematically associated with 
elementary images of corresponding objects. The verbal groups considered correspond 
roughly to temporal arrangements of the pictorial compositions linked to the noun 
phrases that are bound together by those verbal groups. This includes the appearance of 
a “user’s hand” for imperative moods, or of “think bubbles” for subjunctive moods. Al-
though it is quite functional for its definite purpose, the rather small fraction of syntactic 
categories used indicates the limitation of such an approach. What about adjectives, ad-
verbs or conjunctions, for example?  
Of course, texts form just one-dimensional compositions: a comparable composite 
sign with pictures is given by (simple) comic strips, and also by films. While the former 
is clearly organized in several individual pictures by the “guts” between them, moving 
pictures do not offer a similar distinction of autonomous pictorial entities as easily. 
However, taking cuts or dissolves between (continuous) scenes as the temporal equiva-
lent of inter-panel space in comics leaves us with exactly those scenes as pictorially 
autonomous signs, a solution not too implausible indeed (cf. [SCHWAN 2001]).  
Comics do not only come in a linear fashion; the more advanced specimens use quite 
complicated forms of layout, taking into account not only the two-dimensional area of 
possible placements of one page, but the options of using either two opposing pages 
with a marked jump of view, or the even further separation of a page to be turned. This 
is indeed not much different from general layouting, which mostly deals with texts and 
possibly some pictures or other elements in between – pure text layout and comics lay-
out form just the two extremes. A type of pictorial composition in 2D, which is particu-
larly interesting here, is given when pictures are shown within another picture, i.e., not 
just as a morpheme (like the stroke pixeme or even a texture map) but as an autonomous 
picture on top of the other picture plane. A typical example is the use of an enlargement 
inset framed by means of a pictorial magnifying glass. 
There are compositions of pictures into high-order signs even in 3D space: think of an 
exhibition. The arrangement of the exhibits intends to establish correspondences and to 
allow the visitors to see more than just an unconnected set of pictures. For a computa-
tional visualist, a comparable task may come into view when dealing with special VR 
presentation hardware like CAVEs forcing him or her to coordinate the placement of 
pictures in three dimensions.  
We shall not go here into further detail of this particular aspect associated with the 
data type »image«. Computational approaches to text/discourse grammars become 
rather helpful in later sections when taking into account more than just syntactic consid-
erations of layouting.  
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4.2.3 Some Notes on Formalizing Color  
Denn daß man sich etwas „Grauglühendes“ nicht denken kann,  
gehört nicht in die Physik oder Psychologie der Farbe.  
[WITTGENSTEIN 1984, I.40] 
The formal structure of the locational organization of pixemes is only one aspect of 
pictorial syntax, and in fact one not perceivable as such. Like the temporal base 
structure of music that can only be perceived as organizing a sequence of distinct 
auditory markers – difference of pitch or harmonic progression, change of volume or 
variation of timbre – the perception of the spatial base structure of pictures depends on 
visible differences: visual markers usually subsumed under the expression “color”. 
Indeed, color in this general sense includes hue, saturation and intensity as well as 
texture or even homogenous temporal variations thereof. It is exactly the change of any 
one of those values that induces the border of a pixeme. 
The various systems to cover color (in the closer sense) formally in computer science 
are well-known – “color models”  – and do not need a detailed description here: every 
painting program or system for picture manipulation offers at least RGB, HSB or 
CMYK. Here again, we meet the problem of formalizing a seemingly dense dimension 
– between any two colors there appear to be more colors. And again, we depend on a 
perceptual system with a limited resolution in color distinction.41 In contrast to locative 
resolution however, there is no such thing in “color space” as a natural “zooming opera-
tion”: the members of some pairs of colors are only distinguishable by means of a com-
plicated technical device like spectral analysis that has no equivalent in non-technical 
human behavior.42 We may therefore take color without real simplification as a syntacti-
cally discrete dimension with a resolution just below the threshold of human perception. 
Correspondingly, contemporary computer systems offer a data type for homogenous 
colors with more than 16.5 million values (together with methods to select and manipu-
late them easily): two immediately neighboring color values of that system are for most 
humans undistinguishable.43 
Homogenous color is the central, but not the only aspect. More often, the visual 
markers are given as fine-grained textures that only appear as more or less homogenous 
if the spatial resolution is not too high. In these cases, zooming reveals that a locale dis-
tribution of homogenous colors has in fact been used (or even fields with textures on a 
still finer level). However beside the zooming, textures are perceived, remembered, and 
even imagined not as a particular spatial distribution of (homogenous) color but as an-
other kind of visual marker values (more or less analogous to accords in music): the sys-
tem of visual markers consists of two levels. 
As textures can technically be reduced to fine-grained patterns of homogenous colors, 
the most common way to deal with them in computational visualistics is by using a 
sample. More ambitious analytic solutions for a corresponding data type concentrate on 
characteristic structural, statistical or spectral parameters [LONG ET AL. 2000]. Structural 
parameters characterize textures according to geometric relations between correspond-
                                                     
41 Are there arguments for taking color space to be even continuous? Physics at least assumes a continu-
ous spectrum (range of wavelengths / frequencies) of electromagnetic waves implementing color, 
though the relevance of this conception for color perception is only quite indirect. 
42 Zooming locational resolution by microscopes or telescopes can be viewed as a technical equivalent to 
approaching the scene perceived, as was already indicated above 
43 Moreover, there are few technical devices that really reproduce each single value distinctly. 
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ing homogenous sub regions while statistical texture parameters measure the locale 
variations of visual qualities (e.g., granularity, regularity, line-likeness): the feature 
“roughness”, for example, depends on the fractal dimension of the intensity variations 
relative to spatial displacement (cf., e.g., [WU & CHEN 1992]). For spectral approaches, 
the Fourier transform of the texture is calculated as the basis of further analyses.  
For the computational visualist’s perspective, transparency and reflectivity are phe-
nomena of color (in the broad sense) even more interesting then textures. Stained church 
glasses or Mexican folk art with build-in pieces of mirrors are well-known examples of 
corresponding traditional pictures. Note that those effects cannot be ascribed to the pic-
ture as such: it has to be considered in (and in contrast to) changing situational contexts. 
In every single context (i.e., arrangement of objects and lights around the image), the 
transparent and reflective regions of the picture have a fixed appearance undistinguish-
able from other regions – they may be marked by homogenous colors or textures just as 
well. Only if changes in the context do indeed change the distribution of marker values, 
and hence the arrangement of pixemes, an observer perceives regions as being transpar-
ent or reflective. The phenomenon is also directly important for computational visualists 
when combining pictures in layout (mostly transparency) or 3D graphics (transparency 
and reflection). Of course, an adequate conceptualization in the data type »image« must 
explicitly include such “indexical marker values”; we cannot replace them by one arbi-
trarily induced distribution of homogenous colors or textures. As a standard for trans-
parency, an additional dimension of marker values called the “alpha channel” has been 
added.44 
Let us consider in this context as a final aspect of pictorial syntax a thesis that is often 
mentioned: in contrast to verbal expressions that can be syntactically ill-formed, there 
seems to be no such thing as a syntactically ill-formed picture (cf. [PLÜMACHER 1999]). 
Whereas, for example, the syntactic structure of a verbal language may be described by 
just one Chomsky grammar, any expression in any L-system forms a picture. The rea-
son seems to be essentially that the geometric base of pixemes is dense, and any poten-
tial combination of pixemes already forms a picture. However, those discussing this is-
sue do usually not mention damaged screens: cuts, holes, and burned regions disrupt the 
homogenous topology that is part of the pictorial base structure. Cuts, for example, 
separate neighboring pixels: are they neighboring anymore or not, we cannot really say. 
Suddenly, there is non-space in picture space – which is certainly not equivalent to fully 
transparent regions. After all, a cut in a “Rembrandt” results not just in another picture 
but in a destroyed picture. So, our counter-thesis is that pictures might quite well be 
counted as syntactically ill-formed if the underlying geometric structure is disrupted.45  
4.2.4 Syntactic Transformations and Image Processing 
Computationally, transformations of the syntactic structure of pictures belong to the 
field of image processing – we usually interpret such a transformation as an operation 
from one picture to another one although the computer deals with the vehicles alone. In 
                                                     
44 Reflectivity poses some particular problems, which we deal with later. 
45 As with syntactically ill-formed verbal expressions, which may nevertheless be used efficiently for 
communication, syntactic well-formedness is no necessary criterion for a picture to be employed: a cer-
tain art form in the middle of the 20th century, particularly exemplified by L. FONTANA, plays exactly 
with this deviation from well-formed images: FONTANA’s “cut pictures” are reflective pictures that focus 
our attention on the “materiality” – or in our terminology: on the geometric base structure – of pictures 
exactly by means of the violation of that very basis; cf. [SACHS-HOMBACH 2002, 164f.].  
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most cases, pixel matrixes are 
considered: this format is 
what CCD cameras or 
scanners originally provide.  
The transformations that 
are performed on one image 
vehicle alone can be distin-
guished from those combin-
ing two (or more) vehicles. 
Typical combinations are 
weighted addition and differ-
ence. Apart from that, the op-
erations can be classified into 
three categories: pixel opera-
tions, local operations, and 
global operations. In the first 
class, the output value at a 
specific pixel depends only on 
the input value at that same 
coordinate. In contrast, the 
output value at a specific 
pixel is calculated from all the 
input values in the vicinity of 
the coordinate in question for 
local operations – or from the 
complete set of input pixels 
for global operations.  
A typical pixel operation is 
“inversion” leading to the 
negative image. Essentially, 
pixel operations calculate only new marker values: as in the case of inversion, the geo-
metrical base structure is not changed. This is not necessarily so. For example, the trans-
formation from color to grayscale (intensity) maps different marker values from one 
system to the same value in the second system. In consequence some syntactic elements 
are no longer distinguishable: the color version and the grayscale version are determined 
by different sets of pixemes.  
Applying filters is essentially a local operation. For example, the “MEAN filter” re-
places the marker value of any pixel by the average of the marker values of that pixel 
with its immediate neighbors (e.g., the 3 * 3 pixel neighborhood). The effect is obvi-
ously a reduction of detail – the image appears to be smoothed. For reaching the inverse 
effect, several operations have to be combined (cf. Fig. 50). Calculating the difference 
between the corresponding pixels of the original image and the image resulting a 
smoothing operation by the MEAN filter leads in a first step to a picture vehicle in 
which the marker value corresponds to zero (“black”) for most pixels– the smoothed 
picture differs from the original only at few places. Since the mean operation has the 
most effect where the local fluctuation in the original picture vehicle is high, i.e., at 
sharp borders, the difference pixel matrix highlights essentially such edge pixels. When 
in a second step the original pixel matrix is added again to the difference matrix, a pic-
 
Figure 50: Sharpening Transformation in the Context of Aerial 
View Analysis (see text) 
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ture vehicle results that is like the original with the contrast heightened exactly at the 
pixemes borders.46  
A special local transformation is the change of resolution, and in particular its reduc-
tion, since it often leads to unwanted artifacts: everybody is familiar with the Moiré pat-
terns in TV that appear if a regular texture with a periodicity close to the camera resolu-
tion is shown. Aliasing effects disfigure smooth curves if they have to be digitized into a 
pixel matrix. Therefore, anti-aliasing transformations are usually added that smooth 
away the artificial borders 
The most important one of the global operations is the (digital) Fourier transforma-
tion. This transformation is based on the fact that every possible spatial variation of the 
marker values can be described by a parameterized set of cyclic functions. Therefore, 
the two-dimensional spatial distribution of pictorial marker values can be transposed 
into a two-dimensional frequency distribution of the same marker values, i.e., a new 
pixel matrix. However, the pixel positions are here not interpreted as locations but as a 
specification for the frequency of a cyclic function, or more precisely its frequency 
components in the two main directions. Each pixel of the Fourier transform depends on 
information from every pixel of the original vehicle (and, in fact, vice versa).  
In a way, location is spread out over the whole Fourier matrix in a similar manner as 
the cyclic functions disperse the frequency distributions over the whole original pixel 
matrix. Quite obviously, the pixel matrix of the Fourier transform of the vehicle of any 
ordinary picture does not bear any resemblance with the original. However, many trans-
formations that need complicated calculations in the original picture vehicle can be cal-
culated quite easily in its Fourier-transformed version. Therefore efficient versions for 
calculating Fourier transformations and their inversions, e.g., FFT, are extremely impor-
tant in image processing (cf., e.g., [GONZALEZ & WOODS 2002]). 
4.2.5 The Limitations of Pictorial Syntax  
In conclusion: the formal treatment of pictures in computational visualistics covering 
the syntactic aspects rests essentially on two basic data types and their interaction: first, 
the base structure of position and form, for which the calculi of mereogeometry are the 
most promissing general candidates; second, the field of marker values based on a 
discretized range of homogenous colors and an additional dimension for transparency 
(and perhaps reflectivity), offering further structural principles for the level of textures. 
Providing structures isomorphic to the syntactic characteristics of images is indeed 
sufficient for handling pictures by means of a computer – after all that structure is ex-
actly equivalent to all the relevant aspects of the picture vehicles. However, computa-
tional visualistist should not be satisfied, as pictures are not merely picture vehicles but 
much more complicated entities. Not everything flat and covered with regions of tex-
tures is already a picture. If we do not also consider the particular contexts of use that 
make us take a flat object for a picture, there is, for example, no way to select rationally 
from a given set of pictures the one to be best presented to a certain computer user un-
der some specific conditions at hand: computational visualistics would not reach its full 
capacity. 
Even the syntactic grouping of pixemes into entities of higher order takes into ac-
count not only the syntactic attributes of the corresponding elements but also more or 
                                                     
46 A similar combined transformation is in fact encoded in the neuronal network of the retina, leading also 
to the optical illusion of MACH bands. 
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less every other pixeme present in the picture: the grouping is highly context-sensitive. 
Indeed, the identification of the pixemes particularly in a figurative picture depends to a 
high degree on the picture’s content, i.e., what is depicted – a question belonging (at 
least on first view) to the field of semantics.  
4.3 Semantic Aspects 
Semantics in computational visualistics adds those features to the data structure around 
the type »image« that deal particularly with representational aspects of pictures. There 
are, in fact, two facetts of representation to be covered: by considering the “picture 
content”  we focus on those properties of the picture vehicle that are relevant for 
understanding its significance in the sign act – our abilities to recognize pixemes as 
something more than patches of texture, so to speak. If we mention “the referent of a 
picture”  we mean the individual scenes, events, objects, facts, etc. that the picture is 
taken to represent. Since we consider them as intentional objects, i.e., only as far as 
somebody experiences, recognizes, knows them, the referents may be factual or 
fictitious. They depend on the picture content. Therefore, picture content is our main 
focus of attention in this section. For the sake of simplicity, picture contents may be 
transcribed as predicative partial expressions, e.g., “being a large red suspension bridge 
spanning over water to a hilly countryside”, while nominative partial expressions are 
used to mention picture referents: e.g., “the Golden Gate Bridge”. That replacement by 
means of verbal expressions is, of course, necessary because we cannot deal here with 
contents or referents directly.  
We can use linguistics again to inspire our attention. One rather stable distinction in 
linguistic semantics – though often appearing under different names – is that between 
reference semantics and intra-lexical semantics: researchers in the latter framework 
concentrate their efforts on circumscribing the representational aspects of verbal expres-
sions in an explicit and formal manner. The content of an expression, sentence or text is 
then given in a meta-language.47 A relation to extra-linguistic entities (vulgo: the world) 
is not considered in any direct form. Computational linguistics, the older sister disci-
pline of computational visualistics, uses such translations as the internal representation 
of the meaning of sentences or texts in a computer. In the form of operational seman-
tics, they are employed together with translation routines and transformation algorithms 
for simulating the understanding and generating of natural language.  
Linguists dealing with reference semantics try to ground the meaning of verbal ex-
pressions in the world, in particular by investigating the role of contexts: at least those 
terms dealing with concrete, spatio-temporally extended and localizable affairs are usu-
ally understood as being anchored in non-verbal experiences. Assumedly, the reference 
relation, which associates each expression with its (usually) non-verbal “thing”, is men-
tally mediated. Essentially, it is perception that gives access to contexts, and thus sup-
plies the needed referents. By and large, visual perception is used as a paradigmatic case 
for studying reference semantics. We come back to the operational form of reference 
semantics in Section 4.3.2, as it determines an important part of computer vision.  
As indicated above, a first approach to semantics of pictures is something analogous 
to intra-lexical semantics: a translation of the meaning components into a meta-
language – indeed the same type of logical meta-languages used for verbal expressions. 
Such an approach has often been criticized: importing the categories of verbal signs for 
                                                     
47 Some think here even of a so-called language of mind, or “Mentalese”; [FODOR 1976]. 
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analyzing perceptoid signs may be inadequate. However, a proper “intra-pictorial se-
mantics” has not been proposed, not even in a sketchy form. The idea of a translation of 
a picture’s meaning components into other pictures on a meta-level – perhaps the “pic-
tures of the mind“? – appears not to be really promising for scientific purposes. On the 
other hand, transferring the conception of reference semantics directly to pictures is 
complicated, as well, if we take into account that images have the prime function of 
context building: they provide the (absent) contexts that contain the referents for verbal 
expressions.  
Using verbal interpretations as a mediating link is a quite plausible solution in par-
ticular because computational visualists deal essentially with the concepts forming im-
age content, not with the thing per se. Whatever is to be represented by pictures has to 
be covered in the essence in the generic data structure by some – presumably relatively 
unspecific – data types, which we may call »picture content« (and »picture referent« re-
spectively). A representation relation Rep associates an instance of »image« to one (or 
perhaps even several) instance(s) of »picture content«48 – a relation obviously of particu-
lar interest for computer vision algorithms and the determination of pixemes. The in-
verse projection relation Rep-1 has to be considered as a keystone of computer graphics 
and information visualization.  
The sub-types of »image« differ in the kind of »picture content« they are related to, 
and the internal structure of those relations. For example, SACHS-HOMBACH’s three sub-
types of pictures, representational, structural, and reflective ones, are quite distinct in 
semantic respects. Representational pictures are used for representing realistic contexts, 
i.e., arrangements of spatial objects (or rather the intentional pendants thereof). The re-
lations between content and image have to be structured in a way that realizes the char-
acteristics ‘perceptoid’ for this type of signs as a more or less direct resemblanceβ – pos-
sibly modified by a metonymic shift. For structural pictures, a metaphoric shift has to be 
additionally considered that transforms non-spatial entities into spatial things or non-
visual properties into visual ones. Finally, the meaning of reflective pictures (not too 
prominent in computer science, anyway) is mostly not a picture content in the close 
sense but the relation to other pictorial sign acts (including their semantic relations). In 
the following, we therefore concentrate on representational pictures. 
4.3.1 Computer Graphics, Spatial Objects, and Perspective 
The contents of representational pictures are essentially configurations of spatial 
objects. So, what are spatial objects, i.e., what determines the concept of material 
individuals that form the arrangements evoked by images? The answer was already 
given in Section 3.4.4: it is “sortals”. The most general form of the data type »picture 
content« for representational pictures must cover the complicated internal structure of 
sortal concepts. This structure is especially important for the generation of 
corresponding images, for computer graphics, that is. The standart starting point for 
computer graphics is called a geometric model, and we have to investigate the relation 
between geometric models and sortal objects. 
                                                     
48 In the case of reflective pictures, we have to consider even images with an immediate Rep-set that is 
empty – take for example M. ROTHKO’s monochrome screens (but see also Sect. 4.4.5).  
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4.3.1.1 Sortal Objects and Geometric Models 
The kind of geometric models most commonly used consists simply of sets of polygons 
in three-dimensional Euclidean space: the surfaces of the objects considered.49 This form 
has the advantage that many of the consecutive processing steps of picture generation 
become relatively easy. An obvious disadvantage of polygonal models is: they do not 
provide a proper way for dealing with smoothly curved surfaces. However, more 
important at this place is the following problem: geometric models of more extensive 
spatial scenes with many thousands of polygons tend to become extremely hard to 
follow up when being edited. Although this does not seem to be a difficulty of the 
picture generating algorithms as such, but only one for the modeling computational 
visualist’s efficieny of access to the data, the problem has its root in a very general 
simplification: the data type »geometric model« is not equivalent to sortal concepts; it is 
only a very coarse approximation sufficient for some aspects of computational image 
generation. It does not really correspond to spatial objects in the everyday sense.  
For one: the “polygonal soup” as such is not internally structured. Geometric 
neighborhood and the sharing of common nodes are the only relations between two 
polygons inherent to that data type. In order to ease the editing and re-use, groupings of 
polygons and hierarchies of polygon groups have been added (cf. e.g., [PREIM & HOPPE 
1998]). Quite obviously, the supplementary relation is a kind of part-whole relation – 
the second crucial component of sortal concepts apart form geometric Gestalts, as we 
remember from Section 3.4.4. Correspondingly, compounds of grouped polygons are 
often called ‘objects’ already. 
Even so, there is only a weak criterion of identity for groups of polygons. More pre-
cisely: whether or not two groups of polygons in separate models are the same depends 
on their structural organizations alone. They lack conceptually the unique spatio-
temporal history of objects connecting multiple contexts: geometric models form ex-
actly one context and are restricted to that context, similar to the pre-objects mentioned 
in Section 3.3.3. We cannot speak about their identity in the way expected for individual 
sortal objects. 
The instances of the complete data structure »picture content« for representational 
pictures may best be circumscribed by predicative expressions, as has already been in-
dicated above: they do not correspond to individual object instances. But they do corre-
spond to concepts of individual objects. For example, a picture’s content may be de-
scribable as “being a chair”, not an individual chair (e.g., “the one I sat on yesterday 
evening”). But that concept has to include the correct individualization criterion, which 
geometric models usually do not provide. 
This is, of course, not to say that geometric models are of no use or merely bad use in 
computer graphics – the impressive results speak for themselves. It is nevertheless of 
great importance for a computational visualist to know exactly which purposes allow for 
what kind of simplifications from the complete concept of »image content« given by 
sortal concepts. In order to better understand the relations between sortals, geometric 
models, and their pictorial projection, an excursion to the use of arguments between 
fields of concepts is necessary. 
                                                     
49 Other formats in use are more or less equivalent with respect to the arguments in this section. 
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4.3.1.2 Excursion into the Theory of Rational Argumentation 
Let us recapitulate what has been mentioned in Section 2.1 or sketched in some parts of 
Chapter 3 about rational argumentation so far: assertions can only be formulated with 
respect to abstract reference points called concepts. A concept means: a habit of 
distinguishing that is socially established and mutually controlled by the members of a 
community. To that purpose, concepts are determined (“defined”) by means of 
formulating relations to other concepts, and thus grouped into fields the members of 
which determine each other. The relations between the members of a field are often 
called ‘meaning postulates’ as they do not just determine the kind of sorting, classifying 
or distinguishing covered, i.e., what is meant by a corresponding predication. They also 
express how sentences with that predication interact with sentences with other 
predicators. Think of the system of meaning postulates as a logical calculus. Those 
relations can be employed to infer conclusions from a given set of assertions: if we 
agree on “Socrates is a human being” and also on the meaning postulat “the concept 
»human being« is determined by the concept »mortality«” then the assertion “Socrates 
is mortal” can be inferred.50 Such “calculations” are exactly equivalent to what computer 
scientists do with an abstract data structure (cf. Sect. 2.1).  
Let us have at this place a quick look at one of the formalisms developed in AI for 
dealing with the content and referents of verbal utterances. Like every knowledge repre-
sentation language, the family of KL-ONE knowledge bases consists essentially of 
structured sets of propositions [BRACHMAN & SCHMOLZE 1985]. In the case of KL-
ONE, the meaning postulates of a field of concepts are covered by propositions in T-
BOXes, as they are called (‘T’ for ‘terminological’). Empirical propositions are col-
lected into A-BOXes (‘A’ for ‘assertive’). An A-BOX also provides the referents for a 
new nomination. That is, an A-BOX is indeed the KL-ONE equivalent of a context. The 
example syllogism mentioned above then corresponds to an A-BOX that is transformed 
according to the assertions about »mortality« and »humanity« in the corresponding T-
BOX. 
Rational argumentation is any behavior that tries to settle in a community a disagree-
ment about the validity of an assertion or meaning postulate without violence or tricks, 
i.e., by means of finding an agreement about the concepts to be further on used in cer-
tain contexts by the group of speakers considered (cf. [ROS 1989/90]). First of all, the 
participants in a rational argumentation may compare the meaning postulates of the 
concepts they understand as involved in the case of dissent in question. For example, 
complex concepts may be analyzed into more elementary ones of that field, and the op-
ponents find they were indeed using different definitions (“a bachelor is an unmarried 
man” vs. “a bachelor is an unmarried heterosexual man who is not member of a celi-
batarian order”). They can now decide to employ one or the other of them in future and 
thus settle their disagreement.  
But what happens if they do not agree even on that level? This may happen when a 
field of concepts is too complicated to be surveyed easily, as for example the field of 
sortal concepts; or if it is completely new for one of the interlocutors, like the strange 
concepts of quantum physics at the beginning of the last century. What kind of rational 
argument do we have for motivating that a certain set of meaning postulates “really” es-
                                                     
50 Note that the traditionally used form “all human beings are mortal” is meant with strict necessity, i.e., as 
a conceptual relation between the corresponding concepts. It is therefore better to explicitly refer to the 
concepts instead of talking about the infinitely many instances thereof. 
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tablishes a “sound” field of concepts at all? The determination of concepts by means of 
meaning postulates stays necessarily within one field; if that field and its internal struc-
ture are under debate, its postulates cannot be used to solve the conflict.51  
To that purpose, relations between different fields of concepts have to be considered – 
relations that are closely associated with the concept »implementation« between abstract 
data structures. The concepts of one field are conceived of as a particular combination 
of the concepts from other fields – like data types that are understood as combinations 
of types from other abstract data structures. Let us consider two important distinctions: 
instances of substantial concepts carry properties or stand in relations that are expressed 
by attributive predications and need a substance to be carried by. A field of concepts is 
usually centered around a main substantial concept, and includes all the attributive con-
cepts the instances of the main substantial concept have necessarily due to being such an 
instance. Triangles are necessarily planar, have three corners, and at least one of their 
inner angles must not be smaller than π/6. Triangles may also be necessarily either right 
or oblique, either equilateral, isosceles or scalene.52 That a certain instance of »triangle« 
is, for example, made of iron does in fact happen; but it is not an attribute this object has 
due to its being a triangle. We have to distinguish the essential attributive concepts from 
those of arbitrary attributes or relations. In KL-ONE, essential attributes must be part of 
the T-BOX, arbitrary ones must not. The latter are not associated in a systematic way 
with the substantial concept in question: i.e., they are not part of the same field.  
Arbitrary attributes occur if something that is currently viewed as an instance of the 
substantial concept of one field happens to be viewed additionally as an instance of the 
substantial concept of another field, e.g., a triangle as geometrical object and as a mate-
rial object. In this case, the relation between the concepts of different fields is only me-
diated by a common instance (cf. Fig. 51). 
                                                     
51 Nor can, of course, any reference to examples falling under the concepts in question help, since the op-
ponent still rejects those concepts and firstly wants to be convinced of using them. 
52 Such ranges of mutually exclusive attribute values are called incompatibility areas. 
 
Figure 51: Graphical Schema on Ascribing Arbitrary Attributes: not a Conceptual Relation but a Phe-
nomenon of the Transient World of Particulars  
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The “trick” of grounding the meaning postulates of a field of concepts in a rational 
argumentation now becomes obvious: we have to take those instances as instances of a 
new type of substantial concept that has necessarily the attributes formerly rated as arbi-
trary (cf. Figure 52). Note that the field-external relation then provides the new field 
with its instances: any concept of that field is a combination of the “habits of distin-
guishing” inherited from the other fields. The entities of that type have projections to 
entities of the combining fields; their attributes and relations are mixtures of the attrib-
utes of and relations between those projections. Nevertheless, it is important to under-
stand that mentioning the field-external relations does not have an ontological meaning 
(about the things out there in the world). It rather introduces a particular argumentative 
strategy: the meaning postulates of a field of concepts are not seen as something that 
cannot be questioned any further (“that’s how it is; you have to believe it”): something 
set by some untouchable authority. They can be understood as something constructed 
from other (usually simpler) sets of axioms following some construction schema, which 
may be discussed and changed by the community, as well. Only under that perspective, 
new kinds of objects “emerge”. 
For computer scientists, the analogy to abstract data structures may be easier to grasp. 
The algebraic specification of a data structure allows us to abstractly analyze complex 
data types and to define complicated algorithms, i.e., to argue whether or not certain 
structures are possible within the system. But the system itself does not tell us anything 
about how to find concrete instances (how to make the system “real”) or about the ra-
tionality behind its axioms (does the system make “sense”?). An implementation, i.e., 
the systematic combination of several autonomous data structures, gives us indeed an-
other type of rational arguments that allows us to show that the combined data types and 
 
Figure 52: Graphical Schema on Field-External Relations (“Implementation”) – the Argumentational 
Emergence of a New Kind of Entities 
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their implemented relations indeed follow exactly the given specification – or taken in-
versely: we can show that that specification is “realizable” and meaningful. 
The field of concepts of sortal objects is quite complicated; it is almost impossible to 
understand its internal structure in its entirety, i.e., to explicitly know all of its meaning 
postulates. There are, in other words, only partial, incomplete specifications available 
for the rational argumentations about the structure of spatial objects – many aspects re-
main “intuitive” ([LEIBNIZ 1875, §24]). However, it can be conceived of as “imple-
mented” by (i) perceptible geometrical Gestalt concepts, and (ii) abstract entities that 
stand in meronomical relations with each other (cf. Sect. 3.4.4). This implementation 
schema gives us at hand a mechanism for rationally reconstructing the complete struc-
ture: we can refer to the geometric or meronomic projections in order to “found” the 
meaning postulates of the field of sortal objects. 
 In principle, those structures of rational argumentation as depicted in Figures 51 and 
52 can also be translated to the distinctions in KL-ONE. Unfortunately, the family of 
KL-ONE knowledge representation formalisms does not (so far) include relations be-
tween different T-BOXES corresponding to the field-external implementation relation. 
But for our illustrative purpose it may be admissible to assume such a relation. That is, 
we assume a T-BOX governing the contexts with geometric Gestalt individuals, another 
one containing the rules that describe how to deal with parts and wholes, and a third one 
constructed (implemented) by the other two and determining how to deal with sortal ob-
jects and the contexts they appear in. 
4.3.1.3 Reasoning with Spatial Objects 
The effect of such a conceptual reconstruction of the field of spatial objects becomes 
quite clear when we look at Spatial Resasoning, the deduction schemata mediated by 
the meaning postulates of the spatial field in particular with respect to spatial relations. 
Spatial relations are attributive concepts of spatial objects, and their verbal appearance 
is mostly given by locative prepositions, like ‘in’, ‘in front of’, ‘close to’ or ‘across’. In 
other words: the (intra-lexical) semantics of those prepositions is an explicit formulation 
of exactly the set of corresponding meaning postulates of the field of spatial objects.  
This set includes statements about the transitivity or reflexivity of a relation or the 
(in-)compatibility between two relations. For example, we would usually agree in all na-
ïvety that ‘in’ is a transitive relation: when a thing is in something else that is again in a 
third object, then the first thing is also in the third object. If something is to the left of 
another entity, it is also true that the latter entity is to the right of the first one, and vice 
versa. Similar to the example with Socrates’ mortality given above, the deduction 
schemata used here combine several sentences about concrete instances (of spatial ob-
jects) with a meaning postulate that relates the predications (cf. Table 2). 
A scrupulous empirical investigation leads to the insight that the meaning postulates 
of spatial relations are much more complicated. In some cases, »in« is transitive, and in 
others it is not, depending mostly on the types of spatial objects involved. For example, 
a pencil is in my hand, and my hand is in a glove – yet, ‘the pencil is in the glove’ can-
not be deduced. The bee is in the rose, and the rose is in the vase – but nobody would 
expect to find the bee in the vase. In fact, no one could simply produce an exhaustive 
list of all the meaning postulates relevant for the “spatial T-BOX”.53 And even if some-
                                                     
53 Note that this ignorance does not hinder anybody’s ability to deduce or to rate the correctness of spatial 
deductions. That remains however in most cases a purely intuitive skill. 
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body could, the others just have to believe him; what could be their arguments beside 
their very private intuition. 
The meaning postulates of spatial relations are certainly a central part of the data type 
»image content«: we have to use corresponding locative prepositions in order to de-
scribe the arrangement of spatial objects depicted. However, we do not really need a list 
of explicit meaning postulates. We can use a generative schema instead: the implemen-
tation schema of the spatial field. The approach of the French AI-group in Toulouse 
around ANDRÉE & MARIO BORILLO  has demonstrated this method in great detail and 
with much success. In particular the study about ‘dans’ (the French version of ‘in’) by 
LAURE VIEU [1991] exemplifies how a very complex structure like the transitivity of 
»in« can be generated by two calculi that are combined systematically: a mereogeome-
try for the Gestalt aspects of objects and a meronomy for their part-whole aspects.  
VIEU’s overall schema is too complicated to be described here in any detail. It may 
suffice to mention that for certain kinds of spatial objects some part-whole relations are 
more relevant than others. Some types have also special geometric components. The 
material as the most typical and general part of a spatial object is usually considered as 
determining the geometric region relevant for being in that object: “The nail is in the 
wall”. However for container objects, for example, their material forms only a secon-
dary option: the largest part of the object’s convex hull (beyond the geometric projec-
tion of the object’s material) is the primary region for “being in that container”. Essen-
tially, »in« is only transitive if the part-whole-relations involved in the particular cases 
are compatible. Some pairs of »in«-instances are not transitive, because the types of 
part-whole relation involved there cannot be combined accordingly. 
The main effect of this generating schema is indeed a shift of the level of explanation 
considered. The strange pattern of transitivity of “in” is not something invented rather 
arbitrarily by some ancient language creator. Nor does it simply follow the dark paths of 
individual intuition alone. We may view the deductive schemata of Table 2 like that, of 
course, if no dissent about the meaning postulates is to be solved at that time. However, 
if we need to motivate them we can change the perspective and generate the meaning 
postulates as emerging from the systematic interaction between the geometric projec-
tions of the parts of sortal objects. The deductive schemata appear then as a synthesis of 
deductive schemata of the constituent fields: a systematic mixture of elements from the 
geometric T-BOX and the meronomic T-BOX.54 
A geometric model as used in computer graphics is essentially a more or less 
instantaneous  three-dimensional  geometric projection of a corresponding  sortal object. 
                                                     
54 We examine this point again and in more detail in Section 5.4.  
Table 2: Two deduction schemas of the spatial (sortal) field of concepts 
 
given empirical:  Your apple is in the bag.  
given empirical The bag is in my kitchen. 
mediating conceptual:  “In” is transitive. 
deduced empirical:  Your apple is in my kitchen.  
  
given empirical:  The ball is right of the vase.  
mediating conceptual  “Right” is the converse of “left”. 
deduced empirical:  The vase is left of the ball.  
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Every geometric model can indeed be associated with many quite different types of pic-
ture contents: they may differ in their internal materials, or in the role the components 
have with respect to the identity criterion. 
4.3.1.4 A Perspective on Perspectives 
In consequence, »picture content« is associated to »picture« by a chain of two different 
projections: we have to consider (i) the projection from the complete sortal to an 
instantaneous geometric model in 3D, which (ii) must be projected into the 2D 
geometry of pictorial syntax. Only the combination of these two steps can be rightly 
adressed as the (inverse) content relation Rep-1. Most astonishingly, theories on 
pictorial perspective often ignore the first step.  
Naturalistic depiction style – in computer graphics usually called ‘photo-realistic’ – is 
reached if the following restrictions are applied: in step (i), the temporal dimension of 
the sortal objects involved is completely reduced to just one moment; and in step (ii), 
the resulting three-dimensional arrangement of Gestalts is geometrically projected to a 
two-dimensional subspace. The general principles of that transformation are known 
since the Renaissance era and correspond to a simplified version of physical optics (“ray 
optics”). Note that for this projection, the integration of all possible points of view, 
which is characteristic for the sortal field, is abandoned (cf. Sect. 3.4.4): one individual 
viewer perspective has to be specified. It originally defines the two-dimensional sub-
space of the image plane. Obviously, the apparent “simplicity” of the laws of the “natu-
ral” central perspective follows essentially from the fact that this secondary projection 
step is one completely within one field of concepts (geometry), while the primary step – 
often missing in discussions on pictorial semantics – refers to a much more complicated 
relation between different fields (cf. e.g., [REHKÄMPER 2002]). 
Naturalism is, of course, not the only option for the projection relation. Each of the 
two steps may be performed in alternative ways. First, the projection to the geometric 
constituents of the sortal objects needs not to focus on just one moment: the ability of 
sortal objects to move or change their shapes is characteristic for this concept. The pic-
torial representation of movement has a rather long tradition reaching from Australian 
aborigines, who bark paint the movements of their mythical ancestors by means of 
traces, i.e., sequences of their footprints (cf. again Fig. 36, p. 56), to MARCEL 
DUCHAMP’s series “Nue descendant un escalier” of 1912/13 – giving just two exam-
ples.55 In DUCHAMP’s picture, deformations of the object’s geometry also play an impor-
tant role: in the course of the motion depicted, the parts of the human body change their 
shapes and their relative positions (of course without changing the identity of that sortal 
object). The art of depicting movement or other transformations has been perfected in 
the sketchy presentation styles of comics: motion blurring is often mixed with various 
                                                     
55 As has been mentioned above, such pictures do at least partially leave the range of strict representa-
tional images. They include typical elements of structural pictures, and, in the case of the “Nue descan-
dant un escalier” belong even to the category of reflective pictures with a representational core. 
 
Figure 53: Several Manners of Depicting Movement  
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forms of traces. Corresponding techniques can be adopted to computational visualistics: 
M. MASUCH [2001, Sec. 7.2], for example, has collected algorithms for calculating non-
naturalistic images with multiple contour lines, motion lines (cf. Fig. 53) or motion blur 
from an animated geometric model.  
There are alternatives of the second step, as well: multi-perspective images, for ex-
ample. They are most prominent in art, in particular in Cubism (here again with the re-
flective momentum). However, even isometric pictorial presentations often employed in 
scientific visualizations and in some kinds of computer games (Fig. 54) may be counted 
to that group: they do not use central perspective but the closely related parallel perspec-
tive. No individual camera position is marked in this case (or the camera is thought of 
being positioned in infinity), so we can show with such a picture an integral view from 
many perspectives – or, if one prefers: from a God’s eye view. The generalized point of 
view indicates that an overview is given that abstracts from individual perspectives.56 
The inverse – a “hyper-individual” perspective – is also possible and useful: in order 
to embed a focused region of interest in a broader context, an irregular geometric pro-
jection is used which is often associated with the optical device called “fisheye lens”. 
Thus, two perspectives are taken at once in a single picture: one from the distance for 
the contextual overview, and one (or several) from a point of view close to the interest-
ing part of the spatial arrangement (Fig. 55). Typically for fisheye projections, the tran-
sition between the two areas corresponding to the different points of view is smooth (in 
contrast to the inset of a magnifying glass pixeme). In a generalized version proposed 
essentially by G.W. FURNAS [1986], several “focus points” – the parts of the representa-
tion that should be shown close – spread a “degree of interest” to all surrounding con-
tent elements that in turn determines the viewing distance with respect to that element. 
Indeed this generalized fisheye view with its multiple foci is particularly useful for ab-
stract pictures and in interactive systems (cf. [PREIM 1998, Sec. 15]). Maps, for exam-
ple, and in particular city maps are often made with a fluctuating scale emphasizing im-
portant places while unimportant areas are diminished.  
Many other forms of “non-photorealistic rendering” (NPR) in contemporary com-
puter graphics have their conceptual bases in alternative projections from the complete 
sortal object to the geometric components of some of their parts, i.e., in the interaction 
                                                     
56 It is also a little bit more easily to handle, which is an important criterion for the computer game sce-
nario: when the gaze moves around a strategic map, for example, no variations in perspective distortion 
have to be calculated. 
Figure 54: Isometric Representation Figure 55: Example of the Fisheye Effect 
90 VARIATIONS AND APPLICATION CONDITIONS OF THE DATA TYPE »IMAGE«
 
 
of the two steps. Concentration on contours, for example, may be viewed as a purely 
geometric operation. But, the sortal level determines which inner parts are important 
and must be present by some contour, as well. 
4.3.2 Two Levels of Computer Vision: An Example 
In the previous section, the projection relation has been in the focus of attention. Its 
internal division naturally plays a role, too, for its inverse relation Rep mapping the 
structural elements of a picture vehicle to the elements of »picture content«. In 
computational visualistics, this representation relation forms the central aspect of 
computer vision, and from there, also for the computational theory of visual perception 
in cognitive science. We come back to the connections between computer vision, visual 
perception, and picture understanding in the third part of this section, after having had a 
closer look on the components of the relation Rep.  
Given a certain picture vehicle usually in the form of a pixel image, the task of com-
puter vision is to find the corresponding pixemes and interpret them as a configuration 
of spatial objects. As a consequence of pictures being perceptoid signs of the visual 
sense, these steps are assumed of being closely related or even identical to correspond-
ing cognitive mechanisms of human visual perception. Gestalt psychology has articu-
lated the most convincing collection of grouping principles for the latter, and thus plays 
also a crucial role in computational visualistics for finding pixemes from a pixel matrix. 
METZGER [1966] lists seven main Gestalt factors: 
1. Similarity: similar elements of the perceptual field (“tokens”) tend to be grouped 
into a Gestalt  
2. Proximity: tokens that are nearby tend to be grouped  
3. Common Fate: tokens that have coherent motion tend to be grouped  
4. Objective Attitude: new tokens tend to be grouped by means of the same principle 
that groups the older elements 
5. Continuity: tokens that lead to uninterrupted, smooth curves tend to be grouped  
6. Closure: tokens that may contribute to closed shapes tend to be grouped. 
7. Completeness: all tokens are integrated in the Gestalt organization of the percep-
tual field 
On a general level, two structurally different phases of subsequent processing can be 
distinguished: in the lower phase, the primary data is processed “bottom up” (data-
driven): the results depend essentially on that data and grouping rules alone. In the 
higher phase, intermediate data is related to other sources of information, an integration, 
which is usually performed “top-down” (goal- or expectation-driven). It is easy to rec-
ognize in these two phases the construction of Geometric Gestalts (or pixemes), and the 
recognition of sortal objects, i.e., the reverse of the two projection steps discussed 
above. Let us leave for a moment the static images and consider image sequences; the 
influence of Gestalt principles can be demonstrated better in that case, which is also 
more natural with respect to human vision. 
4.3.2.1 Constructing Visual Gestalts – Or Finding Pixemes 
In the following, an example for the “perception” of spatial objects by motion is 
presented in some detail (cf. [SUNG 1988], and [KOLLER 1992]). In most computational 
approaches to visual object recognition, the signal of a video camera, i.e., essentially a 
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sequence of matrices of color values, 
stands at the beginning: a three-
dimensional array of pixels. There is 
no other relation defined between 
any pixel but the relation to its 
immediate neighbors, which may or 
may not belong to the same pixeme. 
This neighborhood relation together 
with the marker value associated 
with each pixel are the only criteria 
to be used for the Gestalt grouping. 
Let us assume for simplicity that the 
marker values are only taken from 
the scalar intensity dimension. 
The original amount of data is ob-
viously quite high. Therefore in a 
first simplification step, some fields 
of pixels are concentrated to signifi-
cant “features”: the pixels with the 
local extremes of the intensity field. 
As anybody familiar with digital im-
age processing knows well, filtering can easily do this. The concentration on the fea-
tures is justified, as it is indeed a hidden coarse grouping step. The pixels in the vicinity 
are grouped together by the factors of similarity and objective attitude. However this 
grouping remains hidden until other Gestalt principles can be integrated: features are 
still only single instantaneous pixels that form the crystallization cores for further 
grouping factors.  
To that purpose, the features at consecutive instants are grouped to instantaneous (ve-
locity) vectors, if they are of the same kind (minimum or maximum) and at almost the 
same position (Fig. 56). Here quite obviously, the Gestalt factors of similarity, continu-
ity, and objective attitude collaborate in forming new instances of a type quite distinct 
from the scalar intensity pixels. Still, the velocity vectors do not extend over time: they 
represent instantaneous local velocity. 
In a third step, closely positioned similar vectors at one instant are grouped to spatially 
extended entities. If several of these still instantaneous entities happen to be close to 
each other and have a similar velocity vector, they are merged (Fig. 57). This originally 
leads to spatially extended entities: here finally the initially grouping hidden in the fea-
tures is made explicit. Following the principle of wholeness, the field between the vec-
tors grouped together is considered also as part of this new Gestalt: their convex hull de-
fines the border.57 The average velocity vector is calculated and taken as a property of 
these “object candidates” as they are called.58  
A temporal extension is still missing; object candidates are pure two-dimensional 
geometric individuals. That is, they are the basic content-bearing pixemes in this exam-
ple, inducing further pixemes by their borders and geometric arrangement by the inter-
nal rules of mereogeometry (cf. Sect. 4.2.2.1). 
                                                     
57 In the schematic Figure 57, co-axial rounded rectangles have been used instead for simplicity. 
58 In computer vision, the expression “object” is unfortunately often used at this level already. 
 
Figure 56: From Pixels to Vectors 
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Figure 58: From Object Candidates to History Fragments 
Instead of using movement for the primary grouping step as in the example given, 
other systems of grouping factors can be employed based on static images. For example, 
abrupt local changes in intensity or color are integrated essentially by the factor of con-
tinuity into one-dimensional pixemes: edges. Furthermore, region-growing algorithms 
apply the factors of objective attitude, closure, and completeness, and expand initial fea-
ture pixels (accordingly chosen) to two-dimensional entities similar to object candidates 
based on color or texture parameters. The different methods can even be combined to 
form grouping synergies: motion-based object candidates may, for example, restrict the 
edge pixels taken into account for a contour grouping, or determine the starting points 
for region growing. 
 
Let us come back for a moment to the motion example: an additional grouping can be 
used here. By means of the factor of common fate, the temporal development of object 
candidates is integrated into a new type of entity, called history fragments (Fig. 58). 
Note that history fragments do not include a criterion of identity restricting their shape: 
the temporally immediately neighboring object candidates grouped into one history 
fragment are of approximately the same size. But they may grow or shrink during the 
lifetime of the history fragment. Furthermore, history fragments may appear “out of 
 
Figure 57: From Vectors to Object Candidates 
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nothing”, and they end when the cor-
responding sortal is occluded (even 
by blinking), or leaves the visual 
field. History fragments do not corre-
spond to the histories of sortal ob-
jects. In fact, applying again Gestalt 
factors can repair some occlusions 
(cf. Fig. 59). However, the fusion of 
compatible history fragments already 
refers to a more complicated concept 
that has a criterion of identity with a 
more restrictive control of the possi-
ble development of shape, and of ex-
istence without immediate percep-
tion.  
Object candidates are not yet spa-
tial objects in the usual sense – as can 
be clearly seen in situations like that 
shown in Figure 60. Let us assume 
that two quite similar sortal objects 
approach each other, move closely 
together for a while, and then leave in 
different directions. The example sequence of grouping steps given above results in ob-
ject candidates and history fragments as given in the schema on the left side of Figure 
60. The history fragments are inter-
rupted since the object candidates be-
fore and after the meeting are not 
similar enough for the temporal 
grouping: the common velocity dur-
ing the meeting results in a “com-
mon” object candidate (C) much lar-
ger than the isolated ones (A, B, D, 
E). As has been mentioned before, 
the object candidates simply appear 
between frames “from thin air” or 
disappear without leaving a trace. 
Quite obviously it is impossible to 
reconstruct which of the original two 
candidates A or B has to be associ-
ated with which one at the end of the 
sequence D or E without additional 
knowledge.59  
A similar problem appears in prac-
tice when human movements are 
“motion captured”, be it in the con-
text of movie special effects, com-
                                                     
59 The feature’s marker values may help as indicated in Figure 60 by the color of the heads. If there are no 
such visual cues for identity beside the histories of the objects, the algorithm fails. 
Figure 60: The Identity of Object Candidates
 
Figure 59: Repairing Occlusions: Fusion of Corre-
sponding History Fragments 
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puter game design or sports teaching software systems: the pure “bottom up” grouping 
has to be complemented by additional “teleological” knowledge providing the condi-
tions under which deformations, loss or exchange of parts and substance, occlusions, 
etc. do or do not alter the identity of an instance. 
4.3.2.2 Instantiating Object Schemata 
The established way in computer vision for adding such goal-driven knowledge is to 
employ “object models” (cf., e.g., [MARR 1982]). They essentially describe which 
configurations of parts form an instance of a particular type of (sortal) object: they 
determine what deformations are within the range of that type of object, and (at least 
theoretically) what materials or parts play an identity-constituting role.60 The projection 
of the object models to the object candidates found establishes finally the perception of 
spatio-temporally extended, persistent, and localizable entities – exactly the type of 
objects involved in spatial descriptions and realistic pictures. The largely geometric 
information about the actual configurations from the bottom-up phase is combined with 
information about part-whole relations governing the possible range of configurations.  
Extending the example from the last section, Figure 61 sketches a possible procedure 
for that projection step. Let us assume that apart from object candidates by motion, edge 
fragments are computed in bottom-up manner, i.e., short pieces of straight lines where 
the intensity changes significantly in the pixel image. The top-down part controlled by 
the set of object models available works in a circular manner: a geometric projection of 
a model instance is adapted as close as possible to the edge segments within the corre-
sponding object candidate thus establishing the instance at that moment. To that pur-
pose, a camera model for the whole scene must be consistently instantiated. Note that 
this projection is a three-dimensional entity while edge fragments and object candidates 
still belong to the two-dimensional image space. The circle is completed by deducing an 
extrapolation of the present movement given by the velocity attribute of the object can-
                                                     
60 In most computer vision systems, much of this information is practically omitted since the reduced form 
suffices for their particular purposes – just as geometric models in computer graphics are highly incom-
plete but mostly sufficient substitutions for sortal concepts. 
 
Figure 61: From Object Candidates to Instances of Sortal Objects 
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didate. It is used as an expectation to help adapting the edge fragments for the next 
frame (hence the expression “expectation-driven”).  
Additionally, a light model can be added, which allows us to calculate shadows, as 
well (Fig. 62). Shadows are a specific consequence of the construction of sortal objects 
without being sortal objects themselves: for shadows (as for clouds) 1 + 1 may indeed 
not be 2 but 1 again. With the Gestalt-finding bottom up processes mentioned in the 
previous section, it is often impossible to distinguish shadows from objects. If the 
shadow touches the object, both are often included in the same object candidate even 
without many edge fragments between them. If the object is hovering so that its shadow 
is separated, two object candidates will result that appear completely unconnected. With 
the association of the object candidate with a sortal object in 3D space, the effect of 
light sources can be deduced and projected onto the image plane forming an expectation 
to be subtracted from the primary object candidates. 
As a precondition for the (re-)construction of picture content, the deviations from 
central perspective should not be too pronounced. Isometric perspectives usually do not 
pose a problem since the perspective is locally not distinguishable from central perspec-
tive – one has to compare distant areas to note the difference. The cumulative effects of 
a locally small deviation from central perspective may add up to rather “screwed” per-
spectives as in M.C. ESCHER’s “Prentententoonstelling” (“The Print Gallery”, Fig. 63). 
It is the overall integration of the points of view in sortal objects that leads to the strange 
interpretation here: with every single glance, we recognize the Gestalts in focus as those 
of familiar sortal objects that are perhaps slightly distorted. But the integration of all the 
glances does not sum up to a consistent arrangement of those sortal objects in space.  
 
   Figure 62: Distinguishing Shadows from Objects 
 
 
Figure 63: Prentententoonstelling 
M.C. ESCHER 1956 
Figure 64: The “impossible” Penrose triangle 
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This effect is most clearly demonstrated 
with a geometric figure called ‘the Penrose 
triangle’ (Fig. 64). Taken as a sortal object, 
the Penrose triangle seems geometrically 
completely impossible. In fact, there exist 
sortal objects that appear in pictures just like 
the seemingly impossible forms – if only 
viewed from one very special point of view 
(cf. Fig. 65). If the perspective is changed, 
the geometric illusion breaks down and a 
usual sortal object that is slightly strangely 
formed becomes visible. This indicates a fur-
ther precondition for algorithms in computer 
vision: they usually fail if special points of 
view are taken so that (coarsely speaking) 
parts of sortal objects in different distances 
seem to merge – like the ends of the two 
arms of “PENROSE’s object”.  
 
4.3.2.3 Determining Configurations 
Since »picture content« must be more than a heap of sortal objects, a final interpretation 
step has to be mentioned: the perception of the spatial relations between the sortal 
objects. The concepts of such relations, which are usually articulated verbally by means 
of locative prepositions, form the basis of spatial reasoning, as has already been 
mentioned above (cf. Sect. 4.3.1.3). This reasoning is also important for the integration 
of the different local interpretations of the field of view into one unique understanding. 
Note that it is exactly the impossibility to ascribe correctly the relation between the 
viewer, the pictures and the gallery in ESCHER’s “The Print Gallery” (Fig. 63) that 
disturbs the beholder here: What is “in” what? Which is “in front of” which? Etc. 
The intensive linguistic investigation of locative prepositions in the last two decades 
(e.g., [HERSKOVITS 1986] or [VIEU 1991]) has made clear that the basing spatial con-
cepts are not merely forms of geometric relations but a complicated system with geo-
metric and part-whole aspects. They are proper attributive parts of the field of sortal ob-
jects. For “the teapot on the table”, we have to concentrate on the geometric relation be-
tween (i) the underside of the bottom of the teapot’s body, and (ii) a part of the surface 
of the table-board of the table.  
Following HERSKOVITS’ analysis, a mostly geometric core relation (the “ideal mean-
ing”) is adapted to apply to certain parts (which may indeed be a whole sequence of 
part-whole relations) of the sortal objects in question (“object idealizations”) 
[HERSKOVITS 1986, 40]: 
In a particular use of a preposition, the ideal meaning may have been transferred to another 
relation, one that is in some way closely related [sense shift]; this new relation may in turn be 
only approximately true [tolerance shift]. Moreover, the objects related are mapped onto 
geometric objects (matching the categories specified for the arguments of the ideal meanings) by 
processes of geometric imagination, idealization and selection.  
The full complexity of the attribute system of spatial relations has not been trans-
ferred to computational linguistics so far. Computer scientists here still have to trade off 
Figure 65: Sketch of One of the Physical 
Realizations of the PENROSE Triangle 
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between a detailed modeling of a very small subset of prepositions (cf., e.g., [VIEU 
1991]), or taking into account a larger set with a much more schematic treatment (cf., 
e.g., [HERZOG ET AL. 1990]). In the latter example, the ideal meanings are embodied by 
“applicability functions” that map “essential parameters” – abstract geometric attributes 
like »distance« or »direction« – to “applicability values”, i.e., a form of fuzzy member-
ship values in the interval [0.0, 1.0]. Figure 66 gives an impression for the dependency 
of the applicability value from the essential parameter »distance« for the core meaning 
of »near«. These schemata have to be differently adapted to the various types of objects 
by considering different parts as those relevant for determining the essential parameters. 
»Distance« for a point has to be calculated in another way than that for a line (taking 
geometrical examples just for the sake of simplicity) – the line is first idealized to the 
closest point. Figure 67 illustrates the corresponding results for the applicability func-
tion of »in front of« with the two essential parameters »distance« (analogous to »near«) 
and »relative direction« (approximately a Gausian curve with medians at 45° around 0° 
toward the object localized).61 The “clouds” are a visualization of the applicability val-
ues for a zero-dimensional localized object for different positions (dark ≅ high value).  
With the spatial relations, the spatial arrangements of objects in a picture can be com-
pletely classified. Thus, the primary »picture content« of representational pictures is fi-
nally determined. Further transpositions to higher fields of concepts, i.e., the one of in-
tentionally acting creatures, may be based on this foundation. They are important for the 
practical use of most pictures and may even guide the construction of the sortal objects 
in a goal-driven manner. But those additional interpretation steps do not really contrib-
ute to the semantics of visual perceptoid signs in the close sense, i.e., to the relation be-
tween contextual pre-objective Gestalts and sortal objects. They are the same for the in-
terpretation of a text describing the activities of human beings in a reduced manner by 
using spatial attributes alone.  
4.3.2.4 Computer Vision and “Picture Understanding” 
Most of the discussion so far seems to support an implicit identification of seeing, 
computer vision, and picture understanding, reflecting the approach in cognitive science 
                                                     
61 The extrinsic form is shown, i.e. “in front of as seen from a point of view explicitly given”. In Figure 
66, those points of view are the left penalty spot (for being in front of a player idealized as a point), and 
the mark below the center line (for being in front of the right goal area). 
Figure 66: The “Ideal Meaning” of »Near«: 
Visualization of the Geometric Schema  
Figure 67: Two Adaptations of the »In front of«- 
Schema to Two Different (Geometric) Objects 
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(cf. [MARR 1982]). One of the commonly used translations of ‘computer vision’ in 
German is indeed ‘Bildverstehen’ – i.e., literally: ‘picture understanding’ (as of human 
beings). The grouping of elementary pixemes into complex ones and their interpretation 
as sortal objects and their parts can serve as a model for human visual perception to 
some degree. We also may implement the algorithms with a computer connected to a 
video camera and receive a more or less stylized verbal description of “what the 
computer sees with its video camera” (cf. Sect. 5.4.3).  
The sketches of argumentation-theoretic considerations above indicate an alternative 
and more precise approach. After all, the computer is still not an entity of the field of 
concepts needed to ascribe visual perception (cf. Sect. 3.3 & 3.4). The two steps of the 
representation relation described in the last section are indeed used to structure (parts 
of) the rational argumentations concerned with visual perception. The implementation 
has the purpose of exemplifying the argumentation in specific cases – and that is exactly 
how they are used when presented at a cognitive science conference. Note at this place 
that any computational realizations of semantic aspects of pictures are necessarily self-
referential in the following sense: they are an implementation of an implementation re-
lation since the field-external relation to the 3D-models already corresponds to an im-
plementation of the concept of sortal objects as has been mentioned earlier.  
At least the naïve identification of computer vision with picture understanding seems 
to be quite justified since the video camera apparently delivers pictures – but who for? 
(cf. again Sect. 3.5.3). »Seeing a scene« and »seeing a picture of a scene« are quite dif-
ferent concepts. Even »seeing the retina image of a scene« cannot be identified with 
»seeing a scene«. The second makes sense in everyday life in almost every context and 
does not involve pictures at all; the first happens frequently only in an ophthalmolo-
gist’s office and does positively not concern the retina of the one doing that seeing. We 
rather keep this distinction when computationally modeling the concept »image«. 
Indeed, the algorithms of computer vision deal firstly with the vehicles of pictures for 
us. This does, of course, not exclude that another picture vehicle is again part of the de-
picted scene: a separate sortal object with a more or less flat colored surface and a rela-
tively clear border, a frame, separating the picture plane proper from the rest of that sor-
tal. That is, there is perceptual space beyond the frame that does simply not belong to 
the picture plane. But beyond the space of pixels forming the input data for a computer 
vision system, there is no perceptual space at all. Correspondingly, a sortal object di-
vided by the viewing frustum is notoriously hard to recognize for such a system. 
Apart from those formal characteristics, the true interpretation as a picture needs ad-
ditionally the ability to recognize the (potential) use of that vehicle as a sign.62 A context 
much broader than usually available in computer vision is necessary to that purpose. 
The sign users and their intentions must be considered, as well. That is indeed, pragmat-
ics has to take over here. 
Nevertheless, for most practical purposes the naïve identification still leads to techni-
cally sufficient solutions: computer vision essentially deals with picture understanding 
not in all but in many relevant respects because visual perception plays such a dominant 
role for the data type »image«. 
                                                     
62  Indeed, the transition corresponds to considering resemblanceβ instead of resemblanceα. 
THE FOUNDATION OF COMPUTATIONAL VISUALISTICS 99
 
 
4.3.2.5 Reference Semantics and Pictorial Reference 
The two steps of the projection relation Rep-1 fit closely to the two steps of the content 
relation Rep (Fig. 68). The latter constists of a preparation phase that deals essentially 
with syntactic elements: the construction of visual Gestalts can be seen as “pixel 
parsing” in analogy to the parsing of letters to words and higher syntactic entities in 
linguistics. This segmentation phase corresponds roughly to the second phase of Rep-1, 
the “rendering”, where the pixels of the final image are calculated from the complete 
geometric Gestalts. The first phase of the projection relation is the projection from the 
sortal objects to the geometric 3D-models, which may be viewed as a preparation step 
for the rendering. It has its immediat pendant in the process of actually interpreting the 
pixemes as the geometric projection of sortal objects. 
The previous sections could in fact be part of a linguistic treatise in the framework of 
reference semantics, as well. In the beginning of Section 4.3, reference semantics was 
characterized as the linguistic investigation interested in particular in the relation be-
tween words or sentences and the particular things or matters of affairs they are used to 
refer to. Reference semantics is especially interested in the study of verbal references to 
concrete instances; though, the extra-linguistic referents cannot be included per se in a 
rational argumentation. They are considered only by means of our perceptions of them 
and actions with them. An essential aspect of this relation is covered by the visual sense 
– it is equivalent to our relation Rep. In general, the various descriptions of what is seen 
constructed in the Gestalt-forming and -interpreting phases form distinct contexts (in the 
sense of Section 3.4.1) on different descriptive levels. Perception can in general be con-
ceived of as the systematic relation between those contexts: the description of one level 
is used as the referential context for the description of the next higher level.  
The contrast to intra-lexical semantics is therefore not really one between those lin-
guists dealing only with words and those dealing with words and the world. The latter 
are essentially relating words, too. But while the former stay within one field of con-
cepts (e.g., the one of sortal objects) using a semantic meta-language of that same field, 
the latter investigate the relations between several fields and are therefore able to use the 
additional schema of rational argumentation to formulate semantic relations. Figures 69 
and 70 illustrate this usage. The reference semanticist can refer to the languages of the 
constituting fields B and C with respect to field A instead of the artificial meta-language, 
the internal structure of which is just as (un-)justified as that of field A. The fields B and 
 
Figure 68: The Two Corresponding Phases of the Relations Rep and Rep-1 
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C do not simply copy the structure of A; they are instead employed to ground that very 
structure. But they also have genuine reference relations themselves, sensory-motor rou-
tines, which we can view as being “inherited” to the field constructed: they thus firstly 
constitute the reference relation for that kind of objects. That is: we see sortal objects 
(instances of field A) by means of perceiving Gestalt objects (or pre-objects, field B) 
and thinking simultaneously of coordinated part-whole relations determining the poten-
tial histories of the sortal objects (field C).63  
That is, the problematic reference relation to extra-linguistic entities is essentially 
“shifted down one level” along the field-constituting relations in reference semantics. 
Note again: this is not an ontological shift but one in the structure of argumentations. It 
has consequences for pictorial reference, as well. So far, we have not dealt with the 
»picture referent« but only with »picture content«, i.e., the concepts behind the in-
stances that originally allow us to see those instances at all, be that in reality or in the 
picture. Nevertheless, representational pictures do not (at least not primarily) refer to the 
concepts of sortal objects, although the latter constitute their content. The referents are 
still individual instances of sortal objects; instances, which in turn may serve to exem-
plify the concept in a secondary, metonymic level of reference.  
Obviously, the “down-shift” that opens the way for the referents to enter the argu-
mentation in linguistics cannot be used for the pictorial reference relation, as well. Take 
for example a picture of the Golden Gate Bridge: if one avows to be seeing something 
in that picture then either instances of Gestalt concepts are brought into the discussion 
or sortal concepts with an implication of their relation to Gestalt concepts. Only in the 
latter case is individuality possible beyond the actual context of perception because pure 
Gestalts do not have any identifying criterion with instances in other contexts if they are 
                                                     
63 The same entity is viewed through a different pair of glasses, so to speak (cf. Sect. 4.3.1.2). We have to 
presuppose that those reference relations are not considered problematic, at least for that moment. They 
may, of course, come into the focus of a subsequent argumentation, as well. 
 
 Figure 69: Intra-Lexical Semantics  Figure 70: Reference Semantics and Field-External Relations 
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not bound, like shadows, to 
sortal objects. As a referent, a 
geometric individual is over-
specific; it is exactly the syn-
tactic pixeme in that picture, 
and nothing more. 
On the other hand, two 
cases can be distinguished for 
a sortal referent: the referent 
may be an unspecific individ-
ual object just introduced for 
the sake of some embedding 
communicative act; or it can 
be an instance we already 
know from other contexts – 
just a large red suspension 
bridge over some water span-
ning between hills; or the one 
and unique Golden Gate 
Bridge. In any case, the picto-
rial reference relation to the 
sortal instance cannot use the direct reference inherent to the geometric field: this leads 
just to visual pre-objects while the part-whole entities coordinated in the linguistic case 
are missing completely. It must take the inverse path through the sortal interpretation, 
i.e., the picture content, which then also provides the relevant meronomic components 
(Fig. 71). Note that this inverse use of the constitution relation of the field of sortal ob-
jects is the reason for the strange fact that the direction of the semantic projection in 
computer vision is reversed – expectation-driven – with respect to the overall “bottom-
up” direction of that algorithm (Fig. 67, upper part). 
There are three cases of pictures that are presented simultaneously with other contexts 
containing the same individuals. They are of particular interest for pictorial reference:  
(a) the picture could be one of a set or sequence with other pictures meant to show 
the same sortal object;  
(b) the picture is presented together with text that is used to refer to the same sortal 
individual (e.g., a caption);  
(c) the picture is presented in the presence of the sortal individual depicted (as is 
often the case for pictures in instruction manuals; cf. also the passport example 
mentioned above).  
The first two items are typical cases of co-referential sign acts. In the propositional 
sign system, there are sets of special signs for an easy use of co-reference – in particular 
the pronouns (“it”) and anaphoric indicators (”that”). The pictorial sign system does not 
offer a similar tool. A set of the visual characteristics of the corresponding sortal con-
cept has to be repeated in all the pictures of the sequence comparable to a (deictic) de-
scription. Each picture opens a distinct context that provides implicitly the deictic com-
ponent. The identification of those individuals depends mostly on conventions and is 
not directly implied by the pictures. 
Figure 71: Reference Semantics for Pictorial Reference: Using 
the Path through the Sortal Field 
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In the third case mentioned, co-reference does not play a role. Nevertheless the prob-
lem of pictorial reference, i.e., to be able to identify the occurrences of one individual in 
two contexts, remains for the beholder. In the case of a repair manual for a laptop, for 
example, the pixeme activating the sortal concept of that laptop might also refer to a 
second individual laptop of that type necessary for performing the repair. Quite obvi-
ously, the interpretation of the pixemes, i.e., the picture content per se cannot indicate 
just that particular individual present in the situational context or referred to in the other 
picture or the text. Although controlled by the picture content, the pictorial reference as 
such remains unspecific since the picture simultaneously introduces the context for that 
reference. Verbal nominations, in contrast, refer relative to a context that is separately 
given. When referring to an individual purely pictorially we do that always without 
connecting that individual explicitly to other contexts. When referring by means of a 
nomination, we do so always by explicitly connecting at least two contexts.  
Correspondingly, it is usually the text that is employed to establish the co-reference 
with a pixeme: if the descriptive part of a nomination in the caption fits to one of the 
sortal concepts in the picture content we take it that the text refers to the same individual 
as that pixeme (and hence implicitly vice versa). 
An approach for pictorial reference employing a purely symbolic identification (par-
allel to the entities of the intra-lexical meta-language) may serve as a simple solution, 
but non-semantic factors form an essential component if the data type »picture referent« 
is to be dealt with: e.g., the likelihood of the communication partners to know that indi-
vidual object in other contexts and consider it being relevant for the communication 
situation at hand. At least in this respect, the concept »image« is indeed not too different 
from verbal signs: both depend on pragmatic principles for identifying individuals. 
4.3.3 Embedding Semantics in Pragmatics 
In summary, the full data structure basing computational visualistics must contain 
beside its syntactic component »picture vehicle« two more associated data types 
explicitly covering semantic aspects: »picture content« and »picture referent«. The 
relations between »image« and »picture content« have a syntactic and a semantic part; 
the first is effectively associated with structures of the image’s »picture vehicle«, the 
second depends on a field-external relation relevant for the concepts of sortal objects 
that form the central aspect of »picture content«. This object constitution also links the 
data type »image« simultaneously to visual perception and to verbal language. The later 
connection is essential for relating »picture content« with »picture referent«, though 
pragmatic factors definitely dominate that type of semantic relation.  
The investigation of »picture content« including the short sketch on »picture referent« 
has been oriented at the verbal transcription of the corresponding entities. While the 
contents are associated to predicative verbal phrases, the referents are circumscribed by 
definite descriptions, i.e., nominatorically used noun phrases. This seems to contradict 
the central finding of image theory sketched in Chapter 3 assigning pictures the main 
function of context builders.  
In accord with the twofold medial use of contexts as the anchoring ground for a 
proposition, and as the result of interpreting a proposition, context building is linked to 
the pragmatic embedding of propositional sign acts more closely than the other partial 
sign acts. This double nature of contexts is immediately reflected by the two grammati-
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cal Gestalts possible for perceptive verbs, e.g., ‘seeing’:64 “I am seeing two shepherds, a 
lawn and a tree” (nominatorical), and “I am seeing that a man embraces a woman” (pro-
positional). Viewed as sets of entities, contexts may be sufficiently approximated by the 
set of nominal phrases identifying those objects that are provided by the context. 
Viewed, on the other hand, as a structural whole in which the objects only form crystal-
lization cores connecting this context with others, a context may also be adequately ap-
proximated by a more or less complicated proposition (in this sense, a novel is a context 
builder, too). As perceptoid context builders, pictures qualify for the two approxima-
tions, as well: depending on the task at hand, their meaning may be given by means of 
the referents accessible in the context they build; or as a complete set of propositions 
describing the state of affairs. The referents relate the context to other contexts with the 
same objects; the state of affairs distinguishes the context from others containing the 
same objects. 
It seems from this point of view that the predicative component dominates both as-
pects. The nominatoric identification rests on the habits of distinguishing. Those habits 
also determine the transformation of a context by integrating a proposition (i.e., an addi-
tional predication). Correspondingly, the predicative nature of »picture content« seems 
to be more important on the preceding pages than the abstract function of context build-
ing. Though within one context, those habits of distinguishing need not already be con-
cepts, i.e., corresponding to predication. Detectors and the associated sensory-motor test 
routines (corresponding verbally to quasi-predicates) are sufficient (cf. Sect. 3.4). Con-
cepts and the full use of predication already depend on the ability of context-building. 
The preference for the predicative characterization of »picture content« is, thus, a sim-
plification necessary to grasp semantic aspects of pictures at all. 
Nevertheless, the true nature of contexts and the full meaning of context builders like 
images enclose always both aspects: the anchoring for a successive predication, and the 
result of previous predications. They are differentiated in the course of the surrounding 
activities, and the complete communicative setting must be considered if an adequate 
treatment is intended. Quite obviously, this setting includes more than one participant, 
and the role the pictorial sign act has for their other activities is the key for completing 
the generic data structure around »image«. 
4.4 Pragmatic Aspects 
The field of pragmatics has been characterized in the beginning of this chapter as the 
investigation of the complex formed by a communication act and the other related 
behavior, i.e., the embedding of the sign act in the “living practice” of the sign users. 
Indeed, semantics in the traditional sense – i.e., an investigation apart from pragmatics 
and restricted to those relations between sign vehicle and sign meaning that are 
independent from the sign act, its participants, and their further behavior – must remain 
relatively sterile. Even the transcription of meaning components into verbal expressions 
used above relates the picture use to another sign behavior. Furthermore, a valid theory 
of resemblance can be reasonably founded only with respect to the behaviors of those 
experiencing a similarity, as has been sketched in Chapter 3. If resemblance is taken as 
a basic ingredient of pictorial semantics, semantic considerations are necessarily 
“contaminated” with the pragmatic perspective. 
                                                     
64 Obviously, a situational context is here introduced by means of the perception verb.  
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Correspondingly, a broader conception of semantics has already been used through-
out the preceding section: that conception views semantics as a part of pragmatics, and 
more precisely, as the part focusing on what is mentioned as being signified by means 
of the picture vehicle by the sign user. The relations to spatial reasoning and argumenta-
tion theory mentioned in that context clearly demonstrate this shift of perspective.  
We might think of classical semantics as the reduced pragmatics of a soliloquy (rather 
than the “God’s eye view” semanticists have often supported). Since it is not the picture 
(or more generally: the sign) that shows or represents something: it is the picture (or 
sign) user who shows or represents something with the sign. In soliloquy, one directs 
and keeps one’s own focus of attention by means of the sign on something that is usu-
ally not actually present. The discussion in Chapter 3 indicates that signs of the level of 
communication that includes propositions are in fact the only tools we have for per-
forming such a peculiar behavior.  
However, those signs are more generally used to communicate with somebody else: 
to direct and keep the focus of attention of a communicative partner on something. That 
is in particular: for allowing her or him to perform some behavior linked with the signi-
fied entity or to coordinate such a behavior with behaviors of the sender of the message. 
The net of relations between the sign act and those behaviors is meant by “the embed-
ding of the sign act in the living practice of the sign users”; it forms the focus of interest 
of pragmatics.  
Thus, the situational settings of the sign uses play a prominent role for pragmatic in-
vestigations. For computational visualistics, most of the traditional settings for picture 
uses are relevant, too. But the truly specific pragmatic setting is the use of pictures in in-
teractive systems, to which we now turn first (4.4.1). An important tool for dealing with 
pragmatic aspects of interactive pictures is the anticipation of the potential beholders 
(4.4.2). But the sender has to be considered explicitly as well when the communicative 
authenticity of a sign act with interactive pictures is to be assured over and above the 
weak form of technical authenticity that can be provided by the medium as such (4.4.3). 
The rhetoric of structural pictures (4.4.4) and pragmatic aspects of computer art with its 
link to reflective pictures (4.4.5) complement our discussion of pragmatics in computa-
tional visualistics.  
4.4.1 Interactive Systems as a New Type of Media 
A well-known classification system of media theory [PROSS 1972] distinguishes three 
types of media: whereas primary media (or media of class I) do not involve any 
technical devices that open the possibility of temporally or spatially separating the 
communicative partners, secondary media (or media of class II), like books or letters, 
involve devices on the producers side. If the communication depends on the use of 
special devices on both sides of the communication channel, a tertiary medium (or 
medium of class III), like TV or telephone, is used. Quite obviously, we can easily 
decide as a symptom whether technical devices are applied for receiving and/or sending. 
But are those symptoms already the true criteria underlying the appropriate 
classification of media intended? Is it not remarkable that primary media have as their 
precondition that all participating communicative partners must share the same 
situational context, while the sender generates persistent sign vehicles with secondary 
media that can be used for communication across temporal separation? And that media 
of class III enable the interlocutors to communicate across large spatial distances 
without significant loss of time? Those differences in the situational setting of the 
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communicative act must have an important influence on the content and form of a 
corresponding message. 
There is a small amount of primary media uses of pictures, like a quickly drawn struc-
tural sketch employed in a verbal argumentation and thrown away afterwards; or the 
ceremonial sand paintings of Australian aborigines, the vehicles of which are also de-
stroyed immediately after the ceremony. We may also count the showing of the picture 
in a passport for personal identification to this category. However, pictures are tradi-
tionally used mostly as media of class II. Their production is often a more or less com-
plicated procedure that makes it impossible for most cases to generate a picture sponta-
neously like a verbal utterance, or to anticipate the need of a particular sign vehicle in 
advance, as in the case of the passport. More importantly, pictures are usually intended 
to persist over a considerable amount of time in order to allow the sign user to establish, 
as with written text, a communicative link between different times. This link may con-
nect sender and receiver in the same person, or in the form of different sign users, form-
ing a kind of external memory or a true act of interpersonal communication, respec-
tively. Pictures in an exhibition or in a book are typical examples of images used in sec-
ondary media; so are films. Note that it is essentially the temporal separation of senders 
and receivers that determines those examples. Spatial distances between the situational 
contexts of the communicative partners that may also appear with media of this class are 
mere by-products. Overcoming the gap is a process that consumes a lot of time com-
pared to the actual communicative activities. 
In contrast to that, the transportation time of the message is almost negligible com-
pared with the duration of the communicative act for media of class III. For spatial con-
texts far apart of each other, this can only be reached if all the interlocutors employ 
technical devices. Note that the fast transportation of the sign vehicles between the spa-
tially separated situational contexts of the interlocutors is the major precondition for a 
two-way communication similar to the direct social interaction in primary media. Of 
course, pictures are also used extensively in media of class III: from sending facsimiles 
by telephone lines to the solitary tele-sensoring by means of surveillance cameras, as 
well as from digital photographs taken and sent by trendy mobile phones to the mass 
participation of viewing a soccer game by means of a life broadcasting in TV. 
The construction process for representational computer graphics indicates clearly that 
a medium of at least class II is considered. The general structure of the device to be used 
for production has already been mentioned in the preceding section: a three-dimensional 
geometric model is provided by the computational visualist as the input data for a pro-
gram that calculates a projection of the geometric model onto a two-dimensional image 
plane. The geometric model is a formalized description based on a data structure that al-
lows the computational visualist to describe three-dimensional geometric Gestalts: the 
description of an individual’s geometric and optical properties concentrates on certain 
aspects of the actual sortal object described (be it real or fictional). The projection cre-
ates another description based on two-dimensional matrices of elementary regions with 
color attributes (pixels). It is a certain presentation of a pixel matrix by a monitor, a pro-
jecting device or a printer that can finally be employed as an image.  
The picture vehicle generated by the computational visualist could be used in the 
same way as a picture vehicle produced in the traditional manner, i.e., independent from 
the production process, as a perceptoid sign in a true communicative situation or in a 
hidden auto-communicative situation, a kind of pictorial soliloquy, that is. The printout 
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or the projection can be employed in many sign acts that are not at all related to the 
situation of the production.  
However, the final step, i.e., the printing or projecting of the pixel matrix, is usually 
not considered of as being part of the production proper. The site of production of the 
pixel matrix and the site of its projection into a directly perceptible form can be (and of-
ten are) far apart from each other. Since the final presentation must be performed by 
means of another technical device on the recipient's side computer graphics have indeed 
to be conceived of as a typical medium of class III. In this case, the computational visu-
alist who has provided model and rendering parameters is usually viewed as the primary 
sender of the sign act of the computer-generated picture (Fig. 72). 
4.4.1.1 Media of Class IV 
When dealing with computer graphics in interactive systems, the schema given in 
Figure 72 has, however, to be adapted in a particular manner: although the picture is 
still produced by means of the rendering algorithm from a geometric model, this 
happens at some point in time and place apart from the person to be considered as the 
primary sender in this communication, the one providing the model and the rendering 
algorithm (Fig. 73).  
Take for example a textbook on human anatomy and its interactive pendant. In the 
book and in the interactive version, pictures illustrating anatomic objects, some of their 
relations, and some of their attributes are offered. The standard situation of use appears 
as a (pictorial) soliloquy: for example, a student uses the pictorial sign for focusing his 
attention on those anatomic matters in order to learn them. Or a physician wants to re-
fresh her memory by means of showing that sign to herself. Although acting as sender 
and receiver simultaneously, the student and the physician have to trust the original pic-
ture producer and the technical devices transporting the sign vehicle to them. Otherwise 
the picture cannot be employed in an authentic soliloquial sign act.  
 For the traditionally printed textbook, this trust is essentially established by means of 
the social institution of the initial production process: the produced picture is persistent; 
it usually does not change significantly. This attribute is also viewed as a disadvantage 
of the traditional medium, which is finally cured by the interactive version. The users of 
an interactive textbook are not restricted to static, pre-fabricated images anymore; they 
can easily chose other perspectives, turn, scale, move or remove parts of the anatomic 
 
Figure 72: Presentation of Computer-Generated Pictures: The Direct Use  
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objects displayed, zoom in or out, and even change the style of the presentation. To that 
purpose, the image is rendered at presentation time.  
In consequence, the situational setting of sign production and sign reception seem-
ingly merge – almost like for primary media; the appearance of a pictorial soliloquy is 
even stronger for interactive media, on first view. The essential pragmatic question is 
then: how can those sign acts gain authenticity? Of course, it is still the computational 
visualist who provides the model and the rendering algorithm that have to be trans-
ported to the users in order to generate the picture on demand. So the soliloquial use of 
the picture in the interactive textbook on anatomy is still a derived sign act borrowing 
its authenticity from an underlying sign act from computational visualist to system user. 
We may use the expression “tele-rendering” for the situational separation between the 
preparatory design activities of the computational visualist and the actual image produc-
tion that is finally induced by the users of the interactive system. Note that computer 
graphics does not necessarily imply tele-rendering although it has opened the way for 
the latter: computer graphics’ potential to easily change the model or the style of render-
ing provides a significant variability of rhetoric elements adaptable to individual com-
municative contexts.  
There is a profound difference to the other examples of media connecting separated 
contexts: whereas the unit to be transferred by technical means through space and time 
with secondary or tertiary media  is formed by one single message, or more precisely 
one unique sign vehicle, tele-rendering can legitimately be viewed as transferring whole 
classes of messages/sign vehicles. Depending on the user’s interaction, one of the in-
stances of that set is realized in a particular user session. Tele-rendering therefore be-
longs to a different class of media altogether. We suggest calling this type “media of 
class IV” (or quaternary media) . The automatic production of verbal signs by language 
generation systems resulting AI research forms another member of that class. It is no 
accident that such programs are a main component of interactive systems, as well. 
We have to expect particular consequences for the communicational function of any 
signs used in class IV media, and especially for the pictures created by tele-rendering. 
The rhetoric force of each concrete picture generated for a specific user must be care-
fully adapted by the interactive system to the particular communicational setting at hand 
if miscommunication with potentially fatal consequences is to be prevented: imagine, 
for example, again the interactive textbook in medicine, and the effects an insufficient 
act of pictorial communication can have in this domain.  
Most of the investigations in tele-rendering so far investigate pictures in interactive 
systems in analogy to propositional utterances and their logical parts. A short overview 
 
Figure 73: Computer-Generated Pictures in Interactive Systems: Tele-Rendering 
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about their solutions is given in the following sections, leading to another component 
for our generic data structure: the beholder models. In those studies, pictures are usually 
employed in quite specific ways: as nominations or predications, the complement of 
which is mostly given verbally. The common background of the picture’s most general 
function as a context builder is not taken into prominent view. In consequence, a pro-
posal to adapt beholder modeling to context building is given in section 4.4.2. 
4.4.1.2 The Selection Problems: Content 
Language generation systems have a tradition longer than that of tele-rendering; some 
aspects relevant for the latter can be derived from corresponding AI research. Selecting 
the content (“what to say”) and determining the form of an verbal utterance (“how to 
say”) are distinguished on the general level and usually form separate components in 
language generation systems. For producing a concrete example, the two components 
usually have to interact. 
An analogous distinction can be used for the autonomous generation of a representa-
tional picture in an interactive system – we may approximately speak of “what to show” 
and “how to show”. Determining the “what to show” is on first view quite similar to se-
lecting the content for a verbal proposition, i.e., which state of affairs is told about what 
objects. More precisely, this seems to be a completely semantic task. But of course, (i) 
not all verbal utterances are propositions (although many of them have propositional 
cores), and (ii) pictures are not really analogous to propositions. Let us deal with the 
second restriction first: choosing “what to show” must essentially be determining which 
context is to be built by means of the pictorial sign act. This can only be planned indi-
rectly and depends on the perspective on the context: what objects are to be identified 
for the interlocutor by means of which attributes? Or: which stories are to be evoked, 
i.e., which states of affairs are to be shared? That is, we here meet again the proposi-
tional and nominatorical aspects of contexts we have covered exactly by the semantic 
aspects dealt with in the preceding section. This semantic core of a planned pictorial act 
may be embedded as partial sign act in higher level communicative acts, like proposi-
tions being used as parts of promises, requests, commands, and other speech acts – we 
shall come back to that aspect (mentioned first above) in the next section. 
Let us have at this place a quick look back at one of the formalisms developed in AI 
for dealing with the content and referents of verbal utterances: KL-ONE. The intra-
lexical conceptual rules of a field of concepts – its meaning postulates – are covered by 
propositions in T-BOXes while empirical propositions are collected into A-BOXes. 
That is, an A-BOX is the KL-ONE equivalent of a context. Essentially, the differences 
between an A-BOX representing the recipient’s point of view and an A-BOX of the 
sender’s focus of interest determine what objects can act as anchor points for nomina-
tion, and which attributes or relations are not shared yet and have to be communicated 
as predication. The process stays essentially within one field of concepts: definitions of 
complex concepts may be intra-lexically analyzed. Field-external relations are usually 
not considered. 
For pictures, this schema is only partially applicable. Determining the context to be 
built by a representational image is certainly the main step, as long as the field of sortal 
objects governs this context. But this is not yet the »image content« we need. In the 
preceding sections, we have characterized »picture content« as the concepts involved in 
recognizing something in the picture space: that is, from the perspective of reference 
semantics, viewing the concepts together with their visual test routines inherited from 
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the implementing Gestalt concepts. In order to determine the »picture content« proper 
from an A-BOX describing the context to be build, we first have to extract the relevant 
concepts. We find them in the corresponding T-BOX where they are only given in their 
intra-lexical form. KL-ONE-like systems do usually not deal with field-external rela-
tions between T-BOXes or the inheritance of sensory-motor test routines determining 
the reference relations. However, we may assume that a corresponding relation between 
the concepts of sortal objects and their geometric projections – geometric 3D individu-
als – is given. In any case, the complex formed by the sortal objects derived from the 
context (i.e., an extract of the T-BOX governing the A-BOX selected) in their relation 
to corresponding geometric objects (i.e., relation between two T-BOXes) is exactly the 
instance of »picture content« we need as the result of selecting “what to show” (cf. Fig. 
74). 
Of course, in the typical situation of an interactive system, like the digital textbook on 
anatomy mentioned above, many of the pictures presented are not generated out of noth-
ing (so to speak): they are essentially transformations of the picture shown the moment 
before. Or more precisely, it is a content already selected that is merely transformed 
leading to corresponding syntactic changes. On the level of the knowledge representa-
tion system, this corresponds to a given A-BOX to which certain propositions are added 
while others are deleted (since they are now irrelevant). Note that adding propositions is 
the only way of shifting the focus to new objects not included in the older context. The 
new A-BOX also has a different T-BOX projection determining the change in content. 
An impressive example is given by the system TextIllustrator, an experimental inter-
active textbook on anatomy [SCHLECHTWEG & WAGNER 1998]. Although not directly 
using a knowledge base, it allows a user (among other things) to change the image dis-
played on the left side of the screen indirectly by scrolling the text shown on the right 
side (cf. Fig. 75). The image always corresponds to the part of the text visible. Further-
more, clicking an expression marked in the text – essentially, those are the Latin medi-
cal terms – results in highlighting the corresponding object and eventually even in turn-
ing the scene so that the object can be clearly seen. While this latter effects are mainly 
part of the “how to show”, and we shall come back to them in a minute, the “what to 
show” aspect is more dominant in the first function.  
 
Figure 74: Selecting What to Show – from A-BOX to T-BOX and beyond 
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Note that the texts we deal with here are really meaning postulates. They determine, 
for example, the concept of a certain muscle connected with the eye, not the individual 
muscle of, e.g., your left eye. Thus, they actually correspond already to (partial) T-
Boxes. In TextIllustrator, the content of the text is not represented explicitly in a knowl-
edge base. Essentially, there are direct links between the medical terms and correspond-
ing parts of the 3D model of the scene. These links are “registered” during the setup 
process of the application, which establishes in principle the relation between the con-
cepts of single 3D models and the corresponding concepts of anatomic entities.  
Nevertheless, the part of the text visible at a time defines a co-textual conceptual con-
text, which could easily be captured by means of a T-BOX of medical sortal objects. 
Correspondingly, the geometric models underlying the computer graphics can be 
thought of as a T-BOX of 3D-objects (geometric Gestalt concepts). Scrolling the text 
changes the textual T-BOX more or less drastically depending on how much of the 
older text is still visible. We expect a corresponding change in the graphical T-BOX: the 
system has to determine which sub-models of the complete 3D model are to be con-
tained (together with their locative relations), which is quite simple with the field-
external relations implemented by means of the registered links. They determine exactly 
the new »picture content«.  
4.4.1.3 The Selection Problems: Form 
Once the semantic core of a picture is determined, an appropriate form for its 
presentation is selected – the “how to show” part. For language, this selection problem 
consists essentially in determining which one of a set of synonymous formulations for 
the content chosen is to be used in the particular case, and which syntactic schemata are 
to be applied. For pictures, the analogous selection means deciding about the 
perspective and frame, the presentation styles, and the lighting.  
 
Figure 75: Screenshot of the TextIllustrator, a Text-Driven Interactive Textbook on Anatomy 
THE FOUNDATION OF COMPUTATIONAL VISUALISTICS 111
 
 
Obviously, the camera perspective must be chosen in a way that the »picture refer-
ents« (associated with the »picture content« selected) are visible, at all. No object 
should be completely out of frame or totally hidden behind a larger object. Therefore, 
the point of view may be neither far away, nor too close. Every object must also remain 
recognizable (as that kind of sortal object). Thus, unusual points of views are to be 
avoided if their environment does not induce the correct interpretation: extreme per-
spective shortenings (anamorphotic presentations), e.g., of a rivet seen along its axis, are 
very hard to interpret as the correct sortal type of object. Edges or corners of objects po-
sitioned at different depths from the camera position lead to problems, too, if they seem 
to meet from the chosen point of view: the object candidates are merged and a proper 
recognition is difficult. The viewer must also be able to recognize the type of partially 
hidden objects (and those cut off by the frame). The environment may induce the cor-
rect interpretation: a rivet, for example, remains recognizable if only its head can be 
seen not in isolation but on the surface of a piece of furniture.65  
Note that we have assumed so far that the complete 3D-model (i.e., the geometric T-
BOX) is already determined when the “how to show” aspects are selected. However, the 
latter usually has to initiate a backtracking – the “what to show” decisions must be re-
vised if the originally selected content cannot be presented in an adequate manner. This 
may be the case if no valid point of view can be determined: e.g., some objects are al-
ways hidden behind some other objects, or too small in the context. Or every plausible 
camera position shows some objects from a completely unusual perspective that makes 
it improbable to recognize the object’s type. In such a case, the original »picture con-
tent« may be split up, leading, for example, to a sequence of pictures with different per-
spectives, or an enlargement to be used as a pictorial inlay.  
The second form aspect – how to select the presentation styles for a stylistically 
mixed presentational picture – is at least partially also related to perspective, though in a 
much more general sense. The presentation styles of a picture often encode the attitude 
of the sender toward the picture content; changing the style for a part of the picture indi-
cates a different attitude, e.g., importance. Let us come back again for a moment to the 
example TextIllustrator. In the graphic, the objects corresponding to the part of the text 
currently visible (i.e., important for the viewer66) are “highlighted”, e.g., by means of 
                                                     
65 For picture riddles in order to be visually enigmatic, these rules are explicitly broken. 
66 Note that we may consider in this example of an interactive system the user (= viewer) as the secondary 
sender of the message in a pictorial soliloquy.  
Figure 76: MCCLOUD on the Function of Naturalism in Comics 
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displaying them in color and fully 
shaded while the others remain gray or 
use a reduced “technical style” (wire 
frames, cf. again Fig. 75). 
Many comics give a good example 
of explicitly mixed pictorial styles, and 
there has been some thinking about the 
significance of more or less naturalism 
(in our sense, cf. sect. 3.5.2), as well. 
S. MCCLOUD [1993, 44] associates a 
more naturalistic depiction of an object 
contrasting a simplified background 
with a more objective and distanced 
view that is necessary if that object as 
such, not its (regular) use or presence, 
is focused – if, for example, a goblet is shown as being The Holy Grail. A graphically 
reduced representation, e.g., outlines only, that does not stand out against the 
representation style of the background, is usually applied to indicate that there is 
nothing special about that object, and that it is merely relevant in its normal use – for 
example, a goblet as a functioning extension for drinking of the protagonist’s body (cf. 
Fig. 76).  Similarly, the relative degree of naturalism of a person’s pictorial representation can 
be used to mark that person as either something strange, as somebody in emotional or 
cognitive distance to the protagonist/reader (more naturalism than background), or as a 
familiar face and nobody unusually strange (no difference to style of the remaining 
scene). The protagonist should be drawn in an even more reduced naturalism, compared 
with the rest, in order to simplify the identification of a comics reader with the charac-
ter.  
This effect of style differences in fact plays with the distinction between medium 
(context) and figure-ground (proposition) mentioned in chapter 3: while contexts pro-
vide the medium of potential figure-ground distinctions, propositions articulate a par-
ticular figure-ground distinction on the basis of a given medium. The variation of pres-
entation styles suggests a certain figure-ground distinction over and above the mere me-
dial spatial configuration. While a neutral context builder leaves the figure-ground dif-
ferentiation to a complementing verbal commentary (or completely to the viewer), pic-
tures with articulate style differences can be read as bearing a preferred reading: take the 
less detailed or abstracted parts for anchoring purposes; the naturalistic and detailed 
parts bear the essentially new of the message. Still, the picture does not articulate the 
figure-ground dichotomy in the unique manner of a proposition; it remains a context 
builder that induces many more propositions. We may call it a rhetorically enriched 
context builder and come back to this category in the practical context of the second 
case study in chapter 5. 
Selecting the lighting parameters is related to the representation styles. The represen-
tation of shadows resulting the lighting is an important clue for depth in the scene and 
the materiality of the objects (cf. Fig. 77). But they also have subtle attentional and 
emotional effects. Important parts of the picture are accentuated – “highlighted”. This 
means of rhetoric enrichment was already used in ancient paintings and can be formal-
ized by means of a feedback loop (cf. [HOPPE & LÜDICKE 1998]). Unfortunately, the 
Figure 77: Contrasting Different Lightings – Em-
phasizing Materiality and Depth on the Right Side
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emotional effects are far less predictable. They depend highly on circumstantial factors, 
and hence resist formalization. 
4.4.1.4 Combined Selection Problems for Choosing a Picture  
For pictures, the two aspects of selecting content and selecting form parameters are less 
clearly separable than for (propositional) language. A reduced but integral form of the 
pair of selection problems appears if we only choose among the given entries of a 
picture database. In this case, form and content obviously cannot provide independent 
dimensions of free selection: choosing one of the given pictures determines both 
features at once. Let us assume that we have a set of images each with associated 
instances of »picture content« and »picture referent«.67 Content and referents together 
can be read as a description of what the corresponding picture shows. We furthermore 
have a similar description of what picture we would like to find. This goal specification 
may be derived from a text. Let us call the description of a picture P, and the description 
of the specifying text T. Comparing P and T literally and minimizing the differences is 
certainly a good first choice of strategy. In some cases, we might be lucky: the database 
contains a picture with a description fitting exactly the pattern – the difference between 
P and T disappears. However in most cases, the picture is either too specific, too 
general, or the two descriptions overlap partially (cf. Fig. 78a to c). What criteria can be 
brought forward to decide between several of such cases? 
L. PINEDA [2003FC] deals exactly with this problem in the context of interactive 
multimedia generation. He extends an idea of VAN DEEMTER [1998] who suggests that 
the picture selection process can be thought of as a deductive inference. Then, the 
picture investigated could have a more general (i.e., weaker) content that implies the 
goal specification completely. Or the picture in question has a more specific (i.e., 
stronger) content that is fully implied by the goal specification. VAN DEEMTER shows 
that for such cases a strategy can be successfully applied that indeed minimizes the 
difference from either side. One could use quite effectively the weakest (least 
informative) picture in the database implying the goal – VAN DEEMTER’s Rule A (Fig. 
78a). Or one could select successfully the strongest (most informative) of the pictures 
available that is implied by the goal – called Rule B (Fig. 78b). In the graphical 
metaphor of Figure 78 Rule A determines the smallest available P including T while 
Rule B goes for the largest P included in T.  
                                                     
67 If no individuals that are known already apart from the picture can be associated with the pictorial ref-
erents, unspecific referents have to fill that hole (corresponding verbally to indefinite noun phrases with 
an implicit existential component); note that they still are sortal individuals offering the potential to be 
found again in other contexts. 
    
(a) Rule A (b) Rule B (c) Rule A’ (d) Rule B’ 
Figure 78: Differences between Goal Specification T and Picture Content P, and Rules Associated 
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PINEDA modifies the two rules for the more complicated overlapping cases. He distin-
guishes the situations where the communicative focus is on the spatial relations from 
those emphasizing the conceptual information about objects. Sometimes, it matters most 
that certain geometrical relations are presented. Even if there are interpretations for the 
object candidates in the picture that are irrelevant for the communicative purpose, a 
viewer usually does not consider such interpretations since the identification of objects 
also depend on his or her expectations in the situation (e.g., induced by co-text). For 
such a case, a relaxed Rule A’ leads to good results: chose the picture whose content 
implies the largest intersection with the goal specification. Figure 78c illustrates this 
rule. 
In other situations, rich conceptual information about objects is to be expressed. 
However, corresponding pictures can only be used to illustrate very specific situations, 
i.e., it is highly unlikely to find a fitting image in the database. PINEDA suggests for that 
case to rather use a schematic picture and complement it with explaining text. For this 
purpose he suggests a variant of Rule B leading to the weakest picture whose representa-
tion is implied by the text such that figural and reference objects in locative expressions 
can be bound to schematic representations of spatial objects in the picture. The arrow in 
Figure 78d points accordingly from T to P, since the goal specification is adapted to the 
pictures available.  
4.4.2 Anticipating the Unknown Beholders 
The approaches to the selection problems described so far are still mainly semantic: 
beside a few hints to “the communicative situation” or “the communicative purpose”, 
senders and receivers of the pictorial (or multi-modal) messages have not been 
considered explicitly. But selecting content and form of a (pictorial) message is always 
relative to a communicative purpose that is part of the current language game (in the 
broad sense of “language”). The basic idea for considering the (more ore less unknown) 
beholders and their understanding of a pictorial sign act planned, is to anticipate that 
understanding and its presuppositions, and to integrate those anticipations in the 
generation process.  
4.4.2.1 Remarks on the Purposes of Picture Uses 
In a formal manner, the purpose of each utterance is determined by the language game 
in which the utterance is a move – a speech act. The expressions ‘language game’, ‘way 
of living’ [WITTGENSTEIN 1953], and ‘speech act’ [AUSTIN 1962, SEARLE 1969] (or 
perhaps less common but more 
general ‘sign act’) have become 
crucial tools for understanding 
modern pragmatics. Although 
primarily developed for 
language in the narrow, i.e., 
verbal, sense, they span an 
interpretative schema for any 
complex sign behavior. Like in a 
game of chess, languages form 
rule-based systems of moves: in 
such a language game, not only 
Figure 79: System of Acts to Be Considered in Business 
Communities 
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an act of sign use is con-
sidered a move, but also the 
other activities of the parti-
cipants related to the signs, 
e.g., applying the sensory-
motor test routines associated 
with concepts (cf. Sect. 3.4.4), 
a certain coordinated move-
ment in the context of a hunt-
ing group, and the ordering of 
goods between firms (cf. Fig. 
79, [PARUNAK 1996]). The 
rules in chess determine 
essentially which moves may follow a certain sequence of preceding moves, and dis-
tinguish those regular moves from the illegitimate ones. Perfoming one of the latter 
interrupts the game.  
Similarly, signs acts and certain other acts are woven into a structure of regular se-
quences, while other sequences do not correspond to the way of living determined by 
that language game. Retaliations have to be expected if a move not sanctioned by the 
rules is applied. More or less formal systems of rules for the sequences of verbal speech 
acts can be designed (e.g., by means of Finite State Machines, cf. Fig. 80, [WINOGRAD 
& FLORES 1986]), and can be composed hierarchically to form more complex language 
games. Such formalizations have been adapted for text generating computer systems 
(e.g., [COHEN 1978]).68  
Many, though not all, speech acts have propositional cores. Beside the situational 
context of the utterances, the propositions are indeed the “glue” binding together the 
speech acts of a language game in a common discourse universe.  The same proposi-
tional content may partake in different “illocutionary” functions: as an assertion, a ques-
tion, a demand etc. Typical speech acts without a propositional core are greetings or ex-
cuses, but also the one-word utterances of infants, and warning cries – both of which we 
have met already as examples of quasi-predicates in Chapter 3. It is usually assumed 
that many of the illocutionary roles of verbal acts that need a propositional core can also 
be completed by images instead. Correspondingly, the role of pictures in pictorial sign 
acts has been compared to propositions, predications or nominations. The act of context-
building with its close relations to quasi-predicates, i.e., to non-propositional illocution-
ary functions (cf. sections 3.4.3 & 3.4.5), has not been considered systematically, so far. 
Accordingly, current computational approaches to pictorial communication deal mostly 
with the nominatoric or propositional aspects derivable from context-building. 
There have been several approaches to formalize language games for pictorial com-
munication. A transfer of SEARLE’s speech act theory to pictorial sign acts was, for ex-
ample, proposed by KJØRUP [1978] leading to a set of conditions for successfully per-
forming several types of “picture acts”, among them representation act and illustration 
                                                     
68 One of the most influential applications of speech act theory in computer science has been the system 
Coordinator by WINOGRAD & FLORES [1986] covering action-oriented conversations in organizations. 
Such a dialog is initiated by partner A with a request (resulting in dialogue state 2, cf. Fig. 80). Partner B 
may answer with committing to the request, with proposing a different action or with refusing the com-
ply. The latter results in the same final dialogue state (8) if A withdraws the initial request or refuses to 
the proposal of B. 
Figure 80: State-Transition Network for Speech Acts  
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act. For SACHS-HOMBACH [2002, Sect. 6.3.4], illustration (orig.: ‘Veranschaulichung’) 
is the most elementary illocutionary act to be performed with pictures, since the primary 
act of illustration is immediately associated with the picture content, i.e., a (more or less 
complex) predication. In contrast to the use of predications in propositional speech acts, 
however, the habit of distinction covered by a concept is not plainly put into the inter-
locutor’s focus of attention: that concept is simultaneously “characterized” by the visual 
symptoms associated with it. This is, for SACHS-HOMBACH, particularly true for geo-
metric concepts, e.g., the sketch of an ellipsis given in a geometry class. In conse-
quence, the function of illustration becomes less determined if more complex concepts 
are considered. If an explicit referential component to a sortal entity is to be dealt with, 
the illustration function becomes the illocutionary role of “exemplification” (orig. Ger-
man: ‘Illustration’). In this case, so SACHS-HOMBACH, the picture does not only illus-
trate a property but applies that property to an object. The nominatoric identification of 
the object is usually performed by means of additional texts, e.g. a caption.  
So far, state transition diagrams with explicit use of picture acts have not been de-
scribed: if pictures are used with the same illocutionary forces available for verbal sign 
acts, they may just be substituted in the corresponding transitions. Speech act transition 
diagrams are optimal for investigating interactions with a lot of turn-taking. They are 
less relevant if we are interested in the coherence between the various parts of one com-
plex speech act. While speech act systems focus on the dynamic aspects, rhetoric rela-
tions concentrate on the relations between the moves of a language game, and are there-
fore preferred for analyzing the internal (static) dependencies between the parts of a 
document. Such relations – for example, “elaboration”, “volitional cause”, “enable-
ment”, “concession” and 19 more in the Rhetorical Structure Theory RST [MANN & 
THOMPSON 1987] – correspond to intentions the author looks out for with the utterance 
relative to the co-text .  
Although pictures are originally not considered, they can be embedded in RST by 
means of the findings of media psychologists (e.g., [LEVIN ET AL. 1987]). ANDRÉ & RIST 
[1993], for example, use rhetoric relations derived from linguistics in order to describe 
the connection between the parts of a picture or between pictures of a series in the con-
text of instruction manuals: a “cause-result” relation often holds between two pixemes 
of a picture while the relation “elaboration” characterizes the rhetoric link between a 
pictorial inlay in a main picture in many cases. Some relations relevant for texts are not 
directly applicable (e.g., “condition”, “negation”, “concession”) but can be integrated by 
means of conventional pictorial symbols (e.g., arrows, red crosslines). On the other 
hand, some relations – in particular between pixemes and text fragments like “label” – 
have usually not yet been considered in linguistic theory. RIST & ANDRÉ organize the 
rhetoric functions ascribed to pixemes hierarchically according to their abstractness: the 
top node “depicting an object” is refined to “show characteristic form”, “show relative 
dimension”, “show parts”, and “show material”. Other top nodes mentioned are “show 
location of an object”, “show object state”, “show object trajectory”, and “show action”.  
Those rhetoric relations are used as one part of a tripartite proposal to structure the 
complex sign acts in a multi-modal system. The rhetoric structure is basically a tree of 
rhetoric relations between the parts of the complex sign act. An additional intentional 
structure covers explicitly goals of the sender associated with each element of the rheto-
ric hierarchy. The sign act hierarchy and the goal hierarchy are usually quite similar but 
have not necessarily the exactly same structure. For example, subordinate sign acts need 
not be subordinate goals, as well. Finally, an attentional structure is defined by “focus 
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spaces” each of which is associated with an entry 
of the intentional structure and contains the dis-
course entities relevant for that goal – the discourse 
context in its nominatoric aspect, that is. It is es-
sentially useful for identifying co-referential items. 
As an example, ANDRÉ & RIST analyze the pic-
ture-text combination used in the instruction man-
ual of an espresso machine. The manual in ques-
tion consists of sequences of combinations of 
speech acts (in the close sense) and pictorial acts 
with representational and simple structural pix-
emes. The first element of one of those sequences 
(‘Filling the water container’) is given in Figure 
81. The corresponding rhetoric structure, shown in 
Figure 82, links the three main pixemes of the pic-
ture as an auxiliary sign act (“NH”) to the text as the main sign act (“HH”) of the com-
plex. The function of the picture is analyzed as enabling the user to perform the request 
articulated by means of ‘Lift the lid’. A special sub function is ascribed to the main pix-
emes: the nomination used in the text – ‘the lid’ – reappears co-referentially as the result 
part of a complex relation “Inform-Cause-Result”. The arrow pixeme, an abstract 
graphical symbol representing conventionally an action, takes the corresponding place 
of the cause. Most interesting for our approach of context building is of course the ele-
mentary function “provide background” associated with the third main pixeme. This 
function is indeed part of every analysis given by RIST & ANDRÉ, the manifestation of a 
separation of figure and ground already fixed.  
The intentional structure (Fig. 83) is closely associated with the rhetoric structure and 
corresponds approximately to SEARLE’s preconditions for corresponding speech acts; 
each of its nodes describes the (sub) goal associated with a certain partial sign act. In the 
example, the main goal is analyzed as making the receivers (“users”) open the lid. To 
that purpose the receivers must be able to do so, and also believe that the sender wants 
them to perform that action. That is, the sub goals are either making the receivers be-
lieve some propositions or enable them to perform some action. 
 
Figure 81: Example „Lift the lid“ 
(“Klappen Sie den Deckel nach 
oben”) 
 
  Figure 82: The Analysis of ANDRÉ & RIST: the rhetoric structure for the example (Fig. 81) 
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Those analyses are used by ANDRÉ & RIST to specify and build a paradigmatic plan-
ning system for the content and form of interactive multimodal presentations [ANDRÉ 
1995], and in particular of the graphics used there [RIST 1996]. The description of the 
picture’s rhetoric and intentional structures are incrementally derived from a given 
communicative goal together with further constraints for the generation (e.g., restricted 
resources) by means of a set of strategic rules. We shall not go into further detail of 
those strategies. The essential aspect for us is that the receiver’s knowledge, believes, 
motivations, and abilities to perform some actions (as viewed from the sender’s per-
spective) are taken into account as the crucial factors for all pragmatic decisions. 
4.4.2.2 User Modeling for Pictures 
It was already mentioned in section 3.5.3 that the anticipation of the other interlocutor is 
crucial to the conception of conscious communication following MEAD. The 
communicative partners have to anticipate each other’s reactions – or a common 
meaning of a sign act remains impossible since the sender’s perspective differs 
necessarily from the receiver’s point of view. The sender has to take into account the 
receiver’s perspective if she or he is to communicate in more than just a signal language 
– and the receivers must anticipate the sender’s position if they do not simply react to a 
signal but understand the sign act as meaningful.  
A classical part of pragmatics in linguistics demonstrates these interdependencies in a 
particularly clear manner: we usually do not communicate everything explicitly but 
leave out information we know our interlocutors can infer nevertheless. In the context of 
his investigations on cooperative communication, GRICE [1974] christened those special 
inferences ‘implicatures’ and formulated several “maxims” that determine certain 
aspects of cooperativity: any contribution should be, for example, as informative as 
possible, but also not more informative than is required. Furthermore, the receiver 
should not be able to infer more from the utterance in its context than the speaker wants 
him to know (and infer).  
With respect to propositional language, implicatures arise essentially from applying 
syllogistically the meaning postulates associated with the predications to the 
corresponding contexts and thus adding additional propositions (cf. again Sect. 4.3.1.3): 
Figure 83: The Analysis of ANDRÉ & RIST: the Intentional Structure for the Example (Fig. 81) 
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if the new proposition states that Buckbeak, an individual in the context in question, is a 
hippogryph, and a meaning postulate connects the concept »hippogryph« with the 
concept »being pride«, we may also add the proposition “Buckbeak is pride” to the 
context.  
From a more technical, information-theoretic perspective, STROTHOTTE & 
STROTHOTTE [1997, 85ff.] describe the difference between the information explicitly 
stated by the sender and the implicatures (expected to be) drawn by the receivers by 
means of the opposition of (explicitly) transmitted vs. (implicitly) transputed informa-
tion. The purpose of the distinction is to conceive of the transputed information as a 
proper part of the communicated message, as well, in contrast to something additionally 
generated purely on the recipient’s side. That is, the sender is also responsible for that 
part of the message.  
The common approach in computational linguistics is a “user model” anticipating the 
interlocutors with their reasoning abilities: “What would I understand in his position if 
being told what I plan to tell him?”, and “What might I in her position have tried to tell 
me with such a message?” respectively. Such a user model works essentially as a “gen-
erate and test” feedback cycle. For natural language systems, WAHLSTER [1991] has 
proposed the double anticipation feedback loop (Fig. 84): starting from a semantic rep-
resentation of what is to be said, the sender system generates a first proposal for a corre-
sponding utterance, which then is analyzed with respect to the meaning a potential inter-
locutor would ascribe to that utterance together with its implicatures in the context of 
the previous interactions. After comparing the result of that analysis with the initial se-
mantic representation, the program decides whether the utterance under investigation 
leads to a sufficiently satisfying communication and is performed, or whether the plan 
has to be revised first. Indeed, the understanding (anticipated) does not need to cover the 
 
Figure 84: WAHLSTER’s Anticipation-Feedback-Loop for Natural Language Systems 
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complete initial semantic representation since subsequent utterances could be used to 
add missing parts or repair misconceptions up to a certain degree.  
Similarly, the receiver system generates an initial understanding of an “incoming” ut-
terance in the current context (by the same algorithm of analysis), which then is used as 
the starting point for re-generating an utterance. Here, the comparison with the real ut-
terance leads to further hints for the interpretation, in particular concerning presupposi-
tions, i.e., additional propositions that one has to assume as being true in the context of 
the utterance in order to understand the utterance at all.69 A revision of the initial under-
standing could be rated as necessary. 
Revising the primary interpretation is typically the case for metonymic expressions, 
too, when, for example, a nurse tells her colleague “our kidney cyst has visitors”. Here, 
a natural language generation system estimates by means of its receiver model whether 
the receiver intended is able to interpret the metonymic reduction from the full form 
“our single in-patient who is attended for his kidney cyst”, while a corresponding auto-
matic receiver system starts with the noun phrase’s literal interpretation as a particular 
pathology of a (human) organ, finding that the predication is incompatible with that in-
terpretation, and thus activating the revision of the interpretation as a patient who is able 
to get visitors and who the speaker could have metonymically associated with the literal 
interpretation. 
Under the precondition that a propositional analysis of an image to its picture content 
(and the derived referents) is sufficient, the general schema of linguistic user modeling 
can be transferred to pictorial communication and in particular to tele-rendering with 
only slight alterations: the active and passive beholder models (Fig. 85). After generat-
ing a picture from a primarily selected picture content (e.g., by means of a strategy-
based planning algorithm like the one of ANDRÉ & RIST), the sender system uses its 
model of the passive beholder to analyze the picture by means of algorithms corre-
sponding to those described in section 4.3. The analysis results in the »picture content« 
that the intended beholders are presumably able to decode when being shown that pic-
ture: their anticipated understanding. Furthermore, referents are derived from the con-
tent either as purely intentional individuals or as individuals that are known from other 
contexts and fit the description in question. A comparison between the two instances of 
»picture content« corresponds closely to the one between the semantic representations 
in the verbal case: two sets of (spatial) propositions – either literally “given” in the pic-
ture, inferred as implicatures or induced as presuppositions – are compared with each 
other. The differences are used to revise the picture initially generated or to reject it al-
together and start up all over again. If, for example, a referent is not recognized because 
the passive beholder model does not dispose of the necessary relation between sortal ob-
ject and geometric Gestalt in question, the plan has to be revised so that the beholder 
(model) becomes able to recognize that geometric projection as one of this referent, e.g., 
by deriving the unknown perspective from a known one in a preparatory picture se-
quence. 
On the other hand: having been presented a picture, the (passive) beholder reaches a 
set of spatial concepts (together with their geometric test routines) as the primary »pic-
                                                     
69 For example, the proposition “The president is not intoxicated today” (uttered in a context so far the-
matically neutral with respect to intoxication) induces the presupposition that the president in question is 
usually – or at least often – drunk; the utterance would not be informative otherwise since the default as-
sumption in the contexts we have in mind here is that presidents are usually not drunk. If used neverthe-
less, the receivers must conclude that the sender intended the presupposition, as well. 
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ture content«: by analyzing the picture on the basis of clustering geometric Gestalts 
(bottom up), and by projecting sortal object models (top down). Those concepts may be 
applicable to some individual sortal objects as the picture’s referents known from an-
other context. A generic intentional object of the appropriate type may be generated as a 
default referent instead. The set of propositions thus formed is extended by means of in-
ferences and inductions. In order to render the inferences to implicatures, and to trans-
form the inductions into presuppositions, the receiver system’s model of the active be-
holder takes the expanded picture content and generates – from the assumed sender’s 
perspective with the potential intentions – another picture: the image the receiver actu-
ally expects from the assumed sender in this communicative situation. The differences 
between the two pictures indicate inconsistencies in the primary interpretation or in the 
sender’s intentions or background postulated by the model. 
There arises one complication at this place: how to compare the two pictures. “Syn-
tactically, e.g., by pixels” may be the immediate answer – an answer obviously without 
much value: on the level of pixels, a minor difference could mean a completely different 
picture, and a major difference nothing more than a slight darkening of the whole im-
age. High-level pixemes are certainly much more informative; but remember that such 
pixemes are only accessible in combination with semantic categories. 
The reasonable solution would be to add another complete analyzing step, and then 
find the differences in the corresponding instances of »picture content«.70 The full form 
of simulative beholder modeling for graphics in media of class IV is in fact prohibitively 
expensive: after all, picture analysis and picture generation each demand already for 
quite extensive computational resources. Correspondingly, the combination of both in a 
potentially iterative feedback loop has never been realized so far. RIST, for example, by-
                                                     
70 We come back to the realization of such an iteration in the case study of Section 5.4. 
Figure 85: The Two Beholder Models for Tele-Rendering  
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passes the analysis of a picture to be generated by the sender’s passive beholder model. 
While incrementally constructing the plan for generating the image, i.e., while deter-
mining successively parts of the picture’s content from the sender’s point of view as a 
description in propositional form, a secondary description is constructed in a rule-
following manner covering the picture’s content from the receiver’s perspective. Note 
that this second description is not generated from the picture but mirrors, so to speak, 
the underlying reasoning processes of the sender with respect to a potential receiver. For 
each step in its design activities, a rule tells the system how the corresponding change in 
the resulting picture will (presumably) change the understanding of the beholder in 
question. The picture per se is not at all involved; no geometric test routine has been 
employed. 
Quite obviously, there are some further complications with explicit beholder model-
ing, which should at least be mentioned at this place: 
- Variations in the type of beholders anticipated: in a positive sense, beholder models 
for tele-rendering are, thus, adaptable to different user groups, and can react to lay 
persons, novices, experts in the domain of discourse. In a negative sense, an incom-
patible or wrong user model impairs the performance severely. 
- Iterations of the revisions: revising the initially generated picture (or picture under-
standing respectively) usually improves the pragmatic quality of the product. But 
there is no guaranty that the revised picture is sufficiently understandable in the cor-
rect way, or that the interpretation reached can be trusted without hesitation. Quite in 
contrary, the revisions have to be tested as well. So: How many cycles are necessary? 
Does the revision always improve the performance so that the approximations come 
close enough after some steps? Or is the improvement not monotone, and the succes-
sive revisions jump in cyclic (or even chaotic) alternations? There is no general an-
swer known to these questions so far. In individual cases, monotony can be ascer-
tained.  
- Recursion of modeling: if a sender models generally a receiver, and vice versa, then, 
this sender model should include again a receiver model, which should include a 
sender model, into infinity (and vice versa). The sender believes something about the 
receiver, and he believes that the receiver believes something about the sender, etc. 
An explicit simulation of those recursions is not possible. Theoretically, the conjunct 
of this infinite chain together with its complement is summarized in the user model-
ing community by the predicate ‘mutual belief’.  
These complications have been dealt with extensively in the literature on user modeling. 
Since they are not specific to the uses of pictures, a more detailed description is not nec-
essary in our context. 
Any further processing of high-level illocutionary aspects of picture uses, e.g., the 
symbolic representation of peace as Noah’s dove, can then indeed be viewed as fully 
equivalent to that of verbal signs. The only difference is the initial transformation to the 
propositional form of combined picture content and associated pictorial reference. 
Those illocutionary aspects are, thus, not specific to pictorial sign acts and of limited 
relevance for our investigation, as well. 
This kind of beholder modeling depends on whether pictures are really just deter-
mined by their content (and the reference relations derived from that content). Are pic-
tures indeed completely covered by means of a definite set of propositions? Or is the 
content itself a product of a much more fundamental communicative function character-
istic for pictorial sign acts?  
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4.4.2.3 Adaptation to the Pragmatics of Context-Building 
The last section has sketched the treatment of pictorial pragmatics in computer science 
in its present state: the approaches are essentially adapted to the structures of verbal 
assertions for which solutions have been developed before – independent from pictorial 
communication. And indeed: although the nominatoric aspect is far less clearly 
separated in pictorial sign acts compared to an assertion, the principal distinction 
between substance concept and attribute concepts of the underlying sortal field often 
induces a first interpretation of representational images as a more or less complex 
assertion predicating properties of and relations between (i.e., attribute concepts of) the 
instances of sortal objects (the substances of the field). In rhetorically enriched pictures, 
form aspects are furthermore employed to modify or focus the nominator/predicator 
structure determining the interpretation of the picture. Therefore, an adaptation of 
pictorial sign acts to verbal assertions in user modeling seems rather reasonable at first, 
and in fact leads to satisfying results for special tasks. 
In the light of the discussion outlined in chapter 3, the presentation of a picture consti-
tutes in general a communicative act with some characteristics quite different from the 
utterance of an assertive sentence. If perceptoid signs are conceived of as a special kind 
of context builder, their function does not yet include a particular figure-ground distinc-
tion or a certain differentiation in nominatoric or predicative aspects. The beholders – 
and possibly some accompanying sign acts, in particular by means of assertions that 
take that picture as context builder – induce both. Metaphorically speaking, context 
builders provide originally the medium in which various figure-ground distinctions can 
take place. It is, thus, crucial for pictures that they are in principle open to various inter-
pretations – evoked by subsequent sign acts, be they performed externally or as an inner 
soliloquy. An adequate user modeling for pictorial communicative acts in general must 
account for this feature, especially if it is intended – like our generic data structure – as 
a reference model, of which concrete systems realize selected parts only. 
Recall at this place the four modes of reflection associated with pictures mentioned in 
section 3.4.1: the immersive mode, covering standard pictorial communication, is con-
stituted as a specific combination of the more elementary deceptive and symbolic 
modes. The intuition that pictures – at least the representational ones – do resemble a 
situational context, i.e., evoke erroneous impulses in our immediate behavior, is the ba-
sis of the deceptive mode. It is still »resemblanceα« we are considering here: the detec-
tors associated with some (pre-) object concepts have to be activated spontaneously by 
the syntactic properties of the picture (recall the birds of ZEUXIS). Only in the combina-
tion with the symbolic mode, i.e., the beholder’s awareness of taking part in a commu-
nicative act in one role or the other (and indeed, following MEAD, both roles simultane-
ously), the concept »resemblanceα« is transformed to »resemblanceβ«: the awareness 
that the activation of the detectors has happened in the wrong situation, and the use of 
this awareness to focus the awareness of the communicative partners to a different situa-
tion in which the detectors are not falsely activated. Only in this combination of decep-
tive mode and symbolic mode into the immersive mode, the reactions, which are still 
fixedly bound to the detectors for cases of pure »resemblanceα«, can be suspended from 
immediate performance without blending them out of the behavior completely.  
Exactly these spontaneous but (more or less) suspended reactions, which also include 
emotional aspects beside the cognitive ones, enable us to employ pictures as primary 
context builders; they mark the essential difference between propositional and pictorial 
communication; and they lead directly and simultaneously to the most acclaimed virtue 
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and the most decried vice of picture use: the efficiency to communicate complex affairs 
holistically, and the power to undermine the rational structures of discourse. Complain-
ing about the latter would indeed not make much sense if pictorial communication were 
essentially propositional. It is, however, quite reasonable with respect to perceptoid con-
text builders, which do not offer a fixed figure-ground distinction but the potential of 
many spontaneous reactions “from the stomach”.  
No doubt, a full simulative beholder model has to provide a comparable complexity 
of interacting reception modes. The symbolic mode is essentially caught by the recur-
sions of beholder modeling. For this mode indeed, the pure propositional description of 
the picture together with propositions covering the beholder’s knowledge and intentions 
(up to the mutual beliefs) is sufficient and provides the distance from immediate reac-
tions on the affairs asserted, that is in particular the picture’s predicative aspects covered 
by the content.  
We have to keep in mind that for context builders, content can only be momentarily 
assigned. It must remain revisable. In the case of ambiguous figures, for example, the 
content changes frequently, spontaneously, and in a rather dramatic manner. This corre-
sponds to the observation that pictorial sign acts do not have a propositional content at 
all – they usually have many of them. As context builders, pictures are not equivalent to 
a single assertion or any of its (traditional) parts for nomination or predication. There is 
a much closer similarity to complete texts, like a novel viewed as a rather complex con-
text builder for subsequent utterances. The possible reactions to the presentation of 
those two types of context builders are at least partially comparable. For example, a 
fixed linearization to a subsequent re-narration is not included in either case, although 
the linear composition of the novel induces a certain sequence of assertions much 
stronger than any picture would do. In general, many paths are possible: in this sense, 
all context builders offer narrative or argumentative maps. Reducing a picture to a se-
quence of propositions, as complete as it may be, does not take full account of the picto-
rial sign act’s semiotic potential. It is indeed crucial to not cut off the connection to the 
 
Figure 86: An Objective Picture Content Depends on the Dyad of Beholder Models 
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perceptual processes generating the propositional form since they are necessary for ap-
plying further test routines. 
Employing the same algorithms of computer vision in the beholder model that are 
used for analyzing directly a scene is certainly the basis for the model’s deceptive 
mode.71 More precisely: those algorithms mediate an association of a picture content and 
the picture in question – an association that we view as a description of the anticipated 
deceptive mode of a beholder. After all: the beholder model always contains descrip-
tions only of the simulated events or states.  
Quite obviously, the spontaneous reactions we would expect being named here have 
to be, in a way, hidden in the instance of »picture content«: let us assume that, for ex-
ample, adding the item »snake« to the beholder model’s »picture content« is rather in-
terpreted as the activation of the detector »snake« together with the relevant repulsive 
movement and other emotional reactions. The execution of such reactions would have 
been automatically triggered “outside of the model”, since they correspond to the inten-
tional pre-objects perceived in the situational context. The entities contained in this 
variant of »picture content« are transformed to real concepts only by means of their em-
bedding in the beholder model with its constituting role for the symbolic mode. Indeed, 
we now see that the “free” version of »picture content« described in the section on se-
mantics, i.e., the one not bound within the mutual modelings of the beholders, is not at 
all sufficient for pictorial semantics, since it cannot really account for the complicated 
interaction of deceptive and symbolic modes inherent in picture uses. Even the primary 
»picture content« of the picture producer describing the spontaneous reactions is sym-
bolic only in as far as it is part of the sender’s soliloquial communication, and thus 
stands in relations with the models anticipating the reactions of potential beholders.  
The conception of a singular »picture content« developed in section 4.3 merely cov-
ers the perceptoid aspects of the concepts governing a picture’s semantics. It does not 
cover the full range of communicative functions usually associated to the concept »con-
cept«. Those aspects are dealt with only by means of the interdependent dyad of »pic-
ture contents« in the active and passive beholder models (Fig. 86). 
This does, of course, not mean that the simple, semanticist version of »picture con-
tent« is not very useful and even mostly sufficient for many practical applications of 
computer vision where an explicit reflection of the complicated interplay of reception 
modes of pictorial communication is not necessary for solving the tasks at hand. Simi-
larly, the intralexical definition of verbal semantics is deficient compared to reference 
semantics; nevertheless, it can be employed with good results to deal with certain prob-
lems of computational linguistics. 
4.4.3 Authenticity and Media of Class IV 
Let us take up again the problem of Section 4.4.1.1: an essential aspect for media of 
class IV related to partner modeling must obviously be the question of authenticity. To 
what degree can the users of an interactive system trust that the sign act they think they 
are performing with a picture presented by the system is uttered authentically?  
The discussion on authenticity in computer science is usually more restricted in its 
focus since the term ‘authenticity’ in the technical sense refers essentially to the ques-
tion whether the apparent sender of a message is the real sender. Traditionally, a mes-
sage is encoded in a way that marks it uniquely as from a certain sender – the signature 
                                                     
71 This holds at least approximately – though, recall the remarks in section 4.3.2.3. 
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or the seal of a letter, the secret code of an encrypted text, or an individual stamp on a 
picture. A short introduction on special syntactical changes to images known as ‘digital 
watermarks’ [DITTMANN 2000] reflects a well-known approach of computer scientists to 
the problem of technical authenticity of images in the second part of this section. 
4.4.3.1 Beholder Models and Authenticity 
Recall the determination of authenticity in sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3: a sign act is called 
authentical if the attitude of the sender to which the sign act shifts the attention of the 
receiver is the actual attitude of the sender. A proposition, for example, is authentical, if 
the sender believes that it is true and is ready to argue for its truth. While the category of 
truth cannot be applied directly to picture acts, authenticity can. To that purpose, we 
obviously have to know who counts as the sender of the pictorial sign act. We therefore 
have to investigate whether or in what respect partner modeling is able of helping to 
improve the receiver’s rating of authenticity of tele-rendered pictures.  
There are two typical classes of senders in the case of a tele-rendered picture: the 
computational visualist originally designing the interactive system in question and thus 
being responsible for the pictures potentially shown; and the user employing the interac-
tive system in a complex soliloquy, hence responsible for the pictures actually gener-
ated. Authenticity in the general, communicative sense indicates a specific relation of 
correspondence between the sender’s sign activities and her or his other behaviors. The 
sender’s attitude to which the sign act primarily refers (and which shows in his behavior 
– his moves in the sign game) must be his or her real attitude, or the sign act is not au-
thentical. In the case of a proposition, it may still be true, even if the sender does not be-
lieve that. Since pictures are neither true nor false, authenticity remains as an essential 
criterion for successful pictorial communication, in particular when using pictures that 
have been generated by tele-rendering. 
Obviously, an interactive program cannot inspect the sender’s actual attitude – it is 
not given the opportunity to observe the system developer’s behavior, nor is it capable 
of reading a user’s mind who directs soliloquially his or her thoughts by means of the 
interactive system’s creations. It only has the representation of a small range of potential 
attitudes in the form of the descriptions of intentions, beliefs, and knowledge in its ac-
tive beholder model. Accordingly, interactive systems are not able to establish authen-
ticity of sign acts by themselves. The active speaker model can only help to set up well-
known standard situations of communication: then, authenticity can be assumed in a ge-
neric way not bound to an individual sender, and indeed independent from the two dis-
tinct classes of senders to be considered. Again it becomes clear that communicative as-
pects of picture communication are adequately handled only by means of the embedding 
in the mutually associated beholder models. 
An explicit conception of beholder modeling as described in the last few pages has 
never been realized so far. From the engineering point of view, reduced derivations of 
such an extensive modeling as described before are often useful and functional to a sat-
isfying degree for specific tasks, and more efficient, too. Nevertheless, discussing the 
full complexity pictorial pragmatics impresses on beholder models is obviously impor-
tant for computational visualistics from the perspective of structural science.  
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4.4.3.2 Authenticity as a Technical Problem: Syntactic Approaches 
When the expression ‘authenticity’ is currently used in computer science, it does not 
refer to the coordination between a sender’s attitude and the message’s content; that 
relation is usually not accessible for the programs. There are, however, commitments of 
the computer as a medium,72 among them those called ‘integrity’ and ‘authenticity’. 
Integrity is granted if the receiver of a message gets exactly what the sender has sent, 
i.e., nothing has been left out, added or changed. Authenticity in the technical sense 
means that the receivers can be sure that the sender marked on the message is indeed the 
one who has sent it. Signatures are a common means of authentification (e.g., of letters, 
works of art). In combination, the two commitments also garantee that the sender cannot 
deny to have sent the message in question (i.e., ‘non repudiation’ of the message). 
Well-known examples of using an explicit authenticity marker are the icons of TV 
senders superimposed in a corner of the images transmitted. Copyright is another impor-
tant application area for techniques to ensure authenticity. Since notes of money are par-
ticularly well protected against un-authorized copying, many techniques for ensuring 
the authenticity of a note are exemplarily applied: the use of special materials, addi-
tional information in the form of serial numbers, the signatures of few authorized per-
sons, and in particular the means of watermarks.73 The latter gave the idea for integrating 
more or less obviously information about the sender’s identity in computerized images 
(and other kinds of computerized perceptoid signs) called ‘digital watermark’. For pic-
tures, the watermark is another picture, mostly a binary one, i.e., in black and white.74 
With a few exceptions, digital watermarks should not be obvious (cf. Fig. 87). Not 
being perceptible for someone who tries to illegally copy or manipulate the message is a 
first step of avoiding the watermark itself from being manipulated or removed. Relative 
to the tasks the digital watermarks have to fulfill, several types can be distinguished de-
pending on who should be able to detect the watermark and how robust it must be. A 
watermark is robust if it is as complicated as possible to manipulate or remove the addi-
tional information embedded as watermark in the image from the message (without de-
stroying the message). This includes “friendly” manipulations like compression or en-
cryptions used for transmission. 
                                                     
72 More precisely, those commitments are assumed by those providing the medium. 
73 Although exchanging money is usually not conceived of as communication, money has quite obviously 
very much in common with a sign. 
74 The watermark image may or may not show text. 
Figure 87: From Left to Right: Original, Watermarked Original, and Watermark Image Used 
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If the purpose is mainly to inhibit unauthorized copying, the digital watermark may 
be mainly detectable for the sender only. Of course, it must be robust in case the copiers 
have noticed the watermark. 
If watermarks are used to ensure authenticity in the close sense they should be visible 
for the receiver only who wants to detect if a fake message was delivered. Again, they 
have to resist attempts of manipulation or removal, but must also be hard to fake. There-
fore, usually encrypted information is used to which only the receivers have the key. 
If integrity is the goal, the digital watermark has the purpose of indicating to the re-
ceiver any manipulations of the original message;75 it, thus, should not be easily visible 
for anybody else. In contrast to the cases above, it may be highly sensitive to “un-
friendly” manipulations since any changes the receiver detects in the watermark indi-
cates a manipulation of the message not authorized by the sender. Advanced systems of 
fragile watermarks even allow the user to identify the regions that have been tampered 
with. Quite obviously, the watermarks should not be too sensitive: if, for example, the 
image was encrypted or compressed (without loss!) during transmission, we would ex-
pect the watermark to be unchanged despite the manipulations in between. Of course, 
all three tasks often are at hand simultaneously. So, different kinds of watermarks may 
have to be integrated into the picture’s syntax. 
Technically, digital watermarks are a kind of steganography. In contrast to cryptogra-
phy, where it is obvious that an encryption has taken place, steganography (from the 
Greek words for ‘hidden writing’) is the general term for hiding a message syntactically 
within another message – the cover message – so that it remains unclear to anybody in-
tercepting the cover message that there is a hidden message at all (Fig. 88). A typical 
example often employed in detective stories is to hide the actual message in the first let-
ters of the words of a cover message with a plausible but relatively irrelevant content. 
While the textual cover message can usually be constructed as needed, the cover is al-
ready given in the case of digital watermarks: it is the original image, which should not 
be modified perceptibly by the hidden message, the watermark data, if the message’s 
function is to be fulfilled. That is, the syntax of the picture must not be changed too 
much. Since digitized pictures usually contain a remarkable amount of noise, which is 
barely noticed by the users, steganographic procedures often hide watermark data in im-
age or sound files as noise; that is, they let the watermark appear as innocent stochastic 
disturbances. Often, the watermark image is even generated from the original (cf. again 
Fig. 86): then, large segments without much color variation in the original do not have 
to carry too much structure of the watermark that could be detected more easily in the 
homogenous area. 
                                                     
75 Ironically, most techniques of watermarking do indeed manipulate the picture, as well. It must obvi-
ously be an important goal to keep the differences originally created by the watermark at low level. Al-
ternatively, the receiver must be able to separate the watermark and completely reconstruct the original. 
 
Figure 88: The Principle of Digital Watermarking 
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For example, a technique called LSB (for Least Significant Bit) is used to lightly 
modify the color information of each pixel. If the watermark is a binary picture, only a 
single bit of the code for the color value of each pixel has to carry the value of the same 
pixel in the watermark. If we select the bit in the code that shifts the color merely to an 
immediately neighboring one, the picture only differs slightly from the original – a ma-
nipulation that is almost impossible to detect with bare eyes.76 Alternatively, a secret al-
gorithm can determine only some of the pixels for carrying watermark information in 
their LSB. To extract the watermark information, we would simply need to take all the 
data in the relevant LSBs of the color bytes and re-combine them.  
Patchwork algorithms change sets of pairs of algorithmically chosen small segments 
of the image (‘patches’) slightly, e.g., by lighting one patch of a pair a bit and darkening 
the other. If one knows which pairs have been chosen, a statistical evaluation of the 
patches can already decide whether the picture has been watermarked, even without 
knowing the original image. Unfortunately, the patchwork watermarks are not very ro-
bust and can be destroyed easily so that they cannot serve for integrity markings, too. 
In section 4.2.4, Fourier transformation of pictorial syntax has been mentioned. It 
leads to another “picture” that can be transformed back without loss. The watermark can 
therefore be applied to the Fourier transform instead of the original image: since local 
changes in the Fourier transform are equivalent to small changes at every location in the 
original image, the watermark is invisibly “smeared” across the picture. It only becomes 
obvious if the Fourier transformation of the picture is analyzed.77 
A further application of digital watermark technology is hiding additional information 
about the picture, its content or its history. Assuming that such secretly embedded anno-
tations are not misused for false descriptions, they can be helpful when automatically 
searching for pictures, e.g., in the Internet. So far, only the file name, which is often not 
informative, and the text appearing on the same web page are indicators of the picture’s 
content for the search engines. This can also include warnings about certain kinds of 
content, e.g., pornography, so that filters can be installed for prohibiting access to such 
image files, for example by minors.  
 
* * * 
 
In the following, pragmatic considerations for the two remaining classes of pictures – 
structural and reflective images – are discussed. For the latter, the fourth mode of recep-
tion of Section 3.4.1 is important: so far, we have not yet considered the role of that re-
flective mode, as we have called it, for beholder modeling, and finally come back to it 
in section 4.4.5 after having had a look at the rhetoric’s of structural pictures. 
 
 
                                                     
76 Obviously, the original image has to be given in one of the usual image formats with high color resolu-
tion. The LSB procedure does not work well with palette-based picture formats since changing even the 
least significant bit of the palette numbers may dramatically change the color. 
77 Since some compression algorithms (including jpeg) manipulate the Fourier transforms of pictures by 
high pass filtering, the watermarking should not be done in the high frequencies, or the watermark is not 
robust for that compression.  
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4.4.4 Information Visualization and the Rhetorics of Structural Pictures 
It has already been mentioned in section 3.5.4 that structural pictures are pictures based 
on a shift of meaning between two fields of concepts. The rhetorical instruments of 
metaphor and, in the case of pictorial abstractions, of metonymy have been identified as 
crucial for the understanding or generating of structural pictures. The metaphorical use 
of geometric Gestalts for visualizing contexts of a field of concepts different from the 
sortal field poses several questions that are mainly handled in the domain of information 
visualization.  
We do not deal in the following with the preparation of the data to be visualized: of-
ten, “raw” data is the real starting point – that is, instances of a data structure with rela-
tively little internal organization (e.g., just sequences of triples of integers). The first 
problem for an information visualizer is, then, to organize (= interpret) that data into a 
high-level field of concepts. In a second step, the instances of that type are projected 
metaphorically to pictorial syntax (visualized) – the step we are only interested in here. 
Since the first step is often quite unclear at the beginning, its solutions can be seen as 
the main scientific advantage gained by the visualization (“visual data mining”). In such 
a case, the cycle of the two steps is usually iterated. Profitable conceptualizations are 
generated in an approximative manner. Intermediate results are gained by experiment-
ing with the form of the conceptualization and with the parameters of the visualization: 
the pictures help the data mining engineer to perceive unusual patterns in the raw data, 
e.g., dependencies between different properties. They, thus, induce ideas that eventually 
enhance the conceptualization. Quite obviously, the crucial point in such an explorative 
use of pictures cannot lay in a straight-forward soliloquial propositional sign act; even 
the interpretation as a predicative act (pure picture content) is not quite reasonable in 
this situation since the picture is originally constructed without the a-priori knowledge 
of the corresponding concept being applicable here – quite impossible for soliloquial 
sign acts. The communicative function as a perceptoid context builder, however, is 
highly plausible: a symbolic situative context is provided in which the data mining en-
gineer can use the pre-attentive grouping principles governing visual perception in order 
to find high-level structures not known before. 
Quite obviously, the first step of information visualization is of an enormous com-
plexity. Additionally, it is not directly concerned with pictures. We therefore assume 
that the data to be visualized is already organized in a relatively complex data structure 
that has to be metaphorically mapped into a picture.  
4.4.4.1 On Source Domains and Target Domains 
In the scientific discourse about metaphor, the two fields of concepts involved are 
specifically called ‘source domain’ and ‘target domain’. In a metaphor, the internal 
structure of the source domain is borrowed to the other field (so to speak): with it, the 
internal structure of the target domain is verbally mirrored. Thus, the expressions that 
are used in a metaphor are originally for speaking about the source domain but are now 
employed to mention the target domain.78 The metaphorical binding between two fields 
of concepts establishes a field-external relationship similar to the constitution relation 
we have meet in Section 4.3.1.2. There, we found out that this relation enables us to 
                                                     
78 The naming is emphasized here, because the association of ‘source’ and ‘target’ of a metaphor may 
seem on first view counter-intuitive: one might prefer thinking of a projection of the target domain’s 
structure to the source domain’s expressions, which would motivate the inverse naming. 
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motivate the meaning postulates of a field by introducing them as a combination of 
other fields. It also allows us to inherit sensory-motor test routines from the constituing 
fields to the field constituted. Like the constitution relation, the metaphoric binding 
provides the target domain with additional sensory-motor test routines from the source 
domain; and it also allows us to substitute reasoning schemata from the source domain 
for those from the target domain.  
By characterizing the source domain, we can distinguish two general types of meta-
phors for information visualization: 
[1] the sortal field is the source domain: the main pixemes of those pictures are derived 
as for a realistic scene: they correspond to momentary Gestalt projections of sortal 
objects, possibly together with auxiliary Gestalts that depend directly on the sortal 
individuals like shadows or clouds (particles). However, each instance of a sortal 
object contained represents another entity. The geometric properties, the recogniz-
able parts, the spatial relations, and the color values (in the wide sense) are 
supposed to have a corresponding meaning in the target domain.  
[2] the geometric field is the source domain: geometric entities, like circles, rectangles, 
irregular shapes, and arcs, together with their sizes, positions, orientations, and/or 
connected neighbors form the primary picture content; a spatial interpretation in the 
narrow sense (supported by sortal objects) is not implied. Each geometric entity 
stands for an entity of the target domain, while its metric, topological or visual 
properties encode corresponding properties of the target domain. 
A tendency to associate a history to the entities is inherent only for sortal objects. The 
beholders expect them to have a development from some contexts into some other con-
texts. However, just a momentary snapshot of that lifeline is given to them with the pic-
ture. This has an important consequence if more than one visualization are to be pre-
sented. Identity of entities can be implicitly induced by using a sortal object as source. 
For geometric entities, identification has usually to be explicitly made by means of la-
bels. A geometric source domain is, on the other hand, in many cases easier to interpret 
since the rather complicated processes of object constitution are not necessary for the 
understanding of a corresponding visualization.  
Additional pictorial abstractions like emphasis of contours can be in reign only in 
case [1]: aspects of the target domain are projected to the attributes of sortal objects, but 
not all of the attributes of the latter that lead to visible features in a picture may be part 
of the metaphoric connection. In order to avoid confusion of the beholders, such attrib-
utes should be suppressed. On the other hand, indications of an interpretation as sortal 
objects – like shadows – distract the beholder when a structural image with geometric 
source domain is presented. Hence, the conception of a visualization being expressive is 
important: the complete description of the target domain is to be visually presented, and 
nothing more (no representational artifacts). 
Figure 89 exemplifies the same data in three different structural pictures: obviously, 
the left image uses a sortal source domain (bundles of stakes), while the right example 
merely employs geometric entities. The analysis of the picture in the middle is a bit 
more complicated, since the colored fields could be interpreted as three-dimensional 
clouds with varying density of very small sortal particles in front of a neutral back-
ground. The scale at its side however indicates that a purely geometric 2D interpretation 
is intended. Every pixel, including those of the (blue) “background” and of the (red) 
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“cloud centers”, encodes the same kind of entities (e.g., a location): the color only indi-
cates that they have different values in another attribute. 
The target domains can be similarly employed for subdividing visualizations depend-
ing on the amount of pictorial syntax they already encompass. The target domain may 
contain: 
(a) sortal objects: the spatial distribution of invisible attributes of sortal objects 
belongs here where the different attribute values correspond to color values, e.g., 
the distribution of a house’s caloric flow; or radiological pictures; 
(b) geometric space as a subdomain (locations and geometric individuals): many 
visualizations in the domain of GIS (Geographical Information systems) belong 
to this type (cf. also Fig. 89). The distribution of invisible attributes (e.g., 
vibration) on the flatly unfolded surface of a space shuttle during entering the 
atmosphere (for example) is of this type, too; 
(c) a dense one- to four-dimensional subdomain apart from geometry: many state 
spaces in physics provide such subdomains, e.g., frequency spaces of Fourier 
transforms, or impetus space in Hamilton mechanics; 
(d) color as a subdomain: this case is often, but not necessarily combined with one 
of the above: take for example the graph of a “color mountain” in isometric 
perspective where the height encodes the size of the area that could be printed in 
a certain color with the stock of pigment still available in the printer;  
(e) none of the above. In this rest category, certain target concepts have to be 
seletcted to be matched to location as the pictorial base structure.  
Apart from case (e), the subdomains mentioned above have a canonical projection 
into pictorial syntax that can be directly used as the core of the visualization. In particu-
lar the geometric spaces – either the projections of sortal objects as in (a), the genuine 
geometric domains in (b), or the quasi-geometric dimensions of (c) – map into the spa-
tial substrate of pictorial syntax while other properties are more likely to be associated 
with elementary pictorial marker values (color), their grouping into pixemes (marks), 
and the high-level properties of associated objects (length).  
On this general level, we can already see that the primary »picture content« for struc-
tural pictures has to be a bit more complicated. It contains in general a combination of 
the geometric concepts governing the pixemes as the perceptual basis, and the target 
domain. The corresponding concepts of both fields integrated in a particular instance of 
»picture content« may be directly linked, or they may be linked by means of sortal con-
Figure 89: Data of One Target Domain in Three Source Domains 
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cepts as mediators. That is, picture content for structural pictures contains an association 
of concepts from one, two or three fields. Let us have a short look at some of the possi-
ble combinations: 
[1](a):  »picture content« corresponds to representational images with an additional 
projection from some pictorial marker values to non-visible attributes of those 
sortals. 
[2](a):  this is essentially the case for representational pictures – if we want to under-
stand them as a special sub-type of structural pictures: »picture content« con-
tains sortal concepts with their constituting relation to geometric Gestalts. 
[2](b):  this covers the special case of purely geometric pictures – the semantic rela-
tion deviates to an identity relation, and »picture content« consists of entries 
from the geometric field only, without considering a constituting relation: the 
syntactic structure is meant literally. This type of visualization plays an im-
portant role when we consider reflective pictures: the semantic reduction can 
be used to focus exactly on that aspect in pictorial communication (cf. Sect. 
4.4.5.1).  
[2](c): similar to representational pictures, »picture content« contains in this case 
concepts with an association between two fields: in contrast to the representa-
tional pictures, the association is not an object constitution, though it has a 
similar effect: it provides the target concept metaphorically with a visually 
perceptible component. 
[1](e): this is certainly the most complicated case, since »picture content« has to deal 
with a double projection: the concepts of sortal objects are contained together 
with their geometric projection (as the perceptible basis) and a metaphoric re-
lation projecting the sortal structures onto a third field. 
In order to ease the beholder, those metaphoric connections have to fulfill some 
minimal semantic criteria: a close structural correspondence between source domain 
elements and target domain elements. 
4.4.4.2 Finding Appropriate Visualization Parameters: An Overview 
Attributes of the target domain are usually divided in the following classes: they are 
qualitative or quantitative; and they are ordinal or nominal, i.e., with or without an 
inherent order that may be linear, cyclic or semi-ordered. Quantitative attributes are 
furthermore divided by their dimensionality. The names of the months, for example, are 
qualitative and ordinal of the cyclic type; the kind of trees found in Yosemite is (viewed 
as) qualitative and nominal (at least if we ignore the alphabetic order that could be 
imported by the names of the trees). Temperature is a one-dimensional quantitative 
property – like all quantitative properties, it has an inherent order, which is linear in this 
case. An analogous distinction applies to the attributes of the source domain, in 
particular of the geometric field providing pictorial syntax. Shape, for example is not 
quantitative and has no inherent order, while size is quantitative with a linear order. 
Color per se is a three-dimensional quantitative attribute without an ordering; however, 
hue is a one-dimensional quantitative feature with a cyclic order, while intensity is also 
one-dimensional but linearly ordered. Color categories (e.g., the naming of colors) is 
qualitative and often has a conventionally determined linear or cyclic order: from the 
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colors of the rainbow, through the color code 
used in cartography or the different one from 
anatomic sketches to the formal descriptions 
of the color of wine in oenology, the 
categories of human hair color or the 
dichotomy between cold and warm colors. 
Note that such color categorizations in the 
beholder’s background may interfere with the 
intended interpretation of a color encoding. 
Quite obviously, the primary choice for the 
elements of a metaphoric transfer is given by 
attributes of the corresponding class. For ex-
ample, quantitative properties of a certain di-
mensionality and ordering should be ex-
pressed by pictorial attributes of the same 
kind. Accordingly, size or saturation should 
not be used for nominal target properties be-
cause they will probably be perceived as or-
dered, and thus induce an erroneous under-
standing. Varying shades of gray (or a mono-
chromous scale) with their inherent linear order correspond better to linear quantities 
than color. IGNATIUS & SENAY [1994] provide a collection of heuristics.  
So far, finding appropriate visualization parameters does not seem too complicated. 
But the main problem of visualization is connected with the amount of data to be visual-
ized, and the high number of properties to be used simultaneously (multivariate visuali-
zations). The source domain only offers a limited number of properties, and not all of 
them fit to the target properties under investigation. Even if an appropriate association 
could be found, the grouping in one dimension leads to interferences with the recogni-
tion of other dimensions in our perceptual apparatus. For example, hue dominates form, 
i.e., it may mask a form distinction; but it is itself dominated by intensity [HEALEY 
2000].  
An elegant and often-used method for composing more target properties into a visu-
alization is given by means of icons (or glyphs). Those are two- or three-dimensional 
entities that group several target properties by means of attributes such as shape, size, 
color, and position. They appear either as embedded images (icons) in the image plane 
or as 3D-objects in the picture space. The distribution of sociologically important fea-
tures across the cities of a country can, for example, be encoded visually by “smiley 
faces” placed at the position of the cities in a map: the size of the head circle indicating 
the tax volume, the filling color from a spectrum between blue and red representing the 
average amount of days taken off by illness, the curve and size of the mouth line encod-
ing the direction and amount of contentment of the inhabitants, etc [CHERNOFF 1973].  
Arrows and weathervanes are prominent members of the glyph family. They are ex-
amples of a special class of glyphs that are also used for gaining an overview about high 
amounts of data items: think of a streaming pattern graphically indicated by a dense 
field of arrows (Figure 90). Stick figure icons as shown in Figures 91 and 92 are a more 
complicated example. Here, the limb angles of an idealized stick figure serve the visual-
izer for encoding target parameters – color and thickness of the limbs could be em-
ployed for representing additional target properties, as well. If the data items are densely 
Figure 90: A 3D Grid of Arrows Indicating 
Flow Gradients 
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packed on a two-dimensional grid indicating location or other target dimensions of ac-
cording kind, the stick figures visually melt to complex textures in which differences 
can be easily perceived. The association of a difference to the parameters causing it is, 
however, not really “readable” from the graphic. Furthermore, it is often unclear 
whether different parameters may lead to the same texture. 
If the amount of data items or target domain attributes becomes extremely large, even 
glyph textures and similar techniques that lead to a single static visualization meet their 
limitations. The visualization has to be divided among several pictures presented at once 
side by side, which is traditionally managed by means of the Model-View-Controller 
paradigm: the target domain is a model certain views of which are generated depending 
on control parameters determined by the user. LAU ET AL. [2001] present alternatively a 
metaphor for multi-screen visualizations derived from theatre that is particularly well 
suited if many users work with the data and its visualizations: the target entities with 
their properties are conceived of as actors that show different roles on several “stages” – 
a small amount of separate images – according to “scripts”, i.e., visualization plans pro-
vided by the directors (users). A virtual stage manager coordinates the different scripts 
for all actors and each director.  
4.4.4.3 Interactive Visualizations 
But even the number of pictures to be presented simultaneously without confusing the 
beholder is quite small. Using time to divide several aspects of a complex visualization 
has proved to be more intelligible. Animations and – even better – interactive pictures 
provide a much more general means. Animations add just one dimension to the pictorial 
base structure that could be employed for encoding an orderd property of the target 
domain. With interactive manipulations, various target properties can be bound to vary 
with the animation’s temporal visualization axis. With the slicing technique, for 
example, a user can change the values of one parameter (i.e., bind it temporally to time) 
and gets successive projections of the other aspects of the complete whole data set (Fig. 
93). 
 
 
 Figure 91: Stick Figure Icon with Five At-
tribute Ranges     Figure 92: “Data Texture” with Stick Figure Icons 
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In general, viewpoint control tech-
niques are an important aspect of in-
teractive visualizations in order to 
help the user keep an overview into 
which he or she can integrate the par-
tial views currently focused: we have 
already mentioned fisheye zooming, 
i.e., the use of a bend perspective 
(Sect. 4.3.1.4). Generally, non-linear 
projections can be used to provide 
visualizations with a detailed area of 
focus (interactively changeable), a 
low resolution surrounding, and a 
more or less continuous transition 
area. 
Most of the criteria mentioned so far are concerned with the correspondence between 
the metaphorical content and its graphical form – we have thus given a short recapitula-
tion of the semantic aspects of structural pictures (that had been omitted in Section 4.3 
on purpose). In principle, the effectiveness of the semantic criteria for selecting appro-
priate visualization parameters has to be controlled by a beholder model, as well.  
We have reach here an interesting distinction in the use of an interactive system: In 
the beginning of this section we have mentioned that visualizations play an important 
role for finding good metaphors for the data to be visualized. The metaphoric mapping 
is used for helping to build a constitution of a field of concepts the internal structure of 
which is still highly unclear. To that explorative purpose, the visualizations are often 
employed in a strictly soliloquial manner. But visualizations are highly valuable tools 
for coordinating knowledge and action between individuals, too. 
4.4.5 Remarks on the Pragmatics of Computer Art 
Das Prädikat Kunst ist ein soziales. Der soziale Prozeß der Rezeption macht ein 
Werk zum Kunstwerk, nicht der Schaffensprozeß des Künstlers. .....  
Kontrolle über den Prozeß der Bildproduktion wird bewußt. ..... Das heißt aber 
nichts anderes als: bewußt werden Zeichen über die Produktion zum Gegenstand 
der Arbeit gemacht. 
[NAKE 1996, Sections 8 & 7] 
The third general category of pictures distinguished by SACHS-HOMBACH is the one of 
reflective pictures. Pictures that are not used in the primary sense of showing their 
content but instead of demonstrating aspects of pictorial communication are called 
reflective, as has been explained in section 3.5.5. Thus, the characteristic distinction of 
that category is not one of semantics but of a pragmatic nature: it is a different reception 
mode in which the picture is dealt with. Considerations on the relations between 
reflective mode of use and reflective pictures therefore start this section.  
Reflective pictures do not play a prominent role in the practice of computational visu-
alistics on the first view although they are widely employed in textbooks on computer 
graphics, information visualization, computer vision or any other domain dealing with 
computerized images. They are used to exemplify the algorithms that have produced 
them. There is, however, one field of generating or manipulating pictures by computers 
that is directly concerned with images to be received in reflective mode: the field of 
Figure 93: Interactively Slicing Views of the Data Set
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computer art – or rather of art with the computer as a tool. A short discussion of a few 
characteristic examples forming a coarse sketch about the categories of aesthetic con-
siderations in the context of computer art completes the overview. 
4.4.5.1 Reflective Pictures and the Reflective Mode of Reception 
Let us start with a simple thesis: any picture can be used as a reflective picture. Indeed, 
we only have to “quote” that picture in order to communicate about the particular details 
of its process of creation and its history of reception. It has been mentioned before that 
screenshots from computer-generated or computer-manipulated pictures are frequently 
employed in papers and textbooks decribing some aspect of computer visualists’ work. 
They are not meant literally: showing diverse variants of a certain teapot does not intent 
to move the beholder’s focus of attention to teapots (or one particular teapot), but to 
various forms of, for example, shading calculations.  
Representational pictures and structural pictures differ in the way the syntax is related 
to the semantics; reflective pictures differ from both of them by a different attitude of 
the beholders. This special attitude has been called ‘the reflective mode of reception’ in 
section 3.5.1. In this mode, we show ourselves a picture as an example of one or the 
other of the many aspects of pictorial communication. Indeed, this is what we usually do 
when visiting an art museum, and pictures of art can generally be interpreted as pictures 
that are made specially for being received in reflective mode. In the motto of this sec-
tion, F. NAKE, one of the first studying and performing art in the context of computer 
science, insists on exactly this point and its two aspects: to conceive of reception as con-
stituting the picture as a reflective one; and to take the creation of pictorial signs as the 
subject of reflection, which can only mean the constitution of the situation of communi-
cation in which the sign partakes, not just the material production of the image vehicle. 
The context built by a reflective picture therefore contains not just what the »picture 
content« determines, but a communicative situation with that picture, its vehicle, and a 
generic sender and receiver. The particular instantiation of that situation is, then, con-
sidered, analyzed, put in relation with instantiations evoked by other reflectively used 
images. The narration (in the wide sense) provoked by such pictures obviously involves 
the discourse of art reviewers, art historians, and art scientists. They thus deal with the 
same subject as general visualistics but from the particular perspective gained by study-
ing reflective pictures, not pictures in general. Art is not restricted to reflect only the 
primary modes of picture reception. Reflecting the reflective mode however increases 
the complications drastically and usually leads to contexts so complicated that only spe-
cialists seem still able to cope with. Some of the problems contemporary art has with re-
ception among the non-expert public may root in the complexity of reflecting the reflec-
tive mode that is involved in their pragmatics.  
Nevertheless, quoted pictures as well as artistic pictures have an underlying “direct” 
use – they are also representational or structural pictures that could be used in a non-
reflective manner. The portrait of a certain merchant created by REMBRANDT can be 
employed in analogy to a passport – ignoring thereby all the sophisticated considera-
tions of art history or art science that deal essentially with what the reflective mode of 
reception may reveal from that portrait.  
Could there be pictures that can only be received in reflective mode – essentially re-
flective images? We can only speculate at this place: let us have a look at non-figurative 
art, and let us conceive of it as a special kind of visualization: the visualization of col-
ored geometric entities where the structural isomorphism degenerates to the identity re-
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lation (i.e., case [2](b) in section 4.4.4.1). Such a picture regularly resists any figurative 
(sortal) interpretation. Due to the missing color legend, even a conventional interpreta-
tion as a geometric metaphor of some other subject fails. Thus, the image urges the be-
holders to “go into reflective mode”: a failed attempt of communication regularly acti-
vates the process of reflecting the conditions of communication (basically in order to 
find the reason for the failure). In consequence, it is highly probable that a beholder of a 
purely geometric picture tries to find a reflective interpretation in the context of pictorial 
communication – following, for example, the line of argumentation that no pictorial 
sign act can do without geometric Gestalts, or that certain geometric configurations 
evoke spontaneous emotional reactions, etc. That is, structural pictures of the case [2](b) 
without a legend can only be interpreted in reflective mode: they are to be conceived of 
as essentially reflective pictures. 
No wonder then, that the first works of what is called ‘computer art’ is of this cate-
gory, and not figurative (representational). It is often mentioned that the technical re-
strictions of that time are responsible for the non-figurative character of the works ex-
hibited by NAKE, NEES or NOLL 1965 in the first ever arts exhibitions of pictures cre-
ated with the computer (Fig.’s 94 & 95). The considerations above add, however, the 
argument that pictures of that abstract kind have an inherent advantage of being per-
ceived as art, and not as mere by-products of testing new technical devices.  
Quite obviously, the attempt to create works of art by means of a computer and its pe-
ripheral machines has to be markedly distinguished from the use of systems for 
(re)producing pictures in a certain style or varying the representation style of a given 
picture. Algorithms for such tasks are regularly included in commercial paint programs, 
and still form a “hot topic” for developers of non-photorealistic computer graphics. 
4.4.5.2 Computer Art – Art with the Computer 
There is a general agreement in that the term ‘computer art’ is not well-chosen 
[STELLER 1992, 11]: the computer is essentially the artist’s instrument but does not 
determine a specific style per se. With the words of one of the pioneers, H. W. FRANKE 
 
 
     Figure 94: 23-ECKE 
GEORG NESS 1964
      Figure 95: Geradenscharen Nr. 2 
FRIEDER NAKE 1965, 50 * 50 cm
THE FOUNDATION OF COMPUTATIONAL VISUALISTICS 139
 
 
[1987, 335]: The term ‘computer art’ refers neither to a specific style nor to a 
particular quality, it merely characterizes the instrumentarium.  
One of the most consequent artists using a computer as his tool is the German MAN-
FRED MOHR. Working essentially on a single theme, the cube, he takes up, we might 
say, the pictorial discussion of the cubists in the early 20th century about the relations 
between the multi-perspective sortals and their traditionally mono-perspective depic-
tion. Like the works of BRAQUE or PICASSO,  MOHR’s pictures are in fact figurative. 
They are derived as fragments of cubes, each fragment viewed from a different perspec-
tive (e.g., Fig. 96).79 Usually grouped to whole sequences of pictures, their very reduced 
syntax essentially is determined by means of the computer and then manually painted 
on canvas.80  
Those pictures can be read as an offer to discuss on a very abstract level the role per-
spective, or more precisely: a set of multiple perspectives, plays in our communicative 
behavior [KING 2002]. It may also be employed to focus a discussion about the role of 
algorithmic processes for creating images, a line followed, for example, by NAKE [1996, 
Sect. 9]:  
The signs of MOHR’s pictures (the name of which are like P197-H or P370-P) stand for 
themselves, but they also represent something different: the four-dimensional situation 
                                                     
79 ‘Cubes’ here has to be understood in a more general sense, as MOHR started with ordinary three-
dimensional cubes, but has proceeded to their four- and even five-dimensional counterparts, the hyper-
cubes – that is, geometric entities that, like sortals, integrate conceptually several (3D and 2D) projec-
tions. 
80 That the pictures are part of a series is in fact an important hint to understand the common figure all the 
pictures of the series refer to, in particular as fragmentation and the multi-perspective views often ob-
scure a direct recognition, and as hypercubes are objects not too familiar for recogition. 
 
 Figure 96: P-361-E 
MANFRED MOHR 1984 (acryl on canvas, 120 * 120 cm)              
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indicated. That different thing is mostly unknown, unviewed, invisible. By means of the 
program, MOHR makes visible some aspects of that mathematical reality. Contingency 
and arbitrariness of each single one of his signs is bound together by the algorithmic 
uniqueness.  
The two lines of argumentation do not contradict or exclude each other, since each is 
a legitimate reflective use of those pictures in a corresponding communication of art 
lovers. The artist, of course, may prefer one or the other himself. For MOHR, who has 
founded together with others the artists group Algorists few years ago, “the shift from 
uncontrollable metaphysics” (of beliefs about objects and perspective, we may interpret) 
“to a systematic and logical constructivism” (a reasonable understanding of the relation 
between geometry and the sortal field, that is) “may well be a sign of tomorrow” [MOHR 
1976, 96]. 
Quite a different result of integrating the computer into the artistic considerations is 
reached by British artist HAROLD COHEN (Fig. 97). Since about 30 years, the tradition-
ally trained and experienced painter works in developing and programming a system 
called Aaron that would be able to generate autonomously pictures in a way that simu-
lates up to some degree human cognitive processes relevant for drawing (and later 
painting). Aaron is constructed as an expert system containing as its knowledge base 
rules about generating images on syntactic and semantic levels.81 There are rules for de-
termining unused space, for drawing closed or open figures, or for controlling repeti-
tions. Other rules select a pose for declaratively given stick figure models, expand the 
models to provide them, so to speak, with flesh, or differentiate plant models to a par-
                                                     
81 COHEN prefers to see Aaron as an “expert’s system” rather than an expert system: the latter provides 
non-experts with a “petrified” version of an expert’s argumentation; the former helps an expert to under-
stand what s/he is doing; cf. [COHEN 1988, Appendix: “Conclusion as delivered”] 
 
Figure 97: Picture Generated with the Fully Automatic Online-Version of COHEN’s Aaron 
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ticular instantiation of branching, branch thicknesses and leaf forms. On each level, 
variances are determined randomly. 
F. NAKE summarizes COHEN’s approach as follows [1996, Sect. 3]:  
COHEN, the painter, urges the machine to do what he wants. He does that by exterioriz-
ing parts of his drawing and painting. More precisely: he externalizes a part of his 
knowledge about drawing and painting. A part of his thinking, that is; the part that he 
can put in algorithmic form. HAROLD COHEN has gone further than anybody else in this 
world to fix a certain kind of form design and paint application in a rule base. Those 
rules are so precise (unique) and contain as much openness (arbitrary) that the com-
puter can follow them, and appears to become creative. 
So what is the discourse initiated and focussed by means of COHEN’s “Aaron pic-
tures” if we take them as reflective images? What context do they build? Recall at this 
point again our interpretation of data structures and algorithms (sequences of opera-
tions) as formalized tools in rational argumentations of sections 2.1 and 4.3.1.2. Aaron, 
then, contains a formalized version of arguments that can be used when discussing 
about image making and its cognitive prerequisites. The pictures produced by the sys-
tem can therefore be read in the reflective way as exemplifying corresponding parts of 
those argumentations. There is, then, a closer relationship to quoted images in a text-
book on computer graphics than is the case for MOHR’s pictures. Aaron’s products pro-
voke the reflective narrative if we know that COHEN has generated them in that specific 
way, while MOHR’s fragmented hypercube projections can be discussed along the same 
lines without mentioning the tool utilized. 
Of course: COHEN states explicitly, that Aaron is not intended as a simulated artist 
producing works of art. He understands the program as an assistant, a highly developed 
and partially autonomous tool, that is – but still a tool dependent from the context of 
use. Since the artist also understands art as a communicative act that has essentially a 
pragmatic embedding unavailable for the computer, the pictures generated (proposed?) 
by Aaron are still COHEN’s pictures, because he is the one binding them originally into a 
sign act.  
4.4.5.3 Interactivity in Computer Art 
A statement on computer-assisted visual arts that is often meant as a criticism is true: 
basically every static image presented on the monitor could also have been created in a 
conventional manner, the only difference being the time needed to produce it. There-
fore, the significance of computer graphics lies only in animation. 
This quote from FRANKE’s programmatic essay of 1987 on the (then) future of com-
puter art leads us not only to animations, but especially back to interactive pictures, 
which we have already identified earlier in this chapter as the crucial contribution to the 
subject of visualistics from computer science. The serial productions of images, which 
always has played an important role for artists working with the computer (including 
MOHR and COHEN), is condensed into a continuous animation that can take into account 
parameters provided by the beholders. Here, the question arises whether such forms of 
pictures have to be understood in the manner of the media of class IV, or rather in a dif-
ferent way. Let us look, for example, at the specific form of interactive pictures used in 
web art, where many beholders can simultaneously interact with the same picture-
generating schema. While tele-rendering in media of class IV in the strict sense provides 
a bundle of potential pictorial sign acts from which the beholder selects – directly or in-
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directly – one or the other, web art essentially consists of one unique though complex 
sign act that explicitly integrates the beholder.82 Two users of an interactive anatomy 
textbook can legitimately state that they had encountered different sign acts, whereas 
two receivers of a project of web art, despite having different experiences, have partici-
pated in the same sign act (or we would abandon the notion of a unique work of art al-
together).  
Indeed, this type of images is a special derivation of the generic concept »image«, 
with which the western tradition of art history is not too familiar. For a long period, the 
identity of an artistic image has been conceived as bound to one particular picture vehi-
cle, the original, which was thought – for example due to the density of pictorial syntax 
– to be not fit at all for proper copying. Recall however at this place the remarks in Sec-
tion 3.1 about religious sand or bark pictures in American and Australian indigenous 
cultures: their vehicles are destroyed immediately after use, yet the pictures are said to 
be the same in different actualizations of the ceremony. The identity criterion of this 
concept of image has a resemblance to the one of music: a generative core – external-
ized as a score – can be instantiated again and again as the same music on different ve-
hicles even with slight alterations. Recall, too, the generative picture format mentioned 
earlier: in section 4.2.1.1, the example of fractal pictures with zooming operation was 
given – a unique computational schema directing how it can be instantiated by different 
beholders. The generic concept of pictures encompasses a sub concept where the picture 
is fixedly bound to a certain individual picture vehicle, as well as a sub concept with an 
elaborate two-level conception of identity similar to the “score-performance” distinction 
in music. During the 20th century, the later sub concept has become more dominant in 
Western art, in particular with the employment of corresponding technical tools like 
video or the computer by the artists. 
Reflective uses are more or less obvious for generative web images, as well. HUBER 
[1997, 188], for example, mentions in a survey on web art a piece of JOHN SIMON JR. 
that certainly evokes in the beholder (or the reader imagining it, in our case) the discus-
sion on syntactic properties of pictures in section 4.2.1: 
In a second work for the web from JOHN SIMON JR. titled ‘Every Icon’ 
(http://stadiumweb.com/EveryIcon), a Java applet generates all combinations of black 
and white squares. The work runs since March 1, 1997. It can be viewed only in its be-
ginning – a computer has to run with that little application day and night for years. 
In fact, about several hundred trillion years are necessary, SIMON points out on the 
commenting web page, for the program to generate systematically all variations of the 
32 * 32 pixel matrix used on the way from completely white to completely black. 
More complicated versions of interactive computer art are derived from highly im-
mersive systems. A prominent example is an installation of the Canadian CHAR(LOTTE) 
DAVIES, first exhibited in 1995:  
Osmose is an immersive interactive environment, involving head mounted display, 3-D 
computer graphics, and interactive sound, which can be explored syn-aesthetically. On 
a second level, the installation offers visitors the opportunity to follow the individual in-
teractor's journey of images through this simulacrum of nature. With the aid of polar-
ized glasses, they watch his or her constantly changing perspectives of the three-
dimensional image worlds on a large-scale projection screen. The images are gener-
                                                     
82 The integration of the beholder into the work has become a standard theme of art with modern media, 
see, for example, in video art the pieces of B. VIOLA. 
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ated exclusively by the interactor, whose moving silhouette can be discerned dimly on a 
pane of frosted glass.  
This description of GRAU [2003, 193] already indicates that DAVIS’s installation has 
indeed two types of beholders: the single interacting “immersant”, and a relatively pas-
sive audience watching simultaneously the immersant’s slightly grotesque shadow be-
hind a screen – with the cables, the head-mounted display, and a sensor vest registering 
the immersant’s breathing and other movements of the torso as important parameters of 
interaction – and a video projection with exactly the computer animation produced for 
the immersant in real-time depending on his or her movements (Fig. 98). For the im-
mersants, the concoction of reactive trompe l’œil and animated sculpture provided by 
the computer and its immersive interface inhibits the symbolic mode to a very high de-
gree. They regularly do not perceive pictures anymore, but a strange and interesting 
situational context: that is, they experience the pure deceptive mode.83 GRAU explains 
[2003, 195]: 
Like a scuba diver, the observer floats upward with lungs filled with air, whereas regu-
lar breathing produces a calm and balanced state. Divers are well acquainted with the 
feeling of immersion, the physical experience of being completely enveloped and slowly 
floating through the watery element. Not surprisingly, it was being underwater that 
gave CHAR DAVIES (who is a passionate diver) the inspiration for this finely gauged, 
physically intimate synthesis of the technical and the organic. Because the interface 
technique of Osmose utilizes intuitive physical processes, the observer's unconscious 
connects to the virtual space in a much more intense way than with a joystick or a 
mouse.  
                                                     
83 There are, however, integrated a few fractures of the illusion – in GRAU’s description [2003, 194]: Two 
textual worlds serve as parentheses around this simulacrum of nature: The 20,000 lines of program 
code for the work are visible in the virtual environment, arranged in colossal columns; and a space 
filled with fragments of text-concepts of nature, technology, and bodies, all penned by thinkers, such as 
BACHELARD, HEIDEGGER, and RILKE, whose ideas were untouched by recent revolutionary developments 
concerning the image.  
 
            Figure 98: Watching the Beholder: the Osmose Installation 
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 The audience – being presented something like a blurred version of Figure 99 to-
gether with the stereo-version of Figure 100 – can more easily gain the distance of the 
immersive mode of reception necessary for perceiving something as a picture. Not al-
lowing the audience to see the immersant directly but only his silhouette projected onto 
a screen – put in frame so to speak – is another strong indicator for perceiving the instal-
lation as a coordinate set of two animated pictures. Observing the explicit opposition of 
the viewer and the viewed, of the interactor and the resulting image, in fact suggests for 
the audience to use the reflective mode. The deceptive mode of the immersant and their 
own immersive attitude towards the computer-generated picture opens a discrepancy for 
the beholders that prepares them for discussing the dual nature of pictures, the sponta-
neous deceptive mode (the picture’s perceptoid character), and the distanced symbolic 
mode (the picture’s sign character).  
Most interestingly, the published critics deal often with the deceptive mode of the 
immersant only. Not questioning the extraordinary experiences gained as immersant, 
many reviewers ask – quite with good reason – whether this really is art already, or 
simply kitsch. Most comments (including remarks of DAVIES), change between techni-
cal details and more or less esoteric evocations of an immersant’s state of mind:84 they 
are not too helpful to decide the problem, which we shall not elaborate here. However, 
the question obviously does not arise for the installation viewed as a whole from the au-
dience’s point of view.  
HUBER [1997, 187] distinguishes reactive, interactive, and participative projects of 
computer art. Every Icon certainly belongs to the (in that dimension) most primitive 
kind of reactive work, since the beholder can do only one thing: changing the internal 
clock of the computer, far from the real potential even of reactive pieces. Osmose is 
clearly representative for fully interactive projects. Participative projects in the full 
                                                     
84 cf., e.g., [DAVIS 1998, 56ff]: Osmose is a powerful example of how technological environments can 
simulate something like the old animist immersion in the World Soul, organic dreamings that depend, in 
power and effect, upon the ethereal fire... Osmose also reminds us how intimate we are with electronics, 
in sight and sound, in body and psyche. 
 
Figure 99: Osmose immersant with head-
mounted stereo display and sensor vest 
Figure 100: Still from Osmose (“Subterranean 
Rocks and Roots”) 
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sense exceed interaction since they additionally allow the users to modify the generative 
schema (or the bundle of messages) – mostly by actively increasing them.  
PERRY HOBERMAN uses in the participative creation of Bar Code Hotel a symbol typi-
cal for our economy: the bar codes found on consumer goods. The participants have to 
scan the bar codes of given objects in order to select computer-generated object models 
to be rendered and projected stereoscopically on a large screen (Fig. 101). The picture 
shown is thus a result of the cooperative effort of all the beholders.  
The basic principle of participative artwork is closely related to the art form of “hap-
penings” popular in the 1960’s and ‘70’s mainly by members of the Fluxus movement 
starting with GEORGE MACIUNAS in 1962. JOSEPH BEUYS was one of its prominent art-
ists. Fluxus is still another form of visual art incorporating its beholders to a much 
higher degree than traditional pictures do. In a typical happening, however, the behold-
ers/participants are present in the flesh. They cannot avoid showing signs of their spon-
taneous reactions (e.g., while being drained with the blood of a freshly slaughtered ani-
mal – recall the œuvre of Austrian artist HERMANN NITSCH: the “Orgien Mysterien 
Theater”). And this is precisely what the artists want to focus on. 
Multi-user art operates in contrast with immaterial representatives, and hence with a 
marked distance between the participant and the events happening to this representative. 
The corporeal (non-)existence of the users and its necessity as a prerequisite to 
communication is often a major theme for multi-user artists, too. Since the aspect of 
technical mediation seems on first view to disappear in communication in immersive 
multi-user environments – a medium of class III allows the users seemingly to 
communicate as in a medium of class I – reflections of this deception are often evoked 
by immersive participative art projects.  
A weak form of participation is realized if the immersive context can be shared simul-
taneously by many users, though not modified in its generative schema. As an example 
for such a work of art, the project Technosphere of a team around the British media art-
 
Figure 101: Photography of HOBERMAN’s Bar Code Hotel Installation: objects with bar code on the 
contol panel with bar code reader in the foreground, computer-generated picture in the back 
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ist JANE PROPHET is usually mentioned [REICHLE 2002]: developed in several steps and 
launched online in the WorldWideWeb since 1995, it is exhibited permanently since 
1999 at the National Museum of Photography, Film & Television at Bradford, UK, in a 
version adapted for that presentation situation.  
In the mathematical realms of a fractal landscape meant to stretch over 16km2 dwell 
creatures whose appearance (and thus indirectly, whose behavior) is selected by the us-
ers of the system out of a given set of options. They are defined to move around, feed, 
hunt each other, reproduce, and die eventually. Significant events, in particular repro-
duction or death, are reported to the creating user by means of an email. On demand, a 
photo or an animation of the creature is rendered and sent to the user. In the web ver-
sion, the creators of other creatures, with which one’s own creature has interacted, can 
be contacted by email, as well. In the faster running museum version, real-time observa-
tion is possible from several terminals and replaces the email messages from the system. 
Initially provided with 30,000 randomly designed creatures by the creators of Tech-
nosphere, several hundred thousand users have added over a million creatures so far. 
While it is not quite clear how the images generated in the Web version are employed to 
induce the reflective mode instead of interpreting them simply as representational im-
ages of fictitious contexts, the museum version offers again the option for the general 
audience to observe users interacting with the installation – though not as explicit as in 
the arrangement of Osmose.  
The participative integration of the users within the simulated context is relatively 
weak in Technosphere, as users are present only by means of creatures that act rather 
independently from their creators. Avatars as more direct representatives are used, for 
example, in computer games, though the reflective potential of commercial computer 
games is quite minimal. Some artists have, however, begun recently to employ the tech-
nical options of computer game engines for artistic purposes. The American media artist 
LONNIE FLICKINGER, for example offers with Pencil Whipped a parody on the notori-
 
 Figure 102: Screenshot from Peacekeeper by TOM BANKS (alias NULLPOINTER)    
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ously naturalistic representation of brutality in ego shooters by replacing textures with a 
kind of coarsely sketched black-and-white comic drawings. Computer-controlled ene-
mies are not modeled as 3D objects but as weird-formed flat papier-mâché creatures. 
The Dutch group JODI strips commercial action games like Wolfenstein [id Software, 
1992] and Doom [id Software, 1993] from their naturalistic skin reaching strangely ab-
stract labyrinths, in which the original game concept itself becomes quite obsolete. 
The British artist TOM BANKS (alias NULLPOINTER) has presented a serious of game 
modifications based on the Quake game engine (Fig. 102). In his installation Peace-
Keeper, two views of the modified game from the perspective of two adversary bots – 
computer-controlled characters – fighting with each other are projected onto opposing 
walls. The viewers – presumably hardly able to recognize corresponding actions in the 
disturbed images – can (try to) participate in the game and thus modify the flow of pic-
tures while being watched by other visitors of the installation.  
In these modified games as art, the user’s presence as an avatar does not play too 
strong a role. Computer-mediated interactions between several users are also of no rele-
vance. Australian digital artists MELINDA RACKHAM has gained attention with her multi-
user project Empyrean (http://www.subtle.net/empyrean/): modeled as a VRML envi-
ronment accessible by internet, users can explore several gravitation-free contexts: 
strange changing objects inhabit the unstructured virtual space, often half transparent, 
pulsing and with unclear boundaries, some with organoid forms – a pumping heart, a ro-
tating eyeball, flickering neurons (Fig. 103). They float around each other emitting 
sounds; written words move in-between. Some forms act as portkeys to another context 
of the set. Since the text objects turn with the user’s movements the fixed spatial orien-
tations we usually expect are not valid: There is no horizon to orient oneself to ... one 
must feel one's way around these immersing zones [RACKHAM 2000]. 
 
Figure 103: RACKHAM’s Empyrean: View of the Context Truth with a pumping heart, moving text 
elements, and an Avatar (“ego”) in the foreground; control panels for moving (bottom) and avatar an-
imations (top) 
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In contrast to Osmose, Empyrean does not work with the apparatus for a highly im-
mersive experience like head-mounted stereo displays; moreover, navigation in VRML-
contexts is not too natural and needs some practicing. Nor does RACKHAM count on be-
holders of the second order. Users can perceive each other visiting the contexts of Em-
pyrean called Truth, Beauty, Chaos, Order, Charm, Strange, and Void. They are part of 
the picture, but merely in their representation by organoid avatars that mix with the 
other forms and are only distinguishable by the user’s nicknames marked on them. Sev-
eral buttons allow the user to activate certain animations of the own avatar (e.g., “blush” 
– a color change, “blink” – shrink and regrow) together with some sound effects that 
could indicate emotional gestures. Each user can also change the system’s parameters so 
that he or she is able to watch the own avatar in a third-person view, i.e., to establish a 
symbolically mediated distance to his or her assumed body as the one being deceived by 
the artificial contexts of the system. 
Empyrean can be seen as a work to be used for reflecting the difference between the 
pure deceptive mode of an immersive trompe l’œil and the symbolically distanced, in-
tentionally controlled deception of picture reception proper. It puts a particular focus of 
attention to the role the bodies of the receivers play for those modes. In an accompany-
ing text, RACKHAM explicitly relates her project to the immediate embodiment in a situ-
ational context prior to the constitution of a self that is aware of sortal objects, and the 
projection of that embodiment in the multiverse of symbolically mediated contexts 
[2000]: 
As an avatar I simultaneously exist – internally and externally to the moist body, con-
gruently within and with out, being self and other, both alone and networked. I am at 
once operating at binary oppositional points, co-present at both zero and one. Here I 
glide through spaces, I have no gravity, and my collision is false. This space reconsti-
tutes my embodied self as soft object, with a resulting loss of rigid structural and sym-
bolic self-definition, an amorphous material embodiment, a shifting node in a network 
constantly reinventing itself. 
And I am simultaneously hard edged. Physically located, constructed of zeros and ones, 
nothingness and singularities written along the x/y/z/axis of a 'real' located space. Hard 
space is where my collision is always true, where I bend slightly and my container often 
leaks, expelling viscous others that it has ingested. 
In a way, we have crossed with Empyrean a border of reflecting pictorial communica-
tion since pictures are here only part of a much more complex sign act including sound, 
text, the movements of the beholders and even the coordination of their interactions by 
means of a chat channel. Continuing that path of thought, we might find that cyberspace 
could very well be conceived of as a kind of super-perceptoid sign, integrating more 
sense modalities than the perceptoid signs known so far. The reflection arisen by visit-
ing Empyrean is, then, much more a reflection on the use of that kind of sign than one 
of picture uses. Such a consideration does, however, exceed the frame of the current in-
vestigation.  
 
 
* * * 
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With these fragmentary considerations on reflective images and computer art, we 
have finally reached the end of investigating pragmatic aspects of computational pic-
tures, and thus also the end of our discussion of the generic data type »image«. 
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5 Case Studies: Using the Data Type »Image«  
Having completed the trifold discussion on general aspects of the generic data structure 
that includes the type »image«, several applications now give an impression of how to 
apply the distinctions introduced. Individual tasks usually do not need all the aspects of 
the generic data structure; but the parts that have to be considered must often be 
transformed into more specific forms valid only for those pictures of the task at hand.  
We start by describing a project on content-based image archiving and retrieval where 
the transformation from »image« to »picture content« is central (5.1). The second case 
study examines the inverse direction: an aspect of how to control a particular pragmatic 
aspect of the generation of rhetorically enriched pictures (5.2). Two varieties of using 
pictures in highly immersive systems are discussed as the third case study: the suppres-
sion of the symbolic mode in favor of a dominant deceptive mode of reception plays an 
ambiguous role in virtual architecture and for virtual institutes (5.3). Cognitive psy-
chologists speaking about mental imagination indicate another kind of borderline case 
of pictorial signs. Computationally, the rules of speaking about mental images can be 
employed for modeling pragmatic effects in reference semantics by means of instances 
of »image« (5.4). 
5.1 Semantic Requests to Image Databases in IRIS 
A major problem arising in the present “age of the images” is the pure amount of 
pictures to be dealt with. The most elementary task of finding a certain picture or even a 
reasonably small group of relevant images in the enormous corpus of pictures available 
(for example, in a press archive) becomes increasingly hard. It is sometimes easier to 
produce a completely new picture instead – which then again contributes to clogging up 
the archive. 
The classical tool for pictorial archiving is to index pictures by means of more or less 
arbitrary annotations associated conventionally with them. The keepers of the archives 
have to manually associate the annotations, essentially following their understanding of 
the pictures’ essential features or contents and the principles of cataloguing of their pro-
fession. It is quite uncomfortable for any human being to describe the content of thou-
sands of images following rather fixed criteria, and to construct a corresponding index. 
However, as soon as a new criterion becomes relevant, all images already categorized 
would have to be revised again: those processes are rather being done automatically. 
In principle, we have to distinguish between several cases of image retrieval: 
1. We want images that contain certain syntactic features, e.g., a red circle or a large 
patch of grass texture: Although such a request can be quite helpful if no other 
means of searching is provided, it is relatively uninteresting in most situations. If the 
archive is managed computationally sample pictures can be used to mark the fea-
tures instead of giving them symbolically: IBM’s system QUBIC provides exactly 
such queries by examples. 
2. We want images that have a certain picture content, e.g., two persons in front of a 
forest: this is the most interesting case and we deal with it below. Specifying (par-
tially) a picture content can reach from a single sortal object type (‘a chair’) to a 
fairly precise set of relative locations of several objects of certain types with associ-
ated visual features (‘a red sports car with a blond guy sitting inside and a black-
haired woman standing at the left side door’).  
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3. We want images that have certain individual referents in them, e.g., a picture of the 
Taj Mahal. As was explained in section 4.3.2.4, image reference is problematic if 
not an unspecific individual is meant: ‘unspecific’ means that the individual in ques-
tion is not known so far from some other context – it is just a spontaneously gener-
ated intentional object. In contrast to that, the specific individual pictured must be 
known as the same individual in other contexts, as well. The picture per se cannot 
establish such identification – another object with high visual similarity could be the 
referent just as well.  
The task of retrieving pictures from a database in a semantic fashion, i.e., by means of 
giving content descriptions can be stated in relatively simple terms – nevertheless it is 
quite demanding to solve. Some aspects of such a task have been sketched already in 
section 4.4.1.4; but there, PINEDA assumed that descriptions of the images’ content had 
already been derived in advance, and essentially “by hand”.  
5.1.1 Image Retrieval for Information Systems 
The project IRIS (Image Retrieval for Information Systems85, 1994–1996, Univ. 
Bremen) has approached the retrieving of a group of images currently of interest from a 
huge image archive, in which the pictures are automatically indexed according to their 
content (up to a certain level of detail). The system developed describes autonomously 
images by their content in a textual form. Only a specification of the general picture 
type is necessary, e.g., landscape picture, technical drawing or sports photograph, since 
the algorithms performing the image analysis depend on domain-specific parameters 
that cannot yet be extracted by the computer on its own. 
The resulting annotations are fed into a standard textual database together with the 
reference to the corresponding picture files. A user of the system is able to retrieve the 
references to images by keywords from the annotations employing the well-known 
methods of text retrieval. The keywords can be derived by means of an analysis of a 
sample picture, as well (Fig. 104). 
                                                     
85 The system has been implemented in C on IBM RS/6000 with AIX. It later became part of  IBM’s sys-
tem “ImageMiner”. 
 
Figure 104: General Architecture of Content-Based Image Retrieval 
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The most interesting task is to construct the image content that is the basis of the an-
notations describing the pictures. An overview of this image analysis component is 
given in Figure 105. As described in section 4.3.2, the first step of picture analysis is to 
determine elementary pixemes: several types of marker values like colors, texture at-
tributes, and contour elements are extracted from the image. Algorithms based on those 
described in [HARALICK ET AL. 1973] and [KORN 1988] have been used for categorizing 
those features. 
Elementary pixemes depending on color and texture are based on a grid with an ad-
justable size subdividing the image into grid elements. For every grid element, a color 
histogram is computed and reduced to a color category: the color category appearing 
most frequently defines the color of the grid element. Neighboring grid elements with 
the same color are grouped, and the circumscribing rectangles are determined. The re-
sults of color-based segmentation are described qualitatively by means of attributes such 
as relative size, position respective to the underlying grid size, and the color category.  
Similarly, for every grid element, the system performs some matrix calculations get-
ting some local statistic parameters like entropy, variance, correlation, and angular sec-
ond momentum that base texture analysis. The mapping between the statistical values 
and the texture category to be used is performed by means of a neural net and depends 
on the type of scenes considered: certain statistic parameters may indicate one texture 
category in landscapes, for example, and another one in indoor scenes. Therefore, the 
neural net has to be trained in advance by backtracking with textures typical for the do-
main chosen (e.g., sky, clouds, sand, forest, grass, stone, snow, ice for landscapes). 
Figure 105: Architecture of  Image Analysis in the System IRIS 
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Again, neighboring grid elements with the same texture type are grouped together so 
that the circumscribing rectangle can be used as the basis of the qualitative description.  
Shape attributes are represented through contour-based region descriptions. Detection 
of edge elements based on the intensity gradient is a standard tool of image processing. 
To avoid the inherent scale-space problem of the gradient-threshold calculation, a 
“pyramid-structured” approach with several levels of resolution is used in IRIS. Rele-
vant edge points (i.e., no noise) are collected into contours if they continue a contour 
hypothesis starting with the most prominent edge points. Closed contours are finally 
used to determine regions. 
Color rectangles, texture rectangles and shape descriptions are encoded in a qualita-
tive manner. Take as an example the BNF specification developed by the author for 
color rectangles given in Table 3.86  
Spatial objects as the basic elements of the goal descriptions are associated to sets of 
segments that are visually perceptible in the picture, but they also involve relations to 
their parts, or to wholes of which they are parts. The definition of those part-whole rela-
tions for a particular type of object in fact organizes which sets of pictorial segments 
show an instance of that type, and which deviations are not to be rated as such instances. 
Spatial objects in the intended sense are constituted by the coordination of correspond-
ing segments by means of object schemata relevant for the domain in question (Fig. 
106). Context-sensitive techniques are used to guide this process. The goal is to elimi-
nate ambiguity as early as possible by means of expectations. 
An association between segments with the same marker values is usually only possi-
ble to elementary parts of spatial objects. To that purpose, topological relations between 
the pixemes found in the previous step are employed in a graph grammar parser to iden-
tify candidates for elementary parts of the scene in question [KLAUCK 1994]. Thus, if a 
certain contour-based region, a white color rectangle, and a snow texture rectangle over-
lap widely, a region of snow is likely to have been recognized. A color rectangle of ei-
ther blue or white in the upper part of the picture together with an overlapping cloud 
texture rectangle gives a good reason for having recognized clouds (Fig.s 106 and 107). 
Note that it is not necessary to call for a precise overlap of color, texture, and shape: as 
is well-known for example from aquarelles, contours and colors need not fit exactly and 
still allow us to determine clearly what is shown.  
                                                     
86 In the later versions of the system, the relative positioning was abandoned; the more precise grid posi-
tions of the rectangles are used instead. Furthermore a “density parameter” was introduced mirroring the 
proportion between the grid elements covered by the rectangle that have the corresponding feature and 
those that have not.  
Table 3: Original BNF for color rectangles in IRIS 
 
<color description> := "HOR=<hor>,VER=<ver>,SIZ=<siz>,DIR=<dir>, 
COM=<com>,COL=<col>" 
<hor>  := ll | left | middle | right | rr ;; horizontal position 
<ver>  := uu | up | middle | down | dd ;; vertical position 
<siz>  := XS | S | M | L | XL    ;; qualitative size 
<dir>  := Ver| Hor | Dec | Inc | none  ;; qualitative direction 
<com>  := Quad | Rect | Path   ;; compactness 
<col>  := white | black | gray | red | yellow | blue | green |  
           orange | violet | brown   ;; the actual marker values 
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5.1.2 Results and Queries 
The overall result of the parsing is a topological graph of primitive objects. Spatial 
relations over and above simple topological relations are not yet used in this version of 
IRIS. The resulting graph is parsed by a second graph grammar dealing expectation-
driven with part-whole relations for more complex object concepts, the definition of 
which is encoded in the thesaurus management system TM/2. It even allows the system 
to classify objects that are only partially pictured. The thesaurus managing system forms 
the knowledge base providing the part-of relations inherent to object schemata of a 
certain domain. The most complex “object” types are the scene categories, like 
landscape, architecture photography or technical drawing that are explicitly given when 
a picture is to be integrated. Stating explicitly the category of a picture when adding it to 
the database helps significantly to determine the annotations proper, since the 
expectation-driven parsing can be performed in a more focused manner.87  
The overall description of the image is finally given by one or several resulting struc-
tures reflecting the topic (e.g., mountain landscape), its particular complex constituents 
(e.g., snowy mountain, meadow, lake), their elements (snow, water), and the corre-
sponding marker values, which is finally fed into the database. That is, a structured 
document containing not only the final interpretation but all the intermediate descrip-
tions of the image, as well, is indexed in a text retrieval system; a user, thus, may use 
both syntactic and semantic descriptions for searching images with the system IRIS. 
Queries to the database can be formulated on any level or combination of levels con-
tained in the image annotation (Fig 108). Specific interfaces have been provided to ease 
the user specifying parameters on the lower levels. Color, for example, can be specified 
either by using text (a partially instantiated color rectangle description), an example 
                                                     
87 Specifying the category in advance is already necessary for using an appropriate set of parameters for 
feature extraction. 
 
Figure 106: A Simple Object Schema (“Clouds”) and a Complex Object Schema (“Mountainlake”) 
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(“picked” from a given picture) or a color editor. Similarly, texture can be specified 
verbally by the texture category (in a partially instantiated texture rectangle description) 
or by an example area from a given picture. Weighed correlation measures are used for 
computing similarity between two feature vectors. Of course, the most complex type of 
request can only be stated verbally by naming the object concepts included in the scene, 
for example, asking for a picture with “mountain”, “snow”, and “lake”; or, on the most 
general level, by simply asking for the type of scene – “mountain scene”.  
Pragmatic restrictions, in particular concerning user modeling, have not been consid-
ered in IRIS. However, the image analysis has been explicitly designed in a relatively 
simple way so that users can more easily understand the categories used for indexing 
and are not mislead to ask too much “understanding” from the system. Of course, IRIS 
does not really understand the pictures it analyses; it is able to deliver a coarse approxi-
mation to »picture content« based on a simplified picture syntax. This approximation is 
proposed as a simple-to-use semi-semantic specification for a kind of image retrieval 
close to common-sense picture understanding. 
Beside its use in picture archiving in the strict sense, the automatically derived de-
scriptions can be integrated as special digital watermarks in pictures that are to be pub-
lished in the WorldWideWeb: search engines could use that information to find more 
easily the pictures a user wants to find, and to block others irrelevant (or prohibited for a 
certain user group).  
5.2 Rhetorically Enriched Pictures 
The expression ‘rhetorically enriched picture’ has been introduced in section 4.4.1.3: 
Having observed that the variation of presentation styles in a picture suggests a certain 
figure-ground distinction over and above the mere medial spatial configuration, we have 
concluded that they can be easily understood as bearing a preferred reading with respect 
to nomination and predication. While a neutral context builder leaves the figure-ground 
differentiation to a complementing verbal commentary (or completely to the viewers 
  
   
  
   
Figure 107: Visualizations of the Intermediate Analysis Results of IRIS 
upper line: original image, color rectangles, texture rectangles; 
lower line: contour elements, segmented regions, object association 
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  Figure 108: Query Menue of the System IRIS  
and their particular interests), pictures with articulate style differences induce a specific 
interpretation – at least to some degree. Textbooks for anatomy, for example, avoid 
traditionally photographs not only because it is too complicated to erase irritating 
details: essentially, there is too little stylistic variation available with photography’s 
extreme naturalism. A long tradition of artful anatomical drawing allows the designer 
for pictures with a better mixture of representation styles fitting their rhetoric demands. 
In this case study, we are basically interested in the influence the variation of the de-
gree of naturalism has on the (relative) rhetoric function of a pixeme. This also answers 
corresponding questions in image generation, for example: Which parts of the geometry 
in question should be presented in a naturalistic way, and why is the rest to be presented 
in a more “abstract” manner? 
Recall in this context the meaning of the expressions ‘realism’ and ‘naturalism’ intro-
duced before: ‘realism’ is the property of a representation of giving the impression of a 
configuration of spatial objects that is or could be found in the world. ‘Naturalism’ re-
fers to the degree of a pictorial representation to which it evokes a visual impression as 
close as possible to that of the scene depicted. While realism is a binary category, natu-
ralism only defines one pole of a continuous scale. Compare the two pictures in Figure 
109: both represent a spatial scene in representation styles with a low degree of natural-
ism. What is the different meaning they suggest by means of their stylistic difference? It 
obviously is related to the differentiation between aspects (shown as) already known to 
the beholder, and new (informative) parts. The former can easily be used as anchor 
points for the other elements supposedly not yet known to the beholder.  
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Recall also at this place the sub functions of propositional communication (cf. section 
3.4.1): by nomination those aspects of an utterance are meant that refer to something al-
ready mutually known (e.g., previously mentioned). They are used to provide the other 
interlocutors with an anchor point for information that is new – the predication. The 
given anchor and the new distinction can indeed be conceived of as prime functions of 
rational communication in general. We therefore conceive of them as important rhetoric 
functions for rhetorically enriched pictures, as well, over and above the more fundamen-
tal function as context builder of pictures in general. 
The various styles in pictures with mixed representation are only indirectly associated 
to pixemes. They relate directly to semantic elements, i.e., elements of the picture con-
tent. Let us call those parts of the underlying geometric model the ‘representational 
elements’ of the picture. The part-whole relations inherent to sortal objects organize 
these elements. 
5.2.1 Descibing Style Parameters 
In order to select style parameters depending on the rhetoric functions of nomination 
and predication for an example system, we first have to provide a formal language 
describing the style variations at hand. As we cannot deal here with the full range of 
syntactic and semantic factors that may add to the naturalism of a realistic picture, we 
restrict ourselves to a reduced and very simplified list of visual components (Table 4): 
First, there is color: a representational element of a picture may be ordinarily colored, 
uncolored or colored in an unnatural manner (e.g., duo-toned). Second, representational 
elements may show texture: the ordinary distribution, no texture at all, or a wrong 
texture (e.g., cross-hedged). Third, picture elements have form: as a respect for 
similarity, this dimension ranges from photo-realistically shaded projection of the full 3-
D form through sketch with outlines and inner contours for indicating part-whole 
relations to the pure outline. Finally, the relative place of the representational element 
and the configuration are relevant: they may be considered as either the “natural” one or 
any other. The dimensions are not completely independent. Configuration is closely 
linked with the referents’ part-whole relations, and controls how the corresponding 
representational elements of the parts form a representational whole. A representational 
element without parts has no configuration: if a representational element shows only 
 
  
 
Figure 109: Two Contrasting Examples of Rhetorically Enriched Pictures
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outlines, all its parts are suppressed – the element becomes “atomic”. In that case, the 
parameters of color and texture have to be adapted, too.  
Any presentation style available for tele-rendering can be attributed such a style de-
scription. The “classical” photo-realistic rendering for example corresponds to «natural 
color, natural texture, shaded projection, natural place, natural configuration», a cop-
per plate engraving of an exploded view of a technical device to «uncolored, unnatural 
texture, inner contours, unnatural place, unnatural configuration». The general idea is, 
that an interactive system uses such a characterization in its active beholder model in 
order to determine how a picture is to be generated for a particular user, or in its passive 
beholder model for evaluating a given picture.  
In a picture with mixed styles, each representation element has, obviously, its own 
stylistic characterization: a tree of style descriptions according to the part-whole rela-
tions between the elements has to be considered. Due to the dependencies, the attribu-
tion of one value in the hierarchy puts constraints on the other values. 
5.2.2 The Heuristics of Predicative Naturalism 
The dual questions are then: how do we select the style parameters for a given 
association between representational elements and basic rhetoric functions? And: how 
can we reconstruct that association given the style parameter description of the 
representational elements of a picture? We need principles mapping one association of 
the hierarchy of representational elements with rhetoric basic functions onto another 
association of the hierarchy with style parameters, and vice versa. 
Some presentational elements serve the communicational purpose of anchoring the 
place of another, usually more central element. We may assume that the beholder of that 
picture does not yet know that element well enough, which was the original intention to 
ask for that picture at all. Form and configuration of the other elements are used nomi-
natorically, and they are sufficient for the intended user to be able to establish a context 
already known for the new information. All other respects of representation – color, tex-
ture, etc. – are reduced. In contrast to that, the representational element in focus is given 
a richer, more naturalistic appearance with more details of form and configuration, and, 
eventually, some color and texture.  
Indeed, a representational element of a picture can take over both rhetoric functions: 
some of its visual properties may be nominatoric while others are predicative. This ob-
servation depends on the fact that there are no pictorial proper names, only definite de-
scriptions. A representational element in an image is able to carry the rhetoric function 
of nomination merely by means of certain visual property in contrast to the other ele-
ments. Other style attributes of that element can simultaneously carry the predicative 
function. We therefore rather speak in the case of pictures of nominatoric and predica-
tive properties of representational elements than of nominatoric or predicative represen-
tational elements.  
Table 4 Color Texture Form Place  Configuration 
 natural natural shaded natural  natural 
 uncolored untextured inner contour unnatural unnatural 
 unnatural unnatural outline  atomic 
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As a heuristic rule derived from these arguments – a Heuristics of Predicative Natu-
ralism for realistic pictures suggests itself: the parts of a spatial scene playing the role of 
nominatoric anchors in a picture of that scene should appear less naturalistic than the 
representational elements carrying the predicative properties. Correspondingly, the 
strange and unexpected parts are to be presented more naturalistically than the common 
and known.  
Given a list of (visual) properties to be communicated by a picture and the list of 
properties that have been communicated already, the active beholder model of an inter-
active system has the task to select for each representational element a presentation style 
according to the style description. That selection must allow the system an encoding so 
that a subset of the nominatoric properties of that picture element (if there are any) suf-
ficient for identification is included. Furthermore, as many of its predicative properties 
as possible have to be shown. While the nominatoric subset can be reduced to the mini-
mal set satisfying a unique identification, the predicational information should be given 
redundantly to ensure a proper understanding. In accordance with GRICE’s maxims (cf. 
Section 4.4.2.2), the picture is then as informative as possible (with respect to predica-
tion) and not more informative than is required (with respect to nomination). 
For a certain communicative intention, this specification enables a system to choose 
autonomously a style that matches the situational conditions best. The Heuristics of 
Predicative Naturalism is to be seen as a strategic rule among others for the generation 
of mix-styled pictures; its results may be overwritten or modified by other strategic 
rules or meta-principles (e.g., consistency principles).88  
The computational visualist can also use the heuristics for critically evaluating the 
rhetoric force of the interactive system’s pictures by means of the passive beholder 
model before actually having them presented. According to the Heuristics of Predicative 
Naturalism, somebody receiving the picture may assume, at least as a first guess, that 
the producer of that picture wants him or her to understand the less naturalistic parts as 
nominatoric, and the more naturalistic ones as predicative. The comics examples quoted 
from MCCLOUD in section 4.4.1.3 can be interpreted exactly in this sense. 
5.2.3 Example Application of the Heuristics 
In general, the Principle of Predicative Naturalism is realized as a constraint system 
propagating restrictions through the hierarchy of representational elements and their 
visual components until a stable association has been established. The following 
parameters act as additional constraints:  
(a) the order of degree of naturalism between the style values (e.g., the degree of 
naturalism decreases from ‘natural color’ to ‘uncolored’ to ‘unnatural colors’),  
(b) the dependencies between the different visual components considered by the style 
description (color, texture, form, place, configuration), and 
(c) the impact a particular attribution of a rhetoric function to a visual component has 
on the other components of that representational element. 
                                                     
88 Such a set has been suggested, for example, by RIST [1996, Sect. 5.2.2] (cf. section 4.4.2.1). 
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Figure 110 presents three gray-scale examples: color and texture parameters are ig-
nored here for simplicity.89 Let us assume that the communicative intention given asso-
ciates the background (a table top) as nominatoric, and a bunny’s shape and the con-
figuration of its (body-) parts as predicative, while the relative position of the bunny 
with respect to the background objects is also marked as known already to the beholders 
in question. Then, it is sufficient for the background to be drawn in outline and without 
parts (“atomic”). For the bunny however, form and configuration parameters should be 
maximal (i.e., value “natural”). If only the bunny’s configuration is predicative, the 
form parameter changes to “outline”: the four components are clearly discernable. 
The third example is more complicated since the place of an element can only be 
predicative if the configuration of the complete scene is emphasized, as well. Therefore, 
using the bunny’s place as predicative property has to be propagated up in the hierarchy 
of representation elements to the configuration of the scene, and from there down again 
to the place parameter of the other children, i.e., all the background elements. The inner 
contours of the tabletop are selected while the configuration of the bunny becomes 
atomic and only outlines need to be shown. The graphic clearly emphasizes the bunny 
being almost at the border (in consequence, its danger to fall off is here more evident). 
5.3 A Border Line Case: Immersion 
Images in highly immersive systems are the interactive pendant of trompe l’œil pictures. 
Using them may be seen as a borderline case of image use due to the dominance of the 
deceptive reception mode. As was already described for the immersant in the art work 
Osmose in section 4.4.5.3, the sign character of the presentation disappears at all: the 
perceptoid context builder becomes a genuin situational context. With respect to 
aesthetic considerations, GRAU explains in his essay on Osmose [2003]:  
In virtual environments, a fragile, core element of art comes under threat: the 
observer's act of distancing that is a prerequisite for any critical reflection. Aesthetic 
distance always comprises the possibility of attaining an overall view, of understanding 
organization, structure, and function, and achieving a critical appraisal. 
                                                     
89 The system described in [HALPER ET AL. 2002] was used to construct parts of Figure 109. Due to its 
modular organisation of simple style-varying operations, it is an ideal candidate for interpreting the style 
descriptions finally associated with the hierarchy of representation elements of the picture.  
 
Background:  all nominatoric 
Bunny:  place  nominatoric 
  shape  predicative 
  config. predicative  
 
Æ Background: « . , . , outline, 
atomic» 
 Bunny: « . , . , natural, natural» 
 
Background:  all nominatoric 
Bunny:  place  nominatoric 
  shape  nominatoric 
  config. predicative  
 
Æ Background: « . , . , outline, 
atomic» 
 Bunny: « . , . , inner contours, 
natural» 
Backgr.:  initially all nominatoric 
Bunny:  shape  nominatoric 
  config. nominatoric 
  place  predicative 
    (⇒ Backgr.: config. →  predica-
tive)  
Æ Background: « . , . , inner con-
tours, reduced» 
 Bunny: « . , . , outline, atomic»
  Figure 110: Simulated Applications of the Heuristics of Predicative Naturalism  
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The act of distancing is indeed not restricted to aesthetic considerations in the close 
sense but forms the core aspect of the symbolic mode: evoking contexts that are not the 
situational context at hand is the major function of signs. ‘Evoking a context’ means not 
only immediately activating certain spontaneous reactions, but also the ability of post-
poning those reactions to the context evoked though not present (cf. Sect. 3.5.1). Thus, 
one of the components defining the concept »picture« is missing. If the use of pictures 
in highly immersive systems aims at a reception in the pure deceptive mode by sup-
pressing any factors able to activate the viewer’s symbolic mode, then there are indeed 
no pictures used at all, at least for the “immersants” who do not spontaneously reflect 
about their situation.  
Nevertheless, an important part of computational visualistics deals exactly with this 
borderline case of image use. As has been mentioned already in chapter 3, the producers 
of trompe l’œil pictures as well as of immersive systems cannot share the reduced recep-
tion mode: they in fact deal with pictures as perceptoid signs that are intended to be mis-
taken – at least for a time or to a certain degree. Usually, we do not meet immersants 
that do not at all reflect their specific situation: highly immersive systems still need so 
much technical effort and preparation that nobody simply find themselves in such a sys-
tem without noticing it. Correspondingly, they are not in a pure deceptive mode but in 
the immersive mode where the postponing of spontaneous reactions is strongly reduced, 
not totally absent. Recall the situation in cinema when we appear to be confronted with 
a life-like Tyrannosaurus rex threatening to attack us: we know that it is an illusion (a 
sign we show to ourselves), consequently having a lot of spontaneous reactions that are 
generally postponed; but we allow those reactions to surface to some degree, which is 
one of the pleasures of viewing such films.  
Long before expressions like ‘virtual reality’ or ‘immersive systems’ have become 
popular, S. LEM investigated different levels of immersion under the name of ‘phan-
tomatics’ [LEM 1964]. Present attempts are based essentially on technical devices pro-
jecting pictures on more or less flat smooth surfaces covering all of the field of view: 
they can be viewed in the ordinary sense.90 Sound is being emitted by speakers in more 
or less sophisticated manners, also to be heard in the traditional way. Quite obviously, 
only distance senses can be easily deceived by that form of immersive systems. Many 
contact senses are much harder to be deceived – recall all the sensations from our skins. 
The feedback from the immersant’s actions is also mostly restricted to very specific and 
very small channels: a mouse, a data glove, or a data suit at most. 
As an improvement of immersion, LEM imagines what he calls ‘peripheral phan-
tomatics’, where technical devices directly manipulate the immersant’s peripheral nerv-
ous system, feeding the sensoric nerves and taking signals from the effectoric nerves: 
the pictures or sounds used can then be inspected only by additional devices. Still, the 
immersant’s body with its movements and the monitoring proprioceptors form a source 
of “disturbance” to the immersion. Therefore, another step is introduced: LEM’s expres-
sion ‘central phantomatics’ refers to the hypothetical technology that allows technical 
devices to directly manipulate the immersant’s central nervous system, overwriting any 
bodily signals including those from the sense organs, and intercepting any nerve pulses 
controlling (real) motion. That is: for the immersant, the physical body is completely 
replaced by the avatar. He or she seemingly exists only in “cyberspace”. 
                                                     
90 Current experimental devices projecting light directly into the eye form the only exception known to the 
author so far. 
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Beside the aspect of plausibility, LEM is basically interested in the epistemological 
question whether (and how) an immersant of any of those levels would be able to detect 
the deception – indeed a modern pendant on DESCARTES’ reflection on the nature of 
truth under the assumption of a deceiving deity.91 This is not the place to investigate 
those problems.  
Of course: the expression ‘immersion’ is not only a question of technology – more 
likely a question of purpose and concentration. Humans are very well able to be com-
pletely absorbed in reading a novel ignoring most of their situational context (even up to 
the bodily needs to some degree) evoking mental imaginations of what they read. High 
degrees of technically induced deceptive mode are relevant in simulations, e.g. for pilot 
training. In other applications, the equilibrium between the symbolic and deceptive 
components of reception is more complicated. Different purposes lead essentially to dif-
ferent possibilities of interactions. Two particular cases – virtual architecture and virtual 
institutes – are presented in the following together with a description of the particular 
conditions and intentions of application, demonstrating alternative needs for deceptive 
or immersive reception modes of the pictures used. 
5.3.1 Virtual Architectur: The Atmosphere Projekt  
The first example is the computational reconstruction of an important Jugendstil house 
built by PETER BEHRENS (1868–1940) in Darmstadt, which is not preserved in its 
original state. The house was designed as a piece of the exhibition Ein Dokument 
deutscher Kunst that was prepared by the artist colony of Darmstadt in 1901. It 
represents a unique Gesamtkunstwerk: Apart from the architecture of the façade and the 
exterior disposition, all details of the interior decorations are based on designs of 
BEHRENS himself. This does not only include the doors, windows, carpets and 
wallpapers. The form of furniture, lamps, glasses, chinas, and cutlery, even music 
instruments, inkstands, and jewelery fitting to the house’s aesthetic conception are 
based on inventions of BEHRENS. In this unique fashioning of human living space 
characteristic for Art Nouveau, a specific conception of life was expressed. It is the 
approach of using artistic abilities to transform the environment in a beautiful and 
reasonable manner in order to harmonize again humaneness and the technical 
development [BUCHHOLZ 2000; BEHRENS 1901, 3–6]. During the 19th century, the two 
aspects had developed more and more into quite different directions in Europe, a 
disintegration of the manners of life that pushed forcefully into public conscience at the 
end of that century and gave rise to a large number of reform-oriented approaches, 
which to our days have a strong influence.92 The functional and aesthetic investigation of 
an integral ensemble like the House Behrens is an important building block toward a 
proper understanding of the characteristic conception of life of that time and its 
lingering influence on us. 
                                                     
91 While LEM keeps an ironic distance to such technologies and is interested mainly in epistemological 
and ethical questions, other scientists are not so prudent: recall, for example, M. MINSKY’s public fan-
tasy about all humans being “equipped” with an implanted computer interface to their brains. The crea-
tivity of narrative artists had been excited by such scenarios, as well; beside FASSBINDER’s TV produc-
tion Welt am Draht [1973], CRONENBERG’s film eXistenCe [1999] is one of the more interesting results. 
92 Just as a few examples: fitness studios and ecological agriculture, functional architecture and feminism, 
health food and artificial tanning; they all can easily be traced back to the broad movement of “Lebens-
reform” about a century ago [BUCHHOLZ ET AL. 2001]. 
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However, the house was destroyed severely during Word War II. The façade was re-
constructed afterwards with only minor alterations, but the interior decoration is utterly 
lost.93 The original partitioning of rooms has not been restored; all decorative elements 
are destroyed. A reconstruction by means of computational visualistics – a virtual archi-
tecture – must, then, appear as a very plausible approach [FORTE & SILIOTTI 1997]. 
Such a virtual reconstruction has to be based on data about the original contexts as 
precise as possible. In the case of BEHRENS’ house in Darmstadt, there is a sufficient 
amount of details available at least for the two central rooms of the ground level: the 
fact that pieces of Art Nouveau have been broadly documented in illustrated papers of 
that time does not only demonstrate how important the underlying conception of life 
was rated then; it obviously is quite helpful for the virtual reconstruction, as well. The 
journal Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration appearing in Darmstadt published an extensive 
article about BEHRENS’ house with floor plans, sketches, and many large black-and-
white photographs [BEHRENS & BREYSIG 1901/02]. A similar paper appeared in the 
journal Dekorative Kunst [SCHEFFLER 1902]. A special catalogue was produced for the 
exhibition covering exclusively BEHRENS’ house: it contains an introduction by 
BEHRENS and a list of all the enterprises that constructed the objects designed [BEHRENS 
1901]. Finally, numerous modern color photographs are available of those parts of the 
furniture that have survived World War II and are exhibited in several museums (e.g., 
[INSTITUT MATHILDENHÖHE DARMSTADT w/o y., 6–27].  
The two rooms in our focus of attention have been discussed extensively in contem-
porary architecture critiques: they are the music room and the dining room just beside 
                                                     
93 Furniture and other movable parts had been already removed from the house since BEHRENS moved to 
Düsseldorf in 1903. Fortunately, some of the furniture was therefore spared from the destruction. 
Figure 111: Contemporary Photography of the Music Room. The door to the dining-room is just 
outside the right frame border 
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each other (Fig’s 111 & 112). Both rooms serve social purposes and are connected by a 
large double door with partitioned wings. The music room is higher in order to evoke a 
particular atmospheric effect described by BEHRENS [1901, 8 f.]: 
In order to heighten the music room in accordance with its purpose with respect to the 
rooms around it – the true festive room of the house – it was necessary to lead down two 
steps from the hall and simultaneously to lift the ceiling approximately for the same dis-
tance compared to the adjacent dining room. The two steps have the practical purpose 
named; but also the other, spiritualized one: to lend a rhythmical movement to the traffic 
between dining room and music room. Stepping down gives us the feeling of being pre-
pared for something; stepping up evokes the one of lifting to something. And in those feel-
ings, very essential moods of humanity can be recognized. 
Numerous details and materials have to be considered: The floor of the music room 
consists of a parquet with seven different woods forming a linear geometric pattern. The 
dining-room has a floor of mosaic in a curved pattern. The steps leading from music 
room to dining-room are of a pink marble, the music room’s walls are covered with grey 
marble and blue reflecting glas. Above the door to the dining room and at both sides, 
additional mosaics are placed. The walls of the dining-room are interrupted by large 
windows above silver-coated heating grills. Between some of the windows, crystal 
mirrors are installed. Other parts of the walls are panelled in white-lacquered wood 
below a frieze of damast. The ceilings of the two rooms are richly decorated: in the 
music room, it consists of gold-painted wood with another linear ornament; the dining-
room’s ceiling has curved stucco ornaments with some of the intermediate spaces 
coated with silver. The doors are also particularly elaborated. The door from the music 
 
Figure 112: Contemporary Photography of the Dining-Room. The door to the music room is par-
tially visible at the left side 
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room to the hall is adorned with a linear ornament in golden aluminium bronze similar 
to the music room ceiling. The door between music room and dining-room is white on 
the dining-room side with a simple curved ornament; toward the music room it shows 
“an uninterrupted surface of noble silver-maple without a single ornamental line” 
[BEHRENS & BREYSIG 1901/02, 148].  
The interior decorations of the House Behrens vary a small number of different or-
naments. The decorative design of the dining room is developed from the basic figure of 
two intersected curves. They appear in the simple form in the gratings of the cupboard 
glasses and in the mirror cuttings. A more complex derivation is shown in the heating 
grills, where different degrees of sinuosity are combined. The curved line induces verve 
and movement into the dining room. In contrast, all forms in the music room are devel-
oped from a linear base, a rhomb, which develops into the complicated form of a crys-
tal. Decoration and furniture of the music room induce the impression of static calm-
ness. 
Taking into account the conceptual background of Jugendstil design mentioned above 
and the particular emphasis BEHRENS put on designing a complex but uniquely coherent 
whole, any alteration of a detail in the virtual reconstruction can destroy the intended 
use. Unfortunately, many of the colors and texture are uncertain. Black and white pho-
tographs only hint at the relative luminescence. Verbal descriptions of the colors are of-
ten rather exuberant but obviously of limited help for the computational visualist. 
The success of a project like the reconstruction of the House Behrens by means of 
computational visualistics depends, thus, on an intense cooperation between computa-
tional visualist and art scientist. Decisions have to be made concerning the colors or tex-
tures to be used. Has a given texture to be modified? In which way? What are the crite-
ria? Is it technically possible? Answers depend essentially on the precise purpose of the 
immersive images to be produced, and in particular on the addressee. Detecting the au-
thenticity of colors and texture falls, of course, essentially in the domain of the art scien-
Figure 113: Screenshot from the Virtual House Behrens: View from the Dining-Room into the Mu-
sic Room (with door to the the hall) 
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tist; but “trial shots” generated by the computational visualist are certainly quite helpful 
even if they are still far from an acceptable end result. In a way, the visual intermediate 
results (e.g., (Fig’s 113 & 114) serve as a virtual experiment in which the effects of de-
cisions about colors and textures can be concretely studied. Thus, the sign character ex-
plicitly controls the deception. 
 The border of present immersive technology can be clearly demonstrated when we 
consider the broad use of reflective surfaces in the two rooms under investigation: that a 
material is highly reflective is, of course, not a major problem for computational visual-
istics: but what happens if the viewer looks at one of the blue glasses in the music room 
from an angle of approximately 90°? In the original (not virtual) room, she could then 
see her own mirror image – an effect BEHRENS certainly has taken into account when 
planning the house. It is, of course, impossible to model for every user of an interactive 
system that provides virtual strolls through the reconstructed House Behrens a fitting 
avatar that could be seen in the virtual mirrors. The geometrical and optical specifica-
tions of the body of that user in its present bearing would have to be included in the 
model. On the other hand: being invisible in the virtual context or having no body is 
certainly not a satisfying solution, too. Finally, a “digital dummy” could appear in the 
virtual mirror representing the user, though it is probable that a user may mistake it not 
for the own reflection but for the avatar of another user. A solution is not yet palpable.  
In the perspective of pictorial pragmatics, the problem offers an interesting aspect 
apart from aesthetical considerations: How does the missing (or wrong) reflection dis-
turb the intention of the reconstruction of a lost Gesamtkunstwerk: i.e., to maintain the 
deceptive mode of reception? In general, the virtual reconstruction of the House 
Behrens has to investigate the problem of how much intentional deviation from the 
original is possible without upsetting the integral atmosphere of the environment. On 
the other side: how much deviation is necessary in order to mark clearly those parts that 
are not (or not certainly) integrated in their original appearance?  
Figure 114: View of the Reconstructed Music Room toward the Dining Room  
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No doubt: virtual architecture can provide experiences over and above those of con-
temporary photographs: for example, views from arbitrary perspectives, and – up to a 
degree – the atmospheric synthesis of the colors and materials used. The effects of dif-
ferent lighting provide another prominent example (compare the two parts of Fig. 115). 
Mediating further atmospheric aspects in an adequate manner is more complicated: the 
experience of stepping up or down between music room and dining-room, for example, 
can hardly be gained in front of a computer screen with the mouse as means of naviga-
tion. The same holds true for the authentical impression of the size of the rooms and the 
objects within: in order to “really” walk though the computationally reconstructed 
house, we have to employ a highly immersive system, like a CAVE [CRUZ-NEIRA ET AL. 
1992] – a cubic room with stereo projections on (almost) all walls on which pictures in 
the correct perspective relative to the position of the user in the room are projected. The 
position and view direction of the user are registered; they influence in real-time the 
projections. Shutter glasses let the beholders see objects in stereovision. Similarly, cor-
responding sounds – e.g., of steps, closing doors, or drawn curtains – adapted to the ac-
tual position of the immersant with a surround sound system enhance the deceptive feel-
ing of being present in that virtual reality. 
The computational effort for the different projections of the House Behrens simulta-
neously necessary in sufficient detail is still rather too high. Apart from that, using a 
CAVE for presentation certainly gives a better basis for studying atmospheric aspects of 
such an artistic ensemble. At least, the proportions of the rooms or their acoustics can be 
perceived in an adequate manner, quite close to the original. But even for that form of 
presentation of a virtual architecture, we can easily find problematic aspects of atmos-
pheric effects. Although the visual impression paired with corresponding stepping 
sounds suggest that we are stepping up from the music room to the dining room, we do 
not use the muscles of our legs in the same way as in real life.  
Figure 115: Two Screenshots from Approximately the Same Perspective – Daylight Atmosphere … 
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With the questions of aesthetical atmosphere, we meet, it seems, a fundamental diffi-
culty of virtual architecture and its use of computer-generated images. The problem is 
connected with BEHRENS’ aim of artistically permeating all aspects of life in the house. 
In the House Behrens, everything is designed towards one unique homogeneous effect. 
That impression of aesthetical homogeneity has been emphasized by the contemporary 
critiques (cf., e.g., [MEIER-GRAEFE 1901, 482–484] or [SCHÄFER 1901, 39]). In order to 
adequately reproduce that impression, it is however necessary to rather use replicas in-
stead of images since the specific distance that always separates the beholders from the 
image referents due to the sign character of the picture easily may “poison” the atmos-
phere and disturb the integral impression intended. 
However, it is not the task of virtual architecture to provide room that can be (virtu-
ally) inhabited: We are interested in gaining a sensible impression of the house that is 
sufficient to understand how the abstractly described desire of BEHRENS (and other art-
ists of Art Nouveau) – to extensively embellish everyday life – is put into concrete ef-
fect. It is quite unclear, how close we have to come to the original to gain a “sufficient” 
impression of the characteristic atmosphere. 
5.3.2  Types of Use of Virtual Architecture 
The degree to which the original atmosphere has to be evoked varies with the different 
aims of such a virtual architectural reconstruction. There are essentially three goals 
determining the design: the presentation should be mainly (1) educational, (2) scientific 
or (3) entertaining. 
 Among the educational goals, the focus can either be on the mediation of the histori-
cal appearance of one individual object, which together with other exhibits and apart 
from the virtual architecture is expected to lead to corresponding new knowledge of the 
beholders/users: “That’s how that object did look like, that approximately was the inte-
gral effect.” Quite easily, we can imagine to have a guided tour in a museum through 
... vs. Nocturnal Atmosphere (and a few more alterations, e.g. drawn curtains) 
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the virtual House Behrens in a CAVE-like presentation engine; or to have the opportu-
nity at a smaller screen to stroll on our own (with a mouse) discovering the atmospheres 
of the reconstruction. But the presentation can also be employed for demonstrating gen-
eral aspects of Art Nouveau or the special idiomatics of BEHRENS’ early style. In that 
case, it is reasonable to directly integrate other exhibit in the CAVE presentation: the 
general stream behind the individual aspects of the house would not become clear oth-
erwise.  
An example is shown in the two parts of Figure 116: the visitors do usually not know 
how the original did look like or what have been the sources for the reconstruction. In-
tegrating on demand posters of contemporary photographs of the original – or of pic-
tures of other important buildings of Art Nouveau, its precursors and successors; or of 
further documents of relevance – into the reconstructed architecture gives the users an 
opportunity to grasp corresponding abstract aspects. In a way, the rooms of the house 
then become the place of a secondary exhibition. 
Apart from those “objective” variants, the peculiar problems of virtual architecture 
can also be the theme of such a presentation: the visitors to the museum are told on the 
meta-communicative level where the computer-generated pictures are authentical, and 
where more or less plausible decisions of the developers had to substitute the unknown 
details of the original (together with their reasons). In that case, too, it is necessary to in-
tegrate more information into the images over and above the architecture as such in or-
der to reach the communicative goal intended.  
In the framework of educational uses, the focus of interest can finally be on showing 
how such a virtual world for a presentation at a museum is created at all. In that case, 
the reconstructed House Behrens is just a more or less arbitrary example. In general for 
educational uses, the option of moving freely in the virtual rooms is secondary com-
pared to the necessity of showing pictures or pre-rendered animations with as much de-
tail as possible in a most naturalistic manner. 
Figure 116: Another View from the Music Room – Standard Presentation and  … 
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Quite different preferences follow if we consider an application scenario with art sci-
entists using the CAVE presentation to aid the discussion in their discipline. Art scien-
tists assume that BEHRENS’ conception of his house in Darmstadt followed a general 
aesthetic plan: by means of the homogenous design, the architecture must have, he be-
lieved, a positive influence on all aspects of the life of its inhabitants. If that assumption 
really plays a role in the discussions of art scientists, then mere debates must remain 
pale if not sterile if the effects on life can only be investigated in blind theory. As we 
have seen, the subtle aspects of aesthetic atmosphere in particular depend on concrete 
experience. Thus, the CAVE presentation allows the art scientists to study at a vivid ex-
ample the consequences of certain theses in art science. As the atmospheric impressive-
ness of the interior design of the House Behrens results on principles of form that are 
systematically applied, it is a central task for art science to propose candidates for such 
principles and elaborate the borders of their effects. With the virtual reconstruction, the 
consequences of such principles can be accessed in a concrete form for comparison. The 
central task of the computational visualist besides providing the immersive system as 
such is, then, to develop tools for the art scientist to easily control the degree of decep-
tion or symbolic distance by changing between different versions of the model (or by di-
rectly modifying it). 
Take for example the parquet floor of the music room with its complicated design in 
crystal shape. All we have is a set of black and white photographs showing parts of the 
floor in perspective distortion, and a list of the seven types of woods used. Fortunately, 
the parts depicted in the photographs are sufficient to reconstruct the complete geomet-
rical pattern of the parquet (Fig. 117 left side). However, the association between the 
parts of the pattern and the types of wood is obvious only for one type: ebony is clearly 
the darkest wood employed. In order to easily check different possibilities, a “parquet 
editor” integrated in the virtual reconstruction is highly helpful: grouping the parts of a 
parquet (or carpet) pattern that are to be associated to the same texture, attributing the 
elements of that group with different texture parameters (size, set-off, rotation), and as-
… with Embedded Sources: Contemporary Photographs Shown and Commented on Demand 
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sociating the groups with alternative texture images are the main tasks, an art scientist 
might want to perform in an easily controllable manner so that the results are immedi-
ately visible in the virtual building.94 
The virtual House Behrens could finally be set up for entertaining purposes. For ex-
ample, it could be used as the scenario for a computer game. In contrast to educational 
or scientific uses, it is then less important to reconstruct the building as originally as 
possible. Major divergences are acceptable depending on the background story of the 
                                                     
94 Such an editor deals only with syntactic aspects of »image«: geometric parts and textures. Used as a 
texture in the actual picture of the room, the result (e.g., Fig. 117 right side) does actually not appear as a 
picture on its own. 
 
    Figure 117: The Reconstructed Floor of the Music Room: Sketch and Textured Version 
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game. Interactivity is the dominating factor here followed by the degree of naturalism of 
the presentation. The amount of detail or alternative presentations are of little interest. 
More important is the option to meet other players online in the virtual building.  
Due to the present state of the art of multi-user 3D engines, a corresponding recon-
struction cannot yet suffice the demands for straightforward educational uses – not to 
mention scientific applications. In order to guarantee interactions in real-time for many 
users all around the world, the model has to be really simple, the textures rather re-
duced.95 In principle, a homogeneously designed impression and a specific atmosphere 
are important, too, for game scenarios. But the aesthetics of computer games has little in 
common with BEHRENS’ intention of beautifying everyday life by means of the house in 
which that life takes place, and of composing all of its elements as explicit parts of a 
whole. This is at least true for the present; a more elaborated investigation may however 
result also in hints for more ambitious computer games that take up BEHRENS’ goal in 
another form. 
* * * 
Several attempts have been made to gain a clear view about the problems involved. They provided the 
screenshots used in this section. In particular, one approach was based on Adobe’s Atmosphere – a pro-
gram to construct and browse interactive 3D worlds in the Internet.96 The system had the specific advan-
                                                     
95 Despite the probably significant deviations from the original, the entertaining use can nevertheless be 
combined with the educational setting: a computer game provided by a museum, where players learn 
implicitly and in an entertaining manner about, e.g., Art Nouveau, Jugendstil, Vienna secession, the his-
torical context of the exhibition in Darmstadt 1901, the other exhibits and their history, and the peculi-
arities of BEHRENS’ architecture, and, maybe, about the differences between the coarse virtual model of 
the game and the subtle composition of the original. 
96 The coincidence of the names of the project and the tool used has not been intended. 
Figure 118: An Alternative Presentation with Sketches for Uncertain Textures  
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tage to allow several users to meet in the virtual context, thus forming a good basis for modeling the 
House Behrens for the web presentation of a museum (Fig’s 113, 114, 115 & 116). Since that system was 
still in its early developmental phase, it did originally not provide all the features necessary or desirable 
for the task. An alternative modeling based on 3D Studio Max and Spinor’s Shark 3D Game Engine al-
lows us to use more kinds of shaders. Here, non-naturalistic textures have been tested when the original 
texture is unavailable (Fig’s 118 & 119). Although not shown here, a simple static model in 3D Studio 
Max of the Behrens house was engaged at the beginning to produce a few short films in order to demon-
strate to the co-operating art scientists the general possibilities and borders of computational visualistics. 
Another experiment was based on the level editor of the computer game Thief: The DarkProject [Looking 
Glass 1998]: without much detail, it led to a first coarse version with real-time interaction and a plausible 
but mostly pre-defined integration of according sounds (stepping, doors etc.).97 
5.3.3 The Virtual Institute of Image Science 
A quite different need for immersive systems appears if we consider the idea of a virtual 
institute. The expression ‘virtual institute’ has still a rather unspecific meaning. 
Basically, it refers to an immersive system (in a rather broad meaning of ‘immersive’) 
accessible by means of a computer network from different places and allowing the users 
to perform tasks as in a non-virtual scientific institute. Virtual institutes are virtual 
insofar as no physical building or meeting place is required; but certainly, members of 
such an institute must be real persons. A virtual institute is, thus, like a virtual 
community, though without using the characteristics of disguise common to the latter. It 
may or may not adhere to the building metaphor like a virtual architecture by providing 
an immersive 3D platform with offices, meeting halls, foyers, galleries, and libraries. 
Quite different platforms for virtual institutes emphasize either the immersion aspect or 
                                                     
97 Cf. also http://www.jrjs.de/Work/Projects/Behrens/ 
 
 Figure 119: Another Perspective in the Alternative Presentation 
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the communication aspect. The decision for a platform depends on the goals pursued 
with the institute: text-based chat systems allow virtual communities to flourish, single-
user VRML scenes convey a highly immersive 3D impression to its users. However, 
both are adequate for certain tasks only. Again, it is helpful to distinguish three major 
application areas: research, presentation, and communicative work. The Virtual Institute 
for Image Science (VIB: www.bildwissenschaft.org) is almost exclusively designed for 
the third task [SACHS-HOMBACH & SCHIRRA 2002]: to provide a working space persons 
can share for joint projects despite being physically separated. 
The Virtual Institute of Image Science has been created as a platform for electronic 
communication in order to simplify the co-ordination of projects of a particular scien-
tific community. The initial motivation for setting up the virtual institute was essentially 
the attempt to support various interdisciplinary research projects between image scien-
tists that mostly live and work at locations far apart. The general intention was to en-
courage the communication between those researchers. An immersive component was 
not considered in the beginning. However, the first approach has not been too success-
ful. A characteristic of present scientific authoring had its bad influence, as it hardly 
ever seems to happen that scientists deliver their papers before deadline. Such a “pro-
duction just in time” does not really allow for an extended discussion or coordination 
process before publishing. Scientists (at least in the humanities) might also tend to fol-
low primarily their idiosyncrasies and refuse to have somebody else see (not to speak of 
‘discuss’) their papers in an unfinished state. Quite interestingly, if you meet the very 
same persons on a conference, and talk to them face to face, such reserve to discuss 
thoughts in the making is often absent: an observation that leads directly to considering 
3D virtual meeting places as a better tool for the initial task of the VIB.  
Nevertheless, we have been quite successful in originally bringing together scientists 
from the different disciplines related to image science. The motivation for the VIB has 
subsequently changed from coordinating single projects to establishing a novel scien-
tific approach: the “unified image science” (or general visualistics) . In consequence, the 
Virtual Institute of Image Science has become the crystallization core for developing a 
compensation for the lacking institutional background for image scientists. This shift in 
the conception of the VIB opens a wide variety of useful functions to be made available 
for the members of the institute but also for the general public. An important step is to 
think about how to make the platform attractive for the members. One has to motivate 
them to spend time in the virtual institute, and to use the functionality it offers. On a 
general level, interesting functionalities for the VIB crystallize around (a) accessing 
data, and (b) meeting people. In other words, we need, on the one hand, a large database 
that contains a critical amount of relevant formal and informal information, and on the 
other hand, communication facilities. 
The database essentially works as a library or media archive. It allows the users to 
easily access texts or other presentations relevant for their present interests. Adequate 
facilities to browse and search must be offered. Beside the user-friendliness, it is mainly 
a question of “critical mass” for the database (and with it the virtual institute) to become 
sufficiently interesting for the members of the community.  
The information one can access is one reason for a scientist to spend time in a virtual 
institute like the VIB. But for the overall goal the facilities to meet people, to communi-
cate, and to cooperate are equally important: the VIB also needs a virtual meeting place 
that is easily accessible. Here, the members have a chance to contact or meet other 
members and organize directly – “face to face” – research cooperation in every respect. 
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Besides getting in touch with experts the meeting place should stimulate and support the 
starting of new projects, the organizing of conferences, and other informal “network-
ing”. The corresponding facilities must also encourage novel ways for publication, 
which include possibilities of reading, writing, rewriting, and reviewing texts together. 
From a more general point of view, it is enlightening to sort the functions of the vir-
tual institute in those that afford a high degree of immersion, and those that depend on 
dense forms of communication. Furthermore, we have to distinguish between those 
tasks that need the cooperation of many users interacting directly with each other from 
those that involve single users working solitarily at a time (cf. Table 5). Note that com-
munication does not necessarily need direct multi-user cooperation: texts are a typical 
example, since they mediate communication but do not call for all participants to be 
present simultaneously.  
Researchers in image science are trained to, and indeed have to publish text, just like 
other researchers. Reading and writing texts are demanding solitary tasks in the context 
of a virtual institute, which call for enough screen space, a familiar user interface, high 
responsiveness, and, last not least, a quiet, relatively undisturbed context. This is, in our 
eyes, the main reason why a complete switch to a 3D environment for the VIB is not de-
sirable, as long as most users first have to struggle with usability and high demands on 
hard- and software. Correspondingly, most of the database functions, e.g., paper collec-
tions, are rather implemented in a “classical” form as web pages, i.e., for solitary, non-
immersive uses.  
Cooperatively writing a paper or research proposal depends on the solitary work of 
the co-authors coordinated by additional formal meetings and the exchange of docu-
ments. Web-based communication applications like file transfer, email, chat, and audio 
streaming are used to that purpose side-by side with classical tele-communication, like 
telephone and facsimile. However, “even with all those organizational and technical fa-
cilities at hand, it will still be very difficult to deal with the way of cooperation that re-
searchers use most, namely the informal ‘ad hoc encounter’ that, via exchange of 
knowledge as well as gossip, opinions, etc., can lead to new research cooperation” [LU-
BICH 1995, 73]. Usually, cooperation is clearly associated with a specific, formalized 
outcome: a paper, a journal, a research project. “Although it is acknowledged that for-
mal meetings, etc. are often part of a research cooperation, the emphasis is clearly on 
the informal part of cooperation, whose dynamics have been much less investigated and 
– in comparison to strictly formal interactions – are harder to model” [LUBICH 1995, 67] 
. Physical proximity evidently plays a large role in successful scientific cooperation.  
If we agree on that informal ad hoc encounters play such an important role within sci-
entific communities it is likely that a 3D environment is worth a try for supporting the 
informal communicative functions. After all, it mimics exactly the necessary physical 
proximity between interlocutors. As a first test in that direction, a 3D environment has 
Table 5 immersive task communicative task 
solitary 
task 
Showcase for public 
Orientation and leisure 
... 
Reading / Writing papers 
Searching the database 
… 
cooperative 
task  
Informal discussion 
Video conferencing 
... 
Formal meeting 
Passing documents 
.. 
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been set up to access an online paper collection simultaneously serving as a virtual 
meeting place (Fig. 120). The actual information of each paper is still offered as a clas-
sical html page. Several persons might access those pages simultaneously, too, without 
using the 3D environment; but they would not know from each other. When using the 
immersive system, simultaneous users are aware of each other, e.g., as interested in the 
same paper of the collection. Even more, a chat function allows them to discuss matters 
related to the papers in a rather informal manner (among other things they may find 
worth talking about).  
This, at least, is the theory. One major problem with such a 3D meeting place is gen-
erally that it is often accessed by a user for relatively short times only. That is, the 
chance to really meet somebody else (anybody!) without having an explicit appointment 
is usually quite small if the site is not visited by many thousands of users a day. Here we 
come again across the problem of motivating people to use such functionality. Only if a 
“critical mass” is reached in the probability to actually meet an interesting interlocutor, 
the virtual reality can attract more users or more frequent accesses, and thus become a 
working meeting place at all. If we assume that a relatively closed group of users with 
common interests and other paths of communication are addressed, as in the case of the 
VIB, their effort in time and concentration used for entering the virtual meeting place 
must be worthwhile, or the members cease to come back and continue to use just tele-
phone and email. 
Informal meetings in a real institute may best be associated with unplanned “kitchen 
encounters” where one member meets accidentally another member at the coffee ma-
chine or water station, etc. A spontaneous conversation may start – leading to just those 
informal interactions relevant for the scientific cooperation in the institute. Similarly, 
tea breaks at conferences or workshops are popular not mainly for relieving thirst: they 
Figure 120: Experimental 3D Environment Combining Library and Meeting Place Functions 
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provide exactly the opportunity for unplanned encounters from which informal meetings 
spark off.  
Quite obviously, providing the virtual institute additionally with a virtual coffee ma-
chine will not be an adequate adaptation. The characteristics of the “kitchen encounters” 
are not preserved. It is essential for that (real) scenario that there is (i) a strong physio-
logical need for the members to move physically to that place with (ii) no immediate in-
tention to perform some work there while (iii) being also open for social interaction. 
The second criterion is important since a primary intention to do some other work might 
certainly reduce the opportunity to chat with a colleague met by chance. This does not 
change for the virtual form of the institute, nor does the third item. A plausible adjust-
ment to the virtual institute must be found essentially for the first point. Instead of the 
physiological cause related to the institute’s tea kitchen, a high motivation must be in-
stalled unobtrusively for the members to come to or pass through the virtual environ-
ment intended as meeting room. But what might that be? 
It is not clear up to now whether a scenario with all three characteristics can be in-
cluded into a virtual institute in a manner not too artificial. Perhaps, the access to the da-
tabase could be channeled exclusively through a virtual meeting place (while requests to 
the database and their results as such need not be in 3D). This scenario reminds us of the 
foyer of a library: whereas the main function of the library – getting access to the infor-
mation in books – can be performed quite well (or actually: even better) without physi-
cally meeting other users of the library, the foyer offers a place for unplanned encoun-
ters, e.g., while waiting for the books or studying some conference posters or ads on the 
wall. In the reading halls and catalogue rooms, silence is demanded since point (iii) 
above does not hold there (nor does the second criterion). The foyer, in contrast, is usu-
ally rather noisy with talk, and the third item is obviously in function. Even criterion (ii) 
seems to be at least partially in reign for the foyer exactly because the work that one in-
tends to do when passing the foyer is actually associated with other rooms and may be 
postponed for a quick chat on the way. 
Finally, we should not forget another aspect highly relevant for informal computer-
mediated communication in a 3D environment. Much of the communication happening 
during “kitchen encounters” is of non-verbal nature. From facial expression to intona-
tion, from body language to eye contact, many expressive background signs enrich the 
verbal foreground and have an enormous impact on the communication. It is presuma-
bly the missing of this additional level of communication that makes scientists hesitate 
to publish unfinished scripts even in the small circle of colleagues while discussing the 
very same drafts without any reluctance face to face [SMITH 2002, 59]. It may, thus, be 
doubtable whether relatively rigid avatars and written chat are already immersive 
enough for a meeting place in the sense intended. The integration of viva voce commu-
nication and even video conferencing must certainly be an option at least.  
Let us come back to the distinctions of Table 5. Quite obviously, immersion and 
communication have very different importance for each of those categories of tasks. 
Table 6 associates the preferred functionality with the four types of tasks as a kind of 
résumé of the preceding discussion. Whereas solitary communicative tasks can be best 
performed without overloading the interfaces with too much “virtuality”, solitary im-
mersive tasks and cooperative communicative tasks call for the specific forms of virtu-
ality provided already by pure virtual realities or straight virtual communities (in the 
wide sense), respectively. Solitary immersion is not too important for our case study so 
far and adds essentially an aesthetic moment for public relations. Communicative coop-
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eration is, in contrast, highly relevant, and all the techniques of virtual communities 
could be applied (apart from their option of disguise).  
Only the class of cooperative immersive tasks, which are essentially associated to in-
formal meetings, demands the full combination of virtual reality with the synchronized 
interaction of virtual communities. The sign character of the pictures setting up the vir-
tual environment has to be suppressed up to a high degree. In accordance with our 
“kitchen encounter” metaphor, the setting of this part of a virtual institute is quite criti-
cal: we have seen in this section that there are still many questions to be answered con-
cerning a proper and continuous motivation of the members to employ the functionality 
offered in this respect. For support, a “natural” integration of the other functions is de-
sirable. 
5.3.4 Conclusions 
The two application examples of immersive systems have demonstrated that the balance 
between deceptive mode and symbolic mode in the uses of interactive pictures depends 
stongly on the actual sub-tasks, and hence may vary with the user’s intentions. While 
the tasks in the example of virtual architecture considered above call for controlling the 
symbolic mode of reception of the pictures used in the immersive system by means of 
pictorial estrangements and thus allowing for more or less deception by its users, the 
function of the virtual institute depends in parts on pure deception. Its other functions 
however cannot be granted by enforcing the symbolic mode of reception, but need a 
totally different presentation. An immersive system may even hamper those tasks. 
The dependencies in the use conditions of immersive systems follow directly from 
the concept »picture« and, thus, are linked to the underlying data structure »image«: We 
indeed have to consider more than just the computerized version of the picture vehicle 
(i.e., the data type »image« only formalizing pictorial syntax). Integrating some of the 
semantic aspects by a hierarchically structured geometrical model already appears al-
most trivial. But mirroring in the beholder models pragmatic aspects of the user’s inten-
tions plus the effects to be expected by the pictures generated is also a necessary part of 
the data structure. It forms the core of any more autonomous control of the balance be-
tween deceptive and symbolic mode in the reception of computer-generated pictures 
even in the case of interactive trompe l’œil mostly received in deceptive mode. 
5.4 Another Border Line Case: Mental Images 
Computational visualistics deals essentially with pictures in the usual sense, i.e., with 
entities with a material carrier that is visible to different persons (at least in principle). A 
common use of the expression ‘image’ however does not refer to such entities, and we 
have to ask whether such an extended sense of images may still fall into the field of 
Table 6 immersive task communicative task 
solitary 
task 
functionality of virtual reali-
ties 
classical single-user 
interfaces 
cooperative 
task  
virtual reality with multi-
user communication and 
other coordination functions 
functionality of virtual 
communities 
(without disguise) 
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interest of computational visualists: mental images. That question is answered positively 
by means of an exemplary case study employing results of our considerations about the 
data type »image« in an application dealing with mental images in the context of the 
pragmatics of objective descriptions of spatial events happening far away. 
5.4.1 An Example Task: Understanding Reports From Absent Spatial Events 
A typical example from our ordinary life is the task of a radio sports reporter: apart from 
emotional effects, which we shall ignore in the following, he has to give to his audience 
a (more or less objective) verbal description of the development of spatiotemporal 
configurations his audience cannot perceive by themselves. The reporter’s behavior is 
often explained by means of reference semantics: the meaning of the utterances forming 
his report is understood as being anchored in his (visual) perceptions, as introduced in 
section 4.3.1. 
While examining from the perspective of computational pragmatics the verbal activ-
ity of a radio sports reporter who describes objectively what he sees happening on, e.g., 
a soccer field, our focus of attention is directed essentially to the following three general 
problems: the speaker should be sure that any assertion of his description can be under-
stood in its particular context by the listeners assumed with respect to reference, plausi-
bility, and adequacy: 
Reference: first, a listener should be able to correctly and uniquely identify those ob-
jects in the common discourse universe that are used by the speaker to anchor con-
textually the assertion. Ambiguities in the literal meaning of definite noun phrases 
and the reference of corresponding pro-forms must be resolvable. For example, the 
correct use of under-specific definite descriptions, like ‘the penalty area’, or ‘the 
defender’, is to be controlled by the speaker’s anticipation of the listener’s under-
standing. 
Plausibility: even if the listener is able to anchor the utterance correctly in the con-
text, she may fail to understand the assertion since the new information communi-
cated is not plausible for her in the contextual situation. Since the new information 
essentially transforms or further restricts the context of the assertion in question, 
such a rejection due to lacking plausibility may occur if the additional restrictions 
are incompatible with the given context. The speaker has to anticipate whether the 
listeners are able to integrate the meaning of a continuation of the description 
presently planned into the understanding assumed so far. On the verbal surface, 
this shows essentially in what has been recognized but is not said. 
Adequacy: finally, under the assumption that the assertion communicated also is 
plausible for her, the listener may draw implications that the speaker does not 
want her to draw. In the case of an objective description, the question is whether 
the listener’s conclusions are adequate with respect to the events observed by the 
speaker. In particular, it is an interesting task for the speaker’s anticipation of the 
listener to initiate – under the general restriction of economy [GRICE 1974] – addi-
tional information only in cases where it is necessary to keep the listener’s under-
standing adequate: on the verbal surface, such additions may be found in gram-
matically optional, locative expressions like ‘she receives the ball at the left pen-
alty spot’; here, again, some further consequences appear in what is left out in the 
description actually produced.  
In order to explain how a listener understands the report grounded in the visual per-
ception of the speaker, the listener is usually assumed to have constructed a visual men-
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tal model – a “mental image” – which substitutes percepts of scenes not perceptually 
present. “The radio reporter has solved his task only if he describes the reality of a 
sports event so vividly and obviously to the listener that the listener believes she sees 
that reality” a German linguist wrote [DANKERT 1969, 94]. The essential claim is such 
that the spatial implications the listener is able to draw from the reporter’s descriptions 
can simply be “seen” in those visual pseudo-percepts: the listener would be able to “see 
in her mind’s eye” that a certain player stands to the left of the opponent penalty area af-
ter being merely told that that player is beside the penalty area. That particular under-
standing is assumed to be the only consistent way for her to continue the contextual 
mental image. In doing so, she resolves ambiguities both included in the meaning of the 
preposition used and in the reference of the noun phrase, but without using spatial rea-
soning in the explicit way described in Table 2 of section 4.3.1.3. 
It should be rather clear that such a conception opens a way to solve the problem of 
integrating the need for referentially anchoring semantics with the idea of partner mod-
eling: first, the mental image would allow the listeners to anchor the speaker's utter-
ances referentially in analogy to the speaker himself. Although mental images are not 
precisely visual percepts, they are conceived of as being very close relatives that can be 
used as substitutes. Thus, we could assume the very same kind of semantics to be used 
both by the speaker and his audience. The listener model of the speaker correspondingly 
has to deal with mental images, as well. The speaker, then, is thought of as taking into 
account the mental image his listeners are able to construct in accord to his utterances: if 
this mental image does not fit to his communicative intentions, he has to change his ut-
terance plan accordingly (Fig. 121). Before presenting the computational example, the 
function of mental images has to be elaborated a bit further. 
 
 
 
Figure 121: Sketch about Mental Images in Explanations of Reference Semantics 
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5.4.2 On the Cognitive Function of Mental Images 
We do not have to ask what mental representations are, or what happens when we imagine something, 
but how the expression ‘mental representation’ is used. 
[WITTGENSTEIN 1953, §370] 
The remark of WITTGENSTEIN above holds for ‘mental images’ (or ‘pictorial mental 
representations’) in particular. That is, we should ask: How and under what 
circumstances do we speak meaningfully while using the expression ‘mental image’ or 
one of its synonyms? 
Most contemporary cognitive theories agree on that a listener while concentrating her 
attention on a sportscast on radio usually imagines the described spatio-temporal con-
figurations. More precisely: the concept »mental image« appears in a specific sort of 
explanations of an aspect of what happens “mentally in” the listener of a radio report: it 
is proposed that, in order to understand the description, the listener has to represent, i.e., 
to bring to her presence, in a concrete, “sensible” form what is described. Since the de-
scription is primarily anchored referentially in something seen, it is assumed that the lis-
tener imagines the scene in a form that substitutes a corresponding visual perception.  
This idea in fact originates from the mentalistic framework of the Philosophy of 
Enlightenment. In the dawn of this position, R. DESCARTES and especially J. LOCKE un-
derstood a concept to be a mental image, or more precisely, a prolongated perception of 
a corresponding particular that serves as a prototype for similar particulars. However, 
this interpretation ran quickly into severe problems [ROS 1990, Vol. II, 55ff.]. Integrat-
ing parts of this idea with G. W. LEIBNIZ’s conception of a concept to be a human fac-
ulty, i.e., a mental program for recognizing corresponding instances, I. KANT in the 
heydays of the Philosophy of Enlightenment presented an elaborated theory of a two-
fold mental construction: first, he considers a human faculty of constructing concepts 
which, second, themselves are mental faculties to construct intuitions, i.e., mental repre-
sentatives of instances, or more colloquially: mental images [KANT 1781, B741f./A713f., 
A105 & B180/A141]. KANT’s second step, the construction of mental images of in-
stances, was resuscitated in contemporary cognitive science by P. N. JOHNSON-LAIRD 
under the name of mental models [JOHNSON-LAIRD 1983]: in the mentalistic tradition, 
the context of an utterance is interpreted as a mental model; the nominations of the ut-
terance under investigation are expected to identify elements of that model; its predica-
tion is used to communicate an additional distinction (with respect to a concept). By 
means of that faculty, the contextual mental model is transformed into (the perception 
of) a concrete instance of that concept. Thus, all implicatures of the application of the 
corresponding distinction in the given context have to be present in the resulting mental 
image. For KANT, those faculties for constructing or revising mental models are 
autonomously created – “synthesized” – by the human mind, as well. More precisely, he 
refers to synthesizing a completely new field of concepts by combining several given 
but originally unconnected fields of concepts. The introduction of the rational numbers 
as a combination of two (sets of) integers (counter and denominator), which we already 
met in section 4.3.1.2, can therefore be viewed as a synthesis in the sense of KANT.  
The crucial question of the traditional conception of mental images is the privacy as-
cribed to them. The most obvious consequence of the assumed privacy of mental repre-
sentations is, that there is no way to determine whether or not an instance really is pre-
sent “in some other mind”. We need not share the mentalistic fundament of LOCKE, 
LEIBNIZ, and KANT: following instead the linguistic turn indicated by the quote of 
WITTGENSTEIN, we shift the focus of our attention from the construction of a concept 
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understood as a private mental entity to the explanations we could give for the explana-
tive power of a concept conceived of as an abstraction of verbal behavior: in order to 
explain why the concepts of a certain field can be used to explain assertions with corre-
sponding predications we could remain within that field of concepts, employing merely 
its meaning postulates. Or we could additionally consider the constituting schema of 
that field: its internal structure is then viewed as combined from those of other fields. 
Exactly these two types of argumentations have already been discussed in section 
4.3.1.2. Recall here in particular the application of the field-external argumentation con-
cerning the synthesis of the concept of (sortal) spatial objects from the fields of contex-
tual geometric Gestalts and abstract part-whole relations: that argumentation has al-
lowed us to explain visual perception and its role for pictures in section 4.3.2. 
We can interpret the meaning postulates with respect to spatial concepts, like the rules 
of transitivity of the concept ‘being in’ or the rules of conversity between the concepts 
of the projective prepositions, simply as expressing the internal structure of that field. 
We may use them to logically explain the adaptation of the context resulting from a new 
spatial assertion: we describe the context – i.e., what we assume to be the common 
knowledge of speaker and hearer – by a set of sentences with spatial predications. 
Meaning postulates corresponding to the predication of the new utterance are used to 
add further statements in the syllogism-like manner of spatial reasoning, thus making 
explicit the implicatures of the utterance in that context. Let us call this procedure the 
horizontal dimension of explaining the understanding of utterances about spatial entities 
(Fig. 122 upper half): the context is based totally on the analysis of what was said be-
fore, and its revision takes place within merely one field of concepts.  
We may also view the meaning postulates as parts of a more ambitious argumenta-
tion: for example, we may say that the concept ‘being in’ is in certain cases transitive 
and in other not, because it is introduced in a particular way on concepts of other fields 
with their characteristic internal specifications. Then, we focus on the two fields of con-
cepts that we conceive as crucial for implementing the field of spatial objects: the field 
of configurational Gestalt concepts (geometrical level), and the field of functional 
part/whole concepts (meronomic level; Fig. 122 dotted arrows). Founding the properties 
of spatial concepts synthetically thus means to explain them with the interaction of the 
properties of the geometrical and the functional field. Let us call this aspect of explana-
tion the vertical dimension, since the synthesis constructs higher, i.e., more complicated 
fields of concepts, from simpler ones. Any set of propositions – or context – of the spa-
tial field of concepts can be vertically explained as a synthesis of a set of propositions of 
the geometrical field with a set of propositions of the functional field: each spatial 
proposition predicating on a sortal object is projected to configurational propositions 
predicating on the – perceptible – Gestalts of the sortal objects, and functional proposi-
tions predicating on its meronomical relatives.  
The geometrical level provides the concepts used to describe the (essentially visually) 
perceptible attributes of sortal objects. As introduced in section 4.3.2.3, the interpreta-
tion of a context of the geometrical field as a projection of a corresponding context of 
the spatial field (with an appropriate meronomical presupposition) can be viewed as an 
explanation of visual perception: the geometrical field providing the visual aspects of 
space is the same as the one determining our considerations of pictorial syntax. Al-
though a mental image is not exactly a sign in the same sense as a material picture, the 
analogy of using the geometric projection of a spatial context motivates us to call it an 
image, as well. We therefore may apply at least some aspects of the data type »image« 
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when dealing with mental images computationally, in particular its syntactic and seman-
tic aspects. 
With this, we are finally able to present a more clearly elaborated version of under-
standing spatial reports in the framework of reference semantics: the revision of the spa-
tial context by means of the predication’s concept – e.g., ‘to be in’ – is partitioned into 
three steps (Fig. 122): first, the proposition of the utterance (including the context) is 
transformed by following the schema of the spatial field into a corresponding structure 
of sets of propositions of the lower fields (1a & b). Second, the revision of the context 
by means of the spatial concept of the predication takes place on the lower fields (2a & 
b): coordinated by the schema of sortal object constitution, the corresponding projec-
tions of the spatial context are revised by those concepts of the lower fields implement-
ing the spatial concept in question. Third, the resulting partial understandings – espe-
cially the derived context of the geometrical field, called ‘a mental image’ – are synthe-
sized back to form the spatial context for the subsequent utterance (3); the resulting con-
text includes the spatial implicatures of the utterance in question. This step is equivalent 
to the goal-driven phase of perception and may be directed by pragmatically motivated 
focusing strategies. With this schema, a corresponding computer model can be de-
signed.  
5.4.3 Building a Computer Model 
A corresponding integration of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of explaining 
spatial cognition is exemplified by the system SOCCER of the project VITRA [ANDRÉ 
ET AL. 1988]: in this case, the exemplary radio sports reporter from the beginning is 
considered. The explanation of the visual perception, which is part of the foundation by 
Figure 122: Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Explaining the Understanding of Spatial Assertions 
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reference semantics of the utterances of the radio reporter, follows the exemplary line 
given in section 4.3.2 up to the field of spatial concepts. Simplified versions of the 
concepts underlying static spatial relations, like »being in«, »- at«, »- near«, »- to the 
left« holding between a reduced version of sortal objects are determined. The concepts 
of spatial events, like »doing a double pass with«, are additionally defined as a temporal 
sequence of phases during which certain spatial relations hold. From the resulting sets 
of spatial propositions, some are finally chosen to be communicated and transformed 
into a corresponding verbal manifestation (Fig. 123):  
S1: Miller, the defender, stands just left to the penalty spot. 
S2: Miller gets the ball and runs with it close to the centre circle. 
As was mentioned in sections 3.5 and 4.4.2, any adequate theory of communication 
explaining the behavior of a speaker also has to consider the audience in a particular 
way: the speaker has to be conceived of as somebody who also sets himself in the posi-
tion of his audience. He has to play anticipatorily its role in the language game in order 
to really communicate. In VITRA, this demand is answered by means of the listener 
model ANTLIMA: we focus here only on the static spatial relations, as in sentence S1, 
although spatial events as in S2 are dealt with accordingly, as well. The understanding 
of the audience is modeled with the three steps described above: 
First, the proposition of the (planned) utterance is projected to the lower levels im-
plementing the spatial field: i.e., restrictions of the spatial interaction with other objects 
Figure 123: Architecture of the System SOCCER with its Listener Model ANTLIMA 
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are transferred mainly into restrictions of the 
locations of the objects (plus the part-whole as-
pects of the objects involved); this transforma-
tion – the schema of the corresponding spatial 
concept – is encoded in ANTLIMA by means 
of functions called ‘TyPoFs’,98 which are al-
ready applied for recognizing spatial relations: 
they can easily be viewed as the characteristic 
functions of the fuzzy sets of situations to be 
described by the corresponding relation (cf. 
again Fig’s 66 & 67, Sect. 4.3.2.3). 
Second, the context of the planned utterance 
is revised on the lower level, i.e., as a mental 
image: the locations of the objects are chosen 
by means of a hill-climbing algorithm ruled by 
the TyPoFs and depending on the contextual 
positions. Figure 124 illustrates the influence of 
three different geometrical contexts (starting 
positions) on the location selected, namely ‘to 
be in front of the penalty area’. The hill-
climbing algorithm determines maximally typical positions for all objects localized with 
respect to the geometric restrictions given by the predication. Therefore, the image con-
struction concretizes the consequences of an additional proposition to the given contex-
tual image – an implicit type of spatial reasoning. If an image can be constructed with 
highly typical positions for all restrictions, the utterance under consideration must be 
rated plausible in the given context.99 
Third, the schemata of the spatial concepts (object models, TyPoFs, and definitions of 
spatial events) are applied to (re)construct the context on the level of the spatial field: 
this finally renders explicit the implicatures included. Another set of spatial propositions 
is the result. 
That set modeling the anticipated understanding of the audience has to be compared 
in the listener model with the understanding intended by the speaker, i.e., what has been 
actually perceived: the differing propositions are used in an anticipation feedback loop 
for an enhancement of the propositions to be effectively uttered (cf. again Fig. 123, and 
Fig. 84, Sect. 4.4.2.2). 
Note, that the image constructed – i.e., the image the speaker anticipates the listeners 
can construct when told the proposition in question – cannot directly be compared to the 
set of propositions describing what the speaker has observed. A first guess might be to 
use the percept instead – after all, the audience should have a mental image correspond-
ing to the speaker's percept. Percept and mental image are assumed to be of the same 
type, so that the comparison can be done syntactically. Unfortunately, such a solution is 
not exactly plausible. That conception does not take into account that the speaker's 
communicative intentions are – even in the case of an objective description – not identi-
                                                     
98 ‘TyPof’ is a speaking acronym for ‘Typicality Potential Field’, alluding to its use in a gradient search: it 
tips off the maximally typical positions falling under the spatial concept in question. 
99 The resulting image is later used as the starting point for constructing the image for the utterances 
planned next, and also to check whether a noun phrase to be employed in that utterance denotes 
uniquely an object in that imaginary visual field of the listener solving the question of reference. 
Figure 124: Visualization of the TyPoF for 
a player being in front of a penalty area, and
approximation paths for several contexts 
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cal to the speaker's “raw percept”: it 
is the set of (spatial) propositions re-
flecting what the speaker has recog-
nized in the percept, which has to be 
considered. Even if we assume that 
the comparison between the percept 
and the mental image could be used – 
for example by means of the distance 
between the two incarnations of an 
object in the two images – we still 
have a serious difficulty: are all dif-
ferences really equivalent? Imagine a 
soccer field with two balls – a black 
one representing the position per-
ceived by the speaker, and a white 
one representing the position antici-
pated by the image construction. Let 
us assume furthermore that the two balls are in one case about one foot apart some-
where in the middle of the field away from any landmark, and in another case – with the 
very same distance between each other – on different sides of the outside line (Fig. 
125). It should be obvious that in the first case, the difference is not considered 
essential, and correspondingly should not trigger a reaction in the listener model. How-
ever in the second case, the two positions are different: if the white ball is the one out-
side the field, the listener model has in fact predicted that the audience falsely under-
stands that the ball is outside of the game: a correction is then highly recommended.100 
The recognition component of the speaker model classifies exactly percepts with es-
sential differences; it generates the same sets of propositions if two percepts do not dif-
fer essentially. Therefore in the listener model with mental images, the very same “cog-
nitive abilities” are employed with respect to the mental image in order to generate a 
propositional description of what the audience (at least presumably) is able to recognize 
in its mental image. That set of propositions can easily be compared to the analogous set 
of the speaker providing the means for dealing with the problem of adequacy mentioned 
above. Thus, the sequence of recognition and secondary selection based on the antici-
pated mental image reflects exactly the speaker’s own activities with respect to his per-
cept: recognition and primary selection. The analogy of the »seeing by one’s mind’s 
eye« and the »seeing by the physical eyes« becomes even more plausible: as was said 
before, it is believed that the listeners can “see” the consequences of integrating a new 
proposition in the contextual knowledge in the mental image. 
As is demonstrated in Figure 126, the spatial restrictions holding for an object simul-
taneously (e.g., during an event phase) can be easily combined on the level of TyPoF’s. 
Only if the combination is consistent, the resulting typicality field has a maximum close 
to the ultimate value. Furthermore, the context-sensitivity of the algorithm for finding 
the maximum of the typicality distribution as demonstrated in Figure 123 adds another 
advantage when considering spatial events: the positions of the objects at consecutive 
                                                     
100 See also again Figure 85 (Sect. 4.4.2.2): the argument used here is also valid for the comparison step in 
the listener’s anticipation feedback loop: the pictures can only be compared with respect to a particular 
“reading”, not as such. 
Figure 125: Same Difference – Different Relevance 
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moments of an event phase are developed in a cinematographic procedure taking the 
position at t-1 as starting position for the gradient search for the position at t.101 
The further uses of the difference propositions in the listener model are not directly 
related to the data type »image«. They have been described elsewhere in detail 
[SCHIRRA 1997]. 
5.4.4 Conclusions: The Data Type »Image« and Explaining Mental Images 
Indeed, the data structure used in ANTLIMA for modeling mental images is a large 
subset of the data structure »image«: syntactically, the very same restrictions apply. 
Similarly, the semantic level is identically resting on the implementation relation 
between sortal objects (as image content and reference) and the geometric Gestalts (of 
the picture syntax). Only the pragmatic aspects of »image« do seemingly not play an 
important role in this use of the data structure, as the image content seems not to be 
embedded in a twofold beholder model in the same way as described in section 4.3. 
However, the comparison with the “raw percept” – computationally handeled as an 
instance of »image« – by means of the corresponding set of spatial propositions is 
structurally equivalent to the relation of the two beholder models. Indeed, the instances 
of these mental images in the computer can easily be viewed on a screen, too, and are 
then used as regular pictures by the beholders. Despite the educated opinion that mental 
images are certainly not pictures, it seems that essentially the same data structure is able 
to cover both phenomena. 
                                                     
101 A more detailed description of some other problems associated with concretizing spatial events is to be 
found in [SCHIRRA 1994, Chap. 10]. That the method employed in ANTLIMA for positioning objects 
can also be adapted easily to control the camera positions in a virtual 3D environment, e.g., a computer 
game by means of verbal orders has been demonstrated by a recent diploma thesis [BERNHARDT 2003].  
Figure 126: Consistent Combination of Spatial Restrictions: the TyPoF for “being simultaneously be-
tween the player No 3 of the White Team and the right goal area, near the center circle, and at the half-
way line” (upper right: cross section through the typicality field along the arrow in the main panel) 
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This mysterious contradiction is solved quite easily: recall what we have found out 
about the relation between fields of concepts and data structures: data structures corre-
spond to fields of concepts; and concepts as we understand them are everything that is 
structurally common to all the explanations of the corresponding predicative expres-
sions. The concepts of mental phenomena, including mental images, therefore are not 
strange entities (although the phenomenon they cover may be strange if the concept is 
ill-formed): by mentioning such a concept, we simply refer to what is common to all 
explanations given about the situations a corresponding expression (e.g., ‘having a men-
tal image of something’ – or rather ‘imagining something visually’) is used, something 
that is very well observable by any beholder. Being able to use the data structure »im-
age« in a system about mental images therefore only means that the explanations for us-
ing the expression ‘picture’ are to a significant degree structurally equivalent with the 
explanations given for using the expression ‘mental image’ – and that is not strange at 
all. “The radio reporter has solved his task only if he describes the reality of a sports 
event so vividly and obviously to the listener that the listener believes he sees that real-
ity”: we have met this quote from a linguist about mental images in sports reports 
above. “In an immersive system, the beholder is forced to believe he sees the reality in-
stead of using a sign” we may add with respect to pictures. ‘Believing to be seeing a 
situational context that is only mediated by means of signs’ states the common structure 
underlying both explanations. Thus, the synthetical relation between image syntax and 
sortal objects is explicitly focused when bringing mental images into the game of ex-
plaining spatial assertions, a game that can also be played without that complications by 
means of field-internal spatial reasoning alone – “propositionally” . But then we would 
give up the option to take the reference semantics perspective. 
 
 
* * * 
 
Four case studies are of course a rather limited set for demonstrating the value of the 
preceding investigations. Nevertheless, they cover a wide range of applications even up 
to the strange phenomenon called ‘mental images’. And they indicate that developing 
new programs is only one part of the tasks a computational visualist has to deal with. 
The other one is: to carefully listen to those knowing the field of application – mostly 
image scientist of various disciplines – and to reasonably translate their concepts into 
the formal structures computer scientists are specialists for. 
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6 Conclusions – Perspectives 
Investigating the variations of the generic data structure with the type »image« and its 
application conditions has been the main goal of the previous chapters. Only a selection 
of aspects has been discussed – there are too many to be exhaustively included, at least 
for the time being, as a unified theoretical view on pictures only starts to form. 
However, we have been able to sketch a generic data structure with a non-trivial set of 
main ingredients necessary for the foundation of computational visualistics as a unique 
scientific domain (Fig. 127). Like all generic data structures, many components are only 
indicated as necessary but are not elaborated. They have to be filled differently for the 
various sub-types covering one of the multitude of application contexts of computerized 
pictures.  
6.1 The Components of »Image« as Basis of Computational Visualistics 
Each picture has a vehicle that determines the syntax: in the generic data structure, a 
corresponding type is contained consisting of a geometric base structure and colors or 
textures as marker values. The concrete realization of this component – e.g., as a pixel 
matrix with fixed resolution (sufficient for many tasks of image processing), or as a 
generative sub structure with an explicit zooming operation – depends on the task at 
hand.  
Pictures also have meaning aspects in general, though this aspect is already much 
more complicated than syntax. In the generic data structure, the central semantic com-
ponent is a data structure containing the formal equivalent of the object constitution re-
lation between the concepts for sortal objects (as the primary target of an image’s mean-
ing: the »picture content«) and their geometric and meronomic projections. The repre-
sentation relation Rep and its inverse relation have been discussed extensively in sec-
tion 4.3. They essentially relate syntactic and semantic components. In many cases, only 
the geometric projection of the sortals is actually considered (e.g., as the 3D models 
used in computer graphics). Although the sortal concepts form the semantic core of pic-
torial semantics, associated individual sortal objects are important, too: they are particu-
larly needed if an identification of the depicted object with a sortal from another context 
is to be considered (»picture reference«).  
Derived forms of meaning relevant especially for information visualization arise by 
means of an additional metaphorical projection from the sortal concepts to a target do-
main. This path of derivation can be followed from the simplest form (non-visual prop-
erties of sortal objects are visualized: projection from sortals to sortals) through inter-
mediate levels (projection from a completely different field to sortals; projection from 
an arbitrary field to the instantaneous geometric projection of sortals) to the extreme (di-
rect projection to the syntactic aspects, i.e., pure 2D geometry) with its special form 
highly relevant in the artistic domain (the identity projection resulting in no real seman-
tics).  
As we have seen in section 4.4, pictorial pragmatics is an even more complicated 
field. In a first step, image uses can be associated with intentions and goals of the pic-
ture users. They are related to the picture content (sortal or target domain). Those inten-
tions and goals are usually arranged in something like sign act games and determined by 
rhetoric relations. This is the primary pragmatic component of the data structure. 
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However a refined analyses has lead us to the conclusion that in fact the semantic and 
primary pragmatic components have to be duplicated by means of the active and passive 
beholder models: only in the mutual relations between the intentions of the sender and 
the receiver – and also between the picture contents for the former and the later – picto-
rial pragmatics can be adapted to the needs of interactive systems with tele-rendered 
images.  
Merely the picture vehicle is given simultaneously to both participants in a pictorial 
sign act – indicated in Figure 127 by means of the overlapping regions of the two be-
holder models. That a picture is so often mixed up conceptually with its vehicle is per-
haps motivated by this fact. However, it is only the integration of the two perspectives 
on semantic and pragmatic aspects that actually constitutes – even in a soliloquial use – 
the picture per se, i.e., the data type in the center of Figure 127.  
Figure 127 can be read as a coarse map of the realms of computational visualistics, a 
structural context builder summarizing what the whole of this text has tried to elaborate 
in a more extensive though linear manner. Scientists in this domain may take it as an 
orientation aid; their actual task is to work out more precise maps of some of the regions 
sketched here, to find passageways and short cuts to be used under certain conditions.  
Let us keep in mind the methodological roots of computer science being simultane-
ously a structural science and an engineering science: the structural perspective has cer-
tainly dominated our discussion. This is of course partially due to the fact that technical 
implementations can hardly be incorporated adequately in written investigations. But 
this by no means intends to indicate that the engineering aspect is not relevant here: im-
portant work in computational visualistics is dedicated to technical implementations of 
the data structure »image« in the aspects helpful for the task at hand. However, those 
implementations always rely on a properly structured background: the implementation 
relation between data structures is primarily an abstract constitution relation, and only 
secondarily transferred to technical artifacts.  
6.2 Computational Visualistics in Education 
In section 1.4, the conception of a “new engineer” has been sketched, a conception that 
also governs the self-image of computational visualists. In that perspective, engineers 
are successful only to the degree to which they are able to adapt their work to the needs 
of clients, to incorporate the expertise of those clients, and to communicate their 
solution to the clients. In this sense, the extended chapter 3 about image science is as 
essential a part of the foundation of computational visualistics as is the analysis of the 
components of the data structure »image«. 
 The future of computational visualistics as a new discipline in computer science over 
and above the well-established fields of computer graphics, information visualization, 
image processing, and computer vision depends essentially on the success the discipline 
has with respect to the two roots of the Western academic system: research and educa-
tion. While chapters 4 and 5 have dealt exclusively with aspects of research, computa-
tional visualistics can also be established in education successfully and in a unique 
manner that differentiates it from other degree programmes in computer science, and 
gives rise to a special identity of those having finished the programme: the “image” of 
being a computational visualist. 
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6.2.1 An Example: Structure of Computational Visualistics in Magdeburg 
In the fall of 1996, the degree programme ‘computational visualistics’ has been 
introduced by the Department of Computer Science of the Otto-von-Guericke Univer-
sity at Magdeburg [SCHIRRA 1999]. Its backbone is formed by three columns (cf. again 
Fig. 41, section 3.5.4):  
- Method: the algorithmic handling of pictorial data structures,  
- Reflection: aspects of dealing with pictures in the humanities, and 
- Application: an example domain of practical visualistics beside computer science. 
The main column covers computer science. Students learn about digital methods and 
electronic tools for solving picture-related problems: they dedicate about 60% of their 
time to study the variations and application conditions of the data type »image«.102 This 
technical core is complemented by courses in general visualistics in theory and in prac-
tice: about 25% of their credit hours, students are occupied with theoretical aspects of 
pictures discussed in the humanities. Besides learning about the “traditional”, i.e. not 
computerized, contexts of using pictures, and the theories developed in disciplines like 
psychology, educational and political sciences, philosophy, and also industrial design, 
students here intensively practice their communicative skills. Furthermore, an applica-
tion subject, which covers about 15% of the credit hours required, gives students an 
early opportunity to apply their knowledge: they learn the skills needed for cooperating 
with (e.g., carefully listening to) clients and experts of an example customer field such 
as medicine.103  
The tripartite division follows current analyses in educational science [GIRMES 1997]: 
the competence we want to teach is not the result of merely acquiring certain techniques 
and methods, i.e., a certain technical repertoire our students are provided with after 
graduating. That repertoire is always used within a particular context of application with 
its proper peculiarities. Moreover, there are usually experts in that field of application 
who have their own traditions and methodologies. They act as clients of computational 
visualists, and have little interest in being patronized in their own field of expertise. 
They specify the problems to be solved by computational visualists, as well as the crite-
ria of quality for the solutions proposed. A third factor of competence is defined as the 
ability to reflect the conditions of successfully applying a method of the repertoire in the 
given context, e.g., a visualizing technique in material science: although a method might 
in fact be successfully applicable to reach the goal, there can be conditions in the con-
text of action that argue against the application of that particular method (negative side 
effects).  
6.2.2 Mental Imagery as a Preview Criterion for Study Success 
In a time with rather limited academic ressources, restricting the access to a programme 
to those with a high probability of being able to successfully finish it is a legitimate 
thought. This is even more true for a new degree programme since potential students 
                                                     
102 In order to ensure accreditation with the German professional bodies of computer science, at least 50% 
of the course work has to be within the core of computer science. 
103 The students choose one application domain at the beginning. Presently there are four options: medi-
cine, material science, construction and production, and electrical engineering (pictorial information sys-
tems). 
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may have strange ideas about what to expect. An elaborate preview for their study 
success helps them to understand their strengths relative to the programme’s intentions. 
It also helps the university to focus its efforts and to diminish the “loss” of students 
(almost 40% in computer science programmes in Germany; cf. [HEUBLEIN ET AL. 2002]).  
 For computational visualistics, the ability to mentally imagine may be one of the key 
criteria for such a preview. Psychologists have invented an extended set of tests for dif-
ferent aspects of mental imagery, for example, the ability to anticipate mentally object 
rotations. The general relation between mental imagery and computer use is also well 
documented (e.g., [DE LISI & CAMMARANO 1996]). There is, however, a severe draw-
back: it has been repeatedly reported that women are less successful in tests on mental 
imagery than men (e.g., [MAIER 1996] or [QUAISER-POHL 2001]). As a kind of “gender 
effect”, the different conditions of socialization and the different options for experiences 
for boys and girls may be the cause [NEWCOMBE & DUBAS 1992].  
Women are massively under-represented in computer science: in average, only about 
7 to 8% of the new students are female in Germany [SCHINZEL ET AL. 1999]. The situa-
tion is similar in the other fields of engineering: less than 6% women start a degree pro-
gramme in electrical engineering, for example. Nevertheless, for more than 6 years in 
sequence since the programme has been installed, about a quarter of the beginners in the 
computational visualistics programme at Magdeburg were female (some years even 
more than 30%).  
We obviously cannot have an interest in installing a preview test that handicaps 
women. It is however important to understand to what degree mental imagery is still a 
useful criterion despite the usual gender-specific differences. From the psychological 
perspective, there is also need for further investigating the relations between using com-
puters, gender, and mental imagery causing those differences. Therefore, two psycholo-
gists have investigated on my initiative how female students of the computational visu-
 
     Figure 41 – Reprise: “The Three Columns of Computational Visualistics” 
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alistics programme at Magdeburg differ with respect to mental imagery from their male 
colleagues, from students in other degree programmes of computer science, and from 
those in other disciplines in general. To start with the major result: computer visualists 
came out most interestingly as one of the very few groups reported in literature on men-
tal rotation that have no (or extremely small) differences between women and men 
[QUAISER-POHL ET AL. 2001].  
6.2.3 An Empirical Investigation 
Velocity and precission of mentally rotating three-dimensional objects (presented by 
means of pictures) has been recorded with the standardized Mental Rotation Test (short: 
MRT [VANDENBERG & KUSE 1978]): each task consists of five pictures of objects 
constructed of simple blocks, the first of which appears again in a rotated version in one 
of the other four pictures (rotation in the picture plane). 24 tasks have been presented to 
the subjects in two test periods of three minutes duration each, separated by a break of 
two minutes. For the ability to mentally visualize, a test called “Cuts” (German: 
“Schnitte” [FAY & QUAISER-POHL 1999]) was employed. In this rather compicated test, 
the subjects have to imagine simple three-dimensonal geometrical entities (surface only) 
being cut by a plane, and report the resulting two-dimensional cut figures possible. The 
test consists of 17 tasks. Furthermore, specific experiences with and attitudes to 
computers prior to their study have been asked. The influence of other learning 
experiences has been taken into account by means of the courses selected in school and 
the relative success in their degree programme so far. 
In general, computational visualists have significantly better results than the other 
students.104 That is also the case for the women only, in particular with respect to MRT.105 
Descriptively, there was an advantage of male students for all disciplines considered; 
however, this difference was statistically not significant for computational visualistics – 
in contrast to the other degree programmes of computer science considered. 
In another part of the study, older students of computational visualistics have been 
confronted with a more complicated version of MRT (rotations in the picture plane and 
around the vertical axis: MRT-C), and the test “Cuts”: the results are similar. In particu-
lar a positive correlation has been found between the number of semesters and the per-
formance in the tests indicating that mental imagery and especially the ability to men-
tally visualize have been practiced during the study.106 
The experiences with mental imagery a person has by means of spatial activities are a 
good option to prove the effects of practicing: therefore, the subjects of our tests have 
been asked how often they have participated in certain leisure activities that rely on spa-
tial imagery.107 We have analyzed the relation between the amount of prior experiences 
and the results on MRT by correlating the two features in the different disciplines for 
each gender separately. The degree of correlation came out as highly depending on gen-
                                                     
104 In average, they reached 14.2 points (of 41); that’s 3.7 points more than students of psychology, 2.8 
points more than other students of the humanities, and 1.2 points more than student of sports. 
105 With 13.25 points, female computational visualists reached significantly better average results than fe-
male students of sports (11.55), psychology (9.5) or other humanities (9.22). 
106 While their male colleagues only got 8.53 points, female computational visualists reached an average 
of 11.7 points (of 17 points) – the highest result reported so far, cf. [FAY & QUAISER-POHL 1999, 25ff]. 
107 This includes “technical activities” (e.g., to repair a bicycle), “artistic activities and needle work” (e.g., 
drawing or knitting), and “sporting activities” (e.g., tennis). 
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der: female students that are technically oriented and have more experiences with com-
puters also have better results in MRT. There is no such clear effect for men.108  
The results of this study indicate that there indeed is a close relation between the abil-
ity to mentally imagine, and working in computer science. Furthermore, the different 
degree programmes in computer science show significant variations with respect to 
mental imagery in the general level of accomplishment as well as in the gender differ-
ences. The alterations in the content of the programmes may be the cause, but also the 
“image” of the disciplines in the context of social gender stereotypes. Only in computa-
tional visualistics among the disciplines investigated, “typically male” and “typically 
female” disciplines are mixed under a common theme: computer science and the hu-
manities, both with respect to pictures. In this combination, the least amount of gender-
differences of mental imagery has been found. More empirical studies have to show in 
which way the choice of the degree programme in computer science and the success in 
that programme may be determined by relevant talents and abilities like mental im-
agery. Which specific prior experiences at the beginning of the university education, 
and what influences from prior learning and practicing are important? And which role 
do differences play between women and men in the conception the students have of 
their own abilities? 
Female beginners in computer science degree programmes certainly profit of highly 
developed mental imagery. However, it appears to be also very relevant if they subjec-
tively estimate their own capacities in a positive manner. Women have to ignore the 
general social stereotype still effective to some degree: that they “are not suited” for en-
gineering and mathematics. In this context, an important task for further investigation 
remains: does the particular interdisciplinary conception of computational visualistics 
with its significant claim on social and communicative competences – i.e., abilities usu-
ally viewed as “typical female” – help women to start their academic education with a 
more positive attitude with respect to their own abilities? It is perhaps this indirect path 
of influence that leads to the unusually good results of that group in mental imagery. 
It is clear from these descriptions that a satisfying preview test is still a long way off. 
Such a preview test needs not be directly linked to restricting access to the degree pro-
gramme. Indeed, offering an automatized online “self test” version may be a helpful 
first step. Although the test conditions cannot be controlled as well as usual, such a test 
allows potential students to get a coarse approximation of their success probability in 
the programme. Furthermore, the data gained by such self tests may be related to later 
investigations and the actual study success and duration in a longitudinal study and lead 
to successive better versions of the previews. 
6.3 The Future of an Institutional Computational Visualistics 
We here reach the end of our investigation. Let us finish with a few thoughts about the 
future of computational visualistics as an institution, not a loose collection of image-
related investigations in computer science. Although the international perspective is 
crucial here, only a glimps at the situation in Germany can be ventured at this place.  
                                                     
108 112 women and 71 men participated in the study: technical activities correlated clearly with the MRT 
results (r = 0.375, p = 0.01) while sporting activities showed a less clear effect (0.253, 0.10). Prior ex-
periences with computers had a marked positive effect (0.251, 0.05) but again, only for women. A nega-
tive correlation was significant for prior experiences with artistic activities (-0.248, 0.001).  
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A comparable step is currently being undertaken for general visualistics in Germany: 
the Virtual Institute for Image Science (VIB) has already been mentioned above. An-
other congregation has formed, as well – the “Centre for Interdisciplinary Visualistics” 
(ZIB): a small number of scientists, each representing a different discipline involved in 
general visualistics, tries to focus the activities toward an institutional “Bildwissen-
schaft” in Germany.  As a first result, an e-journal on general visualistics has been estab-
lished.109  
Computational visualistics is one of the disciplines selected as important for general 
visualistics.110 Together with philosophy and art science, it has been assigned a promi-
nent role (Fig. 128). Like an umbrella, philosophy spans the whole range “from above”, 
metaphorically speaking, since it is the discipline that considers argumentations and the 
proper forms of concepts in general. Art science with its long tradition in art history and 
its reflections of pictorial sign uses rules the center of visualistics, around which most of 
the other disciplines are arranged with their external (i.e., not picture-related) parts radi-
ating off. Computational visualistics is a discipline that basically formalizes the con-
cepts »image« developed (following essentially criteria provided by philosophy) in the 
other disciplines, and thus provides artifacts for “crystallized” (or, for those with a 
Marxist background: “congealed”) argumentations. It spans the other disciplines oppo-
site to philosophy: “from below”, so to speak, like a metaphorical funnel collecting their 
argumentations and transforming them into generally available algorithms. With phi-
losophy as the head, art science as the heart, computational visualistics as the belly, and 
the other disciplines as eyes and hands, the organism of general visualistics is about to 
come alive.  
                                                     
109 IMAGE – An Interdisciplinary Journal on Image Science: www.image-online.info 
110 In fact, the author is one of the founding members of the ZIB and represents the disciplines computa-
tional visualistics and cognitive science. 
 
 
Figure 128: General Visualistics and Computational Visualistics 
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An institutionalization of computational visualistics directly depends on the efforts 
taken in general visualistics: computational visualistics forms exactly the overlapping 
region between computer science and image science. In my eyes, it is less marked by 
external features – a special institute at a university, a journal, a conference series, etc. – 
although all those means certainly help: the core of an institutional computational visu-
alistics is established in the heads of the people involved. Only if the idea is commonly 
established that computer scientists in computer graphics, computer vision, image proc-
essing etc. work with the same methods at the same subjects, and that in doing so, they 
essentially take up the arguments of other image scientists to formalize them for others, 
computational visualistics can act as an autonomous concept with the power to structure 
the future developments. 
With this book I hope to advance that idea.  
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D Overview in German 
 
1  Eine Lageanalyse: Das Kapitel legt Motivation und gesetzte Ziele der Arbeit dar. 
1.1 Bilder nehmen in der Gegenwart eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle ein, was allerdings 
gemeinhin ambivalent aufgenommen wird. Der technische Fortschritt hat einen zentra-
len Anteil an dieser Entwicklung. Eine allgemeine Bildwissenschaft, die der gesteiger-
ten Wichtigkeit Rechnung trägt und nicht nur Einzelaspekte betrachtet, bildet sich aller-
dings gerade erst heraus. 
1.2 Die zunehmende Wichtigkeit der Bilder folgt einem allgemeineren Trend der westlichen 
Gesellschaft hin zur Informationsgesellschaft: wichtiger Teil davon ist die Reflexion der 
Medien. 
1.3 Computer und Computernetze übernehmen in der Informationsgesellschaft eine tragen-
de Funktion: dies zeigt sich insbesondere auch darin, daß sie den Bildbegriff entschei-
dend erweitert haben um das „interaktive Bild“. „Computervisualistik“ wird als neue 
Bezeichnung für eine Unterdisziplin der Informatik eingeführt. In ihr wird versucht, sy-
stematisch alle computerrelevanten Aspekte einer Wissenschaft vom Bild anzugehen. 
1.4 Dabei sollte sich die Computervisualistin/der Computervisualist als Vertreter einer mo-
dernen, nicht-technokratischen Auffassung des Ingenieurberufs sehen, wie sie in den 
letzten Jahren im Nachklang der von SNOW ausgelösten Zwei-Kulturen-Debatte vielfach 
beschworen wurde. Eine Grundlegung der Computervisualistik hat dem Rechnung zu 
tragen. 
1.5 Damit ist die Ausgangssituation umschrieben: Vor diesem Hintergrund ist das Ziel der 
Arbeit, eine fundierte Übersicht über die Computervisualistik und ihre Grundlagen zu 
geben, wie sie bislang noch nicht vorlag. Der Abschnitt schließt mit einer Übersicht 
über die folgenden Kapitel. 
2 Computervisualistik als Fach: Das Kapitel thematisiert die methodologischen 
Grundlagen und die interdisziplinäre Einordnung der Computervisualistik. 
2.1 Als Kernthemen der Informatik werden »(abstrakte) Datenstruktur« und »Implementie-
rung« herausgearbeitet: dabei steht die Informatik selbst im Einflußbereich zweier Me-
thodologien, insofern sie sich sowohl als Strukturwissenschaft wie als Ingenieurwissen-
schaft versteht. Beide Herangehensweisen profitieren von einer argumentationstheoreti-
schen Analogie, bei der Datenstrukturen als formalisierte Begriffsfelder verstanden 
werden und Implementierung als eine sehr komplexe Form des Argumentierens.  
2.2 Eine allgemeine Bildwissenschaft als die zweite Wurzeldisziplin der Computervisuali-
stik bildet sich gerade erst aus; d.h.: bislang gab es eher die vielen Bildwissenschaften 
als die eine Bildwissenschaft. Dieser Abschnitt umreißt daher nur kurz, welche Diszi-
plinen vor allem dazu beitragen und welche Schritte zu einer allgemeinen Visualistik 
unternommen wurden (eine genauere Auseinandersetzung mit dem zugrundeliegenden 
Kernthema „Bild“ erfolgt in Kapitel 3). 
2.3 Damit ergibt sich für die Computervisualistik, daß sie sich mit den Mitteln der Informa-
tik dem Thema widmet, das für die Bildwissenschaft konstituierend ist. In der informa-
tischen Form wird daraus ein (abstrakter) Datentyp »Bild« und die dazugehörigen Ope-
rationen. Zwei mögliche Untergliederungen des Aufgabenfeldes werden dargelegt; eine 
entspricht den bislang entwickelten Teilbereichen der Informatik, die sich mit Aspekten 
von Bildern beschäftigen und daher als Teil der umfassenderen Computervisualistik 
aufzufassen sind. Die zweite weist unterschiedliche Methoden auf, die in allen Teilbe-
reichen gleichermaßen verwendet werden. 
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3 Was genau das Thema der Computervisualistik ist, was nämlich ein Bild ist, das ist 
etwas, was die allgemeine Bildwissenschaft klärt: das Kapitel liefert eine dreifache 
Übersicht: anhand von Beispielen (3.1), anhand einer Definition (3.2), und anhand 
einer logisch-genetischen Skizze zur Motivation der Definition (3.3 – 3.5) 
3.1 Um den Umfang des Bildbegriffs abzustecken, wird eine Reihe von Beispielen mit eher 
randständigen Bildformen gegeben.  
3.2 Bei den gegenwärtigen Bemühungen um eine allgemeine Bildwissenschaft steht ein be-
stimmter Vorschlag zum Verständnis dessen, was den Begriff »Bild« bestimmt, im Mit-
telpunkt: Dieser Vorschlag, Bilder als „wahrnehmungsnahe Zeichen“ zu charakterisie-
ren, führt zwei konkurrierende Traditionslinien zusammen, nämlich die semiotischen 
und die phänomenologischen Bildtheorien. 
3.2.1 Eine genauere Erläuterung dieser Begriffsbestimmung setzt die Klärung des Begriffs 
eines Zeichens im allgemeinen voraus: damit beschäftigt sich die Semiotik. Zentraler 
Punkt ist, daß Zeichen nur als Teile von Zeichenhandlungen auftreten. Zeichenhandlun-
gen sind recht komplexe Formen interaktiven Verhaltens. Daher können Zeichen unter 
sehr vielen verschiedenen Aspekten betrachtet werden. Hervorzuheben sind hierbei ins-
besondere Pragmatik, Semantik und Syntax, sowie Repräsentation, Ausdruck und Ap-
pell. 
3.2.2 Das Spezifikum bildhafter Zeichen, wahrnehmungsnah zu sein, hängt mit der umgangs-
sprachlichen Auffassung zusammen, daß Bilder dem Abgebildeten ähnlich seien. 
Wahrnehmungspsychologische Aspekte müssen also eine gegenüber anderen Zeichen-
arten herausgehobene Rolle spielen. 
3.2.3 An dieser Stelle wird es wichtig, die Gemeinsamkeiten (und Unterschiede) zu einer im 
Zusammenhang mit Bildern häufig verwendeten semiotischen Einteilung von Zeichen 
zu betrachten: Anzeichen, Ikon und Symbol (nach PEIRCE). Eine eindeutige Zuordnung 
von Bild zu Ikon ist nicht sinnvoll. 
Der Bildbegriff wurde also, verkürzt gesagt, in einer Zusammenführung der Begriffe „Ähnlich-
keit“ und „Zeichenverwendung“ bestimmt. Die folgenden Unterkapitel skizzieren, wie zwei zu-
nächst unabhängige logisch-genetische Herleitungen der beiden Begriffe ineinander greifen 
(können), um so den vorgestellten Bildbegriff zu ermöglichen. Dieser etwas ausführliche Ex-
kurs, der hier erstmals in vollem Umfang veröffentlicht ist, ist motiviert darin, daß eine solche 
logisch-genetische Untersuchung weitere Randbedingungen des Bildbegriffs motiviert. 
 
3.3 Der Zusammenhang zwischen Bild und Abgebildetem, also die bildhafte Repräsentati-
onsbeziehung, wird als eines der zentralen Elemente jeder Bildtheorie untersucht. Das 
führt zu der Frage, was eigentlich Ähnlichkeit heißt, bzw. unter welchen Voraussetzun-
gen wir jemandem zuschreiben, daß er einen Fall von Ähnlichkeit erkannt habe. 
3.3.1 Der naive Versuch einer Ähnlichkeitstheorie wird umrissen und zugunsten eines hand-
lungstheoretischen Konzepts abgewiesen. Diese handlungstheoretische Alternative wird 
in den Abschnitten 3.3 und 3.4 skizziert. 
3.3.2 Ähnlichkeit zu erkennen ist ein Begriff, der auf bereits recht komplexen Verhaltensfä-
higkeiten aufsetzt. Sind die Fähigkeiten eines Wesens, sich zu verhalten, nicht komplex 
genug (etwa nur Reflexe), dann ist es nicht einmal sinnvoll, von „wahrnehmen“ oder 
„sich täuschen“ zu reden. 
3.3.3 Ein sinnvoller Wahrnehmungsbegriff setzt eine erste Form der Objektkonstitution vor-
aus. Der Begriff der von solchen Wesen wahrgenommenen (Prä-) Objekte ist allerdings 
nicht mit dem zu verwechseln, was wir Menschen normalerweise einen (materiellen) 
Gegenstand nennen würden. Ein solches Wesen kann sich täuschen, z.B. weil etwas et-
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was anderem sehr ähnlich sieht; aber es kann diese Ähnlichkeit selbst nicht wieder er-
kennen. Es werden daher zwei Typen von Ähnlichkeit als handlungstheoretisch ver-
schieden eingeführt (mit Index alpha und beta). Der komplexere und für den Bildbe-
griff relevante Begriff der Ähnlichkeit hängt damit zusammen, sich zugleich des anwe-
senden Täuschenden und des abwesenden Verwechselten bewußt zu sein.  
3.4 Der Übergang zu dem komplexeren Begriff von Ähnlichkeit (beta), den wir normaler-
weise im Sinn haben, hängt eng mit dem Verhältnis zwischen Bild und Sprache zusam-
men, das in diesem Unterkapitel untersucht wird. 
3.4.1 Es wird zunächst kurz zusammengefaßt, was als das Charakteristische an Sprache gilt. 
Die aus der logisch-semantischen Propädeutik bekannte Aufteilung der kommunikati-
ven Funktionen der Aussage in die ungesättigten Teilfunktionen Nomination und Prädi-
kation bildet den Ausgangspunkt und führt zur Feststellung, daß Aussagen stets kon-
text-relativ aber nicht kontext-abhängig verwendet werden. Der aktuelle Verhaltenskon-
text ist nur eine Möglichkeit. 
3.4.2 Dieser Befund wird anhand einer Gegenkonzeption verdeutlicht: Man kann sich leicht 
eine kontext-abhängige Form der Kommunikation vorstellen. Sie entspricht der in 3.3.3 
beschriebenen Verhaltenskomplexität. Wesen, die nur über solche Kommunikationsar-
ten verfügen, kommunizieren lediglich über das, was für sie aktuell da ist. Ähnlichkeit 
im anspruchsvollen Sinn zu erkennen beruht aber vor allem darauf, zu erkennen, was 
nicht aktuell da ist. 
3.4.3 Die Kontextrelativität aussageartiger Zeichenhandlungen setzt voraus, daß ein Kontext 
mehr oder weniger explizit angegeben wird, in dem die referentielle Verankerung der 
anderen Teilhandlungen (insbesondere die empirische Verifikation der Prädikation) 
stattfinden kann: eine entsprechende Teilhandlung wird unter dem Namen „Kontextbil-
der“ eingeführt. Damit verbunden ist die Fähigkeit, nicht-anwesende Verhaltenssitua-
tionen zu evozieren. 
3.4.4 Der Begriff der Gegenstände, wie wir ihn normalerweise verwenden, hängt entschei-
dend daran, daß wir solche Gegenstände als Elemente vieler Kontexte auffassen: es sind 
Sortale, die trotz verschiedener Gegebenheitsweisen als identisch verstanden werden. 
Eine konstituierende Rolle für Sortale spielen einerseits Gestalt-Aspekte, die vor allem 
instantan und geometrisch-visueller Natur sind, und abstrakte Teil-Ganzes-Beziehun-
gen, die den Zusammenhang zwischen den verschiedenen Gegebenheitsweisen vermit-
teln: das Verhältnis bestimmt die zweite Objektkonstitution. Erst im Zusammenspiel 
zwischen geometrischen Begriffen und den Sortalen kann sich zudem die Vorstellung 
vom reinen (leeren) Raum ausbilden, in dem sich Objekte befinden und bewegen, und 
der durch Koordinaten bestimmt ist.  
3.4.5 Insgesamt folgt, daß Bilder die Fähigkeit zu aussage-artiger Sprache voraussetzen. Ihre 
Grundfunktion wird als die eines Kontextbilders begriffen. Eine direkte Zuordnung der 
Bildfunktion zu der der Aussage oder einer ihrer anderen Teilfunktionen ist als davon 
abgeleitet zu verstehen. Bilder sind besondere Kontextbilder, da sie, im Gegensatz zu 
den anderen meist sprachlichen Formen der Kontextbildung, einen nicht-anwesenden 
Kontext derart mit dem aktuellen Verhaltenskontext verschmelzen, daß zumindest teil-
weise die zugehörigen senso-motorischen Verifikationsroutinen zum Einsatz kommen 
können (im Sinne einer kontrollierten Verwechslung).  
 
Damit wurde die handlungstheoretische Konzeption von Ähnlichkeit mit der Zeichenverwen-
dung zusammengeführt. 
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3.5 Was genau es heißt, daß eine kontrollierte Verwechslung der Bildverwendung zugrunde 
liegt, hängt vom Verhältnis zwischen Bild und Bildbenutzer ab. Zudem ist zu klären, 
wie nicht-repräsentationale Arten von Bildern in die Theorie passen. 
3.5.1 Verschiedene Reflexionsmodi beim Umgang mit Bildern sind zu unterscheiden. Der 
dezeptive Modus im Verhalten einem Bild(träger) gegenüber entspricht der unreflek-
tierten Form von Ähnlichkeit (alpha), also einer unmittelbaren Verwechslung ohne Zei-
chengebrauch. Der symbolische Modus faßt die Verwendung als Zeichen ganz allge-
mein zusammen: der Zeichenträger dient zur Evokation eines Abwesenden. Das spezi-
fisch Bildhafte ist dabei noch nicht berührt. Der immersive Modus besteht aus einer 
Verkoppelung der beiden anderen Modi: das Bild löst unmittelbar dezeptive Reaktionen 
beim Bildnutzer aus, die dieser aber erkennt, da er das Bild als Zeichen verwendet. Die 
spontanen Reaktionen werden dadurch zum Teil unterdrückt, zum Teil (im Rahmen der 
Zeichenhandlung) kontrolliert aufrechterhalten. Als Verwendung höherer Ordnung läßt 
sich schließlich der reflexive Modus unterscheiden, bei dem ein Bild Aspekte der Bild-
kommunikation exemplifiziert. 
3.5.2 Das Wechselspiel der Reflexionsmodi bei der Bildverwendung muß insbesondere dem 
Produzenten in vollem Maße klar sein. Auch wenn das Produkt mit der Intention ange-
fertigt wurde, nur den dezeptiven Modus auszulösen (etwa bei trompe l’œil-Bildern, so-
fern sie nicht reflexiv gemeint sind). Eine Bestimmung von Realismus und Naturalis-
mus (wie er im weiteren verwendet wird) geht der Frage nach der Wahrheit von Bildern 
voraus: statt Wahrheit sollte allerdings besser über Authentizität von Bildhandlungen 
gesprochen werden, da Bilder nicht analog zu Aussagen verstanden werden. 
3.5.3 Zugleich stellt sich die Frage, wie diese semiotische Auffassung bei den sogenannten 
„natürlichen Bildern“, etwa einem Spiegelbild, ausfällt. Es wird vorgeschlagen, sie als 
bildliche Selbstgespräche zu verstehen, wobei die Frage nach der Authentizität auch 
hier eine befriedigende Antwort erlaubt: jemand, der etwas als „natürliches Bild“ in ei-
nem solchen Selbstgespräch verwendet, obwohl er weiß, daß die Entstehungsbedingun-
gen fehlerhaft waren, handelt nicht authentisch. Um Authentizität erzeugen oder ein-
schätzen zu können, müssen sich die Partner der Zeichenhandlung ihrer Rollen wech-
selseitig bewußt sein. 
3.5.4 Mithilfe verschiedener rhetorischer Ableitungen können auch Abstraktionen und Struk-
turbilder durch die in den vorangegangenen Abschnitten skizzierte Bildtheorie behan-
delt werden. Abstraktionen in repräsentationalen Bildern können als graphisches Äqui-
valent des rhetorischen Mittels der Metonymie verstanden werden. Strukturbildern liegt 
das Mittel der Metapher zugrunde.  
3.5.5 Die nicht-gegenständlichen Bilder der modernen Kunst, die auf den ersten Blick ein 
Problem für die skizzierte Bildtheorie darstellen, können mithilfe des reflexiven Modus 
des Bildumgangs behandelt werden: Mit ihnen werden nicht einfach nur Kontexte mit 
Gegenständen zur Verfügung gestellt. Vielmehr sollen verschiedene Aspekte der spezi-
ellen Weise, in der Bilder funktionieren, thematisiert (und insbesondere exemplifiziert) 
werden. Reflexive Bilder, also Bilder, die in reflexivem Modus zu gebrauchen sind, tre-
ten aber auch außerhalb der Kunst auf, etwa in Artikeln der Computergraphik. 
3.6 Eine Zusammenstellung der für Computervisualistik wichtigsten Aspekte der skizzier-
ten Bildtheorie leiten zum Hauptkapitel über, das sich mit der informatischen Behand-
lung dieser Aspekte beschäftigt. 
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4. In diesem zentralen Kapitel wird versucht, das grundlegende Thema der 
Computervisualistik in einer übersichtlichen Form zu entwickeln. Es handelt sich 
um die generische Form der Datenstruktur, die den Datentyp »Bild« enthält. Ihre 
Eigenschaften werden auf alle spezifischeren Formen vererbt. 
4.1 Als übersichtliches Schema, welches das Kapitel organisiert, wird die aus der Semiotik 
bekannte Aufgliederung in syntaktische, semantische und pragmatische Aspekte zu-
grundegelegt.  
4.2 Syntax stellt die bei weitem eingeschränkteste Perspektive auf Zeichen zur Verfügung, 
da es nur um Eigenschaften von und Relationen zwischen Bildträgern geht. 
4.2.1 Trotzdem hat sich in der jüngeren Vergangenheit gerade in diesem Bereich eine wichti-
ge Diskussion der Bildwissenschaft entfaltet, die für die informatische Behandlung 
nicht ohne Bedeutung ist: die Frage nach der Rolle der Auflösung für die Identität von 
Bildern. 
4.2.1.1 Mathematisch gesprochen geht es darum, ob die Syntax von Bildern dicht sein muß, 
was eine wichtige Auswirkung auf die Entscheidbarkeit von Vergleichen zwischen Bil-
dern hat. Interessanterweise ist bislang die alternative Eigenschaft der Kontinuität nicht 
weiter diskutiert worden.  
4.2.1.2 In der Informatik wurden entsprechend Ansätze zur Enkodierung von Bildsyntax unter-
schiedlicher Entscheidbarkeitskomplexität für verschiedene Aufgabenstellungen vorge-
schlagen: von der Pixelmatrix zum generativen Bild(träger).  
4.2.2 Bildliche Auflösung entspricht in etwa der Ebene der Buchstaben bei Sprache; sprachli-
che Syntax beschäftigt sich aber zum großen Teil mit der Zusammensetzung von Wör-
tern aus Silben (Morphemen), von Sätzen aus Wörtern, und von Texten aus Sätzen. Ent-
sprechend kann auch Bildsyntax zu größeren Einheiten übergehen, den Pixemen und ih-
rer Komposition. 
4.2.2.1 Eine solche „Bildmorphologie“ muß einerseits die „Silben“ festlegen. Pixeme sind, all-
gemein gesagt, mehr oder weniger zusammenhängende geometrische Einheiten. Um ei-
ne brauchbare Formalisierung zu erreichen, bietet sich eine Nicht-Standardform der 
Geometrie an, die Mereo-Geometrie, da sie nicht auf nulldimensionalen Punkten als 
Grundelementen basiert, sondern auf weniger abstrakten ausgedehnten sogenannten In-
dividuen. Solche Individuen kann man sich zwanglos als Ergebnisse visueller Wahr-
nehmungsprozesse denken. 
4.2.2.2 Der Vollständigkeit halber wird ein Randbereich der Bildsyntax erwähnt: die Komposi-
tion höherer Bildeinheiten aus mehreren an sich bereits vollständigen Bildern. Film und 
Comics strips komponieren auf unterschiedliche Weise in einer Dimension, Comics 
nutzen zwei Layout-Dimensionen, Ausstellungen und verschiedene immersive Systeme 
ordnen Bilder im Raum an. 
4.2.3 Die geometrischen Aspekte der Syntax stellen gewissermaßen die syntaktische 
Basisstruktur bereit, die auf unterschiedliche Weise mit Markerwerten belegt wird, und 
die umgekehrt die wahrnehmungspsychologische Rekonstruktion der Pixeme basiert. 
Bildliche Markerwerte sind im wesentlichen die Farben. Die Formalisierung von Farbe 
hat historisch verschiedene Farbmodelle hervorgebracht, die sich die Informatik zunutze 
macht. Wieder stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit der Farbraum dicht oder gar kontinuier-
lich sein muß, bzw. ob diskrete Approximationen genügen. Textur wird als ein höher-
stufiges Markersystem identifiziert, das auf Farbe aufbaut. Transparenz und Reflexion 
werden selten in diesem Zusammenhang betrachtet, stellen aber ein wichtiges Moment 
dar, das auch die Informatik zumindest teilweise (alpha-Kanal) zur Verfügung stellt. Im 
Gegensatz zu der Annahme der meisten bildwissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, daß es keine 
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syntaktisch fehlerhaften Bilder geben könne, eröffnet die Unterscheidung zwischen 
geometrischer Basisstruktur und farblichen Markerwerten zudem eine Möglichkeit da-
für, zu definieren, was syntaktisch fehlerhafte Bilder sind. 
4.2.4 Transformationen, die nur auf syntaktischen Eigenschaften der transformierten Bilder 
beruhen, sind der klassische Gegenstand der Bildverarbeitung. Einige der wichtigsten 
Arten solcher Transformationen werden beispielhaft skizziert. 
4.2.5 Syntaktische Kategorien genügen, um Bildträger im Computer zu enkodieren, sie zu 
speichern, zu senden, oder in den verschiedenen Ausgabemedien zu präsentieren. Sie 
genügen nicht, wenn der Rechner tatsächlich mit Bildern umgehen soll. Tatsächlich 
können selbst die höheren syntaktischen Einheiten (komplexe Pixeme) nur korrekt aus 
den möglichen herausgefiltert werden, wenn semantische Aspekte mit berücksichtigt 
werden. Die syntaktische Struktur definiert also nur einen Teil-Datentyp der generi-
schen Gesamtstruktur. 
4.3 Die semiotisch relevanten Beziehungen zwischen Zeichenträger und dem damit Be-
zeichneten stehen nun im Mittelpunkt: Bildbedeutung wird dabei zunächst in der Form 
von prädikatorischem Bildinhalt und nominatorischer Bildreferenz untersucht. Es inter-
essieren uns insbesondere die Repräsentationsrelation (gegebene Syntax zu gesuchtem 
Bildinhalt) und ihr Inverses (gegebener Bildinhalt zu gesuchter Syntax). Die Problema-
tik, dafür einen Bezug zu den Teilfunktionen von Aussagen herzustellen, wird andisku-
tiert. 
4.3.1 Die zentrale von repräsentationalen Bildern dargestellte Kategorie sind materielle, 
raum-zeitliche Gegenstände, also Sortale. Das Begriffsfeld der sortalen Gegenstände 
bildet daher die Basis für die Komponente »Bildinhalt«. Das muß zugleich der Aus-
gangspunkt für die Erzeugung eines repräsentationalen Bildes sein. In der Computer-
graphik werden dazu allerdings geometrische Modelle verwendet.  
4.3.1.1 Gemäß der Konstitutionsbeziehung zwischen Sortalen und geometrischen Individuen 
(Abschnitt 3.4.4) wird damit lediglich ein notwendiger Bestandteil von »Bildinhalt« an-
gegeben, aber keineswegs der vollständige Datentyp. Der für sortale (d.h. Kontexte mit-
einander verbindende) Identität notwendige meronomische Anteil fehlt. 
4.3.1.2 Um genauer zu verstehen, was das bedeutet, ist ein kurzer Exkurs in die Theorie der 
Argumentation notwendig, der sich ausdrücklich auf die argumentationstheoretische 
Analogie der Informatik aus Abschnitt 2.1 stützt. Rationale Argumentation wird benö-
tigt, um einerseits das korrekte Zuschreiben eines Begriffs (d.h.: das Zutreffen einer 
Prädikation) zu kontrollieren, indem etwa eine Definition angewendet wird, und ande-
rerseits, um Begriffsklärungen durchzuführen. Diese äußern sich u.a. in Bestimmungen 
der Bedeutungspostulate, die die Verwendung der Begriffe eines Feldes beschreiben 
bzw. festlegen (z.B. Definitionen oder syllogistischen Schlußschemata). Die Bedeu-
tungspostulate selbst können so nicht hinterfragt werden. Kann auf dieser Ebene kein 
Konsens erzielt werden, muß eine komplexere Form der Argumentation angewendet 
werden, bei der Beziehungen zwischen Begriffsfeldern zur Sprache kommen. Wichtig 
ist hier vor allem das argumentationstheoretische Analogon zur Implementierungsbe-
ziehung: Die innere Struktur eines Begriffsfeldes wird verstanden als systematische 
Kombination von anderen, in der Regel einfacher strukturierten Feldern. Auf diese 
Weise können die Bedeutungspostulate des implementierten Feldes selbst motiviert 
werden – so wie analog gezeigt werden kann, daß eine bestimmte Implementierung eine 
Spezifikation (symbolische Beschreibung erwünschter Bedeutungspostulate) erfüllt. 
Außerdem können die mit den elementareren Feldern verbundenen sensomotorischen 
Testroutinen, mit denen Instanzen der entsprechenden Begriffe gefunden werden, auch 
zur referentiellen Verankerung des komplexen Feldes verwendet werden.  
THE FOUNDATION OF COMPUTATIONAL VISUALISTICS 221
 
 
4.3.1.3 Übertragen auf das Feld der sortalen Objekte mit seiner überaus komplexen inneren 
Struktur heißt das: die oft unklaren Schlußschemata für räumliche Relationen können 
als das Resultat einer systematischen Kopplung von geometrischen und meronomischen 
Begriffen motiviert werden. Ferner können die in der Zeit ausgedehnten Instanzen 
sortaler Objekte mithilfe der ererbten sensomotorischen Testroutinen für die instantanen 
Gestalt-Individuen (unter anderem) referentiell verankert werden. Das bildet die Grund-
lage der referenzsemantischen Verankerung von sprachlichen Ausdrücken, die sich mit 
sortalen Gegenständen und ihrer relativen Lage zueinander befassen. Die geometrischen 
Modelle der Computergraphik beschränkt sich auf diesen Aspekt. 
4.3.1.4 Die Beziehung zwischen sortalem Bildinhalt und der syntaktischen Struktur des Bild-
trägers, oft als „Perspektive“ bezeichnet, besteht mithin tatsächlich aus zwei Projekti-
onsschritten: der Projektion des sortalen Individuums auf eine (mehr oder weniger) in-
stantane geometrische Gegebenheitsweise in drei Dimensionen; und einer zweiten Pro-
jektion des dreidimensionalen geometrischen Modells in die beiden Dimensionen der 
Bildsyntax. Erstaunlichweise gehen einschlägige Arbeiten zur Perspektive nur sehr sel-
ten auf die erste, für das Verständnis des Phänomens „Bild“ offensichtlich zentrale Pro-
jektion ein. Verschiedene Abbildungsstile, wie sie mit photorealistischem bzw. nicht-
photorealistischem Rendering erzeugbar sind, lassen sich durch Variationen der beiden 
Projektionsschritte erklären. 
4.3.2 Auch das Gebiet des Bildverstehens bzw. Computersehens bedient sich der beiden Pro-
jektionsschritte, allerdings (teilweise) in umgekehrter Richtung. Grundlegend ist aller-
dings in der Regel zunächst, überhaupt die vollständige syntaktische Struktur nicht nur 
auf der Ebene der Pixel zu erzeugen. Dabei spielen die Gesetze der Gestaltgruppierung, 
die entsprechende Aspekte unserer visuellen Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit beschreiben, eine 
zentrale Rolle.  
4.3.2.1 Anhand eines ausführlichen Beispiels werden wichtige Kriterien beim Aufbau von Pi-
xemen höherer Ordnung gezeigt. Dabei wird auch deutlich, warum diese Pixeme, die in 
der Bildverarbeitung häufig einfach „Objekte“ genannt werden, bestenfalls mit den Prä-
objekten aus Abschnitt 3.3.3, nicht aber mit sortalen Objekten vergleichbar sind.  
4.3.2.2 Der entscheidende Schritt besteht darin, bestimmte Pixeme höherer Ordnung als eine 
geometrische Instantiierung eines Objektschemas (d.h., sortalen Objektbegriffs) zu in-
terpretieren. Als Nebenresultat können auf diese Weise z.B. auch Schatten erkannt wer-
den. Während das Finden der Pixeme höherer Ordnung meist als datengesteuertes (bot-
tom-up) Verfahren realisiert wird, handelt es sich beim Instantiieren eines Objektsche-
mas immer um einen zielgesteuerten (top-down) Schritt. Das Verfahren ist allerdings 
empfindlich gegenüber gröberen Abweichungen von der normalen Perspektive, wie 
Bilder von sogenannten „unmöglichen“ Figuren demonstrieren. Der Übergang ins drei-
dimensionale sortale Begriffsfeld durch das Instantiieren von Objektschemata ist noch 
nicht der letzte Schritt, denn Bilder zeigen nicht einzelne Objekte sondern räumliche 
Anordnungen davon. Das Erkennen räumlicher Relationen, wie wir sie sprachlich etwa 
durch lokative Präpositionen angeben, hängt, wie schon in 4.3.1.3 angedeutet, ebenfalls 
von geometrischen und meronomischen Faktoren ab. Der Komplex der insgesamt akti-
vierten Begriffe des sortalen Feldes verbunden mit den zugehörigen senso-motorischen 
Testroutinen des konstituierenden geometrischen Feldes bildet die Instanz von »Bildin-
halt« des analysierten Bildes. 
4.3.2.3 Da die Darstellung der Basis bildverstehender Verfahren bislang keinen Unterschied 
zwischen dem Sehen des aktuellen Verhaltenskontextes und dem Sehen eines Bildes, 
oder auch zwischen dem Sehen und dem Modellieren des Sehens im Rechner gemacht 
hat, werden diese Differenzierungen nun nachgeholt. Entscheidend ist, wer hier eigent-
lich sieht bzw. ein Bild betrachtet. 
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4.3.2.4 Repräsentationale Bilder zeigen Gegenstände zwar immer als von einem bestimmten 
Typ sortalen Gegenstands (im Gegensatz zu einem ganz bestimmten Individuum) – et-
was was von einem bestimmten Begriff kontrolliert wird bzw. was diesen Begriff ex-
emplifiziert, so daß dieser Begriff Teil des entsprechenden »Bildinhaltes« ist; gleich-
wohl handelt es sich dabei stets um eine einzelne Instanz. Im Sinne der Überlegungen 
aus Abschnitt 3.3 ist es ein intentionales Objekt, und dieses Objekt muß der Zielpunkt 
der Bildreferenz-Relation sein. Um die Referenzbeziehung besser zu verstehen, wird ein 
kurzer Überblick zur linguistischen Referenzsemantik eingeschaltet: Hier ergibt sich die 
Referenzbeziehung eines (sortalen) Ausdrucks gerade über die Anbindung der senso-
motorischen Testroutinen des konstituierenden geometrischen Begriffsfeldes (vulgo: 
man bekommt den Referenten, indem man im passend gewählten aktuellen Verhaltens-
kontext hinschaut, anfaßt etc.) Infolge der argumentationstheoretischen Einbettung der 
Konstitutionsbeziehung besteht nun aber der Unterschied zwischen intra-lexikalischer 
Semantikaufassung und referenzsemantischer Auffassung nicht darin, daß im einen Fall 
Sprache nicht verlassen wird, im anderen dagegen schon; sondern darin, daß Argumen-
tationsformen unterschiedlicher Komplexität mit der jeweiligen semantischen Erläute-
rung zur Sprache gebracht werden sollen. Die Referenzbeziehung bei Bildern kann 
nicht nach demselben Muster erfolgen, denn Bilder liefern primär nur eine Gegeben-
heitsweise eines Gegenstandes während die sprachliche Referenz immer das Sortal ins-
gesamt meint. Die Identität des in einem Bild gegebenen intentionalen Gegenstandes 
mit einem dem Betrachter anderweitig bekannten Individuum muß daher in der Regel 
über zusätzliche sprachliche Marker etabliert werden. Die Bildreferenz ist dem Bildin-
halt untergeordnet. 
4.3.3 Die Behandlung der Bildsemantik in den vorangegangenen Abschnitten verfolgte die 
Strategie einer sehr engen Anlehnung an linguistische Kategorien; obgleich es eine Rei-
he guter Gründe für diese Analogie gibt, läuft sie im Grunde den bildwissenschaftlichen 
Überlegungen aus Kapitel 3 zuwider, der zufolge Bildkommunikation primär kontext-
bildende Funktion erfüllt. Um diesen Widerspruch aufzulösen, müssen vertieft pragma-
tische Aspekte in die Überlegung einbezogen werden. 
4.4 Pragmatik ist die umfassendste Perspektive auf Zeichen und Zeichenhandlungen, da 
hierbei die Beziehung zwischen der Zeichenhandlung, in der das Zeichen gebraucht 
wird, und den anderen damit im Zusammenhang stehenden Handlungen und Verhalten 
der beteiligten Zeichenhandelnden betrachtet wird. Viele Aspekte der in 4.3 vorgestell-
ten semantischen Überlegungen sind daher wegen ihres eindeutigen Handlungsbezugs 
tatsächlich bereits als Teil der Bildpragmatik zu verstehen. Ein deutliches Kennzeichen 
für pragmatische Überlegungen ist, daß die Kommunikationssituation und die daran Be-
teiligten eine wichtige Rolle spielen. 
4.4.1 Für die Computervisualistik liefert das Bild im Rahmen eines interaktiven Systems die 
charakteristischste Bildverwendungssituation. Die mithilfe von interaktiven Systemen 
vermittelte Kommunikation zeichnet sich durch einige Besonderheiten von anderen 
Medien aus. Daher werden zunächst die Charakteristika der anderen Medien kurz zu-
sammengefaßt. 
4.4.1.1 Interaktive Systeme stellen Medien der Klasse IV dar, bei denen nicht einzelne Zeichen 
zwischen in Raum und Zeit meist weit voneinander entfernten Zeichenhandelnden aus-
getauscht werden, sondern jeweils ganze Klassen von Zeichen, von denen eines für den 
konkreten Fall ausgewählt wird, und zwar algorithmisch aus Handlungen des Empfän-
gers abgeleitet, d.h. nur indirekt vom Sender selbst abhängig. Im Falle bildhafter Zei-
chen wird dafür der Ausdruck „Telerendering“ geprägt. Natürlichsprachliche Systeme, 
wie sie im Gebiet „Künstliche Intelligenz“ der Informatik entwickelt werden, gehören 
ebenfalls zu den Medien der Klasse IV und bieten einige Anhaltspunkte für den beson-
deren Umgang mit pragmatischen Aspekten, der hierbei notwendig wird. Allerdings 
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spielt die Funktion „Kontextbilder“ dort gegenüber Prädikation und Nomination eine 
sehr untergeordnete Rolle. Diese Auffassung ist auch bei den meisten der derzeit beste-
henden Systemen zum Telerendering am Werk, die in den folgenden Abschnitten skiz-
ziert werden. 
4.4.1.2 Die Unterscheidung zwischen „what to say“ und „how to say“ läßt sich für Bilder ana-
log zur Sprachgenerierung stellen. Auswahl des Inhalts wird analog als Bestimmung ei-
ner Instanz von »Bildinhalt« verstanden, also als eine Menge von sortalen Begriffen 
(Gegenstände und räumliche Relationen), die mit den zugehörigen geometrischen Pro-
jektionen assoziiert sind – i.w. den geometrischen Objektmodellen. Sollen ganz be-
stimmte individuelle Objekte, die aus anderem Zusammenhang bekannt sind, im Bild 
auftreten, muß die Koreferenz in der Regel über zusätzliche meist sprachliche Zeichen 
(Bildtitel u.ä.) vermittelt werden. 
4.4.1.3 Auswahl der Form betrifft vor allem die Wahl des Betrachterstandpunkts und Bildaus-
schnitts, aber auch die Beleuchtung und den Darstellungsstil. Vor allem mit den letzten 
beiden Parametern lassen sich „rhetorisch angereicherte“ Bilder herstellen: Obwohl 
Bildern als Kontextbildern an sich noch keine Aufgliederung in nominative und prädi-
kative Teile zukommen, legen gewisse Beleuchtungen oder Darstellungsstile eine be-
stimmte Zuordnung nahe – die reine Funktion des Kontextbilders wird also rhetorisch 
überformt. 
4.4.1.4 Sofern kein Bild neu generiert wird, sondern ein möglichst gut passendes aus einer ge-
gebenen Kollektion gewählt werden soll, treten Inhalts- und Formfestlegung in einer 
kombinierten Fassung auf. Anhand eines Beispiels wird gezeigt, wie hierfür ein rein 
propositional geprägtes Semantikverständnis genutzt werden kann.  
4.4.2 Eine zweite Analogie zu den Verfahren der natürlichsprachlichen Systeme ist das Be-
rücksichtigen der Wirkung auf den oder die Zeichenhandlungspartner. Formal ergibt sie 
sich aus den Überlegungen von MEAD zu komplexem Zeichengebrauch, referiert in Ab-
schnitt 3.5.3, und den sprachphilosophischen Überlegungen zu Sprechakten. Ausgangs-
punkt dafür ist eine Angabe des Zwecks, der mit einem Bildzeigeakt verfolgt wird. 
4.4.2.1 Sprechhandlungen, und ihre verallgemeinerte Form: Zeichenakte, bilden Systeme zum 
regelgeleiteten Ableiten von Sequenzen von Handlungen. Rhetorische Relationen zwi-
schen Zeichenakten beschreiben die Funktion einer Zeichenhandlung in der Sequenz. 
Damit eng verbunden sind explizite Zuschreibungen von Zwecken zu den Zeichenak-
ten. Bisher wurden Bildhandlungen im wesentlichen als Substitute für assertionale 
Sprechakte betrachtet: sie treten mit den gleichen illokutionären Rollen auf; die rhetori-
schen Funktionen sind weitgehend dieselben. Mithilfe von strategischen Regeln lassen 
sich daher auch Planungssysteme für multimedial gemischte Zeichen formulieren, die 
aus vorgegebenen Zwecken rhetorische Relationen und schließlich koordinierte Bild-
zeige- und Sprechakte ableiten. 
4.4.2.2 Der intendierte Zwecke muß keineswegs auch korrekt beim Gegenüber ankommen. Zu 
diesem Zweck werden in natürlichsprachlichen Systemen explizite oder implizite Part-
nermodelle verwendet, die für das wechselseitige Einhalten der für das Sprachspiel gül-
tigen Regeln sorgen, etwa der Konversationsmaxime nach GRICE. Insbesondere werden 
beim Gegenüber durch eine Äußerung ausgelöste Implikaturen und Präsuppositionen 
berücksichtigt. Das funktioniert auch, wenngleich mit einigen zusätzlichen Komplika-
tionen, für Telerendering, so daß das interaktive System die generierten Bilder etwa 
dem Kenntnisstand und den Erwartungen des Benutzers anpassen kann. Es wird unter-
schieden zwischen dem „Modell des aktiven Betrachters“, das ein Betrachter vom Sen-
der der bildlichen Botschaft hat, und dem „Modell des passiven Betrachters“, das sich 
der Sender von den potentiellen Rezipienten macht. Explizite Partnermodellierung ist 
sehr aufwendig und wird häufig durch implizite Regeln approximiert. 
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4.4.2.3 Eine direkte Übertragung der linguistischen Partnermodellierung auf die Bildkommuni-
kation in Medien der Klasse IV geht von einer Analogie zwischen Propositionen und 
Bildsemantik aus, nicht von der grundlegenderen Kontextbilder-Funktion. Eine Anpas-
sung der Benutzermodellierung für Kontextbilder erfordert es, nicht von einem einmal 
festgelegten festen Inhalt (und assoziierter Referenz) auszugehen, sondern diese Inter-
pretationen stets offen und revidierbar zu halten. Hierbei ist die Analyse des der Bild-
verwendung zugrundeliegenden immersiven Reflexionsmodus als Kombination von 
spontanem dezeptivem Modus mit dem symbolischen Modus aus Abschnitt 3.5.1 hilf-
reich. Sie verweist zugleich darauf, daß die rein semantische („unpragmatische“) Auf-
fassung von »Bildinhalt« unvollständig ist, da der symbolische Modus überhaupt nur in 
der Koordination zwischen aktiven und passivem Betrachtermodell sinnvoll ist. Be-
trachtermodelle sind nicht einfach zusätzliche Teile, sondern essentieller Bestandteil der 
Datenstruktur. 
4.4.3 Eine zentrale Frage im Rahmen der Bildpragmatik ist die nach der Authentizität von in 
Medien der Klasse IV verwendeten Bildhandlungen. 
4.4.3.1 Authentizität im allgemeinen kann von den Betrachtermodellen nicht gewährleistet 
werden, da eine direkte Beobachtung der Beteiligten nicht möglich ist. Dies gilt insbe-
sondere für den Konstrukteur, der als primärer Sender betrachtet wird. Lediglich für den 
Endnutzer, der sich selbst Bilder mit einem interaktivem System zeigt und daher als se-
kundärer Sender betrachtete werden kann, können Interaktionsparameter dazu verwen-
det werden, das entsprechende Betrachtermodell zu modifizieren. 
4.4.3.2 In einem wesentlich engeren technischen Sinn wird der Ausdruck „Authentizität“ in der 
Informatik dazu benutzt, syntaktische Methoden der Übertragungssicherung zu beurtei-
len. Hierbei spielen insbesondere digitale Wasserzeichen eine wichtige Rolle.  
4.4.4 Strukturbilder, die durch eine metaphorische Bedeutungsverschiebung erklärt werden, 
treten in der Computervisualistik vor allem im Bereich Informationsvisualisierung auf. 
Häufig helfen sie dabei, überhaupt erst eine relevante Konzeptualisierung von Rohdaten 
zu finden. Diese explorative Bildbenutzung beim „data mining“ entspricht eher einem 
Selbstgespräch als der normalen zweiseitigen Kommunikation; sie deckt sich zugleich 
besser mit der Funktion als Kontextbilder, weniger mit der als Proposition (oder einer 
Teilfunktion davon).  
4.4.4.1 Die metaphorische Bedeutungsverschiebung für Strukturbilder unterliegt bestimmten 
Restriktionen, die sich aus der Struktur von »Bildträger« und »Bildinhalt« ergeben: die 
Quelldomäne der Metapher entspricht direkt dem geometrischen Feld oder indirekt dem 
sortalen Feld. Das Problem von Koreferenzen in verschiedenen Bildern einer Serie stellt 
sich für die beiden Fälle jeweils unterschiedlich. Insofern die Zieldomäne der Metapher 
Subdomänen aus dem sortalen oder geometrischen Bereich (oder dazu isomorphen Be-
griffen) enthalten kann, kann man Strukturbilder auch einteilen in solche, die eine natür-
liche (repräsentationale) Kernabbildung beinhalten, und andere, für die das nicht gilt. 
Aus der Kombination zwischen den beiden Ausprägungen der Quelldomäne und den 
unterschiedlichen Zieldomänklassen lassen sich insbesondere auch repräsentationale 
und nonfigurative Bilder als Sonderfälle bestimmen. Auf jeden Fall müssen die nicht 
durch triviale Isomorphien abgedeckten Begriffe der Zieldomäne auf geeignete, d.h. für 
den intendierten Betrachter nachvollziehbare, konventionelle Weise auf Begriffe der 
Quelldomäne abgebildet, d.h., auf einen sortalen »Bildinhalt« oder direkt die geometri-
sche Bildsyntax projiziert werden. 
4.4.4.2 Als zentrale semantische Einschränkung für die Wahl einer konventionellen Zuordnung 
gilt, daß Quell- und Zielbegriff von gleicher „Mannigfaltigkeit“ sind und dieselbe Art 
von Ordnungsrelationen gelten. Mißachtung dieses Grundsatzes führt leicht zu Abbil-
dungsartefakten oder unvollständigen Projektionen. Beides kann beim Betrachter feh-
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lerhaftes Verständnis auslösen. Problematisch wird die konventionelle Zuordnung aller-
dings vor allem dadurch, daß die Quelldomäne nur eine recht beschränkte Auswahl an 
möglichen Quellattribute verschiedener Ausprägungen zur Verfügung stellt. Zudem 
müssen häufig nicht nur viele verschiedene Zielattribute, sondern auch große Mengen 
an einzelnen Ausprägungen betrachtet werden. Eine Zusammenfassung mehrerer Attri-
bute in Ikonen oder Glyphen bzw. eine texturartige Verschmelzung sehr dicht gesetzter 
Glyphen kann den Problemen zu einem gewissen Grad abhelfen. Auch eine zeitliche 
Entwicklung zu betrachten vergrößert den Spielraum, wobei allerdings eine feste Zu-
ordnung eines Parameters zur Zeitachse die mit der Animation gegebenen Möglichkei-
ten nicht voll ausnutzt. 
4.4.4.3 Wesentlich günstiger ist eine interaktiv wechselnde Zuordnung von Zeitachse und Ziel-
attribut. Um große Datenmengen in interaktiver Form überschaubar zu präsentieren, 
sind zudem Fokus/Kontext-Mechanismen wichtig, die wiederum nur in enger Bezie-
hung zum Vorwissen und den Intentionen der Betrachter sinnvoll zu steuern sind.  
4.4.5 Reflexive Bilder spielen im Rahmen der Informatik auf zweierlei Weise eine Rolle: ei-
nerseits treten sie als Bildzitate auf, mit denen weniger der primäre Bildinhalt vorge-
führt wird. Vielmehr wird das zur Erzeugung verwendete bild-generierende oder bild-
manipulierende Verfahren exemplifiziert. Andererseits sind künstlerische Bilder in aller 
Regel reflexiv, so daß die Produkte der Computerkunst ebenfalls hier betrachtet werden 
müssen. 
4.4.5.1 Im Unterschied zu den beiden anderen Grundkategorien, den repräsentationalen Bildern 
und den Strukturbildern, die sich voneinander in der Beziehung zwischen Syntax und 
Semantik unterscheiden, zeichnen sich reflexive Bilder durch den besonderen Rezepti-
onsmodus des Betrachters aus. Folglich kann jedes Bild zum reflexiven Bild werden, 
wenn es entsprechend rezipiert wird. Eine bestimmte Gruppe von Strukturbildern sticht 
in diesem Zusammenhang hervor: da bei ihr die semantische Relation zu einer Identi-
tätsrelation entartet ist, erscheinen diese Bilder oft „unsemantisch“ (bedeutungslos), 
wodurch leicht eine Reflexion auf die mit ihnen potentiell zu vollziehenden Bildkom-
munikationshandlungen ausgelöst wird. Sie lassen sich also nur im reflexiven Modus 
verstehen. 
4.4.5.2 Eben solche Bilder standen auch am Anfang der Computerkunst. Der Ausdruck ist kei-
ne Stilbezeichnung. Mit ihm werden alle Werke der bildenden Kunst zusammengefaßt, 
bei der ein Künstler mit dem Computer als Werkzeug gearbeitet hat. Die beim Betrach-
ten des Werks ausgelöste Reflexion auf Bildkommunikation reicht beispielsweise von 
einer algorithmischen Untersuchung des Zusammenhangs zwischen den vielen Perspek-
tiven eines Sortals und der einen davon in einem konkreten Kontext verfügbaren geo-
metrischen Projektion (ähnlich dem Kubismus) bis zu Analyse kognitiver Fähigkeiten, 
die beim Umgehen mit Bildern unumgänglich sind, mit den Mitteln der KI.  
4.4.5.3 Auch im Zusammenhang der Computerkunst offenbart sich der eigentliche Beitrag des 
Werkzeugs Computer in der Interaktivität. Diese forciert geradezu eine deutliche Ver-
schiebung des in Europa tradierten Werkbegriffs: Ein bildliches Kunstwerk ist nicht 
notwendig an einen individuellen materiellen Träger gebunden. Mit dem Aufstieg der 
Computergraphik sind insbesondere immersive Kunstwerke möglich geworden, die auf 
den ersten Blick zur antiken Kunstauffassung bzw. dem Ideal eines absoluten trompe 
l’œil zurückzukehren scheinen: der Zeichencharakter der Bilder scheint völlig zu ver-
schwinden. Allerdings stellen die gelungenen Kunstwerke dieser Art die Täuschung ei-
niger Nutzer stets in einen explizit reflexiven Zusammenhang für viele andere Betrach-
ter. Der gespannte Zusammenhang zwischen der Wahrnehmungsnähe und dem Zei-
chencharakter der Bilder wird letzteren ausdrücklich vorgeführt. Ausnahmen davon 
können in der Regel als Kunstwerke höhere Ordnung betrachtet werden, bei denen die 
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eingesetzten Bilder selbst gar nicht im Vordergrund stehen, sondern in ein Gesamt-
kunstwerk aus vielen anderen Komponenten einfließen. Ihre Verwendung ist entspre-
chend auch gar nicht Ziel der künstlerischen Reflexion.  
5. Vier Fallbeispiele ergänzen die Überlegungen des vorigen Kapitels 
5.1 Nur syntaktische und semantische Aspekte der generischen Datenstruktur kommen zum 
Einsatz, wenn es darum geht, nach Bildern inhaltlich in einer Bilddatenbank suchen zu 
können.  
5.1.1 Das vorgestellte System IRIS – Image Retrieval for Information Systems – exemplifi-
ziert den Einsatz bildanalytischer Algorithmen und eines stark vereinfachten Schemas 
der Objektkonstitution. 
5.1.2 Ein Beispiel der Analyse und die Möglichkeiten der Suchanfragen werden gezeigt  
5.2 Werden syntaktische Aspekte verwendet, um pragmatische Faktoren zu variieren, so 
sprechen wir von rhetorisch angereicherten Bildern.  
5.2.1 Obwohl die Interpretation eines wahrnehmungsnahen Kontextbilders nicht absolut fest-
liegt, können durch geschickt gewählte stilistische Variationen im Bild bestimmte In-
terpretationen in einem rhetorischen Sinn betont werden. 
5.2.2 Besonders grundlegend ist dabei, gezielt eine eindeutige Zuordnung des Bildes zu den 
beiden grundlegenden kommunikativen Teilfunktionen der Aussage, Nomination und 
Prädikation, herbeiführen zu können.  
5.2.3 Zu diesem Zweck wird die Heuristik des prädikativen Naturalismus vorgeschlagen und 
an einem Beispiel demonstriert. 
5.3 Einen Sonderfall von Bildern stellen die immersiven Bilder dar, da bei ihnen – zumin-
dest bei einem Teil der Nutzer – der Zeichenaspekt unterdrückt wird. Allerdings wird 
bei genauerer Betrachtung sinnvoller Anwendungen sehr schnell klar, daß beide Bild-
aspekte eine wichtige Rolle spielen, deren Gewicht sich je nach Teilaufgabe verändert. 
5.3.1 Ein Beispiel für den sinnvollen Einsatz immersiver Systeme ist die virtuelle Architek-
tur: Beispielhaft wird das Atmosphären-Projekt vorgestellt, in dem das teilweise verlo-
rene Haus Behrens mit digitalen Mitteln rekonstruiert wird. Bei diesem einzigartigen 
Jugendstilensemble, das der spätere Begründer des Industriedesigns, PETER BEHRENS, 
1901 zu einer Architekturausstellung in Darmstadt als sein Wohnhaus entworfen hat, 
kommt ein Ideal des Jugendstils besonders deutlich zur Ausprägung: der Versuch, alle 
Lebensvollzüge durch eine æsthetische Gestaltung der Umwelt positiv zu verändern. Da 
die computervisualistische Umsetzung speziell hinsichtlich dieser Zielsetzung unter-
sucht werden soll, spielt das harmonische Zusammenwirken aller Elemente auf die At-
mosphäre der Räumlichkeiten eine wichtige Rolle. Störende Artefakte, die aus der Mo-
dellierung oder unklarer Quellenlage resultieren, müssen unbedingt vermieden werden. 
Zugleich muß deutlich bleiben, welche Texturen etwa dem verlorenen Original wirklich 
genau entsprechen, und welche anderen nur ein mehr oder weniger plausibler Ersatz 
sind.  
5.3.2 Allerdings kann die Rekonstruktion in ganz verschiedenem Zusammenhang eingesetzt 
werden. Insbesondere müssen bildende, wissenschaftliche und unterhaltende Verwen-
dungskontexte unterschieden werden. Jede davon stellt unterschiedliche Anforderungen 
daran, inwieweit eine ungestörte Immersion für den Benutzer aufgebaut werden muß, 
oder zu welche Grad der Zeichencharakter der Bilder überhaupt erst wichtige Hand-
lungsgrundlagen abgibt.  
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5.3.3 Obzwar von der Aufgabenstellung her ganz verschieden, zeigt sich auch für das zweite 
Beispiel, das virtuelle Institut für Bildwissenschaft, daß die erforderlichen Funktionen 
nur dann sinnvoll gewährleistet werden können, wenn zu bestimmten Zwecken ein ho-
her Grad an Immersion erreicht wird, der für andere Zwecke geradezu störend wirkt. 
5.3.4 Zusammengefaßt hängt also der Einsatz von Bildern auch in immersiven Systemen von 
der Doppelnatur perzeptoider Zeichen ab: in einigen Fällen, wie dem der virtuellen Ar-
chitektur, fluktuiert das Gewicht der beiden Aspekte Täuschung und symbolische Di-
stanz durch den Betrachter im Rahmen des Gebrauchs. In anderen Fällen, wie dem der 
virtuellen Institute, sind immersive Bilder nur für bestimmte Teilaufgaben sinnvoll.  
5.4 Eine noch peripherere Verwendung des Ausdrucks „Bild“ liegt bei mentalen Bildern 
vor. Ob die Bildwissenschaft hier überhaupt noch zuständig ist, bzw. ob die Computer-
visualistik helfen kann, ist auf den ersten Blick eher zweifelhaft. 
5.4.1 Ein typisches Beispiel für die Rede von mentalen Bildern bieten referenzsemantische 
Erklärungen des Verstehens von Berichten über weit entfernte räumliche Gegebenhei-
ten. 
5.4.2 Ein kurzer Exkurs über die kognitive Funktion von mentalen Bildern eröffnet trotz fun-
damentaler Unterschiede eine große Ähnlichkeit in der Struktur des Redens über Bilder 
bzw. über mentale Bilder, d.h., zwischen den beiden Begriffen.  
5.4.3 Als Beispiel wird die Architektur eines Systems kurz skizziert, das die Argumente des 
Erklärungsansatzes des Verstehens räumlicher Berichte mittels Bildvorstellungen ex-
emplifiziert. Dieser Entwurf wurde im System ANTLIMA praktisch umgesetzt, um ein 
referenzsemantisches Hörermodell zu implementieren. 
5.4.4 Insgesamt gesehen können wesentliche Elemente der generischen Datenstruktur »Bild« 
deshalb auch in Aufgabenstellungen zu mentalen Bildern Anwendung finden, weil sich 
die Informatik vor allem mit Begriffen beschäftigt, nämlich in der Gestalt abstrakter 
Datentypen. Mindestens die begrifflichen Zusammenhänge, die syntaktischen und se-
mantischen Aspekte von »Bild« betreffen, strukturieren auch die Rede von mentalen 
Bildern. 
6. Zusammenfassung und Perspektiven 
6.1 Kehren wir zuletzt zu der Argumentation aus Kapitel 1 und dem Ziel der ganzen Unter-
suchung zurück: Der Zweck einer genauen und umfassenden Analyse der wesentlichen 
Bestandteile der Datenstruktur um den Datentyp »Bild« und ihrer Anwendungsbedin-
gungen bestand darin, den Kern der sich gerade herausbildenden Computervisualistik, 
der Bildwissenschaft der Informatik, bereitzustellen. 
6.2 Ein wichtiges Element hin zu einer institutionalisierten Computervisualistik besteht dar-
in, eine entsprechende Ausbildung anzubieten.  
6.2.1 Hierin nimmt die Magdeburger Universität die Führungsrolle ein. Im Licht der voran-
gegangenen Untersuchung wird kurz die Struktur des Studiengangs Computervisualistik 
dargestellt. 
6.2.2 In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage, ob bzw. inwiefern sich der Studiener-
folg durch einen Zugangstest abschätzen läßt. Besonders die Fähigkeit zur Raum-
vorstellung wird hierbei von Psychologen ins Auge gefaßt, ein Parameter, der allerdings 
in hohem Maße geschlechtsabhängig ist.  
6.2.3 Aus diesem Grund werden die Ergebnisse einer ersten empirischen Studie vorgestellt, 
bei der Computervisualistik-Studierende als eine der wenigen berichteten Gruppen ohne 
signifikante Geschlechtsunterschiede bei der Raumvorstellung hervortraten. 
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6.3 Die vorliegende Arbeit kann nicht mehr sein als eine grobe Landkarte mit wenigen, auf-
fälligen Landmarken, die der zukünftigen Forschung im Rahmen einer einheitlichen 
Computervisualistik im Überlappungsbereich von Informatik und allgemeiner Bildwis-
senschaft Orientierungshilfen geben soll. Es wird der Hoffnung Ausdruck gegeben, daß 
die Arbeit in diesem Sinne erfolgreich wirken möge. 
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